

ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9107110304 DOC.DATE: 91/06/30 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397
AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
* Washington Public Power Supply System
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: "Summary of Transactions for 900630-910630."

DISTRIBUTION CODE: M004D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 42
TITLE: 50.71(b) Annual Financial Report

NOTES: See Financial Rpts

RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL
PD5 PD	1 1	ENG, P.L.	1 0
INTERNAL: AEOD/DOA	1 1	REG FILE	01 1 1
EXTERNAL: NRC PDR	1 1		

NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK,
ROOM P1-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION
LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 5 ENCL 4

AA
EPH



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

709-956495

ADMINISTRATOR:

DEBI SANER 358-0970

US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM
DOC CONTROL - DOCKET #50-397 WNP2
MAIL STATION P1-137
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

9107110304 910630
PDR ADOCK 05000397
I PDR

MOD4 1/



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495SUMMARY OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
BALANCE FROM LAST STATEMENT	0.00	0.00
RECEIPTS		
PROCEEDS FROM SALES/MATURITIES	24,946,411.55	24,927,854.52-
INTEREST RECEIVED ON BOND SALES	141,752.79	
INTEREST INCOME	570,998.52	
SECURITIES EXCHANGED		8,876,694.75
TRANSFER OF FUNDS	2,247,768.63	
TOTAL RECEIPTS	27,906,931.49	16,051,159.77-
DISBURSEMENTS		
COST OF ASSETS PURCHASED	27,582,835.32-	27,582,835.32
ACCRUED INTEREST ON BONDS PURCHASED	107,680.31-	
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES	4,250.50-	
TRANSFER OF FUNDS	207,240.91-	
TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS	27,902,007.04-	27,582,835.32
CURRENT BALANCE	4,924.45	11,531,675.55



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 1

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
	BALANCE FROM LAST STATEMENT	0.00	0.00
	PROCEEDS FROM SALES/MATURITIES -----		
08/03/90	MATURED 225,000 PAR VALUE OF FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 8/03/90 TRADE DATE 8/ 3/90 8/3/90 MATURITY	225,000.00	225,000.00-
08/03/90	MATURED 220,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 8/03/90 TRADE DATE 8/ 3/90 8/3/90 MATURITY	220,000.00	220,000.00-
08/15/90	MATURED 2,115,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 8/15/90 TRADE DATE 8/15/90 2,115,000 PAR VALUE AT 100%	2,115,000.00	2,115,000.00-
08/22/90	MATURED 425,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 8/22/90 TRADE DATE 8/22/90 425,000 PAR VALUE AT 100%	425,000.00	425,000.00-
09/20/90	MATURED 225,000 PAR VALUE OF FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 9/20/90 TRADE DATE 9/20/90 225,000 PAR VALUE AT 100%	225,000.00	225,000.00-





WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 2

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
09/20/90	MATURED 460,000 PAR VALUE OF FED NATL MTG ASSN DISC NT 9/20/90 TRADE DATE 9/20/90 460,000 PAR VALUE AT 100%	455,338.67	455,338.67-
09/25/90	MATURED 1,000,000 PV OF FED HOME LN BK 8.300% 9/25/90 TRADE DATE 9/25/90 1,000,000 PV AT 100%	1,000,000.00	1,000,000.00-
09/26/90	SOLD 1,920,000 PAR VALUE OF U S TREASURY NOTE 7.625% 12/31/91 TRADE DATE 9/26/90 S/D 9-26-90 SHEARSON/FED	1,908,000.00	1,920,000.00-
09/27/90	RECEIVED ACCRUED INTEREST ON SALE OF U S TREASURY NOTE 7.625% 12/31/91	35,008.70	
10/15/90	MATURED 80,000 PAR VALUE OF FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 10/15/90 TRADE DATE 10/15/90 80,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	80,000.00	80,000.00-
10/17/90	MATURED 225,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 10/17/90 TRADE DATE 10/17/90 225,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	222,384.38	222,384.38-



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 3

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
10/29/90	MATURED 220,000 PAR VALUE OF FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 10/29/90 TRADE DATE 10/29/90 220,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	220,000.00	220,000.00-
11/01/90	MATURED 225,000 PAR VALUE OF FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 11/01/90 TRADE DATE 11/ 1/90 225,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	223,052.50	223,052.50-
11/05/90	MATURED 2,230,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 11/05/90 TRADE DATE 11/ 5/90 2,230,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	2,191,802.58	2,191,802.58-
11/08/90	MATURED 695,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 11/08/90 TRADE DATE 11/ 8/90 695,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	687,763.31	687,763.31-
11/14/90	MATURED 435,000 PAR VALUE OF FED HOME LN BK DISC NT 11/14/90 TRADE DATE 11/14/90 435,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	427,204.80	427,204.80-



