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 RECIP. NAME      RECIPIENT AFFILIATION  
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SUBJECT: Special rept re listed fire barriers inoperable longer than seven days allowed by Tech Spec.

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November 13, 1989

Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit Nos. 1 and 2  
Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316  
License Nos. DPR-58 and DPR-74

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Attn: A.B. Davis

Dear Mr. Davis:

This special report is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.10 action a, to 1) inform you that the following fire barriers have been inoperable longer than the seven days allowed by Technical Specification 3.7.10 action a, and 2) provide an update regarding inoperable fire doors reported in a previous letter dated May 16, 1989..

- ° Fire barrier penetration seal W-9772, separating the Unit One Quadrant Two Pipe Tunnel (Fire Zone 12) and the Unit One West Centrifugal Charging Pump Room (Fire Zone 62C), was declared inoperable on October 13, 1989 due to inadequate depth of sealing material. It was returned to service on October 24, 1989. A fire watch, as required by Technical Specification 3.7.10 action a, was maintained while the seal was inoperable.
- ° Fire barrier penetration seal W-9704, separating the middle section of the 587' level Auxiliary Building (Fire Zone 6M) and the Unit Two West Centrifugal Charging Pump Room (Fire Zone 63C), was declared inoperable on October 17, 1989 due to ongoing work on the penetration which violated the seal. It was returned to service on October 25, 1989. A fire watch, as required by Technical Specification 3.7.10 action a, was maintained while the seal was inoperable.

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- ° Fire damper 2-HV-ACF-D3, in the Unit Two P-250 Computer Room was declared inoperable on October 19, 1989 due to the failure of its fire damper release mechanism during routine surveillance testing. At that time, a fire watch, as required by Technical Specification 3.7.10 action a, was established and will remain in effect until the problem is resolved. This problem is the same as that experienced with fire dampers 1-HV-ACF-D1, 1-HV-ACF-D2, 2-HV-ACF-D1, and 2-HV-ACF-D2 as reported in a previous letter dated September 19, 1989. An engineering analysis/evaluation is being performed on the problems with this type of damper release mechanism. We will inform you through a follow-up report when the engineering analysis/evaluation is complete and all of the affected dampers have been restored to operability.
- ° Fire door 387, the Unit One Reactor Cable Tunnel Quadrant #2 door, was declared inoperable on October 25, 1989 due to the failure of its latching mechanism. An evaluation of the door latching mechanism determined that more extensive repairs were required to reinforce the door latch attachment points. It is anticipated that the door will be repaired and returned to operable status by November 29, 1989. A fire watch, as required by Technical Specification 3.7.10 action a, is being maintained while the door is inoperable.
- ° On October 26, 1989, a Civil Construction foreman noticed a 1/8" gap between the block ventilation duct for the control rod drive equipment room supply fan 2-HV-SGRS-4A and the ceiling interface at the 635' elevation of the Engineered Safety System and MCC Room (Fire Zone 45). After finding this condition, the foreman checked the ventilation ducts for fans having a similar ventilation duct configuration and found gaps in the ducts for fans 2-HV-SGRS-1A, 2-HV-SGRS-2, 2-HV-SGRS-3, 2-HV-SGRX-1, 2-HV-SGRX-2, 2-HV-SGRX-3, and 2-HV-SGRX-5. At that time, a roving fire watch, as required by Technical Specification 3.7.10 action 1, was established for the affected fire zones. This roving patrol will remain in effect until the problem is resolved. An engineering analysis/evaluation is being performed to determine the best method of repairing the gaps. We will inform you through a follow-up report when the engineering evaluation/analysis is complete and all of the effected fire barriers have been restored to operability.

In a letter dated May 16, 1989, we informed you that fire doors 349 and 471, in the Unit One 4KV Complex; and fire doors 350 and 472, in the Unit Two 4KV Complex, were declared inoperable due to an adverse trend of fire doors failing to close during CO2 system testing. Following an engineering evaluation, which determined that the doors would

United States Regulatory Commission  
November 13, 1989  
Page 3 of 3

close on a CO2 system actuation, the doors were returned to operable status on October 13, 1989. A fire watch, as required by Technical Specification 3.7.10 action a, was maintained while the doors were inoperable.

Respectfully,



A.A. Blind  
Plant Manager

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