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ACCESSION NBR:8802220028 DOC.DATE: 88/02/16 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL:STN-50-529 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Arizona Publi 05000529
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 RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 88-002-00:on 880118,ASME Section XI surveillance test
 interval exceeded.

W/8 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 4
 TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:Standardized plant.

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Arizona Nuclear Power Project

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192-00345-JGH/TDS/DAJ
February 16, 1988

NRC Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sirs:

Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit 2
Docket No. STN 50-529 (License No. NPF-51)
Licensee Event Report 2-88-002-00
File: 88-020-404

Attached please find Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 88-002-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10CFR 50.73. In accordance with 10CFR 50.73(d), we are herewith forwarding a copy of the LER to the Regional Administrator of the Region V office.

If you have any questions, please contact T. D. Shriver, Compliance Manager at (602) 393-2521.

Very truly yours,

J. G. Haynes
Vice President
Nuclear Production

JGH/TDS/DAJ/kj

Attachment

cc: O. M. DeMichele (all w/a)
E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
J. B. Martin
T. J. Polich
R. C. Sorenson
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A. C. Gehr
INPO Records Center

IE22
1/1

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Palo Verde Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 5 2 9	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)

ASME Section XI Surveillance Test Interval Exceeded

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES					DOCKET NUMBER(S)														
0	1	1	6	8	8	8	8	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	1	6	8	8	N/A	0	5	0	0	0				
OPERATING MODE (9)			1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																								
POWER LEVEL (10)		1	0	0	20.402(b)				20.406(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)											
					20.406(a)(1)(i)				50.38(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)											
					20.406(a)(1)(ii)				50.38(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 355A)											
					20.406(a)(1)(iii)				X 50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)															
					20.406(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)															
					20.406(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)															

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
	AREA CODE	
Timothy D. Shriver, Compliance Manager	6102	393-2521

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)		<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On January 18, 1988 at approximately 1354 MST, Palo Verde Unit 2 was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) at 100 percent power when it was determined that ASME Section XI surveillance testing had not been conducted within allowable time constraints on two Containment Power Access Isolation Valves (VA)(ISV). Pursuant to Technical Specification 4.0.2 the valves were required to have been tested by January 16, 1988. The valves were satisfactorily surveillance tested by 0137 MST on January 19, 1988.

The root cause was inadequate administrative controls established for the tracking and completion of partially completed surveillance tests.

As corrective action to prevent recurrence, appropriate guidance will be implemented to require appropriate tracking of partially completed surveillance tests.

There have been no previous LER's submitted involving the identified root cause.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/88

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Palo Verde Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 5 2 9 8 8	—	0 0 2	—	0 0	0 2	OF 0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On January 18, 1988 at approximately 1354 MST, Palo Verde Unit 2 was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATIONS) at approximately 100 percent power when it was determined that ASME Section XI surveillance testing required by Technical Specification 4.0.5 had not been performed within allowable time constraints on valves (ISV) GPA-UV-4A (Containment Power Access Purge Inlet Outboard Isolation) and CPB-UV-5B (Containment Power Access Purge Outlet Outboard Isolation). In accordance with Technical Specification 4.0.2 the two Containment Power Access Purge (VA) valves were required to be tested no later than January 16, 1988 at approximately 0620 MST. The two valves were satisfactorily tested by approximately 0137 MST on January 19, 1988.

In November 1987, an approved work document was initiated by ANPP personnel (utility, non-licensed) to have required valves surveillance tested in accordance with ASME Section XI requirements. The valves are scheduled to be tested on a quarterly basis and were due to be completed by December 1, 1987. ANPP personnel (utility, licensed) completed testing on all the scheduled valves except the two containment (CTMT) purge valves discussed above on December 1, 1987. The Assistant Shift Supervisor (utility, licensed) decided to delay completion of the surveillance test until the containment needed to be vented in order to minimize the number of stroking evolutions on the containment purge valves. The surveillance test was then inadvertently returned to the surveillance test scheduling personnel prior to work completion. Surveillance personnel received the work package and rescheduled the valve group for the next surveillance interval without realizing the work was incomplete.

During a later review of ASME Section XI valve trend data, the responsible ASME test engineer (utility, non-licensed) noted that fourth quarter 1987 trend information was not available for two Containment Power Access Purge Valves. A followup attempt was made to obtain the trending information from the work document that had been initiated to perform ASME surveillance testing on the two Containment Power Access Purge Valves. During a review of the work document on January 18, 1988, it was identified that the two valves had not been tested as scheduled. An investigation identified that the maximum Technical Specification extension date had elapsed on January 16, 1988 at approximately 0620 MST. As immediate corrective action, Control Room personnel (utility, licensed) were notified and the valves declared inoperable. Also a work document was initiated to have the two purge valves surveillance tested. The valves were satisfactorily tested by 0137 MST on January 19, 1988 and returned to operable status.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/88

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
Palo Verde Unit 2	0500052988	0	02	00	03	OF 03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

The root cause of this event has been determined to be a personnel error as a result of inadequate administrative controls established for tracking the performance of partially completed surveillance tests. Administrative controls were not established to ensure that the appropriate documentation was prepared to track the portion of the surveillance test that had not been completed.

As corrective action to prevent recurrence, controls will be established to ensure that operations department personnel responsible for the performance of surveillance tests prepare appropriate documentation for tracking components that are awaiting completion of scheduled surveillance testing. Additionally, the surveillance testing administrative controls procedure will be revised to provide further clarification concerning the requirements for documenting the completion of assigned surveillance tasks. These corrective actions will be implemented for Units 1, 2, and 3.

There were no structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event, other than as described above, that contributed to the event. There were no unusual characteristics of the work location which contributed to the event. There were no automatic or manually initiated safety system responses and none were necessary. The two containment purge isolation valves were satisfactorily tested prior to and after the period that the valves were administratively not OPERABLE. During the period that the valves were administratively inoperable, the valves were maintained in their deactivated containment isolation position (shut) except that CPB-UV-5B (Containment Power Access Purge Outlet Outboard Isolation) was activated for a period of approximately three hours during a containment vent evolution. However, an OPERABLE Containment Power Access Purge Outlet Inboard Isolation valve was available at all times to provide containment isolation if required. Based upon the above, there were no safety consequences or implications of this event.

There have been previous Licensee Event Reports submitted due to exceeding surveillance interval time requirements; however, none of the previous events were caused by inadequate administrative controls for tracking partially completed surveillance performance.