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 SMITH,W.G. Indiana Michigan Power Co.
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SUBJECT: Special rept:on 890717-18,preventive maint conducted by
 maint personnel resulting in seven inoperable fire dampers.

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**INDIANA
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POWER**

September 8, 1989

Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit Nos. 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316
License Nos. DPR-58 and DPR-74

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control
One White Flint North
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, Maryland 20852

Attn: A.B. Davis

Dear Mr. Davis:

This special report is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.10 Action a, to inform you that 1) seven fire dampers were inoperable for longer than seven days permitted under Technical Specification 3.7.10 Action a, and that the special report required by Technical Specification 3.7.10 Action a was not submitted within thirty days as specified; and 2) that one fire barrier has been inoperable longer than the seven days allowed by Technical Specification 3.7.10 Action a.

On July 17 and 18, 1989, Maintenance department personnel conducted a preventive maintenance activity which had been developed in March, 1989. The intent of this activity was to have Maintenance inspect the plant fire dampers which were not covered by Technical Specifications. However, the preventive maintenance task sheet author incorrectly developed the task sheet from a data base of non-safety related dampers, not realizing that some of the dampers were Technical Specification related. This caused the Maintenance personnel to deal with the subject dampers in a manner which is non-conservative to Technical Specification 3.7.10. The maintenance procedure has been revised to delete the Technical Specification related dampers. The following dampers were affected:

- ° Fire damper 1-HV-ET-FD-2, located in the unit one reactor cable tunnel quadrant #4, failed its preventive


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maintenance operability test on July 17, 1989. It was restored to operability on August 2, 1989. A Fire Watch, as required by Technical Specification 3.7.10 Action a, was not posted due to an error in the preventive maintenance procedure.

- ° Fire damper 1-HV-ET-FD-4, located in the unit one reactor tunnel quadrant #4 failed its preventive maintenance operability test on July 17, 1989. It was restored to operability on August 2, 1989. A Fire Watch, as required by Technical Specification 3.7.10 Action a, was not posted due to an error in the preventive maintenance procedure.
- ° Fire damper 1-HV-TS-FD-1, located in the pressurizer heater transformer room failed its preventive maintenance operability test on July 17, 1989. Due to an error in the preventive maintenance procedure, a Fire Watch, as required by Technical Specification 3.7.10 Action a, was not posted until the error was detected on August 24, 1989. The Fire Watch remained in effect until the damper was restored to operability on September 1, 1989.
- ° Fire damper 1-HV-AS-D4, located in the auxiliary cable vault, failed its preventive maintenance operability test on July 17, 1989. Due to an error in the preventive maintenance procedure, a Fire Watch, as required by Technical Specification 3.7.10 Action a, was not posted until the error was detected on August 21, 1989. The Fire Watch remained in effect until the damper was restored to operability on August 31, 1989.
- ° Fire damper 1-HV-AS-D1A, located in the normal blowdown flash tank room, failed its preventive maintenance operability test on July 17, 1989. Due to an error in the preventive maintenance procedure, a Fire Watch, as required by Technical Specification 3.7.10 Action a, was not posted until the error was detected on August 21, 1989. The Fire Watch remained in effect until the damper was restored to operability on August 23, 1989.
- ° Fire damper 2-HV-ET-FD-3, located in the unit two reactor cable tunnel quadrant #4, failed its preventive maintenance operability test on July 18, 1989. Due to an error in the preventive maintenance procedure, a Fire Watch, as required by Technical Specification 3.7.10 Action a, was not posted until the error was detected on August 21, 1989. The Fire Watch remained in effect until the damper was restored to operability on August 21, 1989.

- ° Fire Damper 1-HV-AS-D2A, located in the hallway of the 633' level of the auxiliary building, failed its preventive maintenance operability test on July 17, 1989. Due to an error in the preventive maintenance procedure, a Fire Watch, as required by Technical Specification 3.7.10 Action a, was not posted until the error was detected on August 21, 1989. The Fire Watch remained in effect until the damper was restored to operability on September 7, 1989.
- ° A seismic gap fire seal in the unit one 4KV cable spreading area was declared inoperable on August 2, 1989 due to a tear in the gap fire seal material. It is anticipated that the seal will be repaired by September 21, 1989. A Fire Watch, as required by Technical Specification 3.7.10 Action a, was posted and will remain in effect until the gap seal is declared operable.

Respectfully,



W. G. Smith, Jr.
Plant Manager

WGS:clw

cc: D.H. Williams, Jr.
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