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
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December 16, 1988

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Annual Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and  
Experiments Conducted Without Prior Commission  
Approval  
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant  
Docket No. 50-244

Gentlemen:

The subject report is hereby submitted as required by 10 CFR 50.59(b). Enclosed are the original and one copy of the report containing descriptions and summaries of the safety evaluations conducted in support of changes to the facility and procedures described in the UFSAR and special tests, from August 1987 through July 1988.

Very truly yours,

Robert C. Maccredy  
General Manager, Nuclear Production

RES/jdw  
Enc.

xc: USNRC Region I Office  
USNRC Resident Inspector

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1988 REPORT  
OF  
FACILITY CHANGES, TESTS AND EXPERIMENTS  
CONDUCTED WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL  
FOR AUGUST 1987 THROUGH JULY 1988

SECTION A	COMPLETED ENGINEERING WORK REQUESTS (EWR)
SECTION B	COMPLETED STATION MODIFICATIONS (SM)
SECTION C	TEMPORARY BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION, STRUCTURE FEATURES, SHIELDING, AND FLUID SYSTEM FEATURES
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SECTION E	COMPLETED SPECIAL TESTS (ST) AND EXPERIMENTS

R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT  
DOCKET NO. 50-244  
ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION

DATED DECEMBER 16, 1988

8812290078



SECTION A - COMPLETED ENGINEERING WORK REQUESTS (EWRs)

This section contains a description of modifications in the facility as described in the safety analysis report, and a summary of the safety evaluation for those changes, pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59(b).

The basis for inclusion of an EWR in this section is closure of the completed modification package in the Document Control Department.



EWR-1607  
CHANGE SCALE NET MW METER

THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES MODIFICATION TO THE "GENERATOR NET WATTMETER" ON THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD WHICH WILL BE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A METER THAT PROVIDES BOTH FORWARD AND REVERSE POWER INDICATION. THE REVERSE POWER INDICATION IS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE ON THE 115 KV BENCHBOARD. HOWEVER, THE 115 KV BENCHBOARD WILL BE REMOVED UNDER A DIFFERENT JOB. IT IS DESIRED TO HAVE THIS INDICATION AT THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD RIGHT SECTION NEAR THE OTHER GENERATION METERS.

THE "1 GEN MEGAWATTS" METER ON THE 115 KV BENCHBOARD IS A SUITABLE REPLACEMENT FOR THE METER ON THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD. HOWEVER, ITS SCALE MUST BE REVERSED TO READ LEFT-TO-RIGHT AS DO THE OTHER GENERATION METERS ON THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD.

AS PART OF THIS MODIFICATION, THE WIRING PRESENTLY POWERING THE METER ON THE 115 KV BENCHBOARD WILL BE MOVED TO THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR, THE SEISMIC BY NRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE (1) SEISMIC, (2) FIRE, AND (3) LOSS OF EXTERNAL ELECTRICAL LOAD.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSIS DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OF MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY, PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT, WILL NOT BE INCREASED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION.

EWR-1833  
FIXED FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM

THIS MODIFICATION CONSISTS OF THE ADDITION OF FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM IN THE AREAS OF THE PLANT NOT PRESENTLY OR NOT ADEQUATELY COVERED BY THE EXISTING FIRE SERVICE WATER OR HALON 1301 SUPPRESSION SYSTEM. REFERENCE (SRP 9.5.1) "FIRE PROTECTION" DATED MAY 4, 1976. THESE AREAS ARE:

1. INTERMEDIATE BUILDING BASEMENT CABLE TRAY CONCENTRATION AREA (ZONE S-15).
2. AUXILIARY BUILDING BUS 16 CABLE TRAY CONCENTRATION AREA (ZONE S-03).
3. AUXILIARY BUILDING INTERMEDIATE LEVEL EAST, CABLE TRAY CONCENTRATION (ZONE S-04).
4. AUXILIARY BUILDING BASEMENT CABLE TRAY AREA (ZONE S-01).





REVISION 5 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND REVISION 3 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS WERE PRESENTED AND APPROVED BY PORC ON DECEMBER 3, 1980, PORC ITEM NUMBER 80-1745.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE: 1) INTERNAL FLOODING, 2) EARTHQUAKE, AND 3) FIRE.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.E OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS, THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATION AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

EWR-2469

STEAM GENERATOR FEEDWATER ELBOWS WITH THERMAL SLEEVES

THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE REPLACEMENT OF THE FEEDWATER ELBOWS AT THE STEAM GENERATOR INLET WITH ELBOWS HAVING THERMAL SLEEVES. THE NEW THERMAL SLEEVE ELBOW PROVIDES ADDITIONAL PROTECTION AGAINST CRACKING OF THE ELBOW/NOZZLE WELDS OVER THAT IN THE CURRENTLY INSTALLED ELBOW.

TWO (2) THERMAL SLEEVE ELBOWS (ONE FOR EACH STEAM GENERATOR) WILL BE FABRICATED AND THEN STORED AT GINNA STATION. THE NEW THERMAL SLEEVE ELBOWS WILL NOT BE INSTALLED UNLESS CRACKING IS DISCOVERED IN THE CURRENTLY INSTALLED ELBOWS.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATING TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE: 1) EARTHQUAKE AND 2) LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.D OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS, THEREFORE BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT WILL NOT BE INCREASED BY THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION.



EWR-2846A

BLOCK WALL MODIFICATIONS

THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE STRUCTURAL MODIFICATIONS TO THE EXISTING BLOCK WALLS FOR EARTHQUAKE AND OTHER LOADINGS AS DEFINED IN THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED TO PROTECT SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT FROM POSTULATED MASONRY WALL FAILURES. THESE MODIFICATIONS ARE A DIRECT RESULT OF USNRC INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 80-11.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE EARTHQUAKES, PIPE BREAKS OUTSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING, TORNADOES, FIRES, AND TORNADO MISSILES.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-3100

MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATERS REPLACEMENT

THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSING THE UPGRADING OF FOUR (4) MOISTURE SEPARATOR/REHEATERS. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE AND RELIABILITY OF THE HIGH PRESSURE (HP) TURBINE EXHAUST MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATERS (MS/R's).

THIS MODIFICATION WILL INCORPORATE A NEW MS/4 DESIGN WITHIN THE EXISTING SHELLS. CHEVRON TYPE MOISTURE SEPARATORS WILL BE USED. THE REHEATER WILL BE OF A FOUR PASS, OR EQUIVALENT DESIGN. IN ADDITION, MOISTURE PRESEPARATORS WILL BE INSTALLED IN THE HP TURBINE EXHAUSTS. THE MS/R's WILL BE DESIGNED WITHOUT TAKING CREDIT FOR THE PRESEPARATORS. THE MS/R's WILL BE OPTIMIZED FOR A MINIMUM PRESSURE DROP AND A MINIMUM DROP AS ACHIEVABLE IN THE COLD REHEAT STEAM. DRAINS AND VENTS FOR THIS EQUIPMENT WILL BE MODIFIED AS REQUIRED BY THE NEW DESIGNS.



A REVIEW HAS BEEN PERFORMED OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND REG. GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE:

- a. LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER.
- b. EXCESSIVE HEAT REMOVAL DUE TO FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE DECREASE.
- c. EXCESSIVE LOAD INCREASE.
- d. RUPTURE OF A STEAM PIPE.

EVENT a, LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER, IS ANALYZED IN THE FSAR AS THAT ACCIDENT (PIPE BREAK, PUMP FAILURE, VALVE MALFUNCTION, OR LOSS OF OUTSIDE AC POWER) WHICH RESULTS IN A REDUCTION IN CAPABILITY OF THE SECONDARY SYSTEM TO REMOVE HEAT GENERATED IN THE CORE.

SINCE NO PROPOSED EQUIPMENT OR PIPING HAVE ANY SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE, THIS MODIFICATION NEITHER EFFECTS NOR IS AFFECTED BY THIS EVENT.

EVENT b, FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE DECREASE, IS ANALYZED IN THE FSAR AS THE ACCIDENTAL OPENING OF THE CONDENSATE BYPASS VALVE 3959, A FAIL OPEN, AIR OPERATED, DIAPHRAGM ACTUATED CONTROL VALVE; OR THE ACCIDENTAL MOVEMENT OF THE FEEDWATER CONTROL VALVES TO THE FULL OPEN POSITION. THE EFFECT OF EITHER EVENT WOULD BE TO DELIVER FEEDWATER TO THE STEAM GENERATORS AT A REDUCED TEMPERATURE. AN UNSAFE CONDITION WOULD RESULT DUE TO EXCESS HEAT REMOVAL FROM THE PRIMARY SYSTEM.

INSTALLING PRESEPARATORS AND MS/R's WITH ANY MODIFICATION TO THE DRAIN AND VENT PIPING HAS NO EFFECT ON THE ACTIONS OF THE VALVES MENTIONED ABOVE.

EVENT c, EXCESSIVE LOAD INCREASE, IS DEFINED IN THE FSAR AS A RAPID INCREASE IN STEAM GENERATOR STEAM FLOW CAUSING A POWER MISMATCH BETWEEN THE REACTOR CORE POWER AND STEAM GENERATOR LOAD DEMAND. EXCESSIVE LOADING BY THE OPERATOR OR SYSTEM DEMAND IS ANALYZED AND EXCESSIVE LOADING FROM THE STEAM LINE RUPTURES (EVENT d) IS EXAMINED.

NEITHER THE CONSEQUENCES NOR THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR THIS EVENT HAVE CHANGED SINCE THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT EFFECT ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT.

EVENT d, RUPTURE OF A STEAM PIPE, MAY BE A STEAM PATH OUT OF THE PIPING OR A VALVE MALFUNCTION. THE STEAM RELEASE INITIALLY RESULTS IN AN EXCESSIVE LOAD INCREASE, DECREASING AS STEAM PRESSURE FALLS.



THE MODIFICATION INVOLVES STEAM PIPING IN THE TURBINE BUILDING, OUTSIDE OF THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES.

THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT INVOLVE ANY CHANGES WHICH WOULD INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF A STEAM BREAK IN THE TURBINE BUILDING. SINCE A STEAM BREAK IN THE TURBINE BUILDING IS NOT AS SEVERE AS A BREAK INSIDE OR OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT, THE SEVERITY OF THE STEAM BREAK TRANSIENT IS NOT AFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION.

THEREFORE, THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATION AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

EWR-3272A

SAS/PPCS FIRE SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS

THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) IS PART OF THE SAS/PPCS COMPUTER SYSTEM INSTALLATION (EWR-3272), THE RAISED FLOOR WILL BE PERMANENTLY REMOVED. THIS MODIFICATION PROVIDES REQUIREMENTS FOR THE REMOVAL AND MODIFICATION OF THE FIRE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT CURRENTLY UNDER THE RAISED FLOOR.

THE EXISTING SMOKE DETECTORS, CONDUITS AND WIRING OF HALON SYSTEM S07 AND PYROTRONICS ZONE 6 UNDER THE RAISED FLOOR WILL BE REMOVED (S07: REMOVE 4 DETECTORS. ZONE 6: REMOVE 1 DETECTOR) FIRE DETECTION ZONE Z17 DETECTORS ON THE CEILING OF THE COMPUTER ROOM WILL BE RE-LABELED S07 AND CONNECTED IN PLACE OF THE ORIGINAL S07 DETECTORS. NO NEW EQUIPMENT WILL BE INSTALLED UNDER THIS MODIFICATION. INSTALLATION REQUIREMENTS ARE LIMITED TO WIRING CHANGES IN EXISTING EQUIPMENT.

REVISION 1 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS WAS PRESENTED AND APPROVED BY PORC ON 1/13/86, PORC NUMBER 6.1.0-86-004-001.

THE PURPOSE OF REVISION 1 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS IS TO INCLUDE THE REMOVAL OF 4 DETECTORS UNDER S07, AND ONE DETECTOR UNDER ZONE 6, INCLUDING TESTING OF S07 AND PYROTRONICS ZONE 6 AFTER THIS MODIFICATION HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE SEISMIC AND FIRE.





BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-3272B

SAS/PPCS COMPUTER ROOM HALON PIPING MODIFICATIONS

THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL RELOCATE THE HALON DISTRIBUTION PIPING PRESENTLY BELOW THE EXISTING 250 COMPUTER ROOM FLOOR AND RELOCATING THEM NEAR THE CEILING. THIS MODIFICATION IS PART OF THE SAS/PPCS COMPUTER SYSTEM INSTALLATION (EWR-3272) AND SAS/PPCS FIRE SYSTEM MODIFICATION (EWR-3272A).

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE FIRE AND SEISMIC.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-3322

DESIGN OF THE MODIFICATION TO THE AUXILIARY AND TURBINE BUILDING BRACING

THIS EWR ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATIONS TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING BRACING AND THE EVALUATION/MODIFICATION OF THE TURBINE BUILDING BRACING. THE BRACING IS BEING MODIFIED TO WITHSTAND THE EFFECTS OF A SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE WITHOUT A LOSS OF IT SAFETY FUNCTION.



BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-3447

"A" AND "B" STEAM GENERATOR METAL IMPACT MONITOR

THE PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO INSTALL A METAL IMPACT MONITORING SYSTEM (ACCELEROMETERS AND ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION) TO DETECT THE PRESENCE OF LOOSE METALLIC PARTS IN THE STEAM GENERATORS.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-3561

SPARE GENERATOR STEP-UP TRANSFORMER FOR GINNA STATION

THIS E.W.R. (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE PROJECT CONSISTING OF PURCHASE AND INSTALL AT STATION 13A OF A SPARE GENERATOR STEP-UP TRANSFORMER FOR GINNA STATION. THIS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY PREPARING THE NECESSARY SPECIFICATIONS IN ORDER TO OBTAIN COMPETITIVE BID PRICES FOR A 550/616 MVA 19KV/120KV 50°C/65°C RISE, TRANSFORMER WHICH CAN BE PHYSICALLY LOCATED IN THE EXISTING G.S.U. LOCATION AND CONNECTED TO THE EXISTING GENERATOR ISOPHASE BUS DUCT. THE NEW TRANSFORMER WILL BE STORED AT STATION 13A AND WILL BE PLACED ON A CONCRETE FOUNDATION. DURING THE NORMAL WARRANTY PERIOD, THE SPARE TRANSFORMER WILL BE ENERGIZED FROM 115KV BUS SECTION 2 AT STATION 13A THRU A CIRCUIT INTERRUPTING DEVICE. AT THE END OF THE WARRANTY PERIOD THE TRANSFORMER WILL BE DE-ENERGIZED AND DISCONNECTED FROM 115KV BUS SECTION 2.

REVISION 1 OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS IS A RESULT OF COMMENTS MADE BY THE PRE-PORC REVIEWERS. DUE TO THEE COMMENTS, REVISION 0 HAS NOT BEEN PRESENTED TO PORC.



A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS OF NRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE ONLY EVENT RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION IS LOSS OF EXTERNAL LOAD AND NATURAL EVENTS.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

EWR-3582

INTER. BLDG. STRUCTURAL MODIFICATIONS

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROGRAM IS TO MODIFY PORTIONS OF THE BUILDING STRUCTURES AT GINNA STATION AS REQUIRED TO ACCEPT NEW OR RECALCULATED PIPE SUPPORT LOADS FROM THE SEISMIC UPGRADING PROGRAM. THE FUNCTION OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO ANALYZE AND MODIFY VARIOUS BUILDINGS. THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT AFFECT THE PERFORMANCE AND CONTROLS OF ANY PLANT SYSTEMS.

