

# ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM

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ACCESSION NBR: 9203250350 DOC. DATE: 92/03/19 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #  
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 SWANK, D.A. Washington Public Power Supply System  
 BAKER, J.W. Washington Public Power Supply System  
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION.

SUBJECT: LER 92-006-00: on 920220, reactor bldg to suppression chamber vacuum breaker setpoints were incorrectly set. Caused by an analysis deficiency. Setpoint documentation was changed & procedures were deviated. W/920319 ltr.

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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

P.O. Box 968 • 3000 George Washington Way • Richland, Washington 99352

March 19, 1992  
G02-92-068


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Washington, D. C. 20555

**SUBJECT: NUCLEAR PLANT WNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 92-006**

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 92-006 for the WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

Sincerely,



J. W. Baker  
WNP-2 Plant Manager (Mail Drop 927M)

Enclosure

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V  
Mr. C. Sorensen, NRC Resident Inspector (Mail Drop 901A, 2 Copies)  
INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA  
Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI  
Mr. D. L. Williams, BPA (Mail Drop 399)

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*JE-22*

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)

Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7

PAGE (3)

1 OF 4

TITLE (4)

REACTOR BUILDING TO SUPPRESSION CHAMBER VACUUM BREAKER SETPOINTS  
INCORRECTLY SET

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)			
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBERS (5)		
0	2	2	0	9	2	9	2	0	0	6	0	0
0	3	1	9	9	2	0	5	0	0	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (9) 1 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

POWER LEVEL (10)	20.402(b)	20.405(a)(1)(i)	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	20.405(a)(1)(v)	20.405(C)	50.36(c)(1)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(vi)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	77.71(b)	73.73(c)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
1	0	0																			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
D. A. Swank, Compliance Engineer	AREA CODE 5 0 9 3 7 7 - 4 4 5 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (16)

On February 20, 1992 contract engineers working in the Setpoint Methodology Program determined that the setpoints for the air-operated butterfly type Reactor Building to Suppression Chamber vacuum breaker valves, CSP-V-5, 6, and 9, did not meet the Technical Specification 3/4.6.4.2 requirement to open at less than or equal to 0.5 psid. The valves were declared inoperable requiring entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3. An Unusual Event was declared at 1718 and a verbal notification was made to the NRC. The setpoint documentation was updated, surveillance procedures were deviated to include the correct setpoints, and the procedures were performed to return the Plant to full compliance. The Unusual Event was terminated at 1935 hours.

The root cause of this event was an analysis deficiency in that the setpoint calculation did not limit the differential pressure switch setting to less than or equal to 0.5 psid. As committed to in previous docketed correspondence with the NRC, the Supply System is performing an extensive review/verification of applicable setpoints. If other similar setpoint problems exist, they will be identified and corrected through this Program.

The small difference between the actual and the required setpoint of the differential pressure switches did not affect the systems' ability to perform its intended safety function. This event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the public or Plant personnel.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION								
FACILITY NAME (1) Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2		DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0   5   0   0   0   3   9   7			LER NUMBER (8) Year   Number   Rev. No. 9   2   0   0   6   0   0		PAGE (3) 2   OF   4	
TITLE (4) REACTOR BUILDING TO SUPPRESSION CHAMBER VACUUM BREAKER SETPOINTS INCORRECTLY SET								

### Plant Conditions

Power Level - 100%

Plant Mode - 1 (Power Operation)

### Event Description

On February 20, 1992 contract engineers working in the Setpoint Methodology Program determined that the setpoints for the air-operated butterfly type Reactor Building to Suppression Chamber vacuum breaker valves, CSP-V-5, 6, and 9, did not meet the Technical Specification 3/4.6.4.2 requirement to open at less than or equal to 0.5 psid. The differential pressure switches, CSP-DPS-4, 5, and 6, that provide the open signal to the vacuum breakers were set to trip at 0.5 psid plus or minus 0.0054 psid. Each of the three vacuum breakers also provides a containment isolation function. Each air-operated butterfly vacuum breaker is installed in series with a check valve that opens into containment to serve a vacuum breaker function and remains in the normal closed position to serve a containment isolation function.

