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LEVINE,J.M. Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power
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SUBJECT: Special rept 2-SR-92-004:on 921222,Control Room personnel declared PASS inoperable due to failure of containment air flow indicator & indication of water leakage.Actions to prevent recurrance will be developed.

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Arizona Public Service Company
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
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JAMES M LEVINE
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

192-00823-JML/TRB/NLT
January 24, 1993

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
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Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sirs:

Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit 2
Docket No. STN 50-529 (License No. NPF-51)
Special Report 2-SR-92-004
File: 93-020-404

Attached please find Special Report 2-SR-92-004 prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 and TS 6.9.2. This report discusses the Post Accident Sampling System being inoperable for greater than seven (7) days. A copy of the Special Report is being forwarded to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region V.

If you have any questions, please contact Thomas R. Bradish, Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs at (602) 393-5421.

Sincerely,

James M. Levine

JML/TRB/NLT

Attachment

cc: W. F. Conway (all with attachment)
J. B. Martin
J. A. Sloan

IE22
1/1

ATTACHMENT

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 2
POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE
GREATER THAN SEVEN DAYS

Docket No. 50-529

License No. NPF-51

Special Report No. 2-SR-92-004

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 2
POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE
GREATER THAN SEVEN DAYS

Docket No. 50-529

License No. NPF-51

Special Report No. 2-SR-92-004

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

This Special Report is being submitted pursuant to Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 and TS 6.9.2 to report an event in which the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) was inoperable for a period greater than seven (7) days. The seven-day period for returning PASS to service was exceeded at approximately 0830 MST on December 29, 1992.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

PASS is designed to sample reactor coolant and containment atmosphere under post accident conditions. The liquid sample portion of the system provides pressurized and depressurized reactor coolant samples as required for analysis. The gas sample portion of the system provides containment atmosphere samples as required for analysis.

ACTIONS TAKEN:

On December 22, 1992, Palo Verde Unit 2 was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) when Control Room personnel declared PASS inoperable at approximately 0830 MST due to the failure of the containment air flow indicator and the indication of water leakage at the PASS reactor coolant system sample septum. The Preplanned Alternate Sampling Program was initiated in accordance with TS 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28.

The failures were identified during the performance of the TS monthly functional surveillance. On December 23, 1992, the containment air flow indicator was repaired and tested. On December 24, 1992, troubleshooting commenced to identify the source of the leakage. The troubleshooting involved extensive coordination between Unit 2 Maintenance and Unit 2 Chemistry personnel to simulate system parameters and valve lineups necessary to draw the reactor coolant system pressurized sample. The source of the leakage was difficult to identify and the replacement of multiple valves was required in order to obtain a pressurized sample and declare the system operable.

On January 3, 1993, following restoration of PASS, a pressurized sample was obtained and the acceptance criteria for the monthly functional surveillance requirement was met. The work documents were closed on January 5, 1993.

CAUSE OF THE INOPERABILITY:

An investigation is being performed in accordance with the PVNGS Incident Investigation Program. As part of this investigation, the cause of the inoperability is being evaluated and appropriate actions to prevent recurrence will be developed. The investigation is scheduled to be completed by March 31, 1993. The results of the investigation will be provided in a supplement to this report. The supplement is expected to be submitted by April 30, 1993.

PLANS AND SCHEDULE FOR RESTORING THE SYSTEM TO SERVICE:

Following satisfactory completion of repairs and required surveillance testing, PASS was returned to OPERABLE status at approximately 1545 MST on January 5, 1993.