

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8706100067 DDC DATE: 87/05/29 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: STN-50-529 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Arizona Publi 05000529
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SUBJECT: LER 87-011-00: on 870430, surveillance intervals exceeded
 plant protection sys parameters. Caused by inadequate
 procedural controls & not performing actual page count.
 Personnel have been reinstructed. W/870529 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: 1E22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 2
 TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES: Standardized plant. M. Davis, NRR: 1Cy.

05000529

RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL
PD5 LA	1 1	PD5 PD	1 1
LICITRA, E	1 1	DAVIS, M	1 1
INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON	1 1	ACRS MOELLER	2 2
AEOD/DOA	1 1	AEOD/DSP/ROAB	2 2
AEOD/DSP/TPAB	1 1	DEDRO	1 1
NRR/DEST/ADE	1 0	NRR/DEST/ADS	1 0
NRR/DEST/CEB	1 1	NRR/DEST/ELB	1 1
NRR/DEST/ICSB	1 1	NRR/DEST/MEB	1 1
NRR/DEST/MTB	1 1	NRR/DEST/PSB	1 1
NRR/DEST/RSB	1 1	NRR/DEST/SGB	1 1
NRR/DLPQ/HFB	1 1	NRR/DLPQ/QAB	1 1
NRR/DOEA/EAB	1 1	NRR/DREP/RAB	1 1
NRR/DREP/RPB	2 2	NRR/PMAS/ILRB	1 1
NRR/PMAS/PTSD	1 1	REG FILE 02	1 1
RES DEPY GI	1 1	RON5 FILE 01	1 1
EXTERNAL: EG&G GROH, M	5 5	H ST LOBBY WARD	1 1
LPDR	1 1	NRC PDR	1 1
NSIC HARRIS, J	1 1	NSIC MAYS, G	1 1

NOTES: 1 1

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 44 ENCL 42

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/88

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Palo Verde Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 5 2 9	8 7	- 0 1 1	- 0 1 0	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

At approximately 0800 on May 3, 1987 Palo Verde Unit 2 was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) operating at 90 percent reactor power when it was discovered that several shiftly channel checks had not been performed within the required surveillance interval. This omission was discovered by a control room operator (utility-licensed) during the performance of procedure 42ST-2ZZ33, Mode 1 SURVEILLANCE LOGS. The operator noticed that the copy of the Surveillance Test procedure was missing two pages of forty-seven (47). A review of previous performances was conducted and revealed that the procedure had been performed six times with the two pages missing. This caused the surveillance interval for performance of the shiftly channel (CHA) checks to be exceeded for Plant Protection System (PPS)(JC) parameters for steam generator (AB) high and low levels, Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio margin and penalty factors, and the Linear Power Density margin and penalty factors.

Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3 was entered at the time of discovery due to the inoperability of the 4 channels of the Plant Protection System parameters discussed above. LCO 3.0.3 was exited at 0808 after successful completion of the channel checks.

The last performance of the shiftly channel check for the PPS parameters had been completed at 2234 on April 29, 1987. The surveillance interval, including the 25% extension allowed by Technical Specification 4.0.2, was exceeded at 1534 on April 30, 1987. The total time between performances of the channel checks on the PPS parameters was approximately 81½ hours.

An investigation was conducted by Nuclear Projects Records Management (NPRM) to determine the cause of the missing procedure pages. A check was made of the control room Surveillance Test copies and the Drawing and Document Control File Copy of the procedure. The file copy is utilized to make reproductions of procedures utilized throughout the plant. The copies checked contained the forty-seven (47) correct pages.

The root cause of the procedures missing pages could not be determined. It is possible that an error could have been made during reproduction. However, this cannot be substantiated. This event is considered to be an isolated occurrence since no previous similar events have been reported.

The cause of the incomplete surveillance test is considered to be inadequate procedural controls. In accordance with administrative control procedures, NPRM is responsible for ensuring that procedures are complete when distributed. The assistant shift supervisors (utility-licensed) perform the review of the PPS channel check test packages. The assistant shift supervisors on shift during the performances of the surveillance tests did not realize that the procedures did not contain all the correct pages. A technical review conducted by the Shift Technical Advisors also did not reveal the missing pages. A

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		8 7	- 0 1 1	- 0 0	0 3	OF	0 3

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review of the event determined that the guidelines provided in the Administrative Control procedure, did not define what the term "completeness" meant and that the individuals involved each had their own interpretation. The confusion resulted in no one performing an actual page count.

Departmental guidance is currently in place which defines the responsibilities for review of a test package by NPRM personnel prior to distribution. As discussed above this is considered to be an isolated occurrence however, as a prudent measure Records Management Department personnel responsible for processing Surveillance Tests have been reinstructed on the correct methodology of surveillance test distribution, including examination of the surveillance test package for completeness.

The PPS parameters passed the channel check when tested, demonstrating that they were able to perform their intended function if needed. Also, if the PPS system had not worked properly, the control room operators are trained to recognize plant anomalies and take appropriate action as necessary. Therefore, this event had no impact on the health and safety of the public.

Should other concerns or information pertinent to this event be discovered, a supplement to this report will be issued.

There were no structures, components, or systems inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event. No failed components other than those described affected the event. Also there were no automatically or manually initiated safety system responses.



Arizona Nuclear Power Project

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192-00217-JGH/TRB/JHT

May 29, 1987

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit 2
Docket No. STN 50-529
Licensee Event Report 87-011-00
File: 87-020-404

Dear Sirs:

Attached please find Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 87-011-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(d), we are herewith forwarding a copy of the LER to the Regional Administrator of the Region V Office.

If you have any questions, please contact T. R. Bradish, Compliance Supervisor at (602) 932-5300 Ext. 6936.

Very truly yours,

J. G. Haynes
Vice President
Nuclear Production

JGH/JHT/clld

Attachment

cc: O. M. DeMichele (all w/a)
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71