ALL MODIFICATIONS DESIGNED AS PART OF THIS WORK WILL INCLUDE SUPPORT AND STRUCTURAL LOADS GENERATED BY THE WORST CASE OPERATING CONDITIONS AS WELL AS NORMAL OPERATING AND TRANSIENT LOADING CONDITIONS.

THE STRUCTURAL STEEL CRITERIA DEFINED BY THE AISC CODE HAS BEEN REVISED TO THE CURRENT 8TH EDITION. ADDITIONALLY, THE USNRC HAS BEEN ISSUED LOADING COMBINATION CRITERIA APPLICABLE TO NUCLEAR STRUCTURES IN THE FORM OF SRP'S 3.8.3 AND 3.8.4. THESE SRP'S PROHIBIT THE 33% INCREASE IN THE ALLOWABLE STRESS FOR OBE LOADS, WHICH WAS ALLOWED IN THE ORIGINAL PLANT DESIGN. FOR EVALUATIONS OF EXISTING STRUCTURES UNDER THIS PROGRAM, THE AISC CODE, 6TH EDITION, AND SRP 3.8.3 AND 3.8.4 WAS USED. HOWEVER, THE 33% ALLOWABLE STRESS INCREASE FOR OBE LOADS WILL BE PERMITTED.

THE DESIGN, FABRICATION, ERECTION AND EXAMINATION OF ANY NEW STRUCTURAL STEEL SUPPORT MEMBERS OR MODIFICATIONS TO EXISTING SUPPORT MEMBERS OR MODIFICATIONS TO EXISTING SUPPORT MEMBERS WILL BE DONE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AISC CODE, 8TH EDITION AND SRP'S 3.8.3 AND 3.8.4 (THE 33% ALLOWABLE STRESS INCREASE FOR OBE LOADS WILL BE PERMITTED).

THE ORIGINAL DESIGN OF THE BUILDING CONCRETE STRUCTURES WAS TO ACI STANDARD 318-63, BUILDING CODE REQUIREMENTS FOR REINFORCED CONCRETE. THIS CODE WILL BE USED TO EVALUATE THE STRUCTURAL ADEQUACY OF EXISTING BUILDING STRUCTURAL CONCRETE.



THE STRUCTURAL CONCRETE CRITERIA DEFINED BY THE ACI CODE HAS BEEN REVISED FOR USE ON NUCLEAR STRUCTURES TO ACI 349-80. ADDITIONALLY, THE USNRC HAS ISSUED LOADING COMBINATION CRITERIA APPLICABLE TO NUCLEAR STRUCTURES IN THE FORM OF SRP'S 3.8.3 AND 3.8.4. ACI 349-80 AND SRP 3.8.3 AND 3.8.4 WILL BE USED FOR THE DESIGN OF ANY NEW OR MODIFIED CONCRETE STRUCTURES.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF THE EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING EVALUATION IN THE ENGINEERING PROCEDURES MANUAL. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS PROGRAM ARE A SEISMIC EVENT AND THE CAPABILITY TO WITHSTAND SEISMIC EVENTS.

ALL WORK DONE AS A PART OF THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE BUILDING STRUCTURES CAPABILITY TO WITHSTAND TORNADOES. IN FACT, THE INCREASED STRUCTURAL STIFFNESS DUE TO THIS MODIFICATION WILL TEND TO ENHANCE THE STRUCTURES CAPABILITY TO WITHSTAND TORNADOES.

ALL WORK DONE AS A PART OF THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT DEGRADE ANY FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS OR FIRE BARRIERS. IN ADDITION, THE BUILDINGS STRUCTURES CAPABILITY TO WITHSTAND THE EFFECTS OF A FIRE WILL NOT BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED.

THEREFORE, BASED ON THE ABOVE ANALYSIS, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT:

- (A) THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION ARE NOT REDUCED AND
- (B) THE STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS ARE ADEQUATE.

EWR-3693

ADDITION OF "A" DIESEL GENERATOR FEEDER BREAKER TO BUS 17

THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION INCLUDES THE INSTALLATION OF A WALL MOUNTED MANUALLY OPERATED CIRCUIT BREAKER IN THE "B" DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM. THE POWER CABLE PRESENTLY GOING FROM THE DIESEL GENERATOR TO BUS 17 WILL BE ROUTED THROUGH THE NEW BREAKER DESIGNATED 52/EG1B3. THE ARRANGEMENT RESULTS IN A FAULT DETECTING BREAKER, LOCATED RIGHT AT THE GENERATOR ASSEMBLY, WHICH CAN PROTECT THE GENERATOR FROM FAULTS ON THE LINE SIDE OF THE MAIN BUS 17 BREAKER, 52/EG1B2.





TO INSURE THAT PROPER BREAKER COORDINATION IS ACHIEVED, THE SERIES TRIP OVERCURRENT TRIP DEVICES ON THE MAIN FEEDER BREAKERS ON BUSES 16 AND 17 WILL BE UPGRADED WITH SOLID STATE AMPTECTOR DEVICES. THESE DEVICES AFFORD THE REPEATABILITY AND TESTABILITY FEATURES NEEDED TO ACHIEVE THE DESIRED BREAKER COORDINATION. THESE FEATURES ARE NOT AVAILABLE ON THE EXISTING OVERCURRENT DEVICES IN USE IN THE DB BREAKERS.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY NRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATING TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE: (1) SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY REQUIRING ONSITE CLASS 1E AC POWER, (2) NATURAL EVENTS: FIRE, FLOOD, EARTHQUAKE AND TORNADO, (3) HIGH AND MODERATE ENERGY LINE BREAKS IN THE SCREENHOUSE.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT:

- A) THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION ARE NOT REDUCED AND
- B) THE STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS, AND SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ARE ADEQUATE.

EWR-3701

[SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION] CENTRAL ALARM STATION HVAC POWER SUPPLY MODIFICATION

THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION TO THE CENTRAL ALARM STATION HVAC UNIT AND ASSOCIATED CONDENSING UNIT POWER FEED.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENT REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE LOSS OF AC POWER AND SEISMIC.

THE MODIFICATION AFFECTS ONLY NON-SAFETY RELATED BUSES. SINCE THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE SAFETY RELATED BUSES, THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE CONSEQUENCES OF A LOSS OF AC POWER.

THE MODIFICATION IS NOT REQUIRED TO BE SEISMIC AND ITS FAILURE WILL NOT AFFECT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT.



BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-3749A

AOV-1596 CONTROL AND POSITION INDICATION

THIS EWR ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL PROVIDE CONTROL AND POSITION INDICATION OF AOV-1596 AT THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD. THE EXISTING MANUAL OPERATED VALVE 1596 WILL BE REPLACED WITH AN AIR OPERATED VALVE WHICH WILL BE INSTALLED UNDER EWR-3741. EWR-3749A COVERS ONLY THE ELECTRICAL WORK TO BE PERFORMED IN SUPPORT OF EWR-3741.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-3766

862-A AND 862-B REPLACEMENT

THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH INVOLVES THE REPLACEMENT OF THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES AT PENETRATIONS 105 AND 109. THE EXISTING VALVES (862A AND 862B) WILL BE REPLACED WITH NEW ASME N-STAMPED, SEISMICALLY-QUALIFIED, CHECK VALVES. THE VALVES ARE LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT ON THE DISCHARGE OF THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE: 1) PRIMARY SYSTEM PIPE RUPTURE, 2) INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVENTS/FIRES, FLOOD, STORM, OR EARTHQUAKE, AND 3) MAIN STEAM FEEDWATER LINE BREAK INSIDE CONTAINMENT.



BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS ARE ADEQUATE.

EWR-3887

TURBINE SUPERVISORY INSTRUMENTATION

THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION INVOLVES THE UPGRADING OF THE TURBINE SUPERVISORY INSTRUMENTATION. THE EXISTING WESTINGHOUSE INSTRUMENTATION WILL BE REPLACED WITH BENTLY NEVADA PICK-UPS SIGNAL CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT AND ANALOG MONITORS. THE EXISTING INSTRUMENTATION IS BEING REPLACED BECAUSE IT IS ANTIQUATED AND SPARE PARTS FOR THIS EQUIPMENT ARE NO LONGER AVAILABLE.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE 1) MAJOR AND MINOR FILES, 2) A SEISMIC EVENT.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS. IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED. THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

EWR-3890

PROTECTED AREA LIGHTING UPGRADE

THIS MODIFICATION CONSISTS OF INSTALLATION OF HIGH PRESSURE SODIUM LIGHTING FIXTURES ON THE EAST WALL OF THE RADWASTE BUILDING AND STEAM GENERATOR FACILITIES BUILDING, ON THE WEST WALL OF THE STORAGE BUILDING, AND INSIDE THE OPEN SHEDS ATTACHED TO THE STORAGE BUILDING.

THE NEW LIGHTING FIXTURES WILL BE POWERED FROM EXISTING SECURITY LIGHTING CIRCUITS PANEL SEP-4L 480 VOLT BUS 13, OR THE SECURITY DIESEL GENERATOR.

THE PROTECTED AREA LIGHTING WAS DESIGNED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR 73.55.



A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE LOSS OF AC POWER AND SEISMIC.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.5 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS, THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THIS MODIFICATION AFFECTS ONLY NON-SAFETY RELATED BUSSES. SINCE THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE SAFETY RELATED BUSSES, THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE CONSEQUENCES OF A LOSS OF AC POWER.

EWR-3891

A AND B VITAL BATTERY SYSTEM REPLACEMENT

THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL REPLACE THE "A" AND "B" VITAL BATTERY SYSTEMS.

PERIODIC LOAD TESTS OF THE A AND B VITAL BATTERY SYSTEMS AT GINNA STATION HAVE PRODUCED DATA INDICATING THAT THE BATTERIES ARE NEARING THE END OF SERVICE LIFE.

THE "A" BATTERY IS SCHEDULED TO BE REPLACED DURING THE 1985 REFUELING OUTAGE, WHILE THE "B" BATTERY REPLACEMENT IS SCHEDULED FOR THE OUTAGE OF 1986.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE 1) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES AND 2) A SEISMIC EVENT.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

EWR-3905

VEHICLE BARRIERS

THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE INSTALLATION OF VEHICLE PROTECTION BARRIERS ALONG SUSCEPTIBLE AREAS OF THE GINNA STATION SECURITY PERIMETER. THIS MODIFICATION CONSISTS OF ADDING CONCRETE MEDIAN BARRIERS AND CABLING. THIS MODIFICATION IS REQUIRED FOR PROTECTION AGAINST A POSTULATED EXPLOSIVE LADEN VEHICLE ATTACK.





A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY THE USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE ONLY EVENT RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION IS SEISMIC.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.5 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THIS MODIFICATION IS NOT REQUIRED TO BE SEISMIC AND ITS FAILURE WILL NOT AFFECT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT OR SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES.

EWR-3986

APPENDIX R FIRE BARRIERS

THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION CONSISTING OF INSTALLING SPECIFIC FIRE BARRIERS IN COMPLIANCE WITH APPENDIX R OF 10CFR50 AS INTERPRETED IN "APPENDIX R ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DECEMBER 1983".

THIS MODIFICATION WILL PROVIDE FIRE PROTECTION FOR SPECIFIC TRAIN A EMERGENCY POWER CABLES THAT ARE LOCATED IN FIRE AREAS ALSO OCCUPIED BY TRAIN B EMERGENCY POWER CABLES. THE MODIFICATION WILL ALSO PROVIDE LIMITED FIRE PROTECTION FOR THE CHARGING PUMP ROOM.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE SEISMIC AND FIRES.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.5 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THIS MODIFICATION IS NOT REQUIRED TO BE SEISMIC AND ITS FAILURE WILL NOT AFFECT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT OR SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES.

EWR-4083

FIRE SERVICE WATER VALVE INSTRUMENT AIR

THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES MODIFICATION OF THE EXISTING INSTRUMENT AIR LINE CONSISTING OF RELOCATION OF THE BRANCH CONNECTION SERVICING AOV-9227 TO PROVIDE AN UNINTERRUPTED SUPPLY TO THIS VALVE. INCLUDED IN THE MODIFICATION ARE AN ISOLATION VALVE AND A BLEED-OFF VALVE.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO RELOCATE THE INSTRUMENT AIR LINE FEEDING AOV-9227 TO PROVIDE UNINTERRUPTED INSTRUMENT AIR DURING THE CONDUCT OF INTEGRATED LEAK RATE TEST (RSSP-6.1) AND LOCAL LEAKAGE TESTING (PT-23.32).



REVISION 1 TO THIS DESIGN CRITERIA AND SAFETY ANALYSIS INCORPORATES CHANGES RESULTING FROM PRE-PORC COMMENTS OF REVISION 0 TO:

1. CORRECT TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS
2. CLARIFY REFERENCES AND TEST REQUIREMENTS
3. IDENTIFY MODES OF OPERATION WHEN THE FIRE SERVICE WATER VALVE IS IN USE
4. INCORPORATE P&ID DRAWING 03021-176, REV. 1 AND ARRANGEMENT DWG. 03021-713, REV. 1 INTO THE REFERENCE SECTION (SECTION 2.0) OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REG. GUIDE 1.70. EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVENTS SUCH AS FIRE, FLOODS, STORMS AND EARTHQUAKES.

THE INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM, ALTHOUGH SUPPLYING VALVES IN SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS, IS NOT DESIGNED AS A SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEM. ALL SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS USING INSTRUMENT AIR ARE DESIGNED SUCH THAT UPON LOSS OF AIR PRESSURE, EACH COMPONENT WILL FAIL IN A POSITION OF GREATER SAFETY.

THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT DEGRADE THE EXISTING INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM OR INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF AN INSTRUMENT AIR LINE BREAK.

THIS MODIFICATION WILL NOT DEGRADE ANY EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS. AVAILABILITY OF INSTRUMENT AIR TO AOV-9227 WILL BE ASSURED DURING CONDUCT OF BOTH INTEGRATED AND LOCAL LEAK RATE TESTING. ALSO THE DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIRES THAT ALL MATERIALS, WHERE APPLICABLE, SHALL BE FLAME RETARDANT AS TO LIMIT THE INTRODUCTION OF HIGHLY COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS INTO THE MODIFICATION AREA.

MODIFICATION OF THE INSTRUMENT AIR FEEDING AOV-9227 WILL NOT AFFECT ANY PREVIOUS ANALYSES CONCERNING FLOODS OR STORMS.

CHANGES TO THE INSTRUMENT AIR PIPING CONFIGURATION, ALTHOUGH NOT DESIGNED AS A SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEM, WILL BE SUPPORTED IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH SEISMIC SUPPORTS. SUCH SUPPORTS WILL ENSURE THAT SEISMIC/SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT LOCATED IN THE AREA OF THE MODIFICATION WILL NOT BE DEGRADED DURING OR FOLLOWING A SEISMIC EVENT INVOLVING A SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE (SSE).

THUS, THIS MODIFICATION NEITHER INCREASES THE CONSEQUENCES, NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVENTS INVOLVING:

- 1) EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURING AND FOLLOWING SSE, FLOODING AND STORMS, INCLUDING TORNADO EVENTS.