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 4

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
11/16/90	SOLD 2,300,000 PAR VALUE OF FED NATL MTG ASSN DISC NT 4/08/91 TRADE DATE 11/16/90 S/D 11-16-90 MERRILL/FED	2,228,668.06	2,228,668.06-
11/16/90	SOLD 220,000 PAR VALUE OF FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 12/05/90 TRADE DATE 11/16/90 S/D 11-16-90 MERRILL/FED	218,299.64	218,299.64-
11/16/90	SOLD 1,055,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 12/05/90 TRADE DATE 11/16/90 S/D 11-16-90 MERRILL/FD	1,039,082.69	1,039,082.69-
11/16/90	SOLD 230,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 11/30/90 TRADE DATE 11/16/90 S/D 11-16-90 MERRILL/FED	228,302.43	228,302.43-
11/16/90	SOLD 85,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 11/30/90 TRADE DATE 11/16/90 S/D 11-16-90 MERRILL/FED	84,491.94	84,491.94-



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 5

DATE	ACTIVITY		CASH	INVESTMENT COST
11/16/90	SOLD 440,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT TRADE DATE 11/16/90 S/D 11-16-90 MERRILL/FED	12/31/90	435,806.56	435,806.56-
11/16/90	SOLD 705,000 PAR VALUE OF FED NATL MTG ASSN DISC NT TRADE DATE 11/16/90 S/D 11-16-90 MERRILL/FED	2/04/91	692,419.67	692,419.67-
11/16/90	SOLD 230,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT TRADE DATE 11/16/90 S/D 11-16-90 MERRILL/FED	1/02/91	226,280.90	226,280.90-
11/16/90	SOLD 230,000 PAR VALUE OF FED NATL MTG ASSN DISC NT TRADE DATE 11/16/90 S/D 11-16-90 MERRILL/FED	2/26/91	224,097.94	224,097.94-
01/14/91	MATURED 225,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT TRADE DATE 1/14/91 225,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	1/14/91	222,300.75	222,300.75-



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 6

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
02/14/91	SOLD 1,920,000 PAR VALUE OF U S TREASURY NOTE 8.500% 2/29/92 TRADE DATE 2/14/91 S/D 2-14-91 SNW/FED	1,959,450.00	1,928,100.00-
02/14/91	RECEIVED ACCRUED INTEREST ON SALE OF U S TREASURY NOTE 8.500% 2/29/92	75,288.40	
02/28/91	MATURED 225,000 PAR VALUE OF FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 2/28/91 TRADE DATE 2/28/91 225,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	221,694.75	221,694.75-
03/21/91	RECEIVED ACCRUED INTEREST ON SALE OF U S TREASURY NOTE 8.000% 7/31/92 S/D 3/21/91	21,549.17	
03/21/91	SOLD 1,990,000 PAR VALUE OF U S TREASURY NOTE 8.000% 7/31/92 TRADE DATE 3/21/91 S.D 3/21/91 SNW/FED	2,016,274.22	2,028,245.31-
04/04/91	MATURED 310,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DN 4/04/91 TRADE DATE 4/ 4/91 310,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	306,109.11	306,109.11-





WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 7

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
04/05/91	MATURED 450,000 PAR VALUE OF FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 4/05/91 TRADE DATE 4/ 5/91 450,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	448,189.06	448,189.06-
04/05/91	MATURED 310,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 4/05/91 TRADE DATE 4/ 5/91 310,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	309,947.90	309,947.90-
05/14/91	MATURED 225,000 PAR VALUE OF FED FARM CR BK DISC 5/14/91 TRADE DATE 5/14/91 225,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	224,065.62	224,065.62-
05/24/91	RECEIVED ACCRUED INTEREST ON SALE OF U S TREASURY NOTE 7.750% 10/31/92 S/D 5/24/91 DEAN WITTER/FED	9,906.52	
05/24/91	SOLD 1,960,000 PAR VALUE OF U S TREASURY NOTE 7.750% 10/31/92 TRADE DATE 5/24/91 S/D 5/24/91 DEAN WITTER/FED	1,989,400.00	1,978,221.88-
06/06/91	MATURED 955,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 6/06/91 TRADE DATE 6/ 6/91 955,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	946,669.80	946,669.80-



