

REGULATOR INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8705180074 DDC DATE: 87/05/08 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: STN-50-528 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Arizona Public 05000528
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 BRADISH, T. R. Arizona Nuclear Power Project (formerly Arizona Public Serv
 HAYNES, J. G. Arizona Nuclear Power Project (formerly Arizona Public Serv
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 87-012-00: on 870407, 09 & 10, channels A & B declared
 operable & placed in bypass for performance of surveillance
 test procedure. caused by cognitive personnel error.
 Night order issued to Unit 1 shift supervisors. W/870508 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 5
 TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES: Standardized plant. M. Davis, NRR: 1Cy.

05000528

	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL
	PD5 LA	1 1	PD5 PD	1 1
	LICITRA, E	1 1	DAVIS, M	1 1
INTERNAL:	ACRS MICHELSON	1 1	ACRS MOELLER	2 2
	AEOD/DOA	1 1	AEOD/DSP/ROAB	2 2
	AEOD/DSP/TPAB	1 1	DEDO	1 1
	NRR/DEST/ADE	1 0	NRR/DEST/ADS	1 0
	NRR/DEST/CEB	1 1	NRR/DEST/ELB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/ICSB	1 1	NRR/DEST/MEB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/MTB	1 1	NRR/DEST/PSB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/RSB	1 1	NRR/DEST/SGB	1 1
	NRR/DLPQ/HFB	1 1	NRR/DLPQ/QAB	1 1
	NRR/DOEA/EAB	1 1	NRR/DREP/EPB	1 1
	NRR/DREP/RAB	1 1	NRR/DREP/RPB	2 2
	NRR/PMAS/ILRB	1 1	NRR/PMAS/PTSB	1 1
	REG FILE 02	1 1	RES SPEIS, T	1 1
	RGN5 FILE 01	1 1		
EXTERNAL:	EQ&G GROH, M	5 5	H ST LOBBY WARD	1 1
	LPDR	1 1	NRC PDR	1 1
	NSIC HARRIS, J	1 1	NSIC MAYS, G	1 1
NOTES:		1 1		

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 45 ENCL 43

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Palo Verde Unit 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 5 2 8					PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 4	
TITLE (4) Late Surveillance Tests Due to Personnel Errors																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
0 4	0 9	8 7	8 7	0 1 2	0 0	0 5	0 8	8 7	N/A				0 5 0 0 0			
OPERATING MODE (9) 1			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)													
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0			20.402(b)				20.405(e)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)	
			20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)	
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 368A)	
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)					
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
			20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)					
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME T. R. Bradish, Compliance Supervisor (Ext. 6936)										TELEPHONE NUMBER 6 0 2 9 3 2 - 5 3 0 0						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC						
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)						
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										X NO						


ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

At approximately 1510 on April 10, 1987 with Unit 1 in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) at 100 percent power, a portion of a shiftly surveillance test (ST) was not completed as required. During the performance of the quarterly ST for calibration of the Excore Linear Safety Channels, Plant Protection System (PPS) Channel "B" Parameters 1-4 had been declared inoperable and placed in bypass to conduct the required calibration. Upon completion of the quarterly ST, Section 8.1.7 of the shiftly ST was not conducted as required prior to the restoration of PPS Channel "B" to operable status. Subsequent review on April 10, 1987 identified that on April 9, 1987, PPS Channel "A" had similarly been returned to an operable status without performing Section 8.1.7 of the shiftly ST and a portion of the daily ST for PPS Channel "A".

The root cause of the late ST's was a cognitive personnel error by two different Reactor Operators (utility-licensed). These errors were contrary to approved administrative controls.

To prevent recurrence, a Night Order was issued to the Unit 1 Shift Supervisors discussing the event and identifying the method of tracking which will be utilized to prevent recurrence of this type of event. Additional procedural controls are currently being evaluated. Based upon the results of this evaluation, revisions will be implemented for Units 1, 2 and 3 as appropriate.

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PDR ADOCK 0500052B
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/88

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Palo Verde Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 5 2 8	8 7	— 0 1 2	— 0 0	0 2	OF	0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

At 1510 MST on April 10, 1987 with Unit 1 in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) at 100 percent power, a portion of the shiftly surveillance test (ST) 41ST-1ZZ33, MODE 1 SURVEILLANCE LOGS, was not conducted as required. This was identified by operations at 2000 on April 10, 1987 during a routine review of the previous shift's ST performances. Because of the finding, additional reviews were conducted which identified that at 1641 on April 9, 1987 a portion of 41ST-1ZZ33 and the daily ST, 41ST-1ZZ16, ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE DAILY MIDNIGHT LOGS, also had not been conducted as required.

On April 7, 1987, Plant Protection System (PPS)(JC) Channel (CHA) "A" parameters 1-4 were declared inoperable and placed in bypass for the performance of ST procedure 36ST-1SE03, EXCORE SAFETY LINEAR CHANNEL QUARTERLY CALIBRATION. The four parameters are Variable Overpower Trip, Logarithmic Power Level-High, Local Power Density-High, and Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio-Low, respectively. Since PPS Channel "A" was declared inoperable, Section 8.1.7 of 41ST-1ZZ33 and Section 8.1.14 of 41ST-1ZZ16 were not performed for the PPS Channel "A" parameters. These sections were not performed since the calibration being conducted could have affected the PPS Channel "A" values obtained during the routine shiftly and daily ST. Upon completion of procedure 36ST-1SE03 for PPS Channel "A", Section 8.1.7 and a portion of Section 8.1.14 were not conducted as required prior to the restoration of PPS Channel "A" to an operable status at 1641 on April 9, 1987.