## 2) FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF GINNA STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-4088

### S.I. FLOW INDICATOR REPLACEMENT

THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE REPLACEMENT OF THE EXISTING SAFETY INJECTION TEST LINE FLOW METER FI-929, AND CONTAINMENT SPRAY TEST LINE FLOW METER FI-933. MINOR PIPING MODIFICATION WILL LIKELY BE REQUIRED TO ACCOMMODATE NEW FLOW METERS OF DIFFERENT DESIGN. THESE METERS AND ASSOCIATED PIPING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS MODIFICATION ARE DESIGNED NON-SAFETY CLASS. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS THAT THE EXISTING SAFETY INJECTION TEST LINE FLOW METER FI-929 AND CONTAINMENT SPRAY TEST LINE FLOW METER FI-933 CANNOT BE CALIBRATED NOR CAN THEY BE CHECK ON-SITE.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE:

- 1) CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY,
- 2) INCREASE IN HEAT REMOVAL BY THE SECONDARY SYSTEM,
- 3) DECREASE IN REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY AND
- 4) INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVENTS SUCH AS MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES, FLOODS, STORMS, OR EARTHQUAKES.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.5 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.



EWR-4099

SECURITY/PRESSURE DOOR ACCESS

THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION CONSISTING OF INSTALLING AN ELECTRO MAGNETIC LOCKING SYSTEM TO REPLACE THE EXISTING ONES ON DOORS: S-32, S-33, S-34, S-35, S-43, S-48 AND S-51. THE NEW ELECTRO MAGNETIC LOCKS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE EXISTING SECURITY COMPUTER WILL PROVIDE CONTROLLED ACCESS TO THE VITAL AREA DOORS LISTED ABOVE. ELECTRICAL CONTROL OF THE EXISTING LATCHES WILL BE REMOVED AND THE LATCHES WILL ONLY BE USED TO MAINTAIN THE PRESSURE RATING OF THE DOORS.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE SEISMIC AND FIRES.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.5 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS, THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. THE ADEQUACIES OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

EWR-4119

EQUIPMENT HATCH STABILIZATION

THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION THAT CONSISTS OF STRUCTURAL ADDITIONS TO THE EQUIPMENT HATCH TROLLEY FRAME TO MAKE IT MORE STABLE DURING REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT OPERATIONS. IT WILL ALSO COVER REPLACEMENT OR CHANGE OF EXISTING TROLLEY LOAD BEARING COMPONENTS SUCH AS TROLLEY WHEELS.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE FIRES AND CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.





EWR-4134

APPENDIX R INSTRUMENT PANELS

THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL PROVIDE PLANT OPERATORS WITH ALTERNATIVE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PLANT INSTRUMENTATION FOR CERTAIN CIRCUITS WHICH WOULD BE DAMAGED BY A FIRE IN SEVERAL PLANT AREAS. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, TWO NEW LOCAL INSTRUMENTATION PANELS WILL BE INSTALLED. ONE INSTRUMENT PANEL WILL BE INSTALLED IN THE INTERMEDIATE BUILDING NORTH AREA AND THE SECOND INSTRUMENT PANEL WILL BE INSTALLED IN THE CHARGING PUMP ROOM.

DUE TO MAJOR REVISIONS OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA PRIOR TO PORC APPROVAL, REVISION 0 WAS NOT PRESENTED TO PORC.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE: 1) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRE, AND 2) A SEISMIC EVENT.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.

EWR-4175

APPENDIX R STEEL PROTECTION

THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH PROVIDES A FIRE PROTECTIVE COATING FOR THOSE MEMBERS WHICH FORM OR SUPPORT A FIRE BARRIER STRUCTURAL STEEL IN THE "A" AND "B" BATTERY ROOM. THIS MODIFICATION IS NECESSARY TO COMPLY WITH 10CFR50 APPENDIX R.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE FIRE AND SEISMIC.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSIS DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS, THEREFORE BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATION AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED.



EWR-4190

AUTOMATIC BANKING SYSTEM

THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL PROVIDE AN AUTOMATIC BANKING SYSTEM IN THE CAFETERIA AT GINNA STATION. THE MODIFICATION CONSISTS OF INSTALLING A FREE STANDING CONSOLE AT THE NORTH END OF THE CAFETERIA AND MOUNTING A CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION CAMERA ON AN ADJACENT WALL. THE ENTIRE SYSTEM INCLUDING SECURITY WILL BE CONTROLLED FROM THE BANK CENTRAL OFFICE.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE LOSS OF AC POWER, FIRE AND SEISMIC.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.5 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-4215

SPARE BATTERY CELL CHARGER AND POWER FEED

THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL PROVIDE A PERMANENT 120 VAC POWER FEED AND CHARGER SYSTEM TO THE THREE (3) SPARE NAX-1200 BATTERY CELLS, UTILIZING THE VACANT COMPUTER BATTERY RACK IN THE "A" BATTERY ROOM AS A MEANS OF CONTAINING THE CELLS. THE THREE (3) NAX-1200 BATTERY CELLS ARE RETAINED AS SPARES AS PART OF THE "A" AND "B" VITAL BATTERY SYSTEM INSTALLED UNDER EWR-3891.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES, AND A SEISMIC EVENT.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.1 TO 4.3 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.



ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF WESTINGHOUSE DB BREAKERS

THE PURPOSE OF THIS TEST IS TO ESTABLISH ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF THE 1B CHARGING PUMP/BUS 16 SUPPLY BREAKERS AND THE REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS. SPECIFIC CABLE SAMPLES WILL ALSO BE INCLUDED IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL TEST. THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROFILES WILL MODEL A HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING AND INTERMEDIATE BUILDING.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION FSAR. AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY NRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATING TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE: 1) PIPE BREAK OUTSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING.

SPARE BREAKERS PURCHASED PER EWR 3700 ARE MAINTAINED AT GINNA STATION FOR USE IN THE EVENT OF A HELB IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING. THE DB-50 AND DB-75 BREAKERS WILL BE REMOVED FROM GINNA STATION JUST PRIOR TO THE 1987 REFUELING OUTAGE. WHEN THE PLANT IS IN COLD SHUTDOWN THE SUBJECT BREAKERS ARE NOT NECESSARY SINCE THE CHARGING PUMPS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE AUX. BLDG. STEAM HEATING LINE BREAK. THIS WILL MINIMIZE THE IMPACT OF NOT HAVING DEDICATED BREAKERS ON-SITE.

DURING THE TIME THAT THE BREAKERS ARE NOT ON SITE, AND GINNA IS IN OPERATION (ABOVE HOT SHUTDOWN), THERE WILL BE ONCE-PER-SHIFT INSPECTIONS OF THE AUXILIARY BUILDING TO DETECT ANY NOTICEABLE DEGRADATION (LEAKAGE) OF STEAM PIPING. THIS APPROACH WAS ACCEPTABLE DURING SEP TOPIC III-5.B REVIEW, UNTIL SPARE BREAKERS WERE PROCURED, AND IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THE SHORT PERIOD OF TIME INVOLVED WILL NOT RESULT IN ANY UNACCEPTABLE CONDITION. THIS WILL BE NECESSARY ONLY IF:

A. THE BREAKERS FAIL THE ENVIRONMENTAL TEST.

AND

B. WILL NOT BE RETURNED TO GINNA PRIOR TO RETURN TO POWER.

THEREFORE, BASED UPON THE ABOVE ANALYSES, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT:

A. THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE STATION ARE NOT REDUCED AND

B. THE STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS ARE ADEQUATE.



EWR-4273

DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM VENTILATION

THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH CONSISTS OF A THERMOSTAT INSTALLED IN EACH DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM TO MAINTAIN THE TEMPERATURE OF THE SENSING LINE ABOVE 32°F. UNDER THE PRESENT DESIGN, DURING COLD WEATHER THE ROOM VENTILATION CAUSES THE JACKET WATER PRESSURE SENSING LINE TO FREEZE. THE INSTALLATION OF THIS MODIFICATION WILL ELIMINATE THE PRESENT PROBLEM.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE: FIRES, SEISMIC EVENTS AND LOSS OF OFF-SIDE POWER.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-4309

SPENT FUEL POOL BRIDGE UPGRADE

THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSING THE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL MODIFY THE EXISTING SPENT FUEL BRIDGE CRANE TO INCREASE ITS CAPACITY TO 4000# AND ALSO ALLOW A 2-TON HOIST TO BE PLACED ON THE 5-TON AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE. THE UPGRADING CAPACITY OF THE SPENT FUEL POOL BRIDGE EAST MONORAIL IS REQUIRED FOR HANDLING THE CONSOLIDATED FUEL OPERATIONS. ONCE THESE OPERATIONS ARE COMPLETED, THE CAPACITY OF THE CRANE WILL BE RETURNED TO THE ORIGINAL LOAD CAPACITY EVEN THOUGH THE STRUCTURAL ADDITIONS ARE LEFT IN PLACE.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE: FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENTS, SEISMIC EVENTS, FIRES, LOSS OF A.C. POWER AND "CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS" GUIDE LINE (NUREG-0612).





BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-4323

A AND B BATTERY ROOM VENTILATION

THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL PROVIDE PROPER CONTROL OF THE SPACE TEMPERATURES AT THE A AND B BATTERY ROOMS SINCE THE TEMPERATURE CONDITIONS AFFECT THE STORAGE CAPACITY OF THE BATTERIES LOCATED WITHIN THE A AND B BATTERY ROOMS. THIS MODIFICATION IS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN SPACE TEMPERATURES WITHIN THE NORMAL OPERATING TEMPERATURE RANGE IN WHICH THE STORAGE CAPACITY OF THE BATTERIES WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED. THIS MODIFICATION WILL HENCE IMPROVE EXISTING CONDITIONS FOR THE SAFE SHUTDOWN SCENARIO OF THE PLANT.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE:

- A - INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVENTS SUCH AS FIRE, FLOODS, STORMS, AND EARTHQUAKES.
- B - LOSS OF AC POWER TO THE AREA WHERE THE MODIFICATION IS TO OCCUR.

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.4 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.



EWR-4374

CONTROL ROOM LIGHTING UPGRADE

THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL UPGRADE THE CONTROL ROOM CEILING LIGHTING SYSTEM. TEST DATA FROM A LIGHTING SURVEY TAKEN BY A.R.D. CORP. HAS REVEALED THAT THE EXISTING LIGHTING SYSTEM DOES NOT MEET THE GUIDELINES OF NUREG 0700, SECTION 6. AS A RESULT, BOTH THE NORMAL AND EMERGENCY LIGHTING SYSTEMS WILL BE UPGRADED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CURRENT INDUSTRY STANDARDS.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE:

- 1) MAJOR AND MINOR FIRES
- 2) SEISMIC EVENT
- 3) LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER

BASED UPON THE ANALYSES DESCRIBED UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.1 TO 4.3 OF THE SAFETY ANALYSIS, IT HAS THEREFORE, BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.

EWR-4496

SAFETY CAGE FOR LADDER IN RHR PIT

THIS EWR (ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST) ADDRESSES THE MODIFICATION TO INSTALL A LADDER CAGE FOR THE RHR PIT LADDER.

THE LADDER PROVIDING ACCESS FROM ELEVATION 235'-8" IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING TO ELEVATION 219'-0" IN THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP PIT CURRENTLY HAS NO ANTI-FALL DEVICE. ALTHOUGH NOT REQUIRED BY OSHA REGULATIONS, THE GINNA STATION SAFETY COMMITTEE HAS RECOMMENDED INSTALLATION OF SUCH A DEVICE.

A REVIEW HAS BEEN MADE OF ALL EVENTS ANALYZED IN THE GINNA STATION UFSAR AND THE EVENTS REQUIRING ANALYSIS BY THE USNRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.70. THE EVENTS RELATED TO THIS MODIFICATION ARE OPERATING BASIS, SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKES AND FIRE.



THE CONNECTION OF THE CAGE TO LADDER AND TO THE LADDER ITSELF WILL BE DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND SSE LOADS. THE REMAINING PARTS OF THE CAGE WILL BE DESIGNED TO NOT AFFECT SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT SHOULD FAILURE OCCUR.

BECAUSE THE CAGE WILL WITHSTAND SSE LOADS, THE MODIFICATION WILL NOT CHANGE (1) THE ASSUMPTIONS IN THE FSAR AND ITS SUPPLEMENTS OR IN THE UFSAR, (2) THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF OBE OR SSE EVENTS, OR (3) THE CONSEQUENCES OF OBE OR SSE EVENTS.

THIS MODIFICATION WILL BE REVIEWED PER ENGINEERING PROCEDURE QE 326 TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF 10CFR50 APPENDIX R AND THE FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE.

BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE UFSAR, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE MARGINS OF SAFETY DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURING THE LIFE OF THE PLANT HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ADEQUACY OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS PROVIDED FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MODIFICATION.



## SECTION B - COMPLETED STATION MODIFICATIONS (SMs)

This section contains a description of station modification procedures performed in the facility as described in the safety analysis report. Station modification procedures are written to complete a portion of an Engineering Work Request (EWR) identified by the same parent number. Station Modifications are reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee to ensure that no unreviewed safety questions or Technical Specification changes are involved with the procedure.

The basis for inclusion of an SM in this section is closure of the SM where portions of the parent EWR, in the form of other SMs or other documentation, remain to be completed.





SM-1594.1

SERVICE WATER 10" AND 6" RETURN PIPING TIE-INS FOR THE NEW AND SKID S.F.P. HEAT EXCHANGERS

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF THE 10" AND 6" SERVICE WATER RETURN PIPING TIE-INS FOR THE NEW AND SKID MOUNTED S.F.P. HEAT EXCHANGERS. MANUAL BUTTERFLY VALVES WILL BE INSTALLED TO PROVIDE ISOLATION.

SM-1594.2

SERVICE WATER 6" SUPPLY PIPING TIE-IN

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF SERVICE WATER 6" SUPPLY PIPING TIE-IN FOR THE SKID MOUNTED SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER.

SM-1594.3

SERVICE WATER 10" SUPPLY PIPING TIE-IN

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF SERVICE WATER 10" SUPPLY PIPING TIE-IN FOR THE NEW SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER.

SM-1594.4

10" AND 6" HILLS MC CANNA BUTTERFLY VALVES(S) LEAK RATE TEST

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TESTING OF THE TWO 10" AND 6" HILLS MC CANNA BUTTERFLY VALVES.

SM-2504.19

CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE SUPPLY SYSTEM ELECTRICAL ACCEPTANCE TEST

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE ELECTRICAL ACCEPTANCE TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF THE CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE SUPPLY SYSTEM AT PENETRATION 309.

SM-2504.21

INSTALLATION OF CABLES R3210 AND R3214 FOR THE CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE SYSTEM

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF CABLES R3210 AND R3214 FROM THE RELAY ROOM TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING.



SM-2504.22

RELOCATION OF R.C.D.T. VENT LINE IN CONTAINMENT

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF THE R.C.D.T. VENT LINE RELOCATED IN CONTAINMENT.

SM-2504.23

MINI-PURGE SYSTEM MECHANICAL INSTALLATION AT PENETRATION 132 (V7971) - AUXILIARY BUILDING

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF NEW MINI-PURGE EXHAUST VALVE AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS AT PENETRATION 132.

SM-2504.24

MINI-PURGE SYSTEM MECHANICAL INSTALLATION AT PENETRATION 132 (V7970) CONTAINMENT BUILDING

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF THE NEW MINI-PURGE SUPPLY VALVE AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS AT PENETRATION 132.

