

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEMOPERATIONAL LEAKAGELIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.3.2 Reactor coolant system leakage shall be limited to:

- ADDED BY THIS LETTER
- a. No PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE.
  - b. 5 gpm UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE. FROM G02-92-085 <sup>24</sup> OR LESS
  - c. 2 gpm increase in UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE within any 24-hour period.
  - d. 25 gpm total leakage averaged over any 24-hour period.
  - e. 1 gpm leakage at a reactor coolant system pressure of  $950 \pm 10$  psig from any reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve specified in Table 3.4.3.2-1.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.
- b. With any reactor coolant system leakage greater than the limits in b. and/or d. above, reduce the leakage rate to within the limits within 4 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- c. With any reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve leakage greater than the above limit, isolate the high pressure portion of the affected system from the low pressure portion within 4 hours by use of at least one other closed (manual or deactivated automatic) (or check\*) valve. be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- d. With one or more of the high/low pressure interface valve leakage pressure monitors shown in Table 3.4.3.2-1 inoperable, restore the inoperable monitor(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or verify the pressure to be less than the alarm setpoint at least once per 12 hours; restore the inoperable monitor(s) to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- e. With any reactor coolant system UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE increase greater than 2 gpm within any 24-hour period, identify the source of leakage increase as not service sensitive Type 304 or 316 austenitic stainless steel within 4 hours, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

FROM G02-92-085

\*Which has been verified not to exceed the allowable leakage limit at the last refueling outage or after the last time the valve was disturbed, whichever is more recent.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT

# WYOMING

Section 16, Township 14N, Range 10E, T14N, R10E, S14

Section 16, Township 14N, Range 10E, T14N, R10E, S14

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## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

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#### 3/4.4.2 SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES (Continued)

the dual purpose safety/relief valves in their ASME Code qualified mode (spring lift) of safety operation.

The overpressure protection system must accommodate the most severe pressurization transient. There are two major transients that represent the most severe abnormal operational transient resulting in a nuclear system pressure rise. The evaluation of these events with the final plant configuration has shown that the MSIV closure is slightly more severe when credit is taken only for indirect derived scrams; i.e., a flux scram. Utilizing this worse case transient as the design basis event, a minimum of 12 safety/relief valves are required to assure peak reactor pressure remains within the Code limit of 110% of design pressure.

Testing of safety/relief valves is normally performed at lower power. It is desirable to allow an increased number of valves to be out of service during testing. Therefore, an evaluation of the MSIV closure without direct scram was performed at 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER assuming only 4 safety/relief valves were operable. The results of this evaluation demonstrate that any 4 safety/relief valves have sufficient flow capacity to assure that the peak reactor pressure remains well below the code limit of 110% of design pressure.

Demonstration of the safety/relief valve lift settings will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Specification 4.0.5.

#### 3/4.4.3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

##### 3/4.4.3.1 LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

The RCS leakage detection systems required by this specification are provided to monitor and detect leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary. These detection systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.45, "Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems," May 1973.

*Insert B*

The primary containment sump flow monitoring system monitors the UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE collected in the floor drain sump with a sensitivity such that 1 gpm change within 1 hour can be measured. Alternatively, other methods for measuring flow to the sump which are capable of detecting a change in UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE of 1 gpm within 1 hour may be used, for up to 30 days, when the installed system is INOPERABLE.



WITH AN ACCURACY OF  $\pm 2\%$

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ADDED BY THIS LETTER



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
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PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION INSERT CHANGE TO BASES  
SECTION 2.0 PARAGRAPH 8

for scram discharge volume 'A' (525'4 1/2" elevation) provides 87.1 gallons of margin above the required 617.9 gallons of free volume required for a reactor scram. The scram discharge volume high level alarm setpoint for scram discharge volume 'B' (524'7" elevation) provides 91.3 gallons of margin above the required 617.9 gallons of free volume required for a reactor scram. The rod block setpoint for scram discharge volume 'A' and 'B' (527'3" elevation) provides ~~77.2~~ 89.6 gallons of margin above the required 617.9 gallons of free volume required for a reactor scram. The scram setpoint for scram discharge volume 'A' and 'B' (529'7" elevation) provides 64.9 gallons of margin above the required 617.9 gallons of free volume for a reactor scram.



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CHANGE REQUESTED IN  
THIS LETTER

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

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