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AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
NICHOLS,W. Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana & Michigan Ele
BLIND,A.A. Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana & Michigan Ele
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 95-005-00:on 950728,lack of communication during bus deenergization resulted in unexpected turbine driven auxiliary feedpump start.Pump was secured from svc after being auto started & declared inoperable.W/950914 ltr.

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PRIORITY 1 DOCUMENT

Indiana Michigan
Power Company
Cook Nuclear Plant
One Cook Place
Bridgman, MI 49106
616 465 5901

INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER

September 14, 1995

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Rockville, Maryland 20852

Operating Licenses DPR-58
Docket No. 50-315

Document Control Manager:

In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Report System, the following report is being submitted:

95-005-00

Sincerely,

A. Alan Blind

A. A. Blind
Plant Manager

/clc

Attachment

c: H. J. Miller, Region III
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NRC FORM 366 (5-92)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 5/31/95

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 1	05000 315	1 OF 3

TITLE (4)
Lack of Communication During Bus Deenergization Results in Unexpected Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedpump Start

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT NUMBER (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000
07	28	95	95	-- 005 --	00	09	14	95	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	1
POWER LEVEL (10)	57

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)

	20.402(b)		20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)
	20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
	20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
W. Nichols, Operations Superintendent	616/465-5901, x2536

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)			EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X	NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On July 28, 1995, with Unit 1 in Mode 3 and preparations underway for repair work on the 101AB startup transformer, the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump (TDAFP) unexpectedly started on an automatic Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) signal. The pump was immediately secured.

The TDAFP start was determined to be the result of undervoltage conditions introduced as part of the transformer repair work when two of the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) buses were deenergized. The pump was restored to operable status after power was restored to the buses. The deenergization of the buses was part of the planned evolution, however, the automatic start of the TDAFP had not been identified as an expected occurrence during the pre-job briefings due to lack of communication between Operations management and the Control Room crew.

Based on the available information, this event was originally determined to not be reportable under either 10CFR50.72 or 10CFR50.73. However, the event was later reevaluated and determined to be reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv), as an ESF actuation.

This event has minimal safety significance as it resulted from planned maintenance and was not indicative of a degradation in the level of safety of the plant or a deterioration of plant conditions. At no time was the health or safety of the public in jeopardy.

Conditions Prior to Event

Unit 1 was in Mode 3, Hot Standby

Event Description

On July 28, 1995, preparations were underway for repair work on the Unit 1 101AB startup transformer. These plans included removing power from the 4 KV balance of plant buses, reenergizing them from the Unit 1 AB Diesel Generator, and then removing power from the A and B Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) buses in order to facilitate the repairs.

Prior to execution the effects of the plan were discussed. The main concerns were the expected Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedpump (TDAFP) auto start on undervoltage from the RCP buses and the potential for the RCP bus underfrequency relays to cause the remaining Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) to trip. The TDAFP auto start was discussed by Shift and Operations management, but the possible underfrequency trip of the RCPs received significantly more attention.

When the plan was executed and the balance of plant buses powered from the Diesel Generator, the RCP buses were deenergized one at a time. After the second RCP bus was deenergzied the TDAFP auto started due to the standing undervoltage condition on the A and B RCP buses.

Although Shift and Operations management had discussed the expected TDAFP auto start, the Control Room crew had not been briefed and did not expect the generation of the ESF signal or the start of the TDAFP.

Cause of Event

This event is attributable to lack of communications between Operations management and the Control Room crew. The expected TDAFP auto start had been discussed extensively by off-shift personnel, but the pertinent information was not conveyed to the crew during the pre-job briefing.

Analysis of Event

This event was determined to be reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv), as an unexpected ESF actuation.

This event has minimal safety significance as it resulted from planned maintenance and was not indicative of a degradation in the level of safety of the plant or a deterioration of plant conditions. At no time was the health or safety of the public in jeopardy.

Based on the available information, this event was originally determined to not be reportable under either

10CFR50.72 or 10CFR50.73. However, the event was reevaluated in August of 1995 and determined to be reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv), as an unexpected ESF actuation. A red phone call was made on August 17, 1995, in accordance with 10CFR72 reporting requirements. This LER is being submitted within 30 days of the red phone call, but does exceed the 30 day submittal period from the date of the initiating event.

Corrective Actions

The TDAFP was secured from service after it auto started and declared inoperable. The pump was restored to standby, operable status after power was restored to the 4 KV balance of plant buses and the plant lineup restored to normal.

The plant document which governs voluntary entry into Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) will be revised to require that possible ESF/SSPS actuations be identified prior to the start of the evolution.

Failed Component Identification

None

Similar Events

None