

ATTACHMENT 4 TO AEP:NRC:0895G
REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES

8812300297 881221
PDR ADOCK 05000315
P PDC

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>CHANNELS TO TRIP</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>APPLICABLE MODES</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
20. Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position Trip					
Above P-7	1/breaker	2	1/breaker per oper- ating loop	1	11
21. Reactor Trip Breakers	2	1	2	1, 2 3*, 4*, 5*	1, 13 14
22. Automatic Trip Logic	2	1	2	1, 2 3*, 4*, 5*	1, 14

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

- ACTION 9 - With a channel associated with an operating loop inoperable, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE within 2 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; however, one channel associated with an operating loop may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1.1.

- ACTION 11 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, operation may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour.

- ACTION 12 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and/or open the reactor trip breakers.

- ACTION 13 - With one of the diverse trip features (Undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) inoperable, restore it to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or declare the breaker inoperable and apply ACTION 1. The breaker shall not be bypassed while one of the diverse trip features is inoperable except for the time required for performing maintenance to restore the breaker to OPERABLE status.

- ACTION 14 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or open the reactor trip breakers within the next hour.

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INTERLOCKS

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>CONDITION AND SETPOINT</u>	<u>FUNCTION</u>
P-6	With 2 of 2 Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Channels $< 6 \times 10^{-11}$ amps.	P-6 prevents or defeats the manual block of source range reactor trip.

2.2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

BASES

Safety Injection Input from ESF

If a reactor trip has not already been generated by the reactor protective instrumentation, the ESF automatic actuation logic channels will initiate a reactor trip upon any signal which initiates a safety injection. This trip is provided to protect the core in the event of a LOCA. The ESF instrumentation channels which initiate a safety injection signal are shown in Table 3.3-3.

Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position Trip

The Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position Trip is an anticipatory trip which provides reactor core protection against DNB resulting from the opening of two or more pump breakers above P-7. This trip is blocked below P-7. The open/close position trip assures a reactor trip signal is generated before the low flow trip setpoint is reached. No credit was taken in the accident analyses for operation of this trip. The functional capability at the open/close position settings is required to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor Protection System.

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>CHANNELS TO TRIP</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>APPLICABLE MODES</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
16. Undervoltage-Reactor Coolant Pumps	4-1/bus	2	3	1	6 #
17. Underfrequency-Reactor Coolant Pumps	4-1/bus	2	3	1	6 #
18. Turbine Trip					
A. Low Fluid Oil Pressure	3	2	2	1	7 #
B. Turbine Stop Valve Closure	4	4	3	1	6 #
19. Safety Injection Input from ESF	2	1	2	1, 2	1
20. Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position Trip					
Above P-7	1/breaker	2	1/breaker per operat- ing loop	1	11
21. Reactor Trip Breakers	2	1	2	1, 2, 3*, 4*, 5*	1, 13, 14
22. Automatic Trip Logic	2	1	2	1, 2, 3*, 4*, 5*	1, 14

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

- ACTION 11 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, operation may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hours.
- ACTION 12 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and/or open the reactor trip breakers.
- ACTION 13 - With one of the diverse trip features (Undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) inoperable, restore it to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or declare the breaker inoperable and apply ACTION 1. The breaker shall not be bypassed while one of the diverse trip features is inoperable except for the time required for performing maintenance to restore the breaker to OPERABLE status.
- ACTION 14 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or open the reactor trip breakers within the next hour.

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INTERLOCKS

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>CONDITION AND SETPOINT</u>	<u>FUNCTION</u>
P-6	With 2 of 2 Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Channels $< 6 \times 10^{-11}$ amps.	P-6 prevents or defeats the manual block of source range reactor trip.



2.2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

BASES

Safety Injection Input from ESF

If a reactor trip has not already been generated by the reactor protective instrumentation, the ESF automatic actuation logic channels will initiate a reactor trip upon any signal which initiates a safety injection. This trip is provided to protect the core in the event of a LOCA. The ESF instrumentation channels which initiate a safety injection signal are shown in Table 3.3-3.

Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position Trip

The Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position Trip is an anticipatory trip which provides reactor core protection against DNB resulting from the opening of two or more pump breakers above P-7. This trip is blocked below P-7. The open/close position trip assures a reactor trip signal is generated before the low flow trip setpoint is reached. No credit was taken in the accident analyses for operation of this trip. The functional capability at the open/close position settings is required to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor Protection System.