### Immediate Corrective Action

The three Reactor Building to Suppression Chamber air-operated butterfly vacuum breaker valves were declared inoperable. This resulted in the Plant entering Technical Specification 3.0.3. An Unusual Event was declared at 1718 hours on February 20, 1992 and a verbal notification was made to the NRC.

Setpoint documentation was changed, procedures were deviated and Plant personnel reset differential pressure switches CSP-DPS-4, 5, and 6 to ensure they would trip at less than or equal to 0.5 psid. The new setpoint of less than 0.443 psid includes margin for potential instrument inaccuracy and drift. At 1935 hours two of the three vacuum breakers were restored to an operable status. The Plant exited Technical Specification 3.0.3 and entered Technical Specification Action Statement 3.6.4.2.a, and terminated the Unusual Event. At 2029 hours testing was completed on the third vacuum breaker valve, it was declared operable, and the Plant exited Technical Specification Action Statement 3.6.4.2.a.

### Further Evaluation and Corrective Action

#### A. Further Evaluation

The root cause of this event was an analysis deficiency in that the setpoint calculation and subsequent differential pressure switch settings may not have limited the differential pressure to less than or equal to 0.5 psid if the condition had developed. The setpoint calculation thus did not satisfy the Technical Specification requirement. The surveillance procedure was developed with the setpoint calculation as a basis.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION														
FACILITY NAME (1) Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2		DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0   5   0   0   0   3   9   7							LER NUMBER (8) Year   Number   Rev. No. 9   2   0   0   6   0   0			PAGE (3) 3   OF   4		
TITLE (4) REACTOR BUILDING TO SUPPRESSION CHAMBER VACUUM BREAKER SETPOINTS INCORRECTLY SET														

Setting the differential pressure switches at greater than 0.5 psid resulted in the Plant not meeting Technical Specification requirement 4.6.4.2.3.b. This condition existed for several periods of time since initial Plant startup in 1984. This is a condition prohibited by the Plant Technical Specifications is reportable pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

There were no structures, systems, or components inoperable prior to the start of this event that contributed to the event.

**B. Further Corrective Action**

The setpoint problem identified in this LER was found during work on the Setpoint Methodology Program. As committed to in previously docketed correspondence with the NRC, the Supply System is performing an extensive review/verification of applicable setpoints. If other similar setpoint problems exist, they will be identified and corrected through this Program.

**Safety Significance**

The Reactor Building to Suppression Chamber vacuum breakers limit the vacuum level in the primary containment to prevent potential structural damage. The Technical Specification required 0.5 psid provides a significant margin of safety to the point where actual containment damage would be projected to occur. The extremely small difference between the maximum actual differential pressure switch setting of 0.5054 psid, and the Technical Specification required settings of 0.5 psid, did not affect the Reactor Building to Suppression Chamber vacuum breaker systems' ability to perform its intended safety function. This event had no impact on these valves containment isolation capabilities. Therefore, this event was not safety significant.

**Similar Events**

LER 91-013 documented several instances of failure to meet the surveillance requirements. Subsequent failures to meet the Technical Specifications were documented in LERs 91-018, 91-019, 91-028, 91-036, 92-002 and 92-004. Specific corrective actions to address these problems were identified in the LERs. As discussed in past LERs and other correspondence, the Setpoint Methodology Program is an ongoing long-term effort. Progress toward completion continues on the Program.



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION														
FACILITY NAME (1) Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2		DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0   5   0   0   0   3   9   7						LER NUMBER (8) Year   Number   Rev. No. 9   2   0   0   6   0   0			PAGE (3) 4   OF   4			
TITLE (4) REACTOR BUILDING TO SUPPRESSION CHAMBER VACUUM BREAKER SETPOINTS INCORRECTLY SET														

EIIS Information

Text Reference

CSP-DPS-4, 5, and 6  
CSP-V-5, 6, and 9  
Containment

EIIS Reference

<u>System</u>	<u>Component</u>
VB	PDS
VB	ISV
NH	---