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 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 POCHÉ, R.J. Washington Public Power Supply System
 BAKER, J.W. Washington Public Power Supply System
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 92-045-00: on 921210, an unplanned automatic isolation of
 RCIC occurred due to surveillance procedure deficiency &
 training inadequacy. RCIC steam supply instruments will be
 improved & personnel will be trained. W/930111 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 6
 TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

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January 11, 1993
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
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Washington, D.C. 20555

**SUBJECT: NUCLEAR PLANT WNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 92-45**

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 92-45 for the WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

Sincerely,



J. W. Baker
WNP-2 Plant Manager (Mail Drop 927M)

JWB/RJP/cgeh
Enclosure

cc: Mr. J. B. Martin, NRC - Region V
Mr. R. Barr, NRC Resident Inspector (Mail Drop 901A, 2 Copies)
INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA
Mr. D. L. Williams, BPA (Mail Drop 399)

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)

Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7

PAGE (3)

1 OF 5

TITLE (4)

UNPLANNED AUTOMATIC ESF ISOLATION OF REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING DUE TO SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE DEFICIENCY AND TRAINING INADEQUACY

EVENT DATE (5)

LER NUMBER (6)

REPORT DATE (7)

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

MONTH			DAY			YEAR			YEAR			SEQUENTIAL NUMBER			REVISION NUMBER			MONTH			DAY			YEAR			FACILITY NAMES			DOCKET NUMBERS(S)				
1	2	1	0	9	2	9	2	0	4	5	0	0	0	1	1	0	9	3										0	5	0	0	0		

OPERATING MODE (9)

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

POWER LEVEL (10)

1	0	0	20.402(b)	20.405(C)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	77.71(b)
			20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.73(c)
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
			20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER				
R. J. Poche, Licensing Engineer	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th colspan="2">AREA CODE</th> </tr> <tr> <td>5 0 9 3</td> <td>7 7 - 4 1 4 5</td> </tr> </table>	AREA CODE		5 0 9 3	7 7 - 4 1 4 5
AREA CODE					
5 0 9 3	7 7 - 4 1 4 5				

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
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ABSTRACT (16)

At 0905 hours on December 10, 1992, an unplanned automatic isolation of Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) occurred due to low RCIC turbine steam supply pressure. This low pressure condition resulted from a gradual pressure decay that was promulgated by closing inboard isolation valves for the steam supply line. Closing the inboard isolation valves was necessary to support surveillance testing of RCIC steam supply flow switches. Immediate notification of this event was not performed until 1040 hours on December 14, 1992.

The root cause of the RCIC isolation was a technical inaccuracy in a surveillance procedure. This inaccuracy involved inadequate precautionary guidance. Delayed reporting of this event resulted from a misunderstanding related to reportability of ESF actuations that involve equipment that is in test. This deficiency resulted from insufficient training regarding reportable events. This event did not involve failure of a plant component or system.

As corrective actions, surveillance procedures for RCIC steam supply instruments will be improved, a memo regarding reportability of ESF actuations will be provided, this event will be discussed with licensed Operations personnel, instructional material or reporting requirements will be developed, and licensed Operations personnel will be trained on reporting requirements.

An actual condition requiring the RCIC isolation feature did not exist during this event. However, if it had, the RCIC isolation feature was available and capable of performing its design function. Consequently, this event did not adversely affect safe operation of the plant, or the health and safety of plant personnel or the public.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION														
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TITLE (4) UNPLANNED AUTOMATIC ESF ISOLATION OF REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING DUE TO SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE DEFICIENCY AND TRAINING INADEQUACY														

Plant Conditions

Power Level - 100%

Plant Mode - 1

Event Description

At 0905 hours on December 10, 1992, an unplanned, automatic ESF actuation of containment isolation valves associated with the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System occurred. This actuation was initiated by a low pressure condition in the steam supply line to the RCIC turbine, and was due to a gradual pressure decay in the RCIC turbine steam supply line that resulted after the inboard isolation valves for this line were closed. At the time of the event, RCIC had been removed from service in order to support routine surveillance testing of flow switches in the RCIC turbine steam supply line. Also, as part of the flow switch testing sequence, both inboard isolation valves for the RCIC turbine steam supply line, RCIC-V-63 and RCIC-V-76, had been closed.

Closing the inboard isolation valves, isolated the RCIC turbine steam supply line from its nuclear steam supply, and resulted in a gradual pressure decay on the RCIC turbine steam supply line. Pressure in the RCIC steam supply line subsequently decreased to the isolation setpoint and initiated an automatic ESF isolation of RCIC at 0905 hours on December 10, 1992. Based upon previous testing experience, both the pressure decay and the isolation were recognized by Operations personnel as expected occurrences. As a note, the pressure switches that initiated RCIC isolation were not within the scope of the surveillance procedure that was in progress at the time the isolation occurred.

