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05000470

STN-50-528 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Arizona Publ

STN-50-470 CESSAR System 80, Combustion Engineering

AUTH. NAME

AUTHOR AFFILIATION

LOWENTHAL, J.

Nuclear Information & Resource Service

RECIP. NAME

RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

EISENHUT, D.G.

Division of Licensing

SUBJECT: Expresses concern w/damage to facility reactor coolant pump & safety of C-E Sys-80 PWR design. Final approval of C-E design should be delayed until sys problems can be thoroughly diagnosed & treated.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: B001S

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SIZE: 2

TITLE: Licensing Submittal: PSAR/FSAR Amdts & Related Correspondence

NOTES: Standardized plant.

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Standardized plant. NRR Kerrigan 1cy.

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NRR SSPB BC	1 0	NRR LB3 LA	1 0
NRR SSPB LA	1 0	LICITRA, E. 01	1 0
MEYERS, G. 01	1 0		
INTERNAL: ELD/HDS3	1 0	ELD/HDS4	1 0
IE FILE	1 1	IE/DEPER/EPB 36	3 3
IE/DEPER/IRB 35	1 1	IE/DEQA/QAB 21	1 1
NRR/DE/AEAB	1 0	NRR/DE/CEB 11	1 1
NRR/DE/EHEB	1 1	NRR/DE/EQB 13	2 1
NRR/DE/GB 28	2 2	NRR/DE/MEB 18	1 1
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NRR/DE/SGEB 25	1 1	NRR/DHFS/HFEB40	1 1
NRR/DHFS/LQB 32	1 1	NRR/DHFS/PSRB	1 1
NRR/DL/SSPB	1 0	NRR/DSI/AEB 26	1 1
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NRR/DSI/RAB 22	1 1	NRR/DSI/RSB 23	1 1
REG FILE 04	1 1	RGNS	3 3
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
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535
JUL 1 1964
AIRTEL
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, NEW YORK
SUBJECT: [REDACTED]
RE: [REDACTED]

STILLT: Expresses concern regarding to facility proper coolant pump & safety of L-55-80 PMP system, final approval of L-55-80 should be delayed until sys problems can be thoroughly diagnosed & treated.

TITLE: Licensing Submittal; RSRVSAI Amdt A Related Correspondence
DISTRIBUTION CODE: R002 COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 FILE 1 SIZE: 1

NOTES: Standardized plant. RSRVSAI Amdt A Related Correspondence
Standardized plant. RSRVSAI Amdt A Related Correspondence

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Nuclear Information and Resource Service

1346 Connecticut Avenue NW, 4th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 296-7552

August 8, 1983

50-528

Darrell G. Eisenhut
Director
Division of Licensing
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Eisenhut:

I am writing to express our deep concern about two separate but related issues: 1) the serious problems recently discovered at Palo Verde 1, and 2) the pending application for a final design approval (FDA) for the Combustion Engineering System-80 PWR nuclear plant, Palo Verde's design. Severe damage to Palo Verde's reactor coolant pumps and cracks in the upper guide structure of the control rod mechanism-- new phenomena and all of uncertain cause -- raise important questions about the safety of this reactor design. Surely these design problems must be thoroughly addressed before a final design approval can even be considered.

The Palo Verde plant has incorporated many design features that are either new to U.S. plants, or new entirely. These features include the affected reactor coolant pumps and guide tube structure. The pumps - pieces of which were found in the steam generator system and at the bottom of the reactor vessel - may require design modifications. The cracking in the guide structure will require careful analysis before any recommendations can be made. Experts inside and outside the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have expressed their concerns regarding the possible significance of these problems for Palo Verde in particular, and for the System-80 design more generally. However, we were extremely disturbed to find that your own staff apparently fails to share such concerns. In fact, one staff member told us that he saw "no relationship" between the two issues.

We understand that the FDA for this CE plant design is expected within approximately a month, subject to your approval. Therefore, we now urge you to delay approval, both to avoid making any serious errors with this design, and to prevent setting a troubling precedent in this new process of plant standardization. While standardization may well be admirable in principle, it must be more cautiously implemented with regard to technology that is still in its infancy. Premature permission to standardize experimental technology -- whether System-80, Gessar II or future designs -- may streamline the approval process -- but at what cost to public safety? The Palo Verde case challenges the NRC's all-too-frequent assumption that nuclear technology can be judged innocent until proven guilty. Any approval of the System-80 design

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H PDR


Boo!
1/0

August 8, 1983

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before Palo Verde's troubles have been thoroughly diagnosed and treated would certainly be counter-productive to the long-term interests of both the industry and the public.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Janet Lowenthal".

Janet Lowenthal
Executive Director

cc: NRC Commissioners
Representative Morris K. Udall
Representative Edward J. Markey
Representative Richard L. Ottinger
Senator Alan K. Simpson

