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ACCESSION NBR:9102120111 DOC.DATE: 91/02/04 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
FACIL:50-315 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Indiana & 05000315
AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
SAMPSON,J.R. Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana & Michigan Ele
BLIND,A.A. Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana & Michigan Ele
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 91-001-00:on 910112,discovered that fire hose station, use as backup compensatory backup fire suppression capability,isolated by red tag clearance,placed on 901230. Fire hose rerouted to transformer room.W/910204 ltr.

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TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

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INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER

February 4, 1991

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Rockville, Maryland 20852

Operating Licenses DPR-58
Docket No. 50-315

Document Control Manager:

In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Reporting System, the following report is being submitted:

91-001-00

Sincerely,

for A.A. Blind
Plant Manager

AAB:sb

Attachment

c: D.H. Williams, Jr.
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NRC FORM 366 (6-89) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 4/30/92
ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 1 5	1 OF 0 4

TITLE (4) TS 3.7.9.5 Required Fire Hose Station Inoperable without Required Backup Fire Suppression Hose Due to Inadequate Administrative Controls

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 1	1 2	9 1	9 1	0 0 1	0 0	0 2	0 4	9 1		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	3	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
J. R. Sampson, Operations Department Superintendent	6 1 6 4 6 5 - 5 9 0 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On January 12, 1991, at 2115, it was identified that a fire hose station (FHC) being used as compensatory backup fire suppression was isolated by a red tag clearance. On December 30, 1990, the FHC for the pressurizer (PZR) heater (HTR) transformer (XFMR) room was isolated by a clearance and a backup fire suppression hose was routed from FHC-30. On January 12, a request to remove an additional section of the fire protection water system from service, which included FHC-30, was approved. The red tag clearance for this additional work was placed at about 0400 on January 12. It was identified at about 2115 on January 12 that FHC-30 had been isolated while it was serving as a backup fire suppression. A second fire hose was routed from an operable FHC to the PZR HTR XFMR room at about 2130.

This event was caused by inadequate administrative controls to assure fire impairment reviews were based on the current status of the fire protection system. A memo was issued on January 18 to address the lessons learned from this event. The administrative controls will be revised by February 15, 1991, to add assurance that fire impairment reviews will be based on the current status of the fire protection system.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

Unit One in Mode Three (Hot Standby)
Unit Two in Mode One (Power Operation) at 100% Power

Description of Event

On January 12, 1991, at 2115, it was identified that a fire hose station (FHC)(EIIS/KP-HYD) being used as compensatory backup fire suppression capability was isolated by a red tag clearance.

A red tag clearance was placed on a portion of the fire protection water system (EIIS/KP) on December 30, 1990, which isolated multiple FHCs and deluge valves (EIIS/KP-XCV). The appropriate Technical Specification (TS) compensatory actions were initiated at that time and included routing a backup fire hose from FHC-30 to the pressurizer heater transformer room as required by TS 3.7.9.5.

On January 11, 1991, a Fire Protection Impairment Request (Operations Standing Order [OSO] 071, Attachment 1) to isolate an additional section of the fire protection water system for repair of a transformer (EIIS/EL-XFMR) deluge valve was approved by the Plant fire protection coordinator. A red tag clearance was written by a licensed senior reactor operator (SRO) to isolate the deluge valve. The boundary for this work involved closing valves which resulted in also isolating the supply to FHC-30. A second SRO reviewed and approved the clearance.

The clearance for the transformer deluge valve repair was placed on January 12, 1991, at 0403, by a licensed reactor operator (RO) and included placing an out-of-service tag on FHC-30. The placement of this clearance was verified by a second RO at 0512.

At 2115 on January 12, 1991, the SRO who reviewed and approved the transformer deluge valve clearance identified that FHC-30 had been isolated while being used as TS 3.7.9.5 required backup fire suppression. This problem was identified when the SRO observed the hose laid out from FHC-30 to the pressurizer heater transformer room during a walkdown of the clearance boundaries in an attempt to locate the source of isolation point leakby.

Cause of Event

The cause of this event was that the administrative controls did not assure that the fire impairment reviews were based on the current status of the fire protection system. The fire protection review for the work which required FHC-30 to be used as backup fire suppression was completed by an SRO at a time when the fire protection coordinator was not on site. The fire protection coordinator identified that FHC-30 would be isolated for the transformer deluge valve, but he was not cognizant that FHC-30 was being used as backup fire suppression.

Contributing to this event was the failure of the SROs writing and approving the transformer deluge valve clearance to verify that FHC-30 was not being used. Also contributing to this event was the failure of the ROs to recognize that FHC-30 was being used as backup fire suppression when they observed the hose laid out while placing and verifying the out-of-service tag for the clearance.

Analysis of Event

This event is considered reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as operation prohibited by the Plant's Technical Specifications. TS 3.7.9.5 requires the routing of an equivalent capacity fire hose within one hour when required hose station is inoperable. This action was initially satisfied, but was subsequently negated when the backup fire hose was isolated. The pressurizer heater transformer room was without the TS 3.7.9.5 required fire protection for a total of about 17 1/2 hours from about 0400 on January 12, 1991, until about 2130 on January 12, 1991, when a second backup fire hose was routed from FHC-28.

The pressurizer heater transformer room fire detection system was operable at the time of this event. Since the fire detection was operable, a fire in the room would have been promptly identified and the Plant Fire Brigade could have promptly responded to the event. Upon discovery of the out-of-service tag at FHC-30, the Plant Fire Brigade would have known that an alternate FHC would be needed. The Plant Fire Brigade could have routed a hose from FHC-28 located about 130 feet from the pressurizer heater transformer room. It is estimated that the hose from FHC-28 could have been routed within five minutes or less of identifying that FHC-30 was out of service.

(Analysis of Event Continued)

Since a fire in the pressurizer heater transformer room would have been promptly identified, the combustible loading in the room is low, and backup suppression could have been aligned within five minutes of arrival at the fire scene, it is concluded that this event did not create a significant safety concern, nor did it create a significant hazard to the health and safety of the general public.

Corrective Action

Immediate corrective action taken when the event was identified involved routing a backup fire hose from FHC-28 to the pressurizer heater transformer room at about 2130 on January 12, 1991.

A memo was issued to Operations Department personnel on January 18, 1991, to address the lessons learned from this event. The administrative controls (OSO.071) will be revised by February 15, 1991, to add assurance that fire impairment reviews will be based on the current status of the fire protection system.

Failed Component Identification

None

Previous Similar Events

None