

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of  
digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

FACILITY NAME (1)

Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000-315

PAGE (3)

1 OF 3

TITLE (4)  
Vulnerability in a Safeguard System That Could Allow Unauthorized or Undetected Access to the Protected Area

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
04	28	1999	1999	S002	00	05	28	1999	Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2	05000-316
OPERATING MODE (9)			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)							
5			20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)	
POWER LEVEL (10)			20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)	
0%			20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		X 73.71	
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER	
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A	
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)			

## LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

Dennis D. Snodgrass, Compliance Engineer

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

(616) 465-5901, X 1627

## COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

## SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X	NO	EXPECTED	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
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## ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On April 28, 1999, at approximately 1500 hours EDT, with both units in Mode 5, an opening in a wall contiguous with the Security Locker Room and the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) was discovered by the Security Operations Supervisor. At 1510 hours EDT, it was determined that this nonconformance constituted a failure, degradation or discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area or transport for which compensatory measures have not been employed and was reportable as a safeguards event pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR73, Appendix G, paragraph I(c) and 10CFR73.71(b)(1). An Emergency Notification System (ENS) report was made to NRC at 1557 hours EDT on the same day.

The apparent cause for this condition was inadequate original plant design. Upon identification of the nonconforming wall opening, compensatory measures were promptly implemented to ensure unauthorized access did not occur. Modifications are being made to the wall opening to eliminate the nonconforming conditions. Compensatory measures will remain in place until the modifications are complete.

This condition was determined to be of minimal safety significance, since security personnel continuously man the SAS.

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**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**  
**TEXT CONTINUATION**

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Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1	05000-315	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 OF 3
		1999	S002	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

**Conditions Prior To Event**

Unit 1 Mode 5 in Cold Shutdown

Unit 2 Mode 5 in Cold Shutdown

**Description Of The Event**

On April 28, 1999, at approximately 1500 hours EDT, an opening in a wall contiguous with the Security Locker Room and the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) was discovered by the Security Operations Supervisor. At 1510 hours EDT, it was determined that this nonconformance constituted a failure, degradation or discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area or transport for which compensatory measures have not been employed.

**Cause Of The Event**

The apparent cause for this event was inadequate original plant design. The investigation determined that the opening was part of original as-built condition of the SAS. Based on the available drawings, a barrier was never installed within this opening to prevent unauthorized access, and meet the Protected Area Barrier requirements for openings. The nonconforming wall opening was not readily visible from the SAS or Security Locker Room and remained undetected since original plant construction.

**Analysis Of The Event**

Commencing at approximately 1500 hours EDT April 28, 1999, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 both in Mode 5, an opening in a wall contiguous with the Security Locker Room and the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) was identified as nonconforming and vulnerable to possible compromise. The identified conditions constituted a failure degradation or discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area or transport for which compensatory measures have not been employed. This event was reported as a safeguards event pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR73, Appendix G, paragraph I(c) and 10CFR73.71(b)(1) (1 hour ENS report). An ENS report was made to the NRC Operations Center at 1557 hours EDT on April 28, 1999. This report is being made pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR73, Appendix G, paragraph I(c) and 10CFR73.71(d) (30 day report).

Compensatory measures were established by security upon identification of the wall opening vulnerabilities. Follow-up investigation of the building walls and ceiling resulted in no additional openings being discovered. This condition was determined to be of minimal safety significance, since security personnel continuously man the SAS.

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**Corrective Actions**

Compensatory measures were established by security upon identification of the wall opening vulnerabilities. These actions included immediately posting an armed security officer. After investigation of the opening, compensatory measures were downgraded to observation of the area by a security officer, securing access patrols of the affected area and monitoring the access portals by the Access Control Officer. These compensatory measures will remain in place until the wall opening is conforming.

A plant modification will install a permanent barrier in the nonconforming wall opening.

An assessment team is walking down security vital barriers as part of the Restart Readiness Assessment Program.

**Similar Events**

316/99-S001-00

