

Attachment 2 to AEP:NRC:0916AB
Proposed Revised Technical Specification Pages

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3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL

SHUTDOWN MARGIN - STANDBY, STARTUP, AND POWER OPERATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be $\geq 2.0\% \Delta k/k$.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2*, and 3.

ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN $< 2.0\% \Delta k/k$, immediately initiate and continue boration at ≥ 10 gpm of 20,000 ppm boric acid solution or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be $\geq 2.0\% \Delta k/k$:

- a. Within one hour after detection of an inoperable control rod(s) and at least once per 12 hours thereafter while the rod(s) is inoperable. If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be increased by an amount at least equal to the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod(s).
- b. When in MODES 1 or 2[#], at least once per 12 hours by verifying that control bank withdrawal is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.
- c. When in MODE 2^{##}, within 4 hours prior to achieving reactor criticality by verifying that the predicted critical control rod position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

*See Special Test Exception 3.10.1

With $K_{eff} \geq 1.0$

With $K_{eff} < 1.0$

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- d. Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of e below, with the control banks at the maximum insertion limit of Specification 3.1.3.6.
- e. When in MODE 3, at least once per 24 hours by consideration of the following factors:
 - 1. Reactor coolant system boron concentration,
 - 2. Control rod position,
 - 3. Reactor coolant system average temperature,
 - 4. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,
 - 5. Xenon concentration, and
 - 6. Samarium concentration.

4.1.1.1.2 The overall core reactivity balance shall be compared to predicted values to demonstrate agreement within $\pm 1\% \Delta k/k$ at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD). This comparison shall consider at least those factors stated in Specification 4.1.1.1.1.e, above. The predicted reactivity values shall be adjusted (normalized) to correspond to the actual core conditions prior to exceeding a fuel burnup of 60 Effective Full Power Days after each fuel loading.

4.1.1.1.3 Prior to blocking ESF Functional Units in accordance with footnotes # and ## of Table 3.3-3, SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 2.0% $\Delta k/k$ by consideration of the factors of 4.1.1.1.e above. The Reactor Coolant System average temperature used in making this SHUTDOWN MARGIN determination shall be less than or equal to 350°F. This SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be maintained at all times when the ESF functions are blocked in MODE 3.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

SHUTDOWN MARGIN - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be:

a. In MODE 4:

1. Greater than or equal to $2.0\% \Delta k/k$ when operating with one or more Reactor Coolant Loops in accordance with Specification 3.4.1.3.
2. Greater than the value shown in Figure 3.1-3 when operating with no Reactor Coolant Loops but one or more Residual Heat Removal Loops in accordance with Specification 3.4.1.3.

b. In MODE 5:

1. Greater than or equal to $1.0\% \Delta k/k$ when operating with one or more Reactor Coolant Loops in accordance with Specification 3.4.1.3.
2. Greater than the value shown in Figure 3.1-3 when operating with no Reactor Coolant Loops but one or more Residual Heat Removal Loops in accordance with Specification 3.4.1.3.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5

ACTION:

With SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than the above limits, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 10 gpm of 20,000 ppm boric acid solution or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to the above limits:

- a. Within one hour after detection of an inoperable control rod(s) and at least once per 12 hours thereafter while the rod(s) is inoperable. If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be increased by an amount at least equal to the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod(s).




Figure 3.1-3 REQUIRED SHUTDOWN MARGIN

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.1.4 The moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) shall be:

- a. Within the region of acceptable operation in Figure 3.1-2, and
- b. Less negative than $-3.5 \times 10^{-4} \Delta k/k/^{\circ}F$ for the all rods withdrawn, end of cycle life (EOL), RATED THERMAL POWER condition.

APPLICABILITY: Specification 3.1.1.4.a - MODES 1 and 2* only#
Specification 3.1.1.4.b - MODES 1, 2 and 3 only#

ACTION:

- a. With the MTC more positive than the limit of 3.1.1.4.a above:
 1. Establish and maintain control rod withdrawal limits sufficient to restore the MTC to within its limits within 24 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours. These withdrawal limits shall be in addition to the insertion limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.
 2. Maintain the control rods within the withdrawal limits established above until subsequent measurement verifies that the MTC has been restored to within its limit for the all rods withdrawn condition.
 3. Prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 10 days describing the value of the measured MTC, the interim control rod withdrawal limits and the predicted average core burnup necessary for restoring the positive MTC to within its limit for the all rods withdrawn condition.
- b. With the MTC more negative than the limit of 3.1.1.4.b above, be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours.

* With K_{eff} greater than or equal to 1.0

See Special Test Exception 3.10.3

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.1.1.4.1 The MTC shall be determined to be within its limits by confirmatory measurements. Measured MTC values shall be extrapolated and/or compensated to permit direct comparison with the above limits.
- 4.1.1.4.2 The MTC shall be determined to be within its limits during each fuel cycle as follows:
- a) The MTC shall be measured and compared to the BOL limit of Specification 3.1.1.4.a, above, prior to initial operation above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, after each fuel loading.
 - b) The MTC shall be measured at any THERMAL POWER within 7 EFPD after reaching an equilibrium boron concentration of 300 ppm and the extrapolated MTC value compared to the EOL limit. In the event this comparison indicates that the MTC will be more negative than the EOL limit, the MTC shall be remeasured at least once per 14 EFPD during the remainder of the fuel cycle and the MTC value compared to the EOL limit.

