

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)

Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7

PAGE (3)

1 OF 3

TITLE (4)

EMERGENCY DIESEL START DUE TO VOLTAGE TRANSIENT ON BPA GRID

EVENT DATE (5)

LER NUMBER (6)

REPORT DATE (7)

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

MONTH DAY YEAR

YEAR

SEQUENTIAL
NUMBER

REVISION
NUMBER

MONTH DAY YEAR

MONTH DAY YEAR

FACILITY NAMES

DOCKET NUMBERS(S)

0 2 2 2 9 5 9 5

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0 5 0 5 9 5

0 5 0 0 0

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0 5 0 5 9 5

0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING
MODE (9)

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

POWER LEVEL
(10)

0 1 0

20.402(b)

20.405(a)(1)(i)

20.405(a)(1)(ii)

20.405(a)(1)(iii)

20.405(a)(1)(iv)

20.405(a)(1)(v)

20.405(c)

50.36(c)(1)

50.36(c)(2)

50.73(a)(2)(i)

50.73(a)(2)(ii)

50.73(a)(2)(iii)

50.73(a)(2)(iv)

50.73(a)(2)(v)

50.73(a)(2)(vi)

50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)

50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)

50.73(a)(2)(x)

73.71(b)

73.73(c)

X OTHER (Specify in Abstract
below and in Text, NRC
Form 366A)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

C.J. Foley, Licensing Engineer

TELEPHONE NUMBER

AREA CODE

5 0 9 3 7 7 - 4 3 2 5

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

EXPECTED SUBMISSION
DATE (15)

MONTH DAY YEAR

☐ YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) ☒ NO

ABSTRACT (16)

On February 22, 1995, the WNP-2 reactor was in power ascension following restart from an earlier reactor shutdown. Electrical power was being supplied to the plant from the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) grid because reactor power levels were below that required to permit synchronizing the WNP-2 generator to the grid. BPA maintenance activities caused a voltage transient on the grid which resulted in a transient reduction of voltage on the WNP-2 safety-related buses. The Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) started automatically but the transient was of such short duration that load transfer did not occur and the buses remained energized from the BPA grid. After BPA confirmed that the transient had originated on the grid, reactor power ascension activities were resumed, and the EDGs were secured. The event had no safety significance and is not reportable. A voluntary LER is submitted per NUREG-1022.

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TITLE (4) EMERGENCY DIESEL START DUE TO VOLTAGE TRANSIENT ON BPA GRID								

Event Description

On February 22, 1995, the WNP-2 reactor was operating in Mode 2 at approximately 10% power during power ascension following an earlier reactor shutdown. Electrical power was being delivered to WNP-2 from the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) distribution grid because reactor power levels were below that required to permit synchronization of the WNP-2 generator to the grid. A power transformer at the Priest Rapids hydroelectric power station failed. Due to on-going maintenance activity at the BPA Midway substation, the failure resulted in a voltage transient in the line between the substation and WNP-2, lasting approximately 15 cycles. This transient caused the voltage on the safety-related buses [ES] at WNP-2 to dip below the under-voltage trip relay [RLY] setpoint level for approximately 2 cycles, resulting in automatic start of the Division 1 and Division 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) units [EK], as was noted in the Control Room at 17:47 hours. The transient was of such a short duration that load transfer did not occur, and the safety-related buses remained energized from the BPA grid.

Immediate Corrective Action

Confirmation was received at 17:51 hours that the disturbance had originated in the BPA grid. Reactor power ascension activities were resumed, and at 18:19 hours the reactor mode was changed to Mode 1. The two EDGs were shut down pursuant to normal procedures.

Root Cause

The root cause of this event was an offsite grid voltage transient.

Further Evaluation and Corrective Action

There were no structures, systems, or components that were inoperable that contributed to the event. All equipment performed normally, and the event was managed effectively by the Control Room Operators. No corrective actions are required.

Safety Significance

The event had no safety significance. All equipment performed per design. The EDGs are not engineered safety features (ESF) at WNP-2, and therefore, the event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii) or 50.73(a)(2)(iv). A voluntary report is submitted per NUREG-1022.

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Similar Event

LER 85-063, "Auto Start of Standby Diesel Generators During RRC Pump Testing Due to BPA Grid Voltage Fluctuations," reports a similar automatic startup of the diesel generator units due to a BPA grid disturbance during operation at low reactor power.



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