SM-2512.115

SEISMIC UPGRADE OF PIPE SUPPORTS ANALYSIS LINES SW-1000 (SERVICE WATER HEADER) AND CC-100, 300 (COMPONENT COOLING WATER) IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF MODIFICATIONS TO PIPE SUPPORTS ON ANALYSIS LINES SW-1000, CC-100, AND CC-300.

SM-2512.116

SEISMIC UPGRADE OF PIPE SUPPORTS - MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT AFU-87 ON ANALYSIS LINE AFW-200

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF ADDITIONAL WELDS AND PAINTING TO CLOSE OUT DISPOSITION OF NCR G-87-312.

SM-2512.118

SEISMIC UPGRADE OF PIPE SUPPORTS ON ANALYSIS LINES SW-1100 AND SW-1410; SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF MODIFICATIONS TO EXISTING SUPPORTS ON SERVICE WATER PIPING IN THE HOT INTERMEDIATE AND AUXILIARY BUILDINGS: ANALYSIS LINES SW-1100 AND SW-1410.



SM-2602.3

PRESSURIZER INSULATION INSTALLATION

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF SUPPORT RINGS, THERMOCOUPLES, AND REFLECTIVE INSULATION ON THE TOP OF THE PRESSURIZER.

SM-3059.1

PRESSURIZER HATCH BLOCK MODIFICATION

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO INSTALL STRUCTURAL STEEL FRAMING ON THE PRESSURIZER HATCH BLOCK CENTER SECTION.

SM-3092.4

BORIC ACID PIPING UPGRADE - MOV ELECTRICAL REMOVALS AND REINSTALLATION

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTROL THE REMOVAL, INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF ELECTRICAL CIRCUITRY ASSOCIATED WITH SPECIFIC MOTOR OPERATED VALVES TO ACCOMMODATE THE BORIC ACID PIPING UPGRADE MODIFICATION.

SM-3092.7

BORIC ACID PIPING UPGRADE HEAT TRACE INSTALLATION AND INSULATION

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF HEAT TRACING CIRCUITS, APPLICATION OF INSULATING MATERIALS, AND TURNOVER OF THE BORIC ACID PIPING HEAT TRACE SYSTEM FOR THE BORIC ACID PIPING UPGRADE MODIFICATION.

SM-3092.8

BORIC ACID PIPING UPGRADE - HEAT TRACE TESTING

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO DIRECT AND DOCUMENT TESTING OF HEAT TRACING.

SM-3092.9.

BORIC ACID PIPING UPGRADE (BAPU) - PIPE SUPPORT REWORK OF SUPPORT SIU-107, SIU-108, SIU-109, AND RHU-114, RHU-122

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF BORIC ACID PIPING PIPE SUPPORT REWORK FOR SUPPORT SIU-107, SIU-108, SIU-109, AND RHU-114, RHU-122.



SM-3258.3

INSTALLATION OF REMOTE HANDWHEEL OPERATORS - EIGHT INCH CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER OUTLET VALVES V-4629, V-4630, V-4643, AND V-4644

THE PURPOSE OF NEW PROCEDURE IS TO DIRECT/DOCUMENT INSTALLATION OF LOCAL VALVE OPERATORS.

SM-3272.1

PPCS/SAS ELECTRICAL INSTALLATIONS AND INITIAL START-UP OF TSC COMPUTER EQUIPMENT

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, START-UP AND TURNOVER OF THE PPCS/SAS ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT AND COMPUTER EQUIPMENT IN THE TSC AND RELAY ROOM.

SM-3272.2

DETERMINATION AND REMOVAL OF P-250 COMPUTER

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE REMOVAL AND DETERMINATION OF THE P-250 COMPUTER.

SM-3272.3

INSTALLATION OF STRUCTURAL STEEL MUX CABINETS AND AUX. TERMINATION ENCLOSURE IN COMPUTER ROOM

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE STRUCTURAL STEEL AND MUX CABINETS INSTALLED IN THE COMPUTER ROOM.

SM-3272.4

TERMINATION OF COMPUTER INPUTS TO MUX CABINETS AND AUX. TERMINATIONS ENCLOSURE

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TERMINATION OF COMPUTER INPUTS TO THE MUX CABINETS AND AUX. TERMINATION ENCLOSURE.

SM-3272.5

INSTALLATION AND START-UP OF PPCS/SAS COMPUTER HARDWARE AND ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO ADD STARTUP OF MUX. CABINETS, AUX. TERMINATION ENCLOSURES AND CONTROL ROOM EQUIPMENT.





SM-3272.9

PPCS AND SAS DISPLAY OPERABILITY TEST

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO ALLOW TESTING OF PPCS/SAS DISPLAYS AND COMPUTER EQUIPMENT.

SM-3272.11

TERMINATION OF CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE AND DEW POINT INPUTS TO MUX CABINETS

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO INSTALL, TEST, AND TURNOVER CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE AND DEW POINT INPUTS TO THE SAS/PPCS COMPUTER SYSTEM.

SM-3296.26

STRUCTURAL UPGRADE - AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOF, LOW AND HIGH ELEVATIONS

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE STRUCTURAL UPGRADE OF THE AUXILIARY BUILDING - LOW AND HIGH ROOF.

SM-3296.27

STRUCTURAL UPGRADE - REROUTING OF CONDUITS ZA30A, ZA30B, AND ASSOCIATED WIRING

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE REMOVAL AND REINSTALLATION, TESTING AND TURNOVER OF MODIFIED FIRE DETECTION CIRCUITS CONTAINED IN CONDUITS ZA30A AND ZA30B.

SM-3296.1644

STRUCTURAL UPGRADE - AUXILIARY BUILDING NORTH WALL

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO DIRECT AND DOCUMENT UPGRADE OF AUX BUILDING NORTH WALL.

SM-3296.1660

STRUCTURAL UPGRADE - INTERMEDIATE BUILDING PLATFORM, ELEVATION 267'-3"

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO DOCUMENT/DIRECT MODIFICATION OF STRUCTURAL MEMBERS SUPPORTING INTERMEDIATE BUILDING PLATFORM AT ELEVATION 267'-3".



SM-3296.1660A

RELOCATION OF MECHANICAL/ELECTRICAL INTERFERENCES: COLUMN G<sub>2</sub> - 4C

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF MODIFICATIONS TO EXISTING PIPE SUPPORTS, CONDUIT SUPPORTS, INSTRUMENTATION SUPPORTS AND RELOCATION OF AN EXISTING INSTRUMENT AIR LINE - ALL ASSOCIATED WITH THE AREA ADJACENT TO COLUMN G<sub>2</sub> - 4C.

SM-3296.1660B

STRUCTURAL UPGRADE COLUMN G<sub>2</sub> - 4C, INTERMEDIATE BUILDING, ELEVATION 253'-6"

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED TO UPGRADE COLUMN G<sub>2</sub> - 4C LOCATED IN THE INTERMEDIATE BUILDING.

SM-3319.25

MCC-1D BREAKER REPLACEMENT

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS FOR BREAKER REPLACEMENT AT SPECIFIED POSITIONS ON MCC-1D. THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO PROVIDE PROPER BREAKER COORDINATION.

SM-3319.27

FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF REPLACEMENT BREAKERS ON MCC-1D AND MCC-1J

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY DIRECTION TO ALLOW FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF THE REPLACEMENT BREAKERS ON MCC-1D AND MCC-1J. THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO PROVIDE PROPER BREAKER COORDINATION.

SM-3319.28

MCC-1J BREAKER REPLACEMENT

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS FOR BREAKER REPLACEMENT AS SPECIFIED POSITIONS ON MCC-1J. THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO PROVIDE BREAKER COORDINATION.

SM-3319.29

MCC-1A BREAKER REPLACEMENT

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS FOR BREAKER REPLACEMENT AT SPECIFIED POSITIONS ON MCC-1A. THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO PROVIDE BREAKER COORDINATION.



SM-3319.41

TROUBLESHOOTING WESTINGHOUSE TYPE W MOTOR CONTROLLER TRIPS

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO PROVIDE BREAKER FAILURE TROUBLESHOOTING DIRECTIONS.

SM-3319.46

MCC-1F BREAKER REPLACEMENT

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO DIRECT/DOCUMENT BREAKER REPLACEMENT.

SM-3319.47

TESTING OF BREAKERS REPLACED ON MCC-1F

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO DIRECT/DOCUMENT TESTING OF BREAKERS ON MCC-1F.

SM-3681.3

INSTALLATION OF PULL POINT #3 FOR GSU TRANSFORMER

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL INSTALLATION OF MATERIALS TO PROVIDE A PULL-POINT ATTACHMENT NORTH OF THE GSU TRANSFORMER.

SM-3692.1

STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ROOM SERVICE WATER SUPPORTS: ANCHOR BOLT REPLACEMENT

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO DIRECT AND DOCUMENT ANCHOR BOLT UPGRADE OF SERVICE WATER SUPPORTS IN THE SAFW ROOM.

SM-3728.1

WASTE EVAPORATOR RECIRCULATION LINE MODIFICATION

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS CONTROL THE MECHANICAL INSTALLATION AND TESTING OF THE WASTE EVAPORATOR RECIRCULATION LINE FROM THE DRUMMING STATION TO THE WASTE EVAPORATOR TANK.

SM-3728.2

WASTE EVAPORATOR RECIRCULATION LINE, HEAT TRACE INSTALLATION, TEST AND INSULATION

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TESTING OF THE WASTE EVAPORATOR RECIRCULATION LINE HEAT TRACE, AND TURNOVER OF THE WASTE EVAPORATOR RECIRCULATION LINE MODIFICATION.



SM-3768.1

PENETRATION COOLING SYSTEM INLET DUCTWORK-MECHANICAL

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF DUCTWORK TIE-INS TO THE EXISTING INLET PLENUM FOR "A" AND "B" PENETRATION COOLING FANS.

SM-3817.4

CATALYTIC OXYGEN REMOVAL SYSTEM (CORS) ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO ALLOW WORK TO BE PERFORMED ON THE ELECTRICAL PORTIONS.

SM-3991.1

SEISMIC UPGRADE OF EXISTING CONNECTIONS AND ANCHORAGES ALONG COLUMN LINE 3 IN THE BASEMENT OF THE INTERMEDIATE BUILDING

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO DIRECT/DOCUMENT MODIFICATION TO STRUCTURAL MEMBERS.

SM-3991.3

SEISMIC UPGRADE TO EXISTING CONNECTIONS AND ANCHORAGES ALONG COLUMN LINE L (NORTH WALL AUXILIARY BUILDING) ABOVE ELEVATION 271'-0"

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO DIRECT/DOCUMENT STRUCTURAL MODIFICATIONS.

SM-4037.3

S.P.I.N.G. TO PPCS OPERABILITY TEST

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE NEW SOFTWARE INSTALLED ON THE PPCS. THIS SOFTWARE WILL ALLOW S.P.I.N.G. TERMINAL INFORMATION TO BE ACCESSED ON THE PPCS.

SM-4067.3

TRANSFER OF CONTROL FOR SWITCHES 6T13A72, 8X13A72, AND 91202 CONTROL FROM GINNA TO POWER CONTROL AND REMOVAL OF ASSOCIATED CIRCUIT CONTROLS FROM 115KV BENCHBOARD

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE WORK ASSOCIATED WITH SWITCHES 6T13A72, 8X13A72, AND 91202 AT GINNA.





SM-4067.4

OPERATIONAL TEST OF SWITCHES 6T13A72, 8X13A72, AND 91202 AT GINNA FOR CIRCUIT 912

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL TESTING OF SWITCHES 6T13A72, 8X13A72, AND 91202.

SM-4067.6

TRANSFER OF CONTROLS FOR SWITCHES 91102 AND 90912 FROM GINNA TO POWER CONTROL AND RELOCATION OF CIRCUITS FOR #1 GENERATOR AND #9 BUS TIE

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE WORK ASSOCIATED WITH SWITCHES 91102, 90912, 9X13A72, 1G13A71, 9X13A73, AND 1G13A72 AT GINNA.

SM-4067.7

OPERATIONAL TEST OF SWITCHES 91102, 90912, 76702, 9X13A72, 9X13A73, 1G13A72 AND 1G13A71

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS EWR-4062 115KV BENCHBOARD REPLACEMENT.

SM-4068.1

RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM UPGRADE

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO PROVIDE DIRECTION FOR RMS UPGRADE (EWR-4068).

SM-4068.2

WORK TO BE ACCOMPLISHED PRIOR TO THE DE-ENERGIZATION OF THE RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM (RMS) RACK #2

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS THE PRE-OUTAGE INSTALLATION OF RMS PHASE 2 HARDWARE.

SM-4068.3

REPLACEMENT OF THE RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM (RMS) PROCESS MONITORS R10A, R11, AND R12 (ELECTRICAL PORTION)

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO REPLACE R10A/R11/R12.



SM-4068.4

REPLACEMENT OF THE RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM (RMS) PROCESS MONITORS R10A, R11 AND R12 (MECHANICAL PORTION)

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF A PORTION OF THE RMS RACK #2 UPGRADE. (MECHANICAL PORTION, SEE SM-4068.3 FOR THE ELECTRICAL PORTION).

SM-4068.5

REPLACEMENT, TURNOVER, AND TESTING OF THE RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM (RMS) PROCESS MONITORS R10B, R13, AND R14 (ELECTRICAL PORTION)

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF VICTOREEN PROCESS MONITORS FOR R10B, R13, AND R14, ELECTRICAL PORTION (MECHANICAL PORTION IS SM-4068.6).

SM-4068.6

REPLACEMENT OF THE RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM (RMS) PROCESS MONITORS R10B, R13 AND R14 (MECHANICAL PORTION)

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF A PORTION OF THE RMS RACK #2 UPGRADE. (MECHANICAL PORTION, SEE SM-4068.5 FOR THE ELECTRICAL PORTION).

SM-4075.4

TSC HVAC CONTROL SYSTEM TEST

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO PERFORM FUNCTIONAL TESTING TO VERIFY THE PROPER OPERATIONS OF VARIOUS DAMPER ACTUATORS AND CONTROL DEVICES UNDER THE VARIOUS MODES OF OPERATION OF THE TSC HVAC SYSTEM.

SM-4075.6

TSC HVAC DUCTWORK AND CONTROL SYSTEM REWORK

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF THE HVAC DUCTWORK DAMPERS AND THE MODIFICATION OF MICROPROCESSOR CONTROL SYSTEM FOR THE TSC HVAC SYSTEM.

SM-4118.1

PRE-OUTAGE PORTION OF THE RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW INDICATION

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF PREOUTAGE CONSTRUCTION TO PROVIDE RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW INDICATION IN THE CONTROL ROOM.



SM-4225.1

INSTALLATION AND TESTING OF AN AMPTECTOR OVERCURRENT DEVICE ON BUS 17 POSITION 26D

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO DIRECT/DOCUMENT MODIFICATION OF THE MOTOR DRIVEN FIRE PUMP BREAKER.

SM-4225.2

INSTALLATION AND TESTING OF AMPECTOR OVERCURRENT DEVICES ON BUS 14 POSITION 22B AND BUS 16 POSITION 16A

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO DIRECT/DOCUMENT MODIFICATION OF THE PRESSURIZER CONTROL AND BACKUP HEATER BREAKERS.

SM-4225.3

INSTALLATION AND TESTING OF AMPTECTOR OVERCURRENT DEVICES ON BUS 13, POSITION 9D AND BUS 15, POSITION 2A

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO DIRECT/DOCUMENT MODIFICATION OF THE 1A AND 1B ROD DRIVE MOTOR GENERATOR BREAKERS.

SM-4225.11

REPLACEMENT OF LOCAL PUSHBUTTONS ON 480V BREAKER 26D FIRE PUMP ON BUS 17

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO INSTALL NEW LOCAL BREAKER PUSHBUTTONS ON MD FIRE PUMP.

SM-4225.12

INSTALLATION AND TESTING OF LOCAL PUSHBUTTONS ON BREAKER 27A INTAKE HEATER 1B ON BUS 17

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO INSTALL A NEW DOOR MOUNTED SWITCH BRACKET AND LOCAL PUSHBUTTONS ON 480V BREAKERS HAVING INTERFERENCE WITH THE AMPTECTOR OVERCURRENT DEVICES INSTALLED USING M-32.8.

SM-4225.13

INSTALLATION AND TESTING OF LOCAL PUSHBUTTONS ON BREAKER 27B INTAKE HEATER 1D ON BUS 17

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO INSTALL A NEW DOOR MOUNTED SWITCH BRACKET AND LOCAL PUSHBUTTONS ON 480V BREAKERS HAVING INTERFERENCE WITH THE AMPTECTOR OVERCURRENT DEVICES INSTALLED USING M-32.8.



SM-4225.14

INSTALLATION AND TESTING OF LOCAL PUSHBUTTONS ON BREAKER 29A  
INTAKE HEATER 1A ON BUS 18

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO INSTALL A NEW DOOR MOUNTED SWITCH BRACKET AND LOCAL PUSHBUTTONS ON 480V BREAKERS HAVING INTERFERENCE WITH THE AMPTECTOR OVERCURRENT DEVICES INSTALLED USING M-32.8.

SM-4225.15

INSTALLATION AND TESTING OF LOCAL PUSHBUTTONS ON BREAKER 29B  
INTAKE HEATER 1C ON BUS 18

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO INSTALL A NEW DOOR MOUNTED SWITCH BRACKET AND LOCAL PUSHBUTTONS ON 480V BREAKERS HAVING INTERFERENCE WITH THE AMPTECTOR OVERCURRENT DEVICES INSTALLED USING M-32.8.

SM-4324.1

PIPE SUPPORT INSTALLATION FOR STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM  
MODIFICATION

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF PIPE SUPPORTS TO FACILITATE STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM MODIFICATION.

SM-4324.4

STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM PIPING INSTALLATION TESTING

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO PERFORM FLUSHING AND HYDROSTATIC TESTING ON THE S/G BLOWDOWN SYSTEM MODIFICATION OF THE NEW PIPING WHERE IT IS PRACTICAL.

SM-4498.1

INSTALLATION OF THE SCREENHOUSE ENVIRONMENTAL COMPOSITE SAMPLER  
SAMPLE CABINET

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO INSTALL NEW CABINET IN SCREENHOUSE TO HOUSE THE ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLER.

SM-4503.1

INSTALLATION OF THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER SUPPLEMENTAL  
UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY (UPS)

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF THE NEW UPS FOR THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER.





SM-4503.2

TESTING OF THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER SUPPLEMENTAL UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY (UPS)

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TESTING AND TURNOVER OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER SUPPLEMENTAL UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY.

SM-4526.1

"A" FUEL OIL SYSTEM MECHANICAL RECONSTRUCTION AND REMOVALS SUCTION/PRIMING TANK PIPING AND SUPPORTS

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF D/G "A" FUEL OIL SYSTEM MECHANICAL PORTION OF THE SUCTION AND PRIMING TANK PIPING SYSTEMS.

SM-4526.3

"B" FUEL OIL SYSTEM MECHANICAL RECONSTRUCTION AND REMOVALS SUCTION/PRIMING TANK PIPING AND SUPPORTS

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER OF D/G "B" FUEL OIL SYSTEM MECHANICAL PORTION OF THE SUCTION AND PRIMING TANK PIPING SYSTEMS.

SM-4526.5

D/G "A" FUEL OIL SYSTEM MECHANICAL RECONSTRUCTION AND REMOVALS DAY TANK INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM, STORAGE TANK FOOT VALVE, PUMP OUTLET PIPING MODIFICATION, AND PRESSURE GAUGE TUBING

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF MECHANICAL PORTION OF THE DAY TANK INSTRUMENTATION, STORAGE TANK FOOT VALVE, AND PUMP OUTLET PIPING REMOVALS AND RECONSTRUCTION.

SM-4526.6

D/G "B" FUEL OIL SYSTEM MECHANICAL RECONSTRUCTION AND REMOVALS DAY TANK INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM, STORAGE TANK FOOT VALVE, PUMP OUTLET PIPING MODIFICATION AND PRESSURE GAUGE TUBING

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF MECHANICAL PORTION OF THE DAY TANK INSTRUMENTATION, STORAGE TANK FOOT VALVE, AND PUMP OUTLET PIPING REMOVALS AND RECONSTRUCTION.



SM-4526.7

DIESEL FUEL OIL DUPLEX STRAINER INSTALLATION MECHANICAL

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF MECHANICAL PORTION OF THE DUPLEX STRAINER INSTALLATION.

SM-4526.12

CORE BORING THROUGH THE D/G BUILDING WALL

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE CORE BORING THROUGH THE D/G BUILDING WALL BETWEEN THE D/G ROOMS.

SM-4554.1

STRUCTURAL SUPPORT INSTALLATION FOR #4 HEATERS REPLACEMENT

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION OF STRUCTURAL SUPPORTS TO FACILITATE #4 HEATERS REPLACEMENT.

SM-4554.3

4A/4B HEATERS SYSTEM PIPING TESTING

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE TESTING AND TURNOVER OF THE 4A/4B HEATERS SYSTEM PIPING.

SM-4640.1

HU-1 TRANSFORMER DIFFERENTIAL RELAY MODIFICATION

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO CONTROL THE INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND TURNOVER OF THE HU-1 RELAY MODIFICATION FOR TRANSFORMER #1, TRANSFORMER #11, AND TRANSFORMER #12A.

SM-4657.1

STRUCTURAL UPGRADE - SERVICE BUILDING FLOOR, ELEVATION 271'-0", BETWEEN COLUMN LINES Ha2b AND Ja2b

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS TO DOCUMENT/DIRECT UPGRADE OF A FLOOR BEAM IN THE SERVICE BUILDING.



SECTION C - TEMPORARY BYPASS OF SAFETY FUNCTION,  
STRUCTURE FEATURES, SHIELDING, AND FLUID  
SYSTEM FEATURES

This section contains descriptions and summaries of safety evaluations of temporary changes pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59(b).



Safety Analysis  
Pressurizer Pressure Channel 449

1.0 Scope of Analysis

This analysis covers the installation of a current simulator signal to the current loop for pressure transmitter 449. This injected signal will effectively maintain the Low Pressurizer Pressure Bistable and the Overtemperature  $\Delta T$  pressure input in a non-trip condition regardless of actual system pressure. This arrangement is desired in order to vent the pressurizer common reference leg without challenging the reactor protection system while still maintaining compliance with the Technical Specifications.

This analysis provides the basis for justification that the below described process does not create an unreviewed safety question or involve a Technical Specification change. This meets the requirements of 10CFR50.59.

2.0 References

- 2.1 RG&E Drawing 33013-1258.
- 2.2 R.E. Ginna Technical Specifications Revision #24.
- 2.3 Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.59.
- 2.4 Ginna Updated Final Safety Analysis report.

3.0 Detailed Description

To prevent an inadvertent actuation of the reactor protection system while performing a reference leg venting process, it is desirable to effectively make inoperable one (1) pressurizer pressure channel 449. This channel provides the pressure factor input to the OT/ $\Delta T$  and is the normal controlling channel for PC431K. Since other protection and indication channels are also common to this reference leg, other considerations need to be addressed. In particular, transmitters PT431, LT428, LT428A, LT433 will be considered.

The intent of the below described actions is based on the premise that compliance with existing Technical Specifications and action statements thereto will be maintained.

To add further conservatism to the above process, all automatic protection features associated with PT-431 will be placed in the Trip Mode, therefore, insuring operability of these functions (performing the intended function in the intended manner). As stated in Ginna Technical Specification "Instrumentation Systems" and Table 3.5-1 "Protection System Instrumentation", operability of the specific protective functions will be provided for this channel satisfying the minimum channels operable.





Below is a listing of affected channels and the functions they perform:

PT-449

- Low Pressurizer Pressure Trip (Rate Sensitive)
  - Overtemperature  $\Delta T$
- $$\leq T_0 \left[ \frac{K_1 + K_2 (P - P^1) - K_3 (T - T^1)}{1 + \frac{1S}{2S}} \right] - f \Delta I$$

Where  $T_0 = 57^\circ F$

$P^1 = 2235$

$K_2 = .0009$

- 431K Pressure Controller
- Overpower  $\Delta T$

PT-431

- Low Pressurizer Pressure Trip Rate Sensitive
- High Pressurizer Pressure Trip
- Safety Injection
- Auto reset SI
- Overtemperature  $\Delta T$
- Overpower  $\Delta T$

LT-428

- Pressurizer - Hi Water Level

LT-428A

- Appendix "R" Local Indication

LT-433

- Cold Calibrated Pressurizer Level (Indication Only)

PT-449

- The low pressure trip will not be operable reducing the trip logic to 2 out of 3. Action Statement #2, pg. 3.5-13, allows one (1) hour to place in trip but furthermore may be bypassed for up to two (2) hours for surveillance testing.



- The OT/ $\Delta$ T will only affect the pressure input to the formula. Assuming worst case, the total contribution is  $K_2(P-P^1) = .0009(1700-2235)$   
 $= .48$   
 Again statement #2 pg. 3.5-13 applies as stated above.
- The 431K pressure controller will be transferred to control off of PT-429.
- The OP/ $\Delta$ T will not be affected by this process since there is no pressure input signal to this trip feature.

#### PT-431

- The low pressurizer trip function will be placed in the trip modes. Actuation of the bistable will occur giving a single channel alert. Note that the venting process will cause only a reduction in pressure. However, as further conservatism, procedurally this will be placed in the trip position as stated above.
- The high pressure trip will be placed in the trip mode to address the concern for the remote possibility of simultaneous venting in coincidence with an actual pressure increase in the system. New logic will now be 1/2.
- Since venting will only cause a reduction in reference leg pressure, the SI bistable may actuate if the setpoint is reached. This is conservative and will result in a new one out of two logic. Again this is only a single channel alert. As further conservatism the SI trip bistable will be placed in the trip position again reducing the logic to one out of two.
- Auto reset function will not be affected in that a change of state will not occur.
- The OT/ $\Delta$ T will potentially be affected should the venting process drop pressure to a point causing actuation of the bistable (approximately a 180 psi pressure drop). With the turbine in manual, no runback will occur. A single channel alert may occur. Procedurally this will be placed in the trip position.
- The OP/ $\Delta$ T will not be affected by this process since there is no pressure input signal to this trip feature.

#### LT-428

- Pressurizer Hi Level Trip has previously been placed in the Trip Mode and will remain as such throughout the venting process.



- These are for indication only and will not affect the controlling or protection circuitry.

### Safety Analysis

A review has been made of the Technical Specifications regarding Section 2.3 "Limiting Safety Systems Settings - Protection Instrumentation", Section 3.5 "Instrumentation Systems". the events associated with this specification are Overtemperature  $\Delta T$  protection, Low Pressurizer Pressure, High Pressurizer Pressure, Safety Injection and Pressurizer Hi Water Level. This is further delineated in Section 7.2 of the UFSAR.

This review is presented to insure the actions proposed will not result in a condition less conservative than those afforded by the Technical Specifications. By placing the protective features in the Trip Mode and compliance with the one (1) hour criteria, it is concluded that adequate protection is maintained and that failure modes considered will result in a conservative condition. This is based on the premise that the Ginna Technical Specification is bounded by the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and that compliance with the above ensures that the design basis is maintained. As described in the UFSAR Channel Testing is permitted as described in Section 7.2.4. Simulated signals are input into the test signal injection switch with appropriate interlocks and alarms to insure return to operability status.

With the observance of minimizing the venting process with the current simulator instated to a maximum of one (1) hour (procedurally directed in M-72.2) and with the following initial conditions:

- 431K switched to PT-429
- PT-431 High Pressure Trip Bistable positioned in the Trip Mode
- Reactor power < 100%
- Turbine in Manual
- PT-431 OT/ $\Delta T$  in Trip Mode
- PT-431 Safety Injection in Trip Mode
- PT-431 Low Pressure Trip in Trip Mode
- PT-431 OP/ $\Delta T$  in Trip Mode



It is concluded that:

The probability of occurrence of the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report will not be increased by the proposed installation.

The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis will not be created by the proposed installation.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced by the proposed installation.

The proposed installation does not involve an unreviewed safety question or require a Technical Specification change.





## Safety Analysis

## Defeat of Source Range Reinstatement Logic

1.0

SCOPE OF ANALYSIS:

This analysis covers the defeat of both NIS source range channels by placing the channels N-31 and N-32 in the trip bypass mode and removing their respective instrument power fuses. This will prevent inadvertent re-energization of the source range channels and subsequent reactor trip. This arrangement is desirable due to the failure of one of the two relays which provide source range block capabilities. This defeat also prevents damage to the source range detectors due to re-energization at a high flux level.

2.0

REFERENCES:

2.1

RG&amp;E Dwg. 110E053 Sht. 2 of 9.

2.2

R.E. Ginna Technical Specifications Rev. #24.

3.0

DETAILED DESCRIPTION:

To prevent an inadvertent actuation of the reactor protection system prior to replacing the 21 source range block relay and the 36 D-X intermediate range P-6 relay, it is desirable to place both NIS source range channels, N-31 and N-32, in the trip bypass mode and remove their respective instrument power fuses. This action will prevent re-energization of the source range channels if the redundant source range block relay (22) were to fail.

The source range channels provide low power startup protection and are normally de-energized at reactor power greater than an equivalent of  $10^{-10}$  amps on the intermediate range channels.



SAFETY ANALYSIS:

A review has been made of the Technical Specifications regarding Section 2.3 "Limiting Safety Systems Settings - Protection Instrumentation", and Section 3.5 "Instrumentation Systems".

This review is presented to ensure the actions proposed will not result in a condition less conservative than those afforded by the Technical Specifications. It is concluded that adequate protection is maintained and that failure modes considered will result in a conservative condition.

It is concluded that:

The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report will not be increased by the proposed installation.

The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis will not be created by the proposed installation.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced by the proposed installation.

The proposed installation does not involve an unreviewed safety question or require a Technical Specification change.



11/19/87

BORIC ACID HEAT TRACE SUPPORT EWR 3092B-2  
SCAFFOLD 87-90 OVER SAFETY INJECTION PUMP

Heat trace circuit support upgrade work is planned over the Safety Injection Pumps, and will require a work platform. The work is planned as pre-outage work.

Erection and use of scaffold in the intended location will not create a hazard to the Safety Injection Pumps provided it is seismically anchored. This structure shall be installed in accordance with guidance and a sketch which has been approved by Structural Engineering, attached.

Access ladders shall be tied off.

Constrain all planking and provide toe boards to minimize the potential for dropped objects.

Maintain access to valves for the purpose of testing and emergency operation, as well as to heat trace circuits and connections.

With observance of the above requirements, the installation will not 1) result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis in the Safety Analysis Report, 2) provide a change to the Plant Technical Specifications, or 3) involve an unreviewed safety question.



1/29/88

SAFETY INJECTION PIPE REPLACEMENT EWR-3092B  
WOOD BLOCKING AND SUPPORT STRUCTURE 88-22

To prevent movement of the piping sections to be cut, several measures are planned to be installed prior to shutdown. These involve placing wooden blocking and cribbing at pump suction from refueling water MOVs 825A and 825B, wooden blocking at a wall penetration, and steel structure which will fit under the overhead ductwork and be bolted to the floor, all as described and pictured in the attached, provided from Structural Engineering. The structure has been designed as seismic quality, as supported by the calculations provided. The blocking and cribbing will augment the support to the piping provided by existing supports.

The temporary supports will not 1) result in a change to the assumptions for the safety analyses in the Safety Analysis Report, 2) provide a change to the Plant Technical Specifications, or 3) involve an unreviewed safety question.





May 10, 1988

STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP BUILDING  
PIPE SUPPORT UPGRADE EWR-2512J

SCAFFOLD 88-83

A pipe support upgrade program has been prepared for the Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Building. Work platforms for the upper reaches of the pump rooms will be required for 5 to 6 months.

Since temporary platforms will exist over both trains of safeguards equipment for an extended period, special construction requirement are imposed as follows:

1. Seismic installation shall be in accordance with direction by Structural Engineering (Guidelines attached, recommendations upon inspection).
2. Inspection for adequacy of installation with Engineering approval.
3. Erection is allowed over one train of equipment at a time to preclude the potential of simultaneously jeopardizing both trains. Once approved as seismically qualified, authorized platform erection may begin over the second train of the standby Auxiliary Feedwater System.
4. Provide kickplates to prevent inadvertent dropping of material from platforms.
5. During scaffold erection, maintain accessibility for testing and emergency operation at instructions, controls and valves at the condensate supply tank, pump suction and discharge. Contact Gregg Joss (ext. 489) with any question on this.
6. Provide overhead protection for instrumentation and, during scaffold erection, extra care should be taken to prevent bumping with scaffold materials.

With the above requirements being observed, the scaffold installation will not 1) result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis in the Safety Analysis Report, 2) provide a change to the Plant Technical Specifications, or 3) involve an unreviewed safety question.



May 26, 1988

AUXILIARY BUILDING BACK DRAFT DAMPER EWR-3296C

SCAFFOLD 88-88

In order to install the planned damper, to be located on the Auxiliary Building north wall over MCC-1E, a scaffold will be needed. It will rise approximately 20 ft. from the floor. It will be in the vicinity of safeguards Bus 14. Since the duration of the scaffold installation is estimated to be 8 weeks, a seismic design was sought so that taking credit for operability of the redundant Bus 16 and its associated equipment would only be necessary during erection and teardown. Guidance for such installation has been provided by Rick Benway, Structural Engineering (attached).

In addition, the "A" Boric Acid Tank is within 30 ft. of the proposed scaffold. A wall approximately 15 ft. high surrounds the tanks and would impede any toppling effect of the scaffold when not seismic.

Project supervision shall contact the Shift Supervisor at three stages of this project. Prior to beginning erection permission to do so must be obtained since Bus 16 and its associated equipment shall be maintained as operable during the erection phase until assessed as meeting the seismic criteria provided. This period is expected to be 4 days at most. Project supervision shall notify the Shift Supervisor upon successful completion of the Engineering seismic assessment. Prior to beginning and during teardown, again, Bus 16 and its associated equipment shall be maintained as operable. Project supervision shall notify the Shift Supervisor of the planned activity and shall await permission from him to commence the activity.

Overhead protection of the electrical cabinets shall be provided in the form of cloth covers. These shall be placed in such a way as to avoid obstructing any cooling air pathway, particularly for the 14 transformer.

With observance of the operational and construction requirements above the installation will not 1) result in a change to the assumptions of the Safety Analysis Report 2) provide a change to Technical Specifications, or 3) involve an unreviewed safety question.



8/14/87

Spent Fuel Pool Filter Lead Stand 87-21

A shield stand has been in place by the Spent Fuel Pool Filter with the purpose of reducing doses for technicians taking monthly surveys to determine time of filter changeout and for pipefitters changing the filter.. It appears on a June 1979 survey map. The weight is estimated to be 320 lbs., occupying a floor area of approximately 2 ft<sup>2</sup>. This results in a floor loading well within the acceptable uniform live load for the floor in this area.

The Spent Fuel Pool Filter is non-seismic category, and the valves which constitute the boundaries with seismic Category I piping are exterior to the room containing the filter and shield.

This shield stand presents no potential hazard which cannot be coped with by isolating the filter from outside the room. UFSAR Section 9.1.3.2 describes the use of the filter in conjunction with the Spent Fuel Pool Demineralizer as maintaining clarity and purity of the pool water by handling approximately 10% of the cooling loop flow. As such it may be placed in service intermittently.

The shield stand does not 1), result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis in the Safety Analysis Report, 2) provide a change to the Plant Technical Specifications, or 3) involve an unreviewed safety question.

The shield stand is acceptable for continued existence pending review and evaluation for permanent use as originally intended.



SPENT FUEL POOL SKIMMER FILTER  
LEAD STAND 87-22

A shield stand has been in place by the Spent Fuel Pool Skimmer Filter with the purpose of reducing doses for Technicians taking monthly surveys to determine time of filter change-out, and for Pipefitters changing the filter. It appears on a February 1979 survey map. The weight is estimated to be 400 lbs., occupying a floor area of approximately 2 feet<sup>2</sup>. This results in a floor loading well within the acceptable uniform live load for the floor in this area. In addition the filter vessel itself is wrapped with 1/4 inch lead sheet. The weight of this wrapped lead is estimated to be 294 lbs., occupying a floor area of approximately 1.1 feet<sup>2</sup>. This is also less than the acceptable uniform live load for the floor in this area.

The Spent Fuel Pool Skimmer loop is non-seismic category.

The Spent Fuel Pool Skimmer Filter is only briefly mentioned, with its pump, in UFSAR Section 9.1.3.3 as "provided for surface skimming of the Spent Fuel Pool water". As such it is used intermittently. No other equipment within its vicinity is safety related.

The shield stand does not 1), result in a change to the assumptions of the analysis in the Safety Analysis Report, 2) provide a change to the Plant Technical Specifications, or 3) involve an unreviewed safety question.

The shield stand and lead wrapping are acceptable for continued existence pending review and evaluation for permanent use as originally intended.





1/4/88

STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN MONITOR R-19  
LEAD CAVE 87-23

The R-19 Blowdown monitor is located above the Nuclear Sample Room. Because of high background radiation a lead cave was installed surrounding the detector in early days of plant operation. It consists of approximately 130 lead bricks and 6ft<sup>2</sup> of 3/8" lead sheet with an estimated total lead of roughly 3125 lbs. occupying about 3.9ft<sup>2</sup>. In general, the piping to the immediate vicinity of the Nuclear Sample Room is non-seismic, with isolation remote from the area. Sample lines whose Seismic Category I isolation is within the room enter through the floor. These lines have isolation valves in the Auxiliary Building which are accessible, and are listed below.

Mixed Bed DI inlet sample root valve 987 (in NaOH Tk Rm)  
Mixed Bed DI outlet sample root valve 974 (by VCT Rm door)  
VCT Sample root valve 975 (by VCT Rm door)

The blowdown sample lines, described in USFAR Section 9.3.2.1.2, are among those with remote isolation valves, that is, outside the vicinity by the Containment wall.

In response to an Engineering Work Request, an inspection was made of the lead cave for the R19 blowdown monitor on the roof of the Nuclear Sampling Room in the Intermediate Building to make an evaluation of the load imposed by the lead cave on the sampling room roof. The inspection revealed that the lead cave is formed with lead bricks in a cube measuring twenty-nine (29) inches on a side and twenty-five (25) inches high. It is made up of one hundred and twenty (120) lead bricks used for the walls and a one-quarter (1/4) inch thick sheet of lead for the lid or top of the cave. The actual total weight of this assembly is approximately two thousand eight hundred and forty-six (2,846) pounds.

GAI drawing #B-431-006, Revision 0, dated 09/11/68 was referenced to obtain the physical dimensions of the roof slab and the arrangement of the steel reinforcement installed in the slab.

Calculations have been made to determine the design capacity of the Nuclear Sampling Room roof slab and the stresses imposed in the slab by the weight of the lead cave. These calculations show that the roof slab can adequately support the weight of the lead cave in accordance with the current ACI building code standards for reinforced concrete construction.

The lead cave installation will not 1) result in a change to the assumptions in the analysis in the Safety Analysis Report, 2) provide a change to the Plant Technical Specifications, or 3) involve an unreviewed safety question.



May 9, 1988

GAS ANALYZER REPLACEMENT EWR-4221  
TEMPORARY OXYGEN MONITOR 88-18

Affected drawing: 33013-1274 WASTE DISPOSAL- GAS H<sub>2</sub> & N<sub>2</sub> AND GAS ANALYZER (WD) P&ID

Affected procedure: None at present; New procedure HP-11.13, to be prepared and approved.

Instructions to Operations: The above procedure will be conducted by lab. personnel.

The present Gas Analyzer is to be replaced with a new Gas Analyzer Cabinet, requiring an interruption in operation of the normal Gas Analyzer. This is to be compensated for by using a temporary O<sub>2</sub> monitor, tying into Gas Decay Tank sample 3/8 in. tubing with poly tubing connected with tubing nuts. The temporary sampler will be operated by lab. personnel at pressures suitable for the sampler; however, the tubing to be used is more than capable of sustaining Full Gas Decay Tank Pressure. The outlet of the monitor is to be tied to the vent header as does the present Gas Analyzer. Pressure reduction from Gas Decay Tank pressure is accomplished at an installed reducer upstream of the Gas Analyzer and the temporary connection.

The installation will not result in a change to the assumptions in the Safety Analysis Report with utilization in accordance with procedure HP-11.13 as approved. It will not result in a change to Technical Specifications or involve an unreviewed safety question.



## SECTION D - PROCEDURE CHANGES

This section contains a description of the changes to procedures as described in the UFSAR and a summary of the safety evaluation pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59(b).



T-41E

PCN 87-3437

TURBINE DRIVEN AUX. FW LINE TO 1B S/G ISOLATION AND RESTORATION TO SERVICE

THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO PROVIDE A MEANS TO ISOLATE AND DRAIN THE AUX FW LINE FROM THE TURBINE DRIVEN FW PUMP TO THE "B" S/G FOR WORK ON CHECK VALVE 4004. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE PRE-PORC REVIEW OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE.

S-16.14.2

PCN 87-3697

ISOLATION AND DRAINING OF SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS SUCTION LINE FROM THE A BORIC ACID STORAGE TANK

THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO PROVIDE DIRECTION TO ISOLATE/DRAIN S.I. SUCTION FROM "A" B.A.S.T. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE PRE-PORC REVIEW OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE.

RF-63

PCN 88-4044

CYCLE XVII-XVIII REFUELING PROCEDURE

THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS FOR CYCLE XVII-XVIII REFUELING ACTIVITIES. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE PRE-PORC REVIEW OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE.

PT-37.11

PCN 88-4026

CONTAINMENT POST ACCIDENT CHARCOAL UNITS MASS AIR FLOW CHECK

THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO DETERMINE TOTAL AIR FLOW THROUGH CONTAINMENT POST ACCIDENT CHARCOAL UNITS. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE PRE-PORC REVIEW OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE.





AP-RHR.2

PCN 87-3668

LOSS OF RHR AT LOW LOOP LEVELS

THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE IN THE EVENT OF A LOSS OF RHR COOLING AT LOW LOOP LEVELS (I.E. AT INDICATED LOOP LEVELS OF LESS THAN 84 INCHES). THIS ACTION WAS TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO NRC GENERIC LETTER 87-12. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURES SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE ON 1/20/88 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE.

M-72.4

PCN 88-2138

PRESSURIZER LEVEL REFERENCE LEG FILLING

THE PURPOSE OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE IS TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS FOR BACKFILLING THE REFERENCE LEG PIPING ON THE PRESSURIZER LEVEL SENSING LINES. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE PRE-PORC REVIEW OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS NEW PROCEDURE.



CP-11

PCN 87T-595

CALIBRATION AND/OR MAINTENANCE OF P.L.P. RACK MODULES

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW ONLY: THE PCN REVISED THE INITIAL CONDITIONS AND ADDED SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO PERMIT AT POWER REPAIR OF CONTROLLER PC-431H WHICH WAS EXPERIENCING MANUAL TO AUTO TRANSFER PROBLEMS. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THEIR RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PORC REVIEW ONLY.

PT-2.2

PCN 87T-786

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM

THE PROC. SPEC. PRESENTED THIS PCN FOR PORC REVIEW ONLY: TO PERFORM RHR RECIRCULATION TEST AS PART OF THIS PROCEDURE. THE COMMITTEE REVIEWED AND RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PCN FOR PORC REVIEW ONLY.

O-2.3.1

PCN 88T-124

DRAINING THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW ONLY: THIS PCN CHANGED THE GROSS ACTIVITY LIMIT TO ALLOW RCS DRAINDOWN TO START. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THEIR RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PORC REVIEW ONLY.

RF-63

PCN 88T-120

CYCLE XVII-XVIII REFUELING PROCEDURE

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW ONLY: 1) HOISTS HAVE CHAIN LINK NOT CABLE, 2) FUEL ASSEMBLIES WERE NOT ROTATED. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THEIR RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PORC REVIEW ONLY.



O-1.1E

PCN 88T-562

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR HEATING THE REACTOR  
COOLANT SYSTEM GREATER THAN 350 DEGREES F

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW ONLY: THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE ALLOWED HEATING REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM >350°F WITHOUT RADIATION ACCIDENT MONITORING (SPING) SYSTEM BEING OPERABLE AS REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THIS WAS A ONE TIME ONLY EXEMPTION. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THEIR RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PORC REVIEW ONLY.

S-25.5

PCN 88T-542

STEAM GENERATORS RADIOACTIVE RELEASE

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW ONLY: TO ALLOW DRAINING OF THE STEAM GENERATORS THROUGH TEMPORARY HOSES AND CONNECTIONS INSTEAD OF INSTALLED PIPING. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THEIR RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PORC REVIEW ONLY.

PT-13.4.28

PCN 88T-668

HALON SYSTEM TESTING COMPUTER ROOM (S07)

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW ONLY: TO ALLOW FOR ACCEPTANCE TESTING OF S07 COMPUTER ROOM HALON SYSTEM FOLLOWING HARDWARE UPGRADE. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THEIR RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PORC REVIEW ONLY.



S-30.4

PCN 88T-678

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM VALVE AND BREAKER POSITION VERIFICATION

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW ONLY: STEP 5.11 REVISED; SOLENOID STRAINER BROKE T/E IN., DELETED SOME STEPS DUE TO MOV-3505A ISOLATED AND TEST TAGGED FOR MOVATS, A-52.4 (LCO) IN ON TDAFW PUMP. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THEIR RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PORC REVIEW ONLY.

PT-5.10

PCN 88T-694

PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR PROTECTION CHANNEL TRIP TEST (CHANNEL 1 RED)

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW ONLY: THIS PCN TERMINATED TRIP TEST PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF PROCEDURE AND REINSTATED CHANNEL #1, RACK #1 DUE TO PLANT PROBLEMS (PZR PRES. 431K). THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THEIR RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PORC REVIEW ONLY.

PT-2.10.5

PCN 88T-763

MSIV EXERCISING REQUIREMENTS - REFUELING OUTAGE

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW ONLY: TO ALLOW STROKINGS OF MSIV'S AT CURRENT PLANT CONDITIONS. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THEIR RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PORC REVIEW ONLY.

