

INDIANA & MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY

P. O. BOX 18
BOWLING GREEN STATION
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10004

March 29, 1979
AEP:NRC:00160

Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units No. 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316
License Nos. DPR-58 and DPR-74

Mr. J. G. Keppler, Region Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region III
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60133

Dear Mr. Keppler:

This letter is in response to Mr. R. F. Heishman's letter of March 2, 1979, which we received March 7, 1979 and which transmitted to us IE Report No. 50-315/79-02; 50-316/79-02.

The enclosed attachment to this letter is our response to the non-compliance with NRC requirements considered to be an infraction of written procedures required by the Technical Specification 6.8.1. The information contained in the attachment is considered proprietary in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 and should be withheld from public disclosure.

Very truly yours,


R. E. Disbrow
Vice President

RED:em

cc: (Attached)

ATTACHMENT CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790
INFORMATION

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Mr. J. G. Keppler

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cc: R. C. Callen
G. Charnoff
D. V. Shaller-Bridgman
R. W. Jurgensen

ATTACHMENT

This report provides a complete explanation of the circumstances surrounding this event:

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

The "CD" Emergency Diesel Generator was being test run per Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 prior to making the "AB" Emergency Diesel Generator inoperable for required maintenance.

By our established practice, the "CD" engine was running while the "AB" engine was tagged and verified for proper tagging before shutting down the "CD" engine.

The maintenance work was on the cooling water valves of the "AB" engine. The cooling water valves for both engines are in a common room that requires transient through the "CD" engine room to get to.

Operations personnel were present for the test running of the "CD" engine and had the main entrance to the room open. Maintenance personnel entered the room to check for proper tagging and to start their required work on the valves of the "AB" engine. When the "CD" engine was secured from the test run, the operator left the entrance door open thinking that the Maintenance personnel were working in the room and had the responsibility of the open door when, in reality, they were in a inter-room away from the unguarded door. This was the condition NRC Inspector K. R. Baker found and reported to the Shift Operating Engineer.

CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN AT TIME EVENT WAS DISCOVERED

The Shift Operating Engineer immediately had the entrance door closed and locked. He issued a door key to the Maintenance personnel so they could traverse the "CD" Engine Room to get to the "AB" engine job.

CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER NON-COMPLIANCE

All Operations personnel have been issued instructions to the effect that if the entrance to any vital area must be held open that it is necessary to stay within eyesight of the open door.

Since this event, all vital areas have been equipped with "Computerized Access Control" and one man no longer needs to be a turnkey for another. With the addition of the "Computerized Access Control" the diesel doors now alarm in the Security Control stations if improperly opened or held open an undue length of time.

THE DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE REACHED

Full compliance is now in effect.

PROPRIETARY SECURITY INFORMATION
PER 10 CFR - 2.790 - WITHHOLD
FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE