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ACCESSION NBR:9402030186 DOC.DATE: 94/01/27 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL:STN-50-529 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Arizona Publi 05000529
 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 GRABO,B. Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power
 LEVINE,J.M. Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power
 RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 93-005-01:on 931123,identified that SR 4.8.1.1.1.a which
 verifies operability of ac offsite sources not completed
 within required time 91 h) due to cognitive personnel error.
 Surveillance completed w/no problems on 931123.W/940127 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 5
 TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:Standardized plant.

05000529 A

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	REG FILE 02	1 1	RES/DSIR/EIB	1 1
	RGN5 FILE 01	1 1		
EXTERNAL:	EG&G BRYCE,J.H	2 2	L ST LOBBY WARD	1 1
	NRC PDR	1 1	NSIC MURPHY,G.A	1 1
	NSIC POORE,W.	1 1	NUDOCS FULL TXT	1 1

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Arizona Public Service Company

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
P.O. BOX 52034 • PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85072-2034

192-00882-JML/BAG/JRP

January 27, 1994

JAMES M. LEVINE
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Mail Station P1-37
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
Dear Sirs:

Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit 2
Docket No. STN 50-529 (License No. NPF-51)
Licensee Event Report 93-005-01
File: 94-020-404

Attached please find supplement 01 to Licensee Event Report (LER) 93-005-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73. This supplement provides information on previous similar events. In accordance with 10CFR50.73(d), a copy of this LER is being forwarded to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region V.

If you have any questions, please contact Burton. A. Grabo, Supervisor, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs, at (602) 393-6492.

Very truly yours,




JML/BAG/RR/rv

Attachment

cc: W. F. Conway (all with attachment)
K. E. Perkins
K. E. Johnston
INPO Records Center

0100000
9402030186 940127
PDR ADDCK 05000529
S PDR



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Palo Verde Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 5 2 9	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 4
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TITLE (4)
Failure to Demonstrate OPERABILITY of A.C. Offsite Sources Within One Hour

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)		REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES
									N/A
11	23	93	93	005	01	01	27	94	N/A
									DOCKET NUMBER(S) 0 5 0 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)					
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 8 5	20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
	20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)		TELEPHONE NUMBER
NAME Burton Grabo, Supervisor, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs	AREA CODE 6 0 2	NUMBER 3 9 3 1 - 6 4 9 2

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On November 23, 1993, at approximately 0630 MST, Palo Verde Unit 2 was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION), operating at approximately 85 percent power when Control Room personnel identified that Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.8.1.1.1.a had not been completed within the required time (1 hour). This SR verifies the correct breaker alignment of the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system.

Diesel Generator B had been removed from service at approximately 0443 MST on November 23, 1993. The required surveillance was completed at approximately 0700 MST with no problems noted.

There have been three previous similar events reported in LERs 529/89-004-00, 529/88-003-00, and 528/86-001-00.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME Palo Verde Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER 05000529	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th colspan="3">LER NUMBER</th> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 33%;">YEAR</td> <td style="width: 33%;">SEQUENTIAL NUMBER</td> <td style="width: 33%;">REVISION NUMBER</td> </tr> <tr> <td>93</td> <td>005</td> <td>01</td> </tr> </table>	LER NUMBER			YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	93	005	01	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th colspan="2">PAGE</th> </tr> <tr> <td>02</td> <td>OF 04</td> </tr> </table>	PAGE		02	OF 04
LER NUMBER																
YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER														
93	005	01														
PAGE																
02	OF 04															

TEXT

I. DESCRIPTION OF WHAT OCCURRED:

A. Initial Conditions:

At approximately 0630 MST on November 23, 1993, Palo Verde Unit 2 was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) at approximately 85 percent power.

B. Reportable Event Description (Including Dates and Approximate Times of Major Occurrences):

Event Classification: Operation prohibited by the Plant's Technical Specifications

At approximately 0630 MST on November 23, 1993, Unit 2 Control Room personnel (utility, licensed) determined that Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.8.1.1.1.a had not been completed within one hour.

On November 23, 1993, at approximately 0443 MST Diesel Generator (DG) B was taken out of service for performance of scheduled maintenance. TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.8.1.1 Action b requires that the A.C. offsite sources be demonstrated OPERABLE by performing SR 4.8.1.1.1.a within one hour. SR 4.8.1.1.1.a verifies the correct breaker alignment indicating power availability.

The required surveillance was completed at approximately 0700 MST on November 23, 1993. No problems with the required breaker alignment were identified during the performance of the surveillance.

C. Status of structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event:

Not applicable - no structures, systems, or components were inoperable at the start of the event which contributed to this event.

D. Cause of each component or system failure, if known:

Not applicable - no component or system failures were involved.

E. Failure mode, mechanism, and effect of each failed component, if known:

Not applicable - no component failures were involved.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT

- F. For failures of components with multiple functions, list of systems or secondary functions that were also affected:

Not applicable - no failures of components with multiple functions were involved.

- G. For a failure that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable, estimated time elapsed from the discovery of the failure until the train was returned to service:

Not applicable - no failures that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable were involved.

- H. Method of discovery of each component or system failure or procedural error:

Not applicable - there have been no component or system failures or procedural errors identified. There were no procedural errors which contributed to this event.

- I. Cause of Event:

The cause of this event was cognitive personnel error in that Control Room personnel failed to identify that SR 4.8.1.1.1.a was required to be performed within one hour of removing DG B from service (SALP Cause Code A: Personnel Error).

- J. Safety System Response:

Not applicable - there were no (other) safety system responses and none were necessary.

- K. Failed Component Information:

Not applicable - no component failures were involved.

II. ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THIS EVENT:

The event did not result in any challenges to the fission product barriers or result in any releases of radioactive materials. Therefore, there were no adverse safety consequences or implications as a result of this event. This event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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Palo Verde Unit 2		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
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TEXT

III. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

A. Immediate:

The required surveillance was completed satisfactorily at approximately 0700 MST on November 23, 1993.

B. Action to Prevent Recurrence:

Positive discipline actions have been administered to all personnel involved.

IV. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:

Three previous similar events have been reported pursuant to 10CFR50.73. All 3 LERs (529/89-004-00, 529/88-003-00, and 528/86-001-00) were written because SR 4.8.1.1.1.a had not been completed within the required 1 hour time frame after declaring either an offsite circuit or DG inoperable. The cause of these events was determined to be cognitive personnel error. Therefore, the corrective actions for the previous events would not have prevented this event.

V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

None