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)


ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TRIP SETPOINT</u>	<u>ALLOWABLE VALUES</u>
4. STEAM LINE ISOLATION		
a. Manual	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
b. Automatic Actuation Logic	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
c. Containment Pressure--High-High	≤ 2.9 psig	≤ 3.0 psig
d. Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines-- High Coincident with T_{avg} -- Low-Low	\leq A function defined as follows: A Δp corresponding to 1.47×10^6 lbs/hr steam flow between 0% and 20% load and then a Δp increasing linearly to a Δp corresponding to 4.02×10^6 lbs/hr at full load. $T_{avg} \geq 541^\circ \text{ F.}$	\leq A function defined as follows: A Δp corresponding to 1.62×10^6 lbs/hr steam flow between 0% and 20% load and then a Δp increasing linearly to a Δp corresponding to 4.07×10^6 lbs/hr at full load. $T_{avg} \geq 539^\circ \text{ F.}$
e. Steam Line Pressure--Low	≥ 600 psig steam line pressure	≥ 585 psig steam line pressure
5. TURBINE TRIP AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION		
a. Steam Generator Water Level-- High-High	$< 67\%$ of narrow range instrument span each steam generator	$< 68\%$ of narrow range instrument span each steam generator

TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES

<u>INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION</u>	<u>RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS</u>
3. <u>Pressurizer Pressure-Low</u>	
a. Safety Injection (ECCS)	$\leq 24.0^*/12.0\#$
b. Reactor Trip (from SI)	≤ 2.0
c. Feedwater Isolation	≤ 8.0
d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A"	$\leq 18.0\#$
e. Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation	Not Applicable
f. Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps	≤ 60.0
g. Essential Service Water System	$\leq 48.0^*/13.0\#$
4. <u>Differential Pressure Between Steam Lines-High</u>	
a. Safety Injection (ECCS)	$\leq 12.0\#/24.0\#\#$
b. Reactor Trip (from SI)	≤ 2.0
c. Feedwater Isolation	≤ 8.0
d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A"	$\leq 18.0\#/28.0\#\#$
e. Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation	Not Applicable
f. Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps	≤ 60.0
g. Essential Service Water System	$\leq 13.0\#/48.0\#\#$
5. <u>Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines - High Coincident with T_{avg}--Low-Low</u>	
a. Safety Injection (ECCS)	Not Applicable
b. Reactor Trip (from SI)	Not Applicable
c. Feedwater Isolation	Not Applicable
d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A"	Not Applicable
e. Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation	Not Applicable
f. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps	Not Applicable
g. Essential Service Water System	Not Applicable
h. Steam Line Isolation	≤ 10



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3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL

3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.2 SHUTDOWN MARGIN

A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that 1) the reactor can be made subcritical from all operating conditions, 2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and 3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel depletion, RCS boron concentration, and RCS T_{avg} . The most restrictive condition for increased load events occurs at EOL, with T_{avg} at no load operating temperature, and is associated with a postulated steam line break accident and resulting uncontrolled RCS cooldown. In the analysis of this accident, a minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 2.0% $\Delta k/k$ is initially required to control the reactivity transient and automatic ESF is assumed to be available.

Technical Specification requirements call for verification that the SHUTDOWN MARGIN is greater than or equal to that which would be required for the MODE 3 low temperature value, 350°F, prior to blocking safety injection on either the P-11 or P-12 permissive interlocks. This assures in the event of an inadvertent opening of two cooldown steam dump valves that adequate shutdown reactivity is available to allow the operator to identify and terminate the event.

With $T_{avg} < 200^\circ\text{F}$, the reactivity transients resulting from a postulated steam line break cooldown are minimal and a 1% $\Delta k/k$ SHUTDOWN MARGIN provides adequate protection for this event.

In shutdown MODES 4 and 5 when heat removal is provided by the residual heat removal system, active reactor coolant system volume may be reduced. Increased SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements when operating under these conditions is provided for high reactor coolant system boron concentrations to ensure sufficient time for operator response in the event of a boron dilution transient.

The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements are based upon the limiting conditions described above and are consistent with FSAR safety analysis assumptions.

3/4.1.1.3 BORON DILUTION

A minimum flow rate of at least 3000 GPM provides adequate mixing, prevents stratification and ensures that reactivity changes will be gradual during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. A flow rate of at least 3000 GPM will circulate an equivalent Reactor Coolant System volume of 12,612 cubic feet in approximately 30 minutes. The reactivity change rate associated with boron reductions will therefore be within the capability for operator recognition and control.