

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**(See reverse for required number of  
digits/characters for each block)ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY  
INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE  
INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY.  
FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND  
RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY  
COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION  
PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC  
20503

FACILITY NAME (1) Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000-315	PAGE (3) 1 of 1
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TITLE (4) Reactor Trip Breaker Manual Actuations During Rod Drop Testing Not Previously Reported
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EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER	
05	12	1994	1999	--	005 --	00	03	18	1999	05000-316	
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)											
OPERATING MODE (9)		3	20.2201 (b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)		
POWER LEVEL (10)		00	20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)		
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		73.71		
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)		X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER		
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		Specify in Abstract below or on NRC Form 366A		
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)				

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)										
NAME Mr. Brent D. Pogue, Licensing								TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code) (616) 465-5901 x2604		

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)					EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
X	YES	(If Yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).			NO		05	12	1999

Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On February 11, 1999, during a review of Licensee Event Reports (LER) that had been submitted by other utilities for actuations of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) during rod drop surveillance testing, engineering personnel questioned the reportability of past D. C. Cook RPS actuations during rod drop surveillance testing. In the course of performing rod drop testing, manual actuation of the reactor trip breaker had been utilized when unplanned problems have occurred during the surveillance. Upon further review, on February 16, 1999, it was determined that there were cases identified in which the manual actuation of the reactor trip breakers was not proceduralized, and therefore not pre-planned. In accordance with the reportability requirements under 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(ii) and 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(iv), these RPS actuations should have been reported, but were not. Based on this determination, an ENS notification was made on February 16, 1999, at 1808 hours in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(ii).

Preliminary investigation indicates that the cause of this event is lack of training on NRC reportability requirements that led to surveillance procedure inadequacies. Personnel involved in the surveillance did not question the reportability aspects of a manual actuation of the RPS. Immediate corrective actions will include a discussion with engineering personnel on the requirements of 10CFR50.72 and 10CFR50.73 as it applies to pre-planned manual actuation of the reactor trip breakers. Rod drop surveillance procedures will be revised to allow the trip breakers to be opened when unplanned problems occur during testing. It has been determined that there is no safety significance due to these manual actuations of the RPS or the delay in reporting the events. When unplanned problems were encountered during the rod drop surveillance, opening of the reactor trip breakers was a conservative action and was not in response to adverse plant conditions.

The root cause investigation for this event has not been completed. Additional corrective actions, including preventive actions, may be developed based on the results of the root cause investigation. Supplemental information will be provided when completed.

