

# CATEGORY 1

## REGULATOR INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9604180325      DOC.DATE: 96/04/11      NOTARIZED: NO      DOCKET #  
 FACIL:50-316 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Indiana M 05000316  
 AUTH.NAME      AUTHOR AFFILIATION  
 HODGE,W.      Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana & Michigan Ele  
 BLIND,A.A.      Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana & Michigan Ele  
 RECIP.NAME      RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 96-004-00:on 960312,fire seal found to have been  
 inoperable for extended period of time w/o compensatory  
 actions.Caused of event could not be determined.Established  
 hourly fire watach patrol for seal W9197.W/960411 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T      COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 4  
 TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

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American Electric Power  
Cook Nuclear Plant  
One Cook Place  
Bridgman, MI 49105  
616 465 5901



April 11, 1996

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Rockville, Maryland 20852

Operating Licenses DPR-74  
Docket No. 50-316

Document Control Manager:

In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Report System, the following report is being submitted:

96-004-00

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'A. A. Blind'.

A. A. Blind  
Site Vice President

/clc

Attachment

c: H. J. Miller, Region III  
E. E. Fitzpatrick  
P. A. Barrett  
R. F. Kroeger  
M. A. Bailey - Ft. Wayne  
S. J. Brewer  
M. R. Padgett  
G. Charnoff, Esq.  
D. Hahn  
Records Center, INPO  
NRC Resident Inspector

9604180325 960411  
PDR ADOCK 05000316  
S PDR

A handwritten signature in dark ink, possibly reading 'J. E. 221'.

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)  
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 2DOCKET NUMBER (2)  
05000 316

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## TITLE (4)

Fire Seal Found To Have Been Inoperable For Extended Period of Time Without Compensatory Actions

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
03	12	96	96	-- 004 --	00	04	11	96	None	
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER

OPERATING MODE (9)	1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) (Check one or more) (11)				
POWER LEVEL (10)	100	20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	73.71(b)
		20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(c)
		20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(4)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	OTHER
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

## LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Walt Hodge, Plant Protection Superintendent	616/465-5901, x3370

## COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

## SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES	X	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

## ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On March 12, 1996, with Unit Two in Mode 1, at approximately 1330 hours, an employee noted that fire seal W9197, located in the wall which separates the Unit 2 CD Diesel Generator Room from the Diesel Generator Corridor, was damaged. It was determined that the amount of foam missing rendered the seal inoperable. Based on the condition of the wall penetration it was also determined that the damage to the seal was a pre-existing condition, which meant that the seal had been inoperable for an unknown length of time without the Technical Specification required compensatory actions established. This is reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

Upon discovering that seal W9197 was in an inoperable configuration, compensatory actions were established in the form of an hourly fire watch patrol. The seal was repaired and returned to operable status at 0940 hours on March 15, 1996. The cause of this event could not be determined.

A technical evaluation of the condition concluded that defense-in-depth fire protection adequately protected the fire safety of the plant. At no time was the health or safety of the public in jeopardy.

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 2		0500 316		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL	REVISION	2 OF 3
				96	-- 004 --	00	

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

#### Conditions Prior to Event

Unit 2 was in Mode 1, Power Operation, at 100 percent Rated Thermal Power

#### Description of Event

On March 12, 1996, with Unit Two in Mode 1, at approximately 1330 hours, an employee noted that fire seal W9197, located in the wall which separates the CD Diesel Generator Room from the Diesel Generator Corridor, was damaged. The employee who discovered this condition was a Plant Quality Control technician, trained to perform inspections of fire seals to determine operability. The employee performed a complete inspection of seal W9197 at the time of discovery and determined that the extent of damage rendered the seal inoperable. The fireproofing foam which functions as the seal was missing. The dimensions of the missing foam was approximately one and one half inches by two inches running the full depth, twenty four inches, of the seal. The technician also documented that this appeared to be a pre-existing condition. This was based on the interior of the wall penetration having a light coating of paint spray. Due to the presence of paint spray, the seal is believed to have been in this condition for an unknown length of time without the Technical Specification required compensatory actions established.

An inspection of 100 percent of the fire seals was undertaken in 1992. Any seals found to be in a degraded condition were declared inoperable, and were subsequently repaired in the appropriate manner. Seal W9197 is known to have been operable as of December 1992.

Plant policy was implemented in February 1995 requiring all records pertaining to fire seal work be retained in a central location. Since this time frame, no records indicate work being performed to this particular seal. It was therefore concluded that the damage to the seal occurred after December 1992.

#### Cause of Event

The cause of this event could not be determined. It was not possible to determine why the seal was damaged and left in this condition without compensatory actions established.

A 10 percent sample of all fire seals is conducted on an 18 month basis. This seal has not been included in the sampling program to date. The seal is not visible from the floor of the Diesel Generator room, and was only accessible in this case because scaffolding had been erected in the room for work. It is not expected that the damage to the seal would have been discovered by casual observation.

## LICENSEE EVENT CONTINUATION

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104  
EXPIRES 5/31/95

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
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TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Analysis of Event

This event is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73, paragraph (a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

Fire seal W9197 is located in the wall which separates the Unit 2 CD Diesel Generator, Fire Zone #18, from the Diesel Generator Corridor, Fire Zone #85. The CD Diesel Generator Room is equipped with thermistor heat detectors which were operable at the time of discovery. The Diesel Generator Corridor is equipped with ionization detectors, which were operable at the time of discovery. In the event of either detection system being declared inoperable, compensatory actions would have been established in the form of an hourly fire watch patrol.

A technical evaluation of the condition concluded that a fire would not propagate between Fire Zone (FZ) 18 and FZ 85 which are on either side of the inoperable fire seal. The following reasons were noted:

1. Any fire in Zones 18 or 85 would be detected by the automatic detectors, heat or ionization type, respectively, while the fire was very small.
2. A fire in FZ 18 would be effectively extinguished by the automatic total flooding CO2 system.
3. A fire in FZ 85 would be effectively extinguished by the automatic wet pipe sprinkler system.
4. Manual fire fighting equipment is readily available for use by the fire brigade.
5. Horizontal propagation of fire through the inoperable seal is not likely. This is based on the lack of significant combustible materials present on either side of the seal in conjunction with no exposed combustibles traversing the seal.

It was concluded that the defense-in-depth fire protection provided in these areas adequately protected the fire safety of the Plant. At no time was the health or safety of the public endangered.

Corrective Actions

Upon discovering that seal W9197 was in an inoperable configuration, compensatory actions were established in the form of an hourly fire watch patrol. The seal was repaired and returned to operable status at 0940 hours on March 15, 1996.

Failed Component Identification

N/A

Previous Similar Events

None