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 FACIL: 50-316 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Indiana M 05000316
 AUTH. NAME: AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 WIEBE, J.S. Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana & Michigan Ele
 BLIND, A.A. Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana & Michigan Ele
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 93-009-00: on 930928, Tech Spec fire door made inoperable.
 Cause of event cannot be determined w/any degree of
 certainty. Stanchion removed from doorway. W/931028 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 5
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Indiana Michigan
Power Company
Cook Nuclear Plant
One Cook Place
Bridgman, MI 49106
616 465 5901



October 28, 1993

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Rockville, Maryland 20852

Operating Licenses DPR-74
Docket No. 50-316

Document Control Manager:

In accordance with the criteria established by
10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Report System,
the following report is being submitted:

93-009-00

Sincerely,

A. A. Blind

A. A. Blind
Plant Manager

/sb

Attachment

c: J. B. Martin, Region III
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PDR ADOCK 05000316
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 1 6 1 OF 0 4										PAGE (3) 1 OF 04			
TITLE (4) Technical Specification Fire Door Made Inoperable Without Proper Compensatory Action Being Taken Due to Personnel Error																							
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)													
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES					DOCKET NUMBER(S)									
0	9	2	8	9	3	9	3	0	0	9	0	0	1	0	2	8	9	3	0 5 0 0 0				
OPERATING MODE (9) 1			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																				
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 7 5			20.402(b)				20.406(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)								
			20.406(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)								
			20.406(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vi)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)								
			20.406(a)(1)(iii)				X 50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)												
			20.406(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)												
			20.406(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)												
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																							
NAME Joel S. Wiebe - Safety and Assessment Superintendent												TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 6 1 6 4 6 5 - 5 9 0 1											
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																							
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS													
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR							
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO											

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On September 28, 1993, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 (Power Operation), at approximately 1315 hours, an employee noted that the fire door to the Unit 2 NESW Valve Area was standing open with a stanchion installed between the door and the door frame (in the doorway). This condition makes the fire door inoperable. It was verified that there was no one in the area and the NESW Valve Area was not being toured by fire watch personnel. The last time that the fire door was known to be unobstructed was at 0715 hours on September 28, 1993, at which time the Fire Brigade was in the area and performing their daily fire door tours. The exact time when the fire door was blocked open could not be determined; therefore, it must be assumed that the door could have been inoperable for approximately 6 hours with no compensatory measures in place.

For immediate corrective action, the stanchion was removed from the doorway.

A technical evaluation of the condition concluded that defense-in-depth fire protection would have mitigated any fire spread between the affected fire zones.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

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FACILITY NAME (1) Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 1 6	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		9 3	— 0 0 9	— 0 0	0 2	OF	0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

Unit 2 (U-2) - in Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Description of Event

On September 28, 1993, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 (Power Operation), at approximately 1315 hours, an employee noted that Fire Door 2-DR-AUX386 to the NESW Valve Area was being blocked open with a stanchion installed in the doorway. This fire door is normally open and will need a clear and unobstructed path to swing closed. It was verified that there was no one in the area and the NESW Valve Area was not being toured by fire watch personnel.

Investigation of the event revealed that Fire Brigade personnel had inspected this door earlier that day in support of the daily fire door tours. The inspection was completed and the Fire Brigade noted the door operable. This is the last time that the fire door was known to be operable. The exact time when the fire door was blocked open cannot be determined; therefore, it must be assumed that the door could have been inoperable for approximately 6 hours (0715 hours to 1315 hours) with no compensatory measures in place.

Fire Door 2-DR-AUX386 is located in the wall which separates the NESW Valve Area (Fire Zone 34B) from the Unit 2 Quadrant 2 Penetration Cable Tunnel (Fire Zone 39). The Unit 2 Quadrant 2 Penetration Cable Tunnel is equipped with early warning type fire detectors which were operable during the time in question. The NESW Valve Area is equipped with ionization-type fire detectors which were operable during the time in question.

Fire Door 2-DR-AUX386 is normally held in the open position by a CO₂ pop-off device. With the stanchion in the way, the door could not have automatically closed upon release of the CO₂ pop-off device or by the melting of the thermal link. The inability of the door to close also would have made the manually-actuated CO₂ System protecting Fire Zone 39 inoperable.

Cause of Event

The cause of this event cannot be determined with any degree of certainty. The individual responsible for leaving the fire door blocked open is unknown. Without the ability to question the responsible individual, it was not possible to determine why the fire door was left in an inoperable configuration or how long it existed under this condition.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Analysis of Event

This report is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73, Paragraph (a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

A technical evaluation of the condition concluded that a fire could have propagated between Fire Zone 39 (Unit 2 Quadrant 2 Penetration Cable Tunnel) and Fire Zone 34B (NESW Valve Area) which are on either side of the inoperable fire door. However, the technical evaluation states that the following factors would have mitigated the spread of fire:

1. The combustible loading within Fire Zone 39 has an equivalent fire severity of less than 24 minutes. This combustible loading is considered low. The combustible loading within Fire Zone 34B has an equivalent fire severity of less than 5 minutes. This combustible loading is considered low.
2. Any fire in Fire Zone 39 or 34B would be detected by the automatic ionization and/or infrared type fire detectors while the fire is small, alerting the control room to initiate Fire Brigade activities.
3. A floor-based fire within Fire Zone 39 would be slowed down by the manually-actuated fixed pipe total flooding CO₂ System if the Fire Brigade deemed it necessary. If the door was manually closed, the CO₂ System could be dumped again and the fire would be adequately suppressed. Multiple dumps of CO₂ are available in the plant's 17-ton CO₂ tank.
4. The subject fire door would perform as designed, provided the door was manually shut (the stanchion did not damage the door).
5. There are no significant ignition sources present.
6. Manual fire fighting equipment is readily available for use by the Fire Brigade.

Therefore, it is concluded that the defense-in-depth fire protection provided in these areas would have been able to mitigate any fire spread between fire zones.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Corrective Actions

Upon discovering that Fire Door 2-DR-AUX386 was in an inoperable configuration, the stanchion was removed from the doorway and the door was free to close without obstructions.

As previously stated, the cause of the event could not be determined. Without knowing why the individual left the door in an inoperable configuration, the effectiveness of any new preventive measures becomes suspect. All reasonable preventive measures have already been taken to ensure that Fire Door 2-DR-AUX386 is left in an acceptable configuration. These measures include the posting of reminder signs in prominent locations to remind personnel not to block this normally open fire door.

Failed Components Identified

None

Previous Similar Events

316/93-001