M-51.1

PCN 88T-782

CHANGING OF A REACTOR PROTECTION RELAY

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW ONLY: TO ALLOW THE REPLACEMENT OF RELAY FC-411X AT POWER. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THEIR RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PORC REVIEW ONLY.





O-1.1

PCN 88T-822

PLANT HEATUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT SHUTDOWN

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW ONLY: TO ALLOW WITHDRAWAL OF S/D BANK SO THAT WE MEET THE ASSUMPTION MADE IN PURPOSE OF O-1.2 WITH PRESENT PLANT CONDITIONS. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THEIR RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PORC REVIEW ONLY.



PR-7.2

PCN 87-4184

PROTECTIVE RELAY CALIBRATION #12B TRANSFORMER AND 34 KV RELAYING

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES BE MADE TO TIME LEVER SETTING AND TIME TOLERANCES (RELAY SETTING CHANGED 4/29/87). THE COMMITTEE REVIEWED AND RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

CP-409

PCN 87-2307

CALIBRATION AND/OR MAINTENANCE OF REACTOR COOLANT TEMPERATURE, COLD LEG, "409B"

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE ESTABLISHED NEW HI AND LO SETPOINTS. THE COMMITTEE REVIEWED AND RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

CP-410

PCN 87-2308

CALIBRATION AND/OR MAINTENANCE OF REACTOR COOLANT TEMPERATURE, COLD LEG, "410B"

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE ESTABLISHED NEW HI AND LO SETPOINTS. THE COMMITTEE REVIEWED AND RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

AR-AA-6

PCN 87-3547

RCS OVERPRESSURE ARM/INHIBIT LOOP A SELECT

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT CHANGED THE RCS COLD LEG TEMPERATURE SETPOINTS. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE PRE-PORC REVIEW OF THIS PCN AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.



CP-35

PCN 87T-645

INTERMEDIATE RANGE N-35 CALIBRATION AND/OR MAINTENANCE

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE DUE TO NEW CALCULATED TRIP AND ROD STOP SETPOINTS FOR HIGHER LEAKAGE FROM CORE. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.

CP-36

PCN 87T-646

INTERMEDIATE RANGE N-36 CALIBRATION AND/OR MAINTENANCE

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE DUE TO NEW CALCULATED TRIP AND ROD STOP SETPOINTS FOR HIGHER LEAKAGE FROM CORE. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.

PT-13.4.24

PCN 87-4252

MULTIMATIC VALVE TESTING-SUPPRESSION SYSTEM #S17 SCREENHOUSE BSMT  
AUTO DELUGE

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES BE MADE TO ELIMINATE USE OF BEEHIVE SMOKER, AND MANUAL CONTROL PUSHBUTTON, TO ADD NEW ATTACHMENT 1, AND TO CORRECT TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS. THE COMMITTEE REVIEWED AND RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

AR-WD-47

PCN 87-3579

PLANT STACK RAD MONITOR HI

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED THIS PROCEDURE BE DELETED BECAUSE THE ALARM HAS BEEN DISCONNECTED. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE SECTION MANAGER THAT THIS PROCEDURE BE DELETED, AND RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PCN FOR PROCEDURE DELETION.



O-5.1

PCN 87T-681

LOAD REDUCTIONS

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE TO ALLOW FOR ISOLATION OF SERVICE WATER TO MAIN FEED PUMPS AT PUMP RATHER THAN AT SERVICE WATER HEADER. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.

PT-17.4

PCN 87-4266

CONTROL ROOM RADIATION R-36, R-37, R-38 AND TOXIC GAS MONITOR OPERABILITY TEST

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES BE MADE TO REFLECT RECENT CHANGE OF SETPOINTS DUE TO DETECTOR REPLACEMENT. THE COMMITTEE REVIEWED AND RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

O-6.13

PCN 87T-695, 87T-696, 87-3632

DAILY SURVEILLANCE LOG

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE TO ALLOW THE PLANT TO UTILIZE EXCESS LETDOWN OR BE ABLE TO CHOOSE ANY DESIRED LETDOWN ORIFICE TO BE PLACED IN SERVICE WHILE OPERATING OR IN HOT SHUTDOWN, TO ADD TWO "T" SIGNAL VALVES AND REMOVE FOUR VALVES THAT ARE CHECKED IN A PREVIOUS STEP, AND TO UPDATE THE DAILY LOG. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.





PT-6.2

PCN 87T-694

N.I.S. INTERMEDIATE RANGE CHANNELS CHANNEL NO.

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE TO CHANGE THE N.I.S. INTERMEDIATE RANGE RODSTOP AND REACTOR TRIP BISTABLE SETPOINTS IN THE PT TO THE NEW VALUES AS CHANGED ON 10/6/87 AND 10/7/87, AS PER TROUBLE CARD. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.

AP-CCW.3

PCN 87-3533

LOSS OF CCW - PLANT SHUTDOWN

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO ALLOW MANUAL START OF PUMP AND TO ADD A SUBSTEP TO CHECK NATURAL CIRC IF REQUIRED. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 87/09/24 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

AP-RCP.1

PCN 87-3495

RCP SEAL MALFUNCTION

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE PER A CHANGE IN RCP LOW SEAL LEAKOFF SETPOINT. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 87/09/24 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.



ECA-3.1

PCN 87-3541

SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT - SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE BECAUSE OF A SETPOINT CHANGE.  
THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE  
REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 87/09/24 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL  
COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL  
OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

ER-ELEC.6

PCN 87-3639

RESTORATION OF OFFSITE POWER USING 12B TRANSFORMER TO BACKFEED  
BUS 12A

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE BECAUSE THE CABLE ROUTE HAS BEEN  
CHANGED TO FACILITATE CHANGING OUT 12A TRANSFORMER, IF NECESSARY.  
THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE  
REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 87/10/20 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL  
COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL  
OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

AP-CVCS.2

PCN 87-3455

IMMEDIATE BORATION

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO CHANGE METHODOLOGY FOR EMERGENCY  
BORATION. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOM-  
MITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 87/10/20 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT  
ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED  
APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

PT-1

PCN 87T-716



ROD CONTROL SYSTEM

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE TO PREVENT SPURIOUS SIGNALS FROM MRPI CAUSING TURBINE RUNBACK. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.

T-64.4027

PCN 87T-754, 87T-762

MOV-4027 ISOLATION AND RESTORATION FOR "MOVATS" TESTING

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE BECAUSE THREE PUMPS PROVIDE SUFFICIENT PRESSURE, TO CORRECT A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR, AND TO ADD PROPER VALUES AND NUMBERS. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.

CP-210B

PCN 87-2465

CALIBRATION AND/OR MAINTENANCE OF RMS CHANNEL R-10B (PLANT VENT IODINE)

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO OPEN TOLERANCES TO A MORE REALISTIC VALUE OF 1% INSTEAD OF .1%. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.



O-6.13

PCN 88-3020

DAILY SURVEILLANCE LOG

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO INCORPORATE CONCERNS OF SINGLE  
FAILURE ON SI RECIRCULATION PER INTERNAL RG&E LETTER. THE  
COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

O-2.5

PCN 88-3019

PLANT SHUTDOWN FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO COLD SHUTDOWN WHEN CONDENSER  
STEAM DUMP IS UNAVAILABLE

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO INCORPORATE CONCERNS OF SINGLE  
FAILURE ON SI RECIRCULATION PER INTERNAL RG&E LETTER. THE  
COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

S-13C

PCN 88-3022

1A RHR HEAT EXCHANGER ISOLATION AND RESTORATION

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO INCORPORATE CONCERNS OF SINGLE  
FAILURE ON SI RECIRCULATION PER INTERNAL RG&E LETTER. THE  
COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

S-13A

PCN 88-3021

RHR SYSTEM LINEUP FOR SAFETY INJECTION

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO INCORPORATE CONCERNS OF SINGLE  
FAILURE ON SI RECIRCULATION PER INTERNAL RG&E LETTER. THE  
COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.





S-13F

PCN 88-3023

1B RHR HEAT EXCHANGER ISOLATION AND RESTORATION

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO INCORPORATE CONCERNS OF SINGLE FAILURE ON SI RECIRCULATION PER INTERNAL RG&E LETTER. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

O-2.4

PCN 88-3018

NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO COLD SHUTDOWN

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO INCORPORATE CONCERNS OF SINGLE FAILURE ON SI RECIRCULATION PER INTERNAL RG&E LETTER. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

E-0

PCN 88-3037

REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO INCORPORATE CONCERNS ON RHR PUMPS MINI-FLOW RECIRCULATION PER INTERNAL RG&E LETTER. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 88/01/18 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

ECA-3.2

PCN 88-3033

SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT - SATURATED RECOVERY DESIRED

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO ADD RHR PUMP TRIP/RESTART CRITERION TO THE FOLDOUT PAGE BECAUSE OF RHR PUMP MINI-FLOW RECIRCULATION CONCERNS PER INTERNAL RG&E LETTER. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 88/01/18 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.



ES-0.0

PCN 88-3038

REDIAGNOSIS

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:

IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO ADD RHR PUMP TRIP/RESTART CRITERION TO THE FOLDOUT PAGE BECAUSE OF RHR PUMP MINI-FLOW RECIRCULATION CONCERNS PER INTERNAL RG&E LETTER. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 88/01/18 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

ECA-2.1

PCN 88-3041

UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF BOTH STEAM GENERATORS

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:

IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO ADD RHR PUMP TRIP/RESTART CRITERION TO THE FOLDOUT PAGE BECAUSE OF RHR PUMP MINI-FLOW RECIRCULATION CONCERNS PER INTERNAL RG&E LETTER. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 88/01/18 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

ES-1.2

PCN 88-3040

POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:

IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO ADD RHR PUMP TRIP/RESTART CRITERION TO THE FOLDOUT PAGE BECAUSE OF RHR PUMP MINI-FLOW RECIRCULATION CONCERNS PER INTERNAL RG&E LETTER. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 88/01/18 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.



ECA-0.2

PCN 88-3039

LOSS OF ALL AC POWER RECOVERY WITH SI REQUIRED

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO INCORPORATE CONCERNS ON RHR PUMPS MINI-FLOW RECIRCULATION PER INTERNAL RG&E LETTER. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 88/01/18 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

ECA-3.1

PCN 88-3042

SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT - SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO ADD RHR PUMP TRIP/RESTART CRITERION TO THE FOLDOUT PAGE BECAUSE OF RHR PUMP MINI-FLOW RECIRCULATION CONCERNS PER INTERNAL RG&E LETTER. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 88/01/18 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

ES-1.3

PCN 88-3034

TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO INCORPORATE CONCERNS ON RHR PUMPS MINI-FLOW RECIRCULATION PER INTERNAL RG&E LETTER. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 88/01/18 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.



E-1

PCN 88-3036

LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO ADD RHR PUMP TRIP/RESTART CRITERION TO THE FOLDOUT PAGE BECAUSE OF RHR PUMP MINI-FLOW RECIRCULATION CONCERNS PER INTERNAL RG&E LETTER. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 88/01/18 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

E-3

PCN 88-3035

STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO ADD RHR PUMP TRIP/RESTART CRITERION TO THE FOLDOUT PAGE BECAUSE OF RHR PUMP MINI-FLOW RECIRCULATION CONCERNS PER INTERNAL RG&E LETTER. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW OF THIS PCN ON 88/01/18 AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

CP-44

PCN 87-2488, 88-2079

CALIBRATION AND/OR MAINTENANCE OF POWER RANGE N-44

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE FOR 3 YEAR REVIEW, TO CORRECT DELTA FLUX INDICATOR SECTION OF PROCEDURE. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE PRE-PORC REVIEW OF THIS PCN AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.





PT-2.5.5

PCN 88-4038

AIR/SOLENOID OPERATED VALVES, QUARTERLY SURVEILLANCE CLEAN  
INTERMEDIATE BUILDING

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO ADD VALVE LOCATIONS AND  
RE-ARRANGE TESTING SEQUENCE. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL  
OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

CP-421

PCN 88T-054

CALIBRATION AND/OR MAINTENANCE OF PRESSURIZER SURGE LINE TEMPERA-  
TURE LOOP T-421

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC  
REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND  
PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF  
THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE TOLERANCE FOR CALIBRATION FROM 1% TO 2%,  
DUE TO THE USE OF AN RTD OTHER THAN WHICH WAS SPECIFIED. THE  
COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION  
FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.

O-2.5

PCN 88T-090, 88T-097, 88T-101

PLANT SHUTDOWN FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO COLD SHUTDOWN WHEN CONDENSER  
STEAM DUMP IS UNAVAILABLE

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC  
REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND  
PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF  
THIS PROCEDURE FOR TECH SPEC COMPLIANCE, PREVENT ACCUMULATOR  
OPERATION AT REDUCED RCS PRESSURE, AND TO CHANGE THE DESIRED  
SETPOINT FOR DRAINING LOOPS. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY  
APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN  
FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.



O-2.2

PCN 88T-076, 88T-089

PLANT SHUTDOWN FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO COLD CONDITION

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE TO ALLOW FOR MINI-PURGE SYSTEM TO BE IN OPERATION TO SATISFY THE PURGING REQUIREMENTS, AND FOR TECH SPEC COMPLIANCE, AND OTHER MINOR CHANGES. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.

O-7

PCN 88T-098

ALIGNMENT AND OPERATION OF THE REACTOR VESSEL OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEM

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE BECAUSE THE ALARM SETPOINT HAS BEEN CHANGED TO 350°F ON COOLDOWN. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.

RSSP-2.2

PCN 88-4068

DIESEL GENERATOR LOAD AND SAFEGUARD SEQUENCE TEST

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO INCORPORATE MANUAL START OF CV SPRAY PUMP WITH ASSOCIATED TRAIN UNDERGOING TEST, ADD MOV DISCHARGE VALVES ASSOCIATED WITH CV SPRAY PUMPS, AND TO RENUMBER AFFECTED STEPS. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.



PT-5.20

PCN 88-4073, 88-4043

PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR PROTECTION CHANNEL TRIP TEST  
(CHANNEL 2 WHITE)

THE PROC. SPEC. PRESENTED THIS PCN:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES BE MADE TO INSURE Q UPPER CONTROLLER IS  
RETURNED TO AUTOMATIC AND TO CORRECT COMPONENT DESIGNATION. THE  
COMMITTEE REVIEWED AND RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE  
CHANGE.

PT-12.2

PCN 88-4082

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR 1B

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES BE MADE TO CORRECT TERMINOLOGY; TO PREVENT  
LEVEL SWITCH DAMAGE; AND TO MAKE CHANGES PER STATION MODIFICATION.  
THE COMMITTEE REVIEWED AND RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE  
CHANGE.

RF-2E

PCN 88T-226, 88-4076, 88-4081

DRAINING OF REFUELING CANAL

THESE PCNs WERE PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
THEY REQUESTED CHANGES BE MADE TO IMPROVE FLOW OF PROCEDURE,  
INCLUDE PREVIOUSLY OMITTED VALVES, AND REMIND CONTROL ROOM  
PERSONNEL TO LOG RCS WATER LEVEL WHEN IT IS BELOW THE PZR LEVEL  
INDICATORS' RANGE. THE COMMITTEE REVIEWED AND RECOMMENDED  
APPROVAL OF THESE PROCEDURE CHANGES.