The inboard RCIC isolation valves were already closed when the isolation actuation occurred; therefore, the isolation actuation only resulted in valve motion for the outboard isolation valve, RCIC-V-8. The outboard steam supply isolation valve was opened following reset of the isolation logic at 0923 hours, 18 minutes after initiation of the RCIC isolation.

Immediate Corrective Actions

RCIC was unavailable at the time of the event due to surveillance testing activities. Therefore, no immediate actions were necessary to restore RCIC availability. The outboard steam supply isolation valve was opened within minutes after the actuation, and inboard steam supply isolation valves were placed in the desired lineup following completion of flow switch testing.

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TITLE (4)		UNPLANNED AUTOMATIC ESF ISOLATION OF REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING DUE TO SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE DEFICIENCY AND TRAINING INADEQUACY													

Further Evaluation and Corrective Action

Further Evaluation

This event is considered reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an unplanned, automatic ESF actuation. Although both the RCIC isolation and the pressure decay that occurred during this event are anticipated occurrences during surveillance testing of RCIC steam supply flow switches, this event is not considered a planned ESF actuation because the expected nature of its occurrence was not sufficiently documented in shift logs or as a part of a proceduralized test sequence.

Personnel who were on duty at the time when this event occurred did not perform the immediate notification required by 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii), or otherwise document the RCIC isolation at the time when it occurred due to a misunderstanding of reporting requirements for ESF actuations. This misunderstanding involved failure to recognize that an anticipated, but otherwise unplanned, ESF actuation involving equipment that is not in service is reportable.

Due to this same misunderstanding, reportability of this event was also not detected on December 11, 1992, when I&C Technicians presented a Problem Evaluation Request (PER) to shift personnel. This PER was written because the RCIC flow switch surveillance procedure did not provide sufficient precautionary guidance regarding the possibility of an ESF actuation.

This PER was presented to the Management Review Committee at a meeting held on the morning of December 14, 1992, and the RCIC isolation was subsequently determined to be reportable as an ESF actuation. Presentation of the PER at this meeting was the initial notification to management that an isolation event had occurred. The NRC was notified of this event at 1040 hours on December 14, 1992.

The root cause of the ESF event was a technical inaccuracy in procedure PPM 7.4.3.2.1.80, "RCIC Isolation on RCIC Steam Supply Flow High Div II - CFT/CC." This procedure, and the reciprocal procedure for Division I instrumentation, did not provide adequate precautionary guidance to inform operators and I&C technicians that a RCIC isolation would occur if pressure in the steam supply line to the RCIC turbine decreased below the isolation setpoint.

Delayed reporting of this event was caused by inadequate training regarding reportable events, and involved an error by licensed, utility personnel.

The condition described in this report did not involve any structures, components, or systems that were inoperable at the start of the event, nor did it involve failure of a plant component or system.

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TITLE (4)		UNPLANNED AUTOMATIC ESF ISOLATION OF REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING DUE TO SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE DEFICIENCY AND TRAINING INADEQUACY																	

Further Corrective Action

The following actions will be provided as corrective measures in response to the ESF actuation:

1. Procedures used to perform surveillance testing of RCIC steam supply instruments will be improved to provide the detail necessary to prevent further unplanned isolations due to pressure decay in the RCIC steam supply line. These procedure changes will be completed by February 1, 1993.
2. Similar deficiencies that may exist in other procedures are being addressed under an ongoing Procedure Upgrade Project. The scope of this project includes verification that adequate precautionary guidance regarding ESF and other expected plant responses is included in procedures.

The following actions will be taken in response to delayed reporting of the RCIC isolation:

1. Instructional material will be developed, and training will be performed, to ensure that licensed Operations personnel are knowledgeable of reporting requirements. Development of instructional material is scheduled for March 31, 1993, and training of licensed Operations personnel is expected by June 31, 1993.
2. This event will be discussed with licensed Operations personnel. These discussions are scheduled to be complete by March 2, 1993.
3. A memo from management to plant personnel will be provided regarding reportability of ESF actuations and other relevant topics. Completion of this action is expected by February 1, 1993.

Safety Significance

The RCIC isolation feature is provided to protect against a loss of reactor coolant due to a break in the steam supply line to the RCIC turbine. An actual condition requiring actuation of the RCIC isolation feature did not exist during this event. However, if it had, the RCIC isolation feature was available and capable of performing its design function. Consequently, the conditions described in this report did not adversely affect safe operation of the plant, or the health and safety of plant personnel or the general public.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION													
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Similar Events

A previous event involving a RCIC isolation due to a surveillance procedure inadequacy was reported in LER 84-099. This previous event involved ESF actuations resulting from spurious signals generated during testing. This previous event did not involve inadequate precautionary guidance regarding an expected ESF actuation, and is therefore not directly related to the event described in this report.

EIIS Information

Text Reference

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System
(RCIC), Isolation Valves

EIIS Reference

System

Component

BN

ISV