Similarly, on April 9, 1987, PPS Channel "B" parameters were declared inoperable and placed in bypass for the performance of 36ST-1SE03. Since PPS Channel "B" was declared inoperable, Section 8.1.7 of 41ST-1ZZ33 and Section 8.1.14 of 41ST-1ZZ16 were not performed for PPS Channel "B" parameters. Upon completion of 36ST-1SE03 for PPS Channel "B", Section 8.1.7 was not conducted as required prior to the restoration of Channel "B" to an operable status at 1510 on April 10, 1987.

Upon discovery of the error at 2000 on April 10, 1987, PPS Channel "B" was declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.3.1, ACTION 2 was entered. The appropriate section of 41ST-1ZZ33 was conducted and PPS Channel "B" was subsequently declared operable at 2034 on April 10, 1987. PPS Channel "B" was inoperable for approximately 5 hours without complying with the associated ACTION Statement. ACTION 2 of Technical Specification 3.3.1 states that with the number of channels operable one less than the total number of channels, power operation may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/88

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)		
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Palo Verde Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 5 2 8	8 7	— 0 1 2	— 0 0	0 3	OF	0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

PPS Channel "A" was incorrectly restored to an operable status on April 9, 1987 without conducting the necessary portions of procedures 41ST-1ZZ33 and 41ST-1ZZ16 as discussed above. These ST's, although not required to be performed on inoperable equipment, had exceeded their maximum surveillance intervals while procedure 36ST-1SE03 was being conducted. PPS Channel "A" was inoperable from 1641 through 2304 on April 9, 1987 until the regularly scheduled daily and shiftly ST's were performed successfully. During the period of time (approximately 6½ hours) that PPS Channel "A" was inoperable, PPS Channel "B" was placed in bypass for performance of 36ST-1SE03 at 1734. Thus, from 1734 through 2304 on April 9, 1987, two channels were inoperable at the same time without complying with the associated ACTION Statement. ACTION 3 of Technical Specification 3.3.1 states that with the number of channels operable one less than the minimum channels operable requirement, power operation may continue provided that one of the inoperable channels has been bypassed and the other channel has been placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour.

The root cause of the late STs was a cognitive personnel error on the part of two different Reactor Operators (utility licensed). Portions of the shiftly and daily ST's had exceeded their maximum surveillance interval while the appropriate channel was being calibrated and the Reactor Operators did not conduct the ST's prior to restoring that channel to operability. This action was necessary to reestablish the test performance intervals. These errors were contrary to approved administrative controls.

In order to prevent recurrence of a similar event, a Night Order was issued to the Unit 1 Shift Supervisors discussing the event and identifying the method of tracking which will be utilized to prevent recurrence of this type of event. A Technical Specification Component Condition Record (TSCCR) is currently utilized to track the inoperability of Technical Specification required equipment and the associated Technical Specification ACTION requirements. It will be the Shift Supervisor's/Assistant Shift Supervisor's (SS/ASS) responsibility to denote on a TSCCR the specific ST number that could not be performed, signifying the component's surveillance requirement which has lapsed. This will indicate what is required to be performed prior to declaring the component operable. For ST's with less than a 72 hour interval, it will be the performing operator's responsibility to immediately inform the SS/ASS when a scheduled ST cannot be performed on a component. Additional procedural controls are currently being evaluated. Based upon the results of this evaluation, revisions will be implemented for Units 1, 2, and 3 as appropriate. This LER will be issued to all Licensed Operators for required reading.

Based on the fact that PPS Channel "B" successfully passed its ST following the discovery of the error, PPS Channel "B" would have performed its safety function if required. Likewise, although PPS Channel "A" should have been declared inoperable, PPS Channel "A" would have performed its safety function in the event it was required based on the successful completion of its ST. Additionally, in both cases, a minimum of two PPS Channels were correctly surveilled and considered operable that would have been able to perform the same safety function. Therefore, this event did not affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/88

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		0 5 0 0 0 5 2 8	8 7	—	0 1 2	—	0 0

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

There were no structures, components, or systems that were inoperable at the start of the events, other than those previously described, that contributed to the events. There were no unusual characteristics of the work location which contributed to the events. There were no automatic or manually initiated safety system responses.

Although there has been a previous LER (Unit 1, 86-044-01) in which a portion of an ST was missed as a result of the inability to conduct the entire ST, the corrective actions which were implemented for that event would not have prevented this event. The corrective actions dealt specifically with obtaining NRC guidance regarding the testing of Subgroup Relays and their actuated components and would not have prevented this event from occurring.



Arizona Nuclear Power Project

P.O. BOX 52034 • PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85072-2034

192-00205-JGH/TRB/TJB

May 8, 1987

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit 1
Docket No. STN 50-528
Licensee Event Report 87-012-00
File: 87-020-404

Dear Sirs:

Attached please find Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 87-012-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(d), we are herewith forwarding a copy of the LER to the Regional Administrator of the Region V Office.

If you have any questions, please contact T. R. Bradish, Compliance Supervisor at (602) 932-5300 Ext. 6936.

Very truly yours,

J. G. Haynes
Vice President
Nuclear Production

JGH/TJB/cld

Attachment

cc: O. M. DeMichele (all w/a)
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