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FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397
AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
HUGO,B.R. Washington Public Power Supply System
PARRISH,J.V. Washington Public Power Supply System
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 95-010-00:on 950609,HPCS DG declared inoperable due to
discovery that TS test method incomplete.Caused by
inadequate testing procedure.Test procedure for HPCS DG
reviewed & special test procedures written.W/950707 ltr.

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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

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July 7, 1995
GO2-95-126

Docket No. 50-397

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
Gentlemen:

Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT WNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21,
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 95-010, REVISION 0

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 95-010 for the WNP-2 Plant. This report discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

Should you have any questions or desire additional information, please call me or D.A. Swank at (509) 377-4563.

Sincerely,



J. V. Parrish (Mail Drop 1023)
Vice President, Nuclear Operations

JVP/BRH
Enclosure

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7	PAGE (3) 1 OF 4
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TITLE (4) Failure to Comply With Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement for Diesel Generator Due to Inadequate Test Method
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EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)					
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES			DOCKET NUMBER(S)		
06	09	95	95	0 1 0	0 0	07	07	95	N/A			0 5 0 0 0		
												0 5 0 0 0		

OPERATING MODE (9) 4	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR: (11) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405c <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv) <input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v) <input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vi) <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)A <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)B <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)		TELEPHONE NUMBER	
Bruce R. Hugo, Compliance Engineer		AREA CODE 509	377-8593

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) <input type="checkbox"/> YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
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ABSTRACT (16)

At 0330 hours on June 9, 1995, with WNP-2 in Cold Shutdown, the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) diesel generator was declared inoperable due to discovery by a system engineer that a Technical Specification test method was incomplete. This test, which verifies certain HPCS diesel generator trips are automatically bypassed by an Emergency Core Cooling System actuation signal, could not have detected a failure of a relay in the bypass logic.

The cause of the event was an inadequate testing procedure.

The trip bypass relay was tested and operated properly, demonstrating it would have functioned properly if required. The surveillance procedure will be changed to correct the deficiency.

This event had no safety significance.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7	95	-	0 1 0	-	0 0	2	OP	4
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TEXT (17)

Event Description:

At 1900 hours on June 8, 1995, with WNP-2 in Operational Condition 4 (Cold Shutdown), a system engineer comparing division 1 and 2 diesel generator [EK, DG] logic drawings with field labeling determined that a Technical Specification test method would not have detected a failure of one of two sets of contacts in series. These contacts are on the same relay [RLY]. This test verifies certain division 1 and 2 diesel generator trips are automatically bypassed on an Emergency Core Cooling System [BG, BM, BO] actuation signal.

Immediate Corrective Action:

The division 1 and 2 diesel generators were declared inoperable at 2039 hours on June 8.

The test procedure for the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) diesel generator was reviewed to see if it had a similar potential deficiency. An unrelated testing deficiency was discovered by a system engineer that resulted in the bypass feature for three trip functions in one logic branch not being properly tested. The test only verified that one of two relays providing the bypass functions had changed state. The HPCS diesel generator was declared inoperable at 0330 hours on June 9.

Special test procedures were written and performed to test each set of contacts; the trip bypass contacts on the three diesel generators functioned properly. The division 2 diesel generator was declared operable at 2223 hours on June 8, the division 1 diesel generator was declared operable at 0010 hours on June 9, and the HPCS diesel generator was declared operable at 0535 hours on June 9.

Further Evaluation:

After further review of the division 1 and 2 diesel generator test procedures and IEEE Standard 338-1977, "IEEE Standard Criteria for the Periodic Testing of Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems," the Supply System determined that the Technical Specification surveillance requirements for these two diesel generators had been satisfied by the normal test procedures based on an evaluation of credible component failure modes. A single fused relay contact would not have been detected by these test procedures; however, this failure was not credible since the contacts do not break energized circuits in this application. NUREG/CR-4715, "The Interactive Effects of Relay and Circuit Breaker Aging in a Safety-Related System," was also reviewed; fused relay contacts were not identified in this report as an effect of component stress.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT (17)

The HPCS diesel generator test procedure was deficient since it would not have detected a failure of one relay to change state, a credible component failure mode. This LER is submitted per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), due to failure to meet the HPCS diesel generator Technical Specification surveillance requirement.

There were no structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event.

WNP-2 completed a Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Project (TSSIP) in March 1994, following the discovery in 1991 of programmatic weaknesses in WNP-2's Technical Specification surveillance program. The TSSIP was an in-depth technical review of the surveillance procedures to ensure they met Technical Specification requirements. The TSSIP reviewers examined the trip bypass feature test procedure but did not identify this deficiency due to a reviewer oversight.

Root Cause:

The cause of the event was an inadequate surveillance procedure. The procedure step intended to test the affected branch of HPCS diesel trip logic specified the wrong jumper placement points. Instead of simulating a trip condition in the trip logic, the step actuated the corresponding trip condition alarm [TA] at the local control panel [CBD]. Controls in place to ensure proper development and changes to surveillance procedures were not effective at the time this surveillance procedure was last significantly revised.

Further Corrective Actions:

The programmatic weaknesses in WNP-2's Technical Specification surveillance program have been corrected by enhancements that are described in detail in LER 93-10.

The HPCS diesel generator surveillance procedure will be revised to correct the deficiency before the next 18-month surveillance test.

Safety Significance:

The special test procedures demonstrated that the trip bypass features for each diesel generator would have functioned properly if required; therefore, this event had no safety significance.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7	YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER			
		95	-	0 1 0	-	0 0	4	OF	4

TEXT (17)

Previous Similar Events:

Licensee Event Report 93-10 described the reportable surveillance test deficiencies identified by the TSSIP. The TSSIP heightened plant staff awareness of Technical Specification testing requirements and has fostered the questioning attitude that prompted discovery of the problem described in this report.