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 SWANK, D.A. Washington Public Power Supply System
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 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 91-013-00: on 920318, control room operator found
 annunciator RHR B/C injection VLV open permissive lit &
 pressure switch found isolated. Cause not determined.
 Supplemental LER will be submitted. W/920416 ltr.

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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

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April 16, 1992
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
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Washington, D. C. 20555

**SUBJECT: NUCLEAR PLANT WNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 92-013**

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 92-013 for the WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

Sincerely,



J. W. Baker
WNP-2 Plant Manager (Mail Drop 927M)

Enclosure

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V
Mr. C. Sorensen, NRC Resident Inspector (Mail Drop 901A, 2 Copies)
INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA
Mr. D. L. Williams, BPA (Mail Drop 399)

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION																	
FACILITY NAME (1) Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2		DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7					LER NUMBER (8) <table border="1"> <tr> <th>Year</th> <th>Number</th> <th>Rev. No.</th> </tr> <tr> <td>92</td> <td>013</td> <td>00</td> </tr> </table>			Year	Number	Rev. No.	92	013	00	PAGE (3) 2 OF 4	
Year	Number	Rev. No.															
92	013	00															
TITLE (4) Residual Heat Removal Pressure Switch Found Isolated During Startup																	

Plant Conditions

Power Level - 0%

Plant Mode - 2 (Startup/Hot Standby)

Event Description

During a reactor startup on March 18, 1992 with main steam pressure at 913 psig, a Control Room Operator found annunciator "RHR B/C INJECTION VLV OPEN PERMISSIVE" lit. Technical Specification 4.3.3 requires that this permissive have a trip setpoint of greater than or equal to 470 psig on decreasing main steam pressure. This permissive and the associated annunciator should have cleared, due to a reset of the RHR-PS-413D trip, shortly after main steam pressure exceeded 470 psig.

Immediate Corrective Action

A Plant Instrument Technician was sent to investigate and found pressure switch MS-PS-413D, associated with the RHR "C" train, isolated from service. The Technician returned the pressure switch to service, and the annunciator and permissive cleared as required.

Further Evaluation and Corrective Action

A. Further Evaluation

Pressure switch MS-PS-413D is set to trip on decreasing main steam line pressure at or above 470 psig. This switch provides a permissive to allow opening of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) to reactor vessel injection valve RHR-V-42C when main steam pressure is less than 470 psig. This valve is used in the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) mode of RHR operation. MS-PS-413D was found isolated. The pressure at the isolated switch was low enough that the switch was tripped, the permissive logic was satisfied, and the valve could have opened if called upon to do so. However, this means that RHR-V-42C would have opened at reactor pressures greater than 470 psig if a LPCI injection demand occurred. RHR-V-42C provides isolation of the RHR system from the reactor at reactor pressure greater than 470 psig, and remained closed throughout this event. A second isolation valve, check valve RHR-V-41C located between the reactor vessel and RHR-V-42C, also provides RHR system isolation.

Technical Specification 3.0.4 states that the Limiting Condition for Operation must be met, without reliance on the Action requirements, prior to entry into an Operational Condition. Pressure switch MS-PS-413D was required to be operable for entry into Operational Condition 2. Entry into Operational Condition 2, from Operational Condition 4, at 0415 hours on March 18, 1992 with MS-PS-413D valved out of service was a condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications and is

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reportable pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). MS-PS-413D is not required to be operable in Operational Condition 4. This condition was corrected at 1957 hours on March 18, 1992.

A review of past work on the pressure switch revealed that the switch was isolated twice during the forced outage that ended on March 18, 1992. On February 27, 1992 the pressure switch was calibrated using surveillance procedure PPM 7.4.3.3.1.34. The calibration includes an independent verification of proper return to service of the pressure switch by a second Instrument Technician. On March 5, 1992 excess flow check valve (EFC) testing was performed using procedure PPM 7.4.6.3.4.1G. The EFC test procedure includes isolation and de-isolation of the pressure switch. The procedure requires an independent verification of re-opening of the single valve used for isolation of the pressure switch.

The Root Cause Analysis of this event included a review of other procedures, logs, etc. in an effort to determine when the pressure switch may have been isolated or left isolated. No root cause for the instrument isolation has yet been identified. The analysis of this event continues in an effort to gain a greater understanding of how and why this event, and similar events, has occurred. A supplemental LER detailing the results of the Root Cause Analysis will be submitted by May 16, 1992.

There were no structures, systems, or components inoperable prior to the start of this event that contributed to the event.

B. Further Corrective Action

The analysis of this incident has not been completed. Appropriate corrective actions will be determined based on the results of the Root Cause Analysis.

Safety Significance

Pressure switch MS-PS-413D was isolated in a condition that provided the permissive for valve RHR-V-42C to open if required. The opening function of the valve was therefore not affected. The valve could, however, have opened at a reactor pressure greater than 470 psig. Isolation of the RHR system from the reactor is also provided by check valve RHR-V-41C which is located between RHR-V-42C and the reactor. RHR-V-41C is leak tested at least every 18 months to ensure isolation capability, and is stroke tested in accordance with the Pump and Valve Inservice Test Program Plan requirements to further ensure operability. Thus, the RHR system was protected from an overpressure condition.

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RHR-V-42C is a normally closed valve that would open only on a LPCI initiation signal. The LPCI initiation occurs on either a low-low reactor level or high drywell pressure. These conditions are indicative of a LOCA. Pressure switch MS-PS-413D provides a permissive which keeps RHR-V-42C closed until reactor pressure has decreased to below the RHR system design pressure, 500 psig.

The permissive logic to allow opening of RHR-V-42C was satisfied during this event since MS-PS-413D was isolated in the tripped condition. The system isolation logic function for RHR-V-42C was not met, but it is redundant to system isolation provided by RHR-V-41C. RHR-V-42C remained closed and provided the required isolation throughout this event. The pressure switch was isolated for only 16 hours while the Plant was in a condition where it was required to be operable, and was isolated for approximately 1.5 hours after exceeding 470 psig. This event is deemed to have had no safety significance.

Similar Events

LERs 91-034 and 89-037 documented separate instances where a single differential pressure indicating switch was found isolated. The root cause for both of these LERs was indeterminate. The corrective actions associated with these LERs are being reviewed as part of the this Root Cause Analysis to determine if they may have impacted or contributed to this event.

EIIS Information Text Reference

MS-PS-413D
 Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
 RHR-V-42C
 Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI)
 RHR-V-41C
 Primary Containment

EIIS Reference

<u>System</u>	<u>Component</u>
BO	63
BO	--
BO	INV
BO	--
BO	ISV
NH	--

