

# CATEGORY 1

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 WEBRING, R.L.      Washington Public Power Supply System  
 RECIP. NAME      RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 97-S01-00: on 970718, failure to take compensatory  
 measure for inoperative microwave security zone occurred.  
 Caused by personnel error. Training will be conducted w/  
 appropriate members of security force. W/970815 ltr.

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 TITLE: Safeguards Phys Sec Event Pt. 73.71 (Public Available)

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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

P.O. Box 968 • Richland, Washington 99352-0968

August 15, 1997  
GO2-97-158

Docket No. 50-397

Document Control Desk  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Subject: **NUCLEAR PLANT WNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21,  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 97-S01-00**

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 97-S01-00 for WNP-2. This report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action to preclude recurrence.

Should you have any questions or desire additional information regarding this matter, please call me or Mr. Paul Inserra at (509) 377-4147.

Respectfully,



RL Webring  
Vice President, Operations Support/PIO  
Mail Drop PE08

IE74 1

Enclosure

cc: EW Merschoff, NRC RIV  
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9708250347 970815  
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# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) <b>Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2</b>	DOCKET NUMBER (2) <b>50-397</b>	PAGE (3) <b>1 OF 3</b>
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TITLE (4) **FAILURE TO TAKE COMPENSATORY MEASURE FOR INOPERATIVE MICROWAVE SECURITY ZONE**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV. NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
07	18	97	97	S01	00	08	15	97	N/A	05000

OPERATING MODE	1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)								
POWER  83%		20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)	X	73.71(b)		
		20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)		
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER		
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)				
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)				
		20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)				

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)	
NAME <b>Bill Pfitzer, Licensing Engineer</b>	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) <b>509-377-2419</b>

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, completed EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).		NO					

**ABSTRACT:** On 18 July, 1997, with the plant operating at 83% power, an intrusion alarm was received in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) from a microwave unit monitoring a section of the isolation zone for the plant protected area. Both the CAS operator, and the operator of the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS), acknowledged the alarm and surveyed the associated security zone using closed circuit television (CCTV), but did not immediately recognize the need for a compensatory measure. Approximately 30 minutes later, as the CAS operator was reviewing the alarm summary display, he saw the affected microwave zone in constant alarm and realized it may indicate a Safeguards System failure requiring a compensatory measure within ten minutes. He dispatched a security patrol officer to the zone to conduct an operability test of the affected microwave unit. The test revealed the microwave unit was inoperative. The security patrol was then posted at the zone as a temporary compensatory measure. Upon arrival of the permanent compensatory officer, the security patrol conducted a walk-down of the affected isolation zone. No signs of intrusion were noted.

The root cause of this event is personnel error. Training will be conducted with appropriate members of the Security force, and disciplinary action will be taken with personnel involved in this event.

No intrusion occurred and compensatory measures were in place within approximately 30 minutes. Therefore, the safety consequences of this event are minimal.



**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**  
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
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Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	50-397	97	S01	00	2 OF 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Event Description

On 18 July, 1997, with the plant operating at 83% power, an intrusion alarm was received in the CAS from a microwave unit monitoring a section of the isolation zone for the plant protected area. The CAS operator acknowledged/assessed the alarm and annotated it on the alarm summary as a "false alarm/CCTV shows zone and area clear." He did not notice that the microwave unit was in constant alarm and required compensatory posting, and consequently did not dispatch an officer to assume the required compensatory post within ten minutes per Security Plan Implementing Procedure (SPIP) 14.5.1, Contingency Events Response and Reporting.

Coincident with the actions of the CAS operator, the officer in the SAS heard the original alarm when it sounded, checked the alarm summary to confirm the alarm, and surveyed the associated area using the CCTV for any potential signs of intrusion into the associated isolation zone.

Approximately 30 minutes later, as the CAS operator was reviewing the alarm summary display, he saw the affected microwave zone in constant alarm and realized it may indicate a Safeguards System failure requiring a compensatory measure. He dispatched a security patrol officer to the zone to conduct an operability test of the affected microwave unit. The test revealed the microwave unit was inoperative. The security patrol officer was then posted at the zone as a temporary compensatory measure.

Upon arrival of the permanent compensatory officer, the security patrol officer conducted a walk-down of the isolation zone covered by the affected microwave unit. No signs of intrusion were noted.

Immediate Corrective Action

A Problem Evaluation Request (PER) was initiated to document the failure to post the required compensatory measure within ten minutes.

Further Evaluation

A work request was generated on 18 July, 1997, and the microwave unit was repaired, tested and placed back in service. The posting of a security officer as a compensatory measure was discontinued on 19 July, 1997.

Due to misinterpretation of the guidance in 10CFR73.71 by the security supervisor at the time, the event was classified as meeting the criteria of 10CFR73.71, Appendix G (II) which requires the event be recorded in the safeguards event log within 24 hours, and requires no NRC notification. Upon review of the event the Security Programs Manager reclassified the event, and on 23 July, 1997, telephone notification was made to the NRC Operations Center per 10CFR73.71, Appendix G (I) which requires NRC notification within one hour for events of this type.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**  
**TEXT CONTINUATION**

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Root Cause

The root cause for the failure to post a compensatory measure within ten minutes was personnel errors on the part of the CAS and SAS operators. The CAS operator did not recognize the constant alarm and, therefore, did not dispatch an officer for compensatory posting. The SAS operator did not check his alarm summary to make sure the proper actions had been taken by the CAS operator.

Further Corrective Action

Nuclear Security Officers will receive refresher training on the use of self-checking techniques.

Security force CAS/SAS operators will be briefed on this incident to reinforce procedure compliance, and will receive refresher training on the appropriate Alarm Station Instruction(s), placing emphasis on alarm station operators ensuring intended actions and verifications are performed as required.

Remedial training on appropriate compensatory measures for Microwave Intrusion Alarms will be completed with the officers involved in this event.

Appropriate disciplinary action will be taken with the officers involved in this event.

Security force supervisors will receive refresher training on reporting of safeguards events.

Assessment of Safety Consequences

No unauthorized intrusion occurred. The CAS and SAS operators were monitoring the affected microwave zone by means of the CCTV during the 30 minute period prior to the compensatory officer being posted. When the permanent officer was posted, a thorough walk down of the area was conducted to confirm no intrusion had occurred. Therefore, the safety consequences of this event are minimal.

Similar Events

None