PT-34.4

PCN 88-4098

RCC BANK BORON END POINT CONCENTRATION

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO CHANGE BORON ENDPOINT TEST  
REQUIREMENT PER ANSI/ANS-19.6.1 REQUIREMENTS. BORON ENDPOINT  
TEST WILL BE PERFORMED ONLY IF THE BANK IN QUESTION DOES NOT PASS  
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA PER PT-34.3. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED  
APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.



PT-34.0

PCN 88-4094

STARTUP PHYSICS TEST PROGRAM

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE AS ANSI/ANS-19.6.1 STANDARD ONLY  
REQUIRES ONE METHOD TO MEASURE CONTROL ROD WORTH. THIS PCN  
CHANGES THE BORON ENDPOINT CONCENTRATION TEST FROM A REQUIREMENT  
TO AN OPTION, TO BE PERFORMED IF THE BANK DOES NOT MEET THE  
ACCEPTABLE CRITERIA AS TESTED IN PT-34.3. THE COMMITTEE RECOM-  
MENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

PT-37.11

PCN 88-4079

CONTAINMENT POST ACCIDENT CHARCOAL UNITS MASS AIR FLOW CHECK

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO CHANGE ACCEPTABLE FLOW VALUES  
AS PER ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT'S ACCIDENT ANALYSIS REVIEW. THE  
COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

O-7

PCN 88T-412

ALIGNMENT AND OPERATION OF THE REACTOR VESSEL OVERPRESSURE  
PROTECTION SYSTEM

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC  
REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND  
PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF  
THIS PROCEDURE TO ALLOW SI PUMPS IN THE TEST POSITION WHILE  
PERFORMING RSSP-2.1A. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY  
APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN  
FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.





RSSP-2.1A

PCN 88T-401, 88T-413

SAFETY INJECTION FUNCTIONAL TEST ALIGNMENT/REALIGNMENT

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC. REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE. VALVES 5709 AND 5710 HAVE BEEN PERMANENTLY REMOVED AND MUST BE REMOVED FROM THIS PROCEDURE; ADDITIONALLY UNDER CURRENT PLANT CONDITIONS ACTUAL S/G LEVELS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW AFW PUMPS BREAKERS TO BE PLACED IN AUTO. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.

RF-14.1.2

PCN 88T-421

THIMBLE INSERTION PROCEDURE FOR PLANT REFUELING

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC. REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE TO ALLOW HOOK-UP OF SUPPORTS PRIOR TO INSTALLING TUBING TO THIMBLES. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.

O-6.3.1

PCN 88-3190

STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN CORRECTION FACTOR

THE PROC. SPEC. PRESENTED THIS PCN:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES BE MADE TO REFLECT NEW BLOWDOWN HEAT RECOVERY SYSTEM AND NEW BLOWDOWN CORRECTION FACTOR SAFETY ANALYSIS. THE COMMITTEE REVIEWED AND RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.



P-9

PCN 88-3189

RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM

THE PROC. SPEC. PRESENTED THIS PCN:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES BE MADE TO MAKE SETPOINT CHANGES TO INCREASE SENSITIVITY TO PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAKAGE. THE COMMITTEE REVIEWED AND RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

CP-920

PCN 87-2397, 88-2025

CALIBRATION AND/OR MAINTENANCE "920" REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK LEVEL CHANNEL

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:

IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE AS A RESULT OF 3 YEAR REVIEW, AND ALSO TO REFLECT DELETION FROM EQ PROGRAM. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE PRE-PORC REVIEW OF THIS PCN AND THEIR CONCURRENCE THAT ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

CP-210A

PCN 87-2464

CALIBRATION AND/OR MAINTENANCE OF RMS CHANNEL R-10A (CONTAINMENT IODINE)

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:

IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO OPEN TOLERANCES TO A MORE REALISTIC VALUE OF  $\pm 1\%$  INSTEAD OF  $.1\%$ . THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

CP-2022A

PCN 87-2407, 87-2396, 88-2049

CALIBRATION AND/OR MAINTENANCE OF CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK LEVEL CHANNEL 2022A

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE AS A RESULT OF 3 YEAR REVIEW. PORTIONS DELETED FROM EQ PROGRAM. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.



CP-212

PCN 87-2467

CALIBRATION AND/OR MAINTENANCE OF RMS CHANNEL R-12 (CONTAINMENT GAS)

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO OPEN TOLERANCES TO A MORE REALISTIC VALUE OF  $\pm 1\%$  INSTEAD OF  $.1\%$ . THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

CP-2001

PCN 87-2399, 87-2387

CALIBRATION AND/OR MAINTENANCE OF 1A MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW LOOP 2001

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES BE MADE TO THE PROCEDURE TO REFLECT DELETION OF EQUIPMENT FROM EQ PROGRAM, ALSO TO MAKE DATA SHEETS CORRECT, AND INCORPORATE REQUIREMENTS FOR USE OF MAINTENANCE HISTORY REVIEW SHEETS. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

CP-64

PCN 88T-495

CALIBRATION AND/OR MAINTENANCE OF THE "A" OR "B" EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR INSTRUMENTATION

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES BE MADE IN LEVEL SETPOINT. THE COMMITTEE REVIEWED AND RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

CP-211

PCN 87-2466

CALIBRATION AND/OR MAINTENANCE OF RMS CHANNEL R-11 (CONTAINMENT PARTICULATE)

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO OPEN TOLERANCES TO A MORE REALISTIC VALUE OF  $\pm 1\%$  INSTEAD OF  $.1\%$ . THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.



S-27.427

PCN 88T-549

ISOLATION AND RETURN TO SERVICE OF LETDOWN ISOLATION VALVE FROM  
"B" RCS LOOP AOV-427

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE ALLOWS THIS PROCEDURE TO BE USED IN VARIOUS PLANT CONDITIONS. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.

ES-1.3

PCN 88T-550

TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE BECAUSE OF SW FLOW CONCERNS, AND CCW HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY. THIS PROCEDURE WAS REVIEWED BY EPC COMMITTEE MEMBERS ON 88/03/05. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.

S-27.294/296/392A

PCN 88T-548

ISOLATION OF AOV-294, AOV-296, OR AOV-392A

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE ALLOWS THIS PROCEDURE TO BE USED UNDER VARIOUS PLANT CONDITIONS. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.





O-2.3.1

PCN 88T-605, 88-3210

DRAINING THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE TO ALLOW USE OF THE MINI-PURGE SYSTEM DURING RCS DRAINDOWN, AND TO ENSURE A VENT FLOW PATH FROM THE REACTOR VESSEL HEAD. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.

O-6.6

PCN 88-3222

CORRECTED MEASURED BORON CONCENTRATION TO REFERENCE FULL POWER EXPECTED BORON CONCENTRATION

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO REFLECT CYCLE 18 PARAMETERS.  
THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

PT-2.7

PCN 88T-672

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE TO INSURE FLOW TO FAN COOLERS ON A SINGLE FAILURE CRITERIA. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.

PT-6.2

PCN 88-4158

N.I.S. INTERMEDIATE RANGE CHANNELS  
CHANNEL NO.

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO IMPROVE LEVEL OF REVIEW AND REFLECT PROPER LIMIT FOR 10<sup>-11</sup> AMP SWITCH POSITION. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.



P-9

PCN 88T-682

RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE TO PREVENT ALARMS (SPURIOUS) DURING INTERMITTENT SPIKES. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.

O-11

PCN 88T-698

CONTROL OF MINI-PURGE EXHAUST VALVES WHILE DEPRESSURIZING CONTAINMENT

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE. THE UFSAR (SECTION 6.2.1.4) AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (SECTION 3.6) STATE THAT CNMT PRESSURE IS ADMINISTRATIVELY CONTROLLED BETWEEN  $-.2$  AND  $+.5$ . NEW VALUES IN THE PROCEDURE WILL FACILITATE CONTROL WITHIN THESE VALUES. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.

CP-2030

PCN 88T-716

CALIBRATION AND/OR MAINTENANCE OF 1B MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE LOOP 2030

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE TO ALLOW CALIBRATION OF PI-2190A WITHOUT CALIBRATING THE COMPLETE LOOP. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.



CP-15

PCN 88T-737

CALIBRATION AND/OR MAINTENANCE OF REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL MEASUREMENT SYSTEM "LOOP A"

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE TO REFLECT SETPOINT CHANGES. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.

CP-18

PCN 88T-745

CALIBRATION AND/OR MAINTENANCE OF REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL MEASUREMENT SYSTEM "LOOP B"

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE. THE SETPOINT FOR THE S.I. FLOW ALARM MODULE WAS CHANGED FROM 0.5 VDC TO 1.0 VDC. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.

EM-665

PCN 88T-766

INSTALL AND WELD CAP DOWNSTREAM RCS HEAD VENT SOLENOIDS SV 591 AND SV 993

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE TO ALLOW STEPS 5.6, 5.6.1 AND 5.7 TO BE CONDUCTED IN ANY SEQUENCE. THIS WILL RESULT IN COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURE A-503. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.



T-4F

PCN 88-3308

RESTORING 1B FEEDWATER PUMP TO SERVICE AFTER MAINTENANCE OR POWER REDUCTION

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE BECAUSE IT IS NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE A 40°F  $\Delta$  T BECAUSE OF ROOM TEMPERATURE, TC SENSITIVITY, ETC. ALSO TO CHANGE THE TITLE TO INCLUDE STARTING A PUMP AFTER A POWER REDUCTION. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

T-4E

PCN 88-3307

RESTORING 1A FEEDWATER PUMP TO SERVICE AFTER MAINTENANCE OR POWER REDUCTION

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE BECAUSE IT IS NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE A 40°F  $\Delta$  T BECAUSE OF ROOM TEMPERATURE, TC SENSITIVITY, ETC., ALSO TO CHANGE THE TITLE TO INCLUDE STARTING A PUMP AFTER A POWER REDUCTION. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.

CP-18

PCN 88T-770, 88T-767

CALIBRATION AND/OR MAINTENANCE OF REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL MEASUREMENT SYSTEM LOOP B

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE PER ECN 2799-32 RECALCULATIONS FOR 1 RCP AND 2 RCP RUNNING (PCN 88T-770), AND TO ALLOW FOR VENTING OF TRANSMITTER LT-490A AND LT-490B SENSING LINES (PCN 88T-767). THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.





CP-15

PCN 88T-771, 88T-768 .

CALIBRATION AND/OR MAINTENANCE OF REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL MEASUREMENT SYSTEM LOOP

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE DUE TO ECN 2799-32 RECALCULATIONS FOR 1 RCP AND 2 RCP RUNNING (PCN 88T-771), AND TO ALLOW FOR VENTING OF TRANSMITTER LT-490A AND LT-490B SENSING LINES (PCN 88T-768). THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE..

P-1

PCN 88T-795

REACTOR CONTROL AND PROTECTION SYSTEM

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE BECAUSE THE LIMIT OF 573.5 CURRENTLY SPECIFIED IN P-1 IS OVERCONSERVATIVE AND SHOULD BE CHANGED TO REFLECT TRUE AVERAGE TEMPERATURE LIMIT GIVEN ACCIDENT ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.

PT-2.5.4

PCN 88-4225

AIR OPERATED VALVES, QUARTERLY SURVEILLANCE CONTROLLED INTERMEDIATE BUILDING

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO ESTABLISH NEW ACCEPTABLE STROKE TIMES FOR AOV-966B FOLLOWING VALVE MAINTENANCE (REPACKING).  
THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.



PT-6.2

PCN 88T-824, 88-4237

N.I.S. INTERMEDIATE RANGE CHANNELS

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE FOR PORC REVIEW OF THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND PLANT STAFF MEMBER AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PERMANENT CHANGE OF THIS PROCEDURE BECAUSE NEW SETPOINTS INSTALLED FOR CYCLE 18 (88T-824), AND TO ESTABLISH TOLERANCES WHEN CALCULATING LOOP WIDTH (88-4237). THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY APPROVAL AND THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PORC CONCURRENCE OF THIS PCN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE.

CP-2039

PCN 87-2282

CHECK AND/OR MAINTENANCE OF SUMP "A" LEVEL CONTROL AND ALARM SWITCHES

THIS PCN WAS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE:  
IT REQUESTED CHANGES TO BE MADE TO SETPOINTS AS PER PC-25.6 AND INTER OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE LETTER "TECHNICAL EVALUATION", DATED 7-16-87. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE.



## SECTION E - COMPLETED SPECIAL TESTS (ST) AND EXPERIMENTS

This section is to contain a description of special tests and experiments performed in the facility, pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59(b). Within the time frame of this report, there was one conducted.



## ST-87.001 BORIC ACID TREATMENT TESTING

### SCOPE OF ANALYSIS

This analysis addresses the consequences of boric acid injection to the Ginna secondary system. Short-term injection (approximately 10 days) is being pursued as part of a test program to further characterize the impact of boric acid treatment on condensate polisher effluent quality.

### SAFETY ANALYSIS

A review has been made of the potential impact of boric acid injection to a condensate polisher bed on secondary system corrosion and the maintenance of acceptable system chemistry controls.

Boric Acid treatment has been qualified for field use by Westinghouse and other NSSS suppliers. This treatment is being utilized at approximately 20 operating plants to counter denting and tube support plate IGA/SCC.

Field experience with the treatment is extensive and dates back to 1978. Based on published laboratory evaluations and these field experiences, no significant degradation of steam generator, high-energy piping, heater, condenser, or turbine materials is expected due to the presence of boric acid. Any potential for degradation is being limited by restricting injection to a single polisher vessel and testing on a short-term basis.

Chemistry control specifications for boric acid treatment have been addressed in the existing PWR Secondary Water Chemistry Guidelines. Temporary incorporation of appropriate new limitations for certain parameters into Plant Procedure WC-15 (Secondary Water Chemistry Monitoring) will ensure conformance to accepted water quality standards.

The installation of the tubing necessary for injection and sampling on one polisher vessel will be processed per the Plant Temporary Modification Program.

### PRELIMINARY SAFETY EVALUATION

The probability of occurrence and the consequences of an accident or malfunction of the equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report are not increased.

The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a type different from any previously evaluated in the Safety Report has not been created.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

Therefore, the proposed special test does not involve an unreviewed safety question. No changes to the Technical Specification are required as the result of this special test to maintain the present margins of safety.





All of the above were reviewed by the PORC committee with respect to the Technical Specifications and the committee has determined that no Technical Specification changes or violations were involved.

Additionally, these changes were reviewed in committee to determine if they presented an Unreviewed Safety Question and the general summations of these reviews are as follows:

1. These changes do not increase the probability of occurrence, or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR, because:

These changes were made to ensure continued operability/availability of plant equipment and will not result in any equipment being operated outside of its normal operating range. This results in continued operability/availability of equipment important to safety. These changes additionally will not result in a change of operating characteristics of equipment used in transient/accident mitigation which precludes an increase in the probability of occurrence of an accident. Because these changes ensure continued availability of plant equipment, the limits shown in the Technical Specifications, and the assumptions of the safety analyses of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report continue to be met. As a result there is no increase in the consequences of any presently postulated accident.

2. These changes do not create the possibility for a new or different kind of accident, or a malfunction of a different type from any accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR because:

These changes do not present new failure mechanisms outside of those presently anticipated, and are bounded by the events contained in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

3. These changes do not reduce the margin of safety because:

Present margins as contained in the Technical Specifications are valid, and these procedure changes are made within those limits. These procedure changes will not result in violating the baseline assumptions made for equipment availability in the Technical Specifications, and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

