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 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 LEVINE,J.M. Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power
 RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
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SUBJECT: Special Rept 3-SR-92-004:seven-day period for returning PASS
 to svc exceeded on 920817.On 920902,discovered that PASS
 unable to draw vacuum on gaseous sample bomb.Possibly caused
 by maint on 920810.PASS reworked & operability restored.

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NOTES:Standardized plant.

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Arizona Public Service Company

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
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JAMES M. LEVINE
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

192-00801-JML/TRB/JJN
September 18, 1992

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
Dear Sirs:

Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit 3
Docket No. STN 50-530 (License No. NPF-74)
Special Report 3-SR-92-004
File: 92-020-404

Enclosed please find Special Report 3-SR-92-004 prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 and 6.9.2. This report is being resubmitted to correct the report number since 3-SR-92-003 had been previously used. This report discusses the Post Accident Sampling System being inoperable for greater than seven days. A copy of the Special Report is being forwarded to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region V.

If you have any questions, please contact Thomas R. Bradish at (602) 393-5421.

Sincerely,



JML/TRB/JJN/pmm

Enclosure

cc: W. F. Conway (all w/enclosure)
J. B. Martin
J. A. Sloan

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PDR ADDCK 05000530
S PDR

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ENCLOSURE

**POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE
GREATER THAN SEVEN DAYS**

**PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 1
POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE
GREATER THAN SEVEN DAYS**

LICENSE NO. NPF-74

DOCKET NO. 50-530

SPECIAL REPORT 3-SR-92-004

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

This Special Report is being submitted pursuant to Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 and TS 6.9.2 to report an event in which the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) was inoperable for a period greater than seven days. The seven-day period for returning PASS to service was exceeded at approximately 1005 MST on August 17, 1992.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

PASS is designed to sample reactor coolant and containment atmosphere under post accident conditions. The liquid sample portion of the system provides pressurized and depressurized reactor coolant samples as required for analysis. The gas sample portion of the system provides containment atmosphere samples as required for analysis.

ACTIONS TAKEN:

On August 10, 1992, Palo Verde Unit 3 was in Mode 1 (power operation) when PASS was declared inoperable at approximately 1000 MST for maintenance. Following the completion of work at approximately 1503 MST on August 10, 1992, PASS was declared operable.

On September 2, 1992, Chemistry Technicians discovered that the PASS was unable to draw a vacuum on the gaseous sample bomb. Initial troubleshooting determined on September 4, 1992, that the maintenance performed on August 10, 1992, may have caused the PASS to be inoperable. The PASS was reworked and operability was restored on September 5, 1992.

CAUSE OF THE INOPERABILITY:

APS is currently investigating this event and will provide the results of this investigation in a supplement to this report. This supplement is expected to be submitted by November 1, 1992.

PLANS AND SCHEDULE FOR RESTORING THE SYSTEM TO SERVICE:

Following satisfactory completion of repairs and required surveillance testing, PASS was returned to OPERABLE status at approximately 2137 on September 5, 1992.

