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ACCESSION NBR: 9303090565 DOC. DATE: 93/03/04 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
FACIL: 50-316 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Indiana M 05000316
AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
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RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 93-001-00: on 930202, discovered that TS compensatory
action not met due to personnel error. Safety pins pulled &
fire door was closed. W/930304 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 5
TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

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EXTERNAL:	EG&G BRYCE, J.H	2 2	L ST LOBBY WARD	1 1
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Indiana Michigan
Power Company
Cook Nuclear Plant
One Cook Place
Bridgman, MI 49106
616 465 5901



March 4, 1993

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Rockville, Maryland 20852

Operating Licenses DPR-74
Docket No. 50-316

Document Control Manager:

In accordance with the criteria established by
10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Report System, the
following report is being submitted:

93-001-00

Sincerely,

A. A. Blind
Plant Manager

/sb

Attachment

c: A. B. Davis, Region III
E. E. Fitzpatrick
P. A. Barrett
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B. Walters - Ft. Wayne
NRC Resident Inspector
W. M. Dean - NRC
J. G. Keppler
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9303090565 930304
PDR ADOCK 05000316
S PDR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 60.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 1 6 1 OF 0 4 PAGE (3)

TITLE (4) Technical Specification Compensatory Action not Met Due to Personnel Error
After the Blocking Open of a Fire Door

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)							
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)						
0	2	0	2	9	3	9	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	2	0	2	9	3	9	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9)	20.402(b)	20.406(e)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
1	20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.73(a)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Joel S. Wiebe - Safety and Assessment Superintendent	AREA CODE 6 1 6 4 6 5 - 1 5 9 0 1 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
X					

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On February 2, 1993, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 (Power Operation), at approximately 1935 hours an employee noted that the fire door to the Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room was standing open with the safety pins installed in the door tracks. This condition makes the fire door inoperable. It was verified that there was no one in the area and the Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room was not being toured by fire watch personnel. The last time that the fire door was known to be closed was at 1422 hours on February 2, 1993, at which time the Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room was removed from a fire watch tour after some work was completed in the area. The exact time when the fire door was left open could not be determined, therefore it must be assumed that the door could have been inoperable for approximately 5 hours with no compensatory measures in place.

For immediate corrective action, the safety pins were pulled and the fire door was closed.

A technical evaluation of the condition concluded that defense-in-depth fire protection adequately protected the fire safety of the plant.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE (3)

Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

Unit 2 (U-2) - in Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Description of Event

On February 2, 1993, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 (Power Operation), at approximately 1935 hours an employee noted that fire door (EIIS/NF-DR) 2-DR-AUX314-244 to the Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room was standing open with the safety pins installed in the door tracks. This fire door is a roll up type door which becomes inoperable when the safety pins installed. It was verified that there was no one in the area and the Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room was not being toured by fire watch personnel.

Investigation of the event revealed that fire watch personnel had been in the Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room earlier that day in support of fire detector (EIIS/IC) testing. The work was completed and the fire watch was released at approximately 1422 hours. At that time the safety pins were removed and the door was placed in the closed position. This is the last time that the fire door was known to be closed. The exact time when the fire door was left open cannot be determined, therefore it must be assumed that the door could have been inoperable for approximately 5 hours (1423 hrs. to 1935 hrs.) with no compensatory measures in place.

Fire door 2-DR-AUX314-244 is located in the wall which separates the Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room (Fire Zone 20) from the Turbine Building (EIIS/NM) 591' elevation (Fire Zone 85). The Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room is equipped with ionization type fire detectors which were operable during the time in question. The Turbine Building 591' elevation is equipped with a wet pipe sprinkler system (EIIS/KP-SRKN) that was operable during the time in question.

Fire door 2-DR-AUX314-244 is the only access and egress for fire zone 20. This door is mounted on the inside of the door opening with the manual opening mechanism also on the inside. The door is equipped with safety pins that, in the event of a fire, would hold the door open at 5 feet above the floor. This would allow an injured person, who cannot manually operate the door, a way to exit while also reducing the overall size of the opening between fire zones.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 1 6	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR 9 3	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 0 0 1	REVISION NUMBER 0 0			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Cause of Event

The cause of this event cannot be determined with any degree of certainty. The individual responsible for leaving the fire door open is unknown. Without the ability to question the responsible individual it was not possible to determine why the fire door was left in an inoperable configuration or how long it existed under this condition.

Analysis of Event

This report is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73, paragraph (a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

A technical evaluation of the condition concluded that a fire would not propagate between the Fire Zone 20 (Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room) and Fire Zone 85 (591' elev. Turbine Bldg.), which are on either side of the inoperable fire door. The following reasons were noted:

1. The combustible loading within Fire Zone 20 has an equivalent fire severity of less than two minutes. The combustible loading within Fire Zone 85 has an equivalent fire severity of less than five minutes. These combustible loadings are considered very low.
2. Any fire in Fire Zone 20 or 85 would be detected by the automatic ionization type fire detectors or automatic wet pipe sprinklers while the fire was small.
3. A fire within Fire Zone 85 would be effectively extinguished by the automatic wet pipe sprinkler system.
4. There are no significant ignition sources or fixed fire exposure hazards to threaten the degraded fire door. This condition makes propagation of fire through this opening extremely unlikely.
5. Manual fire fighting equipment is readily available for use by the fire brigade.
6. The subject fire door would perform as designed provided the door was manually shut.

It is concluded that the defense-in-depth fire protection provided in these areas adequately protected the fire safety of the plant.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3160-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 1 6 9 3 — 0 0 1 — 0 0	LER NUMBER (6)		PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

Corrective Actions

Upon discovering that fire door 2-DR-AUX314-244 was in an inoperable configuration, the safety pins were removed from the door tracks and the door was closed.

As previously stated, the cause of the event could not be determined. Without knowing why the individual left the door in an inoperable configuration, the effectiveness of any new preventive measures becomes suspect. All reasonable preventive measures have already been taken to ensure that fire door 2-DR-AUX314-244 is left in an acceptable configuration upon exiting the Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room. These measures include attaching chains to the safety pins that block the door area requiring that personnel duck under the chains if the pins are not removed and the posting of reminder signs in prominent locations to remind personnel to remove the safety pins from the door tracks upon leaving the area.

The last occurrence of a similar event was on March 3, 1986. While plant management does not take this occurrence lightly, the amount of time lapsed between these events would not indicate the existence of an adverse trend.

Plant Management is aware of the value of "Self Checking" which may have been able to prevent the occurrence of this event, and has recently begun training all plant personnel in the methods of "Self Checking". Additionally, in order to heighten personnel awareness of the significance of events of this nature, an article will be placed in an internal plant publication.

Failed Components Identified

None

Previous Similar Events

Ler 316/86-007