

SENSEE EVENT REPORT

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	M	I	D	C	C	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5		
7	8	LICENSEE CODE						14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSE TYPE				30	57	CAT		58

REPORT
SOURCE

REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 1 5 7 0 9 0 8 7 9 8 1 0 0 9 7 9 9

7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | WHILE PERFORMING ROUTINE PLANT INSPECTIONS DURING NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS, THREE
0 3 | CIRCUIT BREAKERS TO SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT WERE FOUND TO BE OPEN. EACH BREAKER
0 4 | WAS FOUND ON A SEPARATE OCCASION. THE FIRST OPEN BREAKER WAS FOUND (FOR FMO-241),
0 5 | AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FROM THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX. FEED PUMP TO STEAM GENERATOR NO. 4
0 6 | ON 09/08/79, CONTRARY TO TECH. SPEC. 3.7.1.2. THIS BREAKER HAD BEEN VERIFIED
0 7 | CLOSED 4.6 HOURS EARLIER. THE VALVE WAS IN ITS NORMAL STANDBY OPEN POSITION AND
0 8 | FLOW THROUGH IT COULD HAVE BEEN CONTROLLED BY PUMP SPEED. (CONTINUED PAGE 2)

SYSTEM CODE E B (11)		CAUSE CODE X (12)		CAUSE SUBCODE Z (13)		COMPONENT CODE Z Z Z Z Z (14)				COMP. SUBCODE Z (15)		VALVE SUBCODE Z (16)	
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 7 9 (17)		EVENT YEAR 7 9 (21)		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 4 7 (24)		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 (28)		REPORT TYPE L (30)		REVISION NO. 0 (32)			
ACTION TAKEN H (18)		FUTURE ACTION Z (19)		EFFECT ON PLANT Z (20)		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z (21)		HOURS 0 0 0 (22)		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y (23)		NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N (24)	
										PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER Z (25)		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER Z 9 9 (26)	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

ALL THREE CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE RECLOSED WHEN FOUND OPEN AND THE AFFECTED EQUIPMENT TEST OPERATED. ALL LOW HEAT TRACE CIRCUITS RECOVERED TO $\geq 145^{\circ}\text{F}$ WITHIN A 5 HOUR PERIOD. REASON FOR BREAKERS BEING OPEN COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED. A "KEEP FREE" AREA IS BEING LAID OUT ON THE FLOOR IN FRONT OF ALL MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS WITH SAFETY RELATED BREAKERS. A DIRECTIVE HAS BEEN ISSUED TO ALL PLANT (CONTINUED PAGE 2)

7		8		9		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80	
1		5		E		28		1		0		0		29		NA		30		B		31		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION		32		OPERATOR OBSERVATION		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80																							

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE

1 6 7 33 34 35 36

2 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

NA NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES										
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)						
1	7	0	0	0	(37)	Z	(38)	NA		

7		8		9		11		12		13		80	
PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION		(41)							
1	8	0	0	0	(40)	NA							
7910160473													

[illegible]

7	8	9	10	80
PUBLICATION				NRC USE ONLY
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)				

2 0 N (44) NA 68 69 80

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES:

THE SECOND OPEN BREAKER WAS TO ESF VENTILATION FAN-1 ON 09/11/79. THIS BREAKER HAD BEEN VERIFIED CLOSED 8 HOURS EARLIER. REDUNDANT ESF VENTILATION FAN-2 WAS OPERABLE AND RUNNING THIS ENTIRE PERIOD. THE THIRD OCCASION THE POWER BREAKER TO SOME OF THE "A" TRAIN HEAT TRACE CIRCUITS WAS FOUND OPEN ON 09/20/79. THIS WAS IDENTIFIED DURING NORMAL DAILY HEAT TRACE SURVEILLANCE WHEN SOME OF THE CIRCUITS OF TECH. SPEC. 3.1.2.2 WERE FOUND TO BE $<145^{\circ}\text{F}$ AND ONE CIRCUIT OF TECH. SPEC. 3.5.4.2 WAS FOUND TO BE $<145^{\circ}\text{F}$. ALL CIRCUITS HAD BEEN VERIFIED TO BE $\geq 145^{\circ}\text{F}$ ON THE PREVIOUS 24 HOUR SURVEILLANCE. THE LOWEST CIRCUIT OF TECH. SPEC. 3.1.2.2 WAS 103°F . DURING THIS TIME OF LOW TEMP. THE ALTERNATE FLOW PATH FROM THE RWST WAS OPERABLE. THE SINGLE CIRCUIT OF TECH. SPEC. 3.5.4.2 WAS AT 130°F AND THIS WAS UNDER CONSTANT RECIRCULATION FLOW.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

DEPARTMENTS AND THE CONSTRUCTION MANAGER RE-EMPHASIZING THE NEED TO CONTROL ALL WORK ACTIVITIES IN THESE "FREE AREAS".