

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

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1

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	M	I	D	C	C	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5
7	8	14						15	25											26	30				57	CAT	58		
		LICENSEE CODE							LICENSE NUMBER												LICENSE TYPE								

CON'T

0 1 7 8 REPORT SOURCE 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | UNIT WAS OPERATING AT 100% POWER WHEN IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CONTAINMENT UPPER AND
0 3 | LOWER VOLUME CTS HEADERS ON THE EAST TRAIN WERE ISOLATED IN VIOLATION OF T.S. 3.6.2.1
0 4 | THE ISOLATION VALVES WERE IMMEDIATELY OPENED. THE WEST CTS HEADER WAS OPERABLE.
0 5 | THERE WAS NO EFFECT ON THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC. (SEE SUPPLEMENT)
0 6 |
0 7 |
0 8 |

SYSTEM CODE S B (11)		CAUSE CODE A (12)		CAUSE SUBCODE B (13)		COMPONENT CODE V A L V E S (14)		COMP. SUBCODE (15)		VALVE SUBCODE X (16)	
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 0 9 (17)		EVENT YEAR 8 0 (21) (22)		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. (23) 0 3 3 (24) (26)		OCCURRENCE CODE (27) / 0 1 (28) (29)		REPORT TYPE (30) L (31)		REVISION NO. (32) 0 (33)	
ACTION TAKEN X (18)		FUTURE ACTION H (19)		EFFECT ON PLANT Z (20)		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z (21)		HOURS (22) 0 0 0 (23) (24) (25) (26)		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED (27) Y (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) (65) (66) (67) (68) (69) (70) (71) (72) (73) (74) (75) (76) (77) (78) (79) (80) (81) (82) (83) (84) (85) (86) (87) (88) (89) (90) (91) (92) (93) (94) (95) (96) (97) (98) (99) (100)	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | AUX. EQUIP. OPERATOR DID NOT PERFORM CORRECT VALVE LINEUP IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRE-
1 1 | SCRIBED PROCEDURE FOR RESTORING CTS FLOW PATH TO NORMAL AFTER IT HAD BEEN ISOLATED
1 2 | TO PERFORM SURVEILLANCE TESTING. RETRAINING OF ALL OPERATING SHIFTS WAS CONDUCTED.
1 3 | (SEE SUPPLEMENT)
1 4 |
7 8 9 80

FACILITY STATUS						% POWER						OTHER STATUS						METHOD OF DISCOVERY						DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION											
1	5		E	(28)	1	0	0	(29)	NA	(30)	A	(31)	OPERATOR TOUR OBSERVATION										(32)												
ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE												AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY												LOCATION OF RELEASE											
1	6		Z	(33)	Z	(34)	NA	(35)			NA												(36)												
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER												TYPE DESCRIPTION																							
1	7		0	0	0	(37)	Z	(38)			NA																								
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER												DESCRIPTION																							
1	8		0	0	0	(40)					NA																								
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE												DESCRIPTION																							
1	9		Z	(42)						NA																									
PUBLICITY ISSUED												DESCRIPTION												NRC USE ONLY											
2	0			(44)	8101050 546																														

NAME OF PREPARER R. S. KEITH

PHONE: 616 - 465-5901 X 1313

Supplement to 10

Manual Isolation Valves CTS-124E and CTS-128E on the discharge of the East CTS Heat Exchanger were found shut at 0640 on December 14, 1980. The two valves were opened by 0700 the same date.

Investigation revealed these valves had been shut on December 4, 1980 at about 1000 hours to perform the surveillance test on East CTS Pump. The valves are shut to prevent inadvertent spray to the containment while testing the pump. After pump testing was complete, an Auxiliary Equipment Operator was assigned to restore the flow path to normal. CTS-124E and CTS-128E are required to be locked and sealed open in the flow path. The Auxiliary Equipment Operator locked and sealed CTS-124E and CTS-128E in the shut position, but initialled the Checkoff Sheet as having locked and sealed the two valves in the open position.

At the time of the event, Unit 2 was in Mode 5 preparing to heat up and start up. The heatup and startup were completed and the Unit taken to 100% power. This is also a violation of T.S. 3.0.4 for entering the next higher modes of operation with the East CTS headers inoperable.

A review was made of all activities taking place on Unit 2 since December 4, 1980. This review revealed the West CTS headers were operable at all times while the East CTS headers were inoperable. The RHR East and West spray headers to the Containment upper volume were also available for use during this time if the need had arisen.

Supplement to 27

To prevent recurrence of the event, the Operations Superintendent met with each operating shift on December 19 and 20, 1980 to reemphasize the absolute requirement for making valve lineups in accordance with the procedure and, if for some reason this could not be done, to not sign off the procedure as completed but to bring the discrepancy to the attention of the Shift Supervisors so that a resolution could be made. It was also pointed out that we have an obligation to protect the health and safety of ourselves, our fellow workers, and the general public. We can only fulfill this obligation by operating the plant in accordance with prescribed procedures and the Technical Specifications.

Additionally, Plant Manager Instruction, PMI-2110, had been revised by temporary sheet on December 9, 1980 to require independent verification of restoration of valve lineups on all ECCS equipment prior to declaring operable after maintenance or surveillance testing. Had this been in effect on December 4, 1980, this event would not have happened.

The Auxiliary Equipment Operator involved in this event was terminated effective December 17, 1980.

10-10-68

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