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. . 8

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
06/27/91	MATURED 225,000 PAR VALUE OF FED HOME LN MTG CORP DISC N 6/27/91 TRADE DATE 6/27/91 225,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	225,000.00	225,000.00-
06/27/91	MATURED 75,000 PAR VALUE OF FFCB DISC NT 6/27/91 TRADE DATE 6/27/91 75,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	74,314.27	74,314.27-
	SUBTOTAL FOR INTEREST RECEIVED ON BOND SALES	141,752.79	
	SUBTOTAL FOR PROCEEDS FROM SALES/MATURITIES	24,946,411.55	24,927,854.52-
	TOTAL	25,088,164.34	24,927,854.52-
	INTEREST INCOME -----		
08/15/90	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON U S TREASURY NOTE 8.000% 8/15/99 \$0.04/PV ON 2,000,000 PAR VALUE DUE 8/15/90	80,000.00	
09/20/90	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON FED NATL MTG ASSN DISC NT 9/20/90 460,000 PAR VALUE AT 100%	4,661.33	
09/25/90	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON FED HOME LN BK 8.300% 9/25/90 \$0.0415/PV ON 1,000,000 PV DUE 9/25/90	41,500.00	



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 9

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
10/17/90	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON FHLMC DISC NT 10/17/90 225,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	2,615.62	
11/01/90	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 11/01/90 225,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	1,947.50	
11/05/90	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON FHLMC DISC NT 11/05/90 2,230,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	38,197.42	
11/08/90	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON FHLMC DISC NT 11/08/90 695,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	7,236.69	
11/14/90	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON FED HOME LN BK DISC NT 11/14/90 435,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	7,795.20	
11/16/90	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON FED NATL MTG ASSN DISC NT 4/08/91 S/D 11-16-90 MERRILL/FED	5,551.94	
11/16/90	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 12/05/90 S/D 11-16-90 MERRILL/FED	844.62	



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 10

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
11/16/90	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON FHLMC DISC NT 12/05/90 S/D 11-16-90 MERRILL/FD	11,813.65	
11/16/90	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON FHLMC DISC NT 11/30/90 S/D 11-16-90 MERRILL/FED	1,031.21	
11/16/90	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON FHLMC DISC NT 11/30/90 S/D 11-16-90 MERRILL/FED	261.80	
11/16/90	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON FHLMC DISC NT 12/31/90 S/D 11-16-90 MERRILL/FED	150.94	
11/16/90	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON FED NATL MTG ASSN DISC NT 2/04/91 S/D 11-16-90 MERRILL/FED	1,143.66	
11/16/90	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON FHLMC DISC NT 1/02/91 S/D 11-16-90 MERRILL/FED	1,512.06	
11/16/90	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON FED NATL MTG ASSN DISC NT 2/26/91 S/D 11-16-90 MERRILL/FED	1,144.89	





WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 11

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
01/14/91	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON FHLMC DISC NT 1/14/91 225,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	2,699.25	
02/15/91	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON U S TREASURY NOTE 8.000% 8/15/99 \$0.04/PV ON 2,000,000 PAR VALUE DUE 2/15/91	80,000.00	
02/28/91	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 2/28/91 225,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	3,305.25	
04/04/91	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON FHLMC DN 4/04/91 310,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	3,890.89	
04/05/91	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 4/05/91 450,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	1,810.94	
04/05/91	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON FHLMC DISC NT 4/05/91 310,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	52.10	
04/30/91	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON U S TREASURY NOTE 7.750% 10/31/92 \$0.03875/PV ON 1,960,000 PAR VALUE DUE 4/30/91	75,950.00	



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 12

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
05/14/91	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON FED FARM CR BK DISC 5/14/91 225,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	934.38	
05/15/91	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON U S TREASURY NOTE 8.875% 11/15/97 \$0.044375/PV ON 4,190,000 PAR VALUE DUE 5/15/91	185,931.25	
06/06/91	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON FHLMC DISC NT 6/06/91 955,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	8,330.20	
06/27/91	CASH RECEIPT OF INTEREST EARNED ON FFCB DISC NT 6/27/91 75,000 PAR VALUE AT 100 %	685.73	
	TOTAL	570,998.52	



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 13

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
	SECURITIES EXCHANGED -----		
07/26/90	RECEIVED 445,000 PAR VALUE OF FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 8/03/90 TRANS FROM A/C 748-993102		445,000.00
07/26/90	RECEIVED 2,115,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 8/15/90 TRANS FROM A/C 748-993102		2,115,000.00
07/26/90	RECEIVED 425,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 8/22/90 TRANS FROM A/C 748-993102.		425,000.00
07/26/90	RECEIVED 225,000 PAR VALUE OF FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 9/20/90 TRANS FROM A/C 748-993102		225,000.00
07/26/90	RECEIVED 1,000,000 PV OF FED HOME LN BK 8.300% 9/25/90 TRANS FROM A/C 748-993102		1,000,000.00
07/26/90	RECEIVED 80,000 PAR VALUE OF FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 10/15/90 TRANS FROM A/C 748-993102		80,000.00
07/26/90	RECEIVED 220,000 PAR VALUE OF FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 10/29/90 TRANS FROM A/C 748-993102		220,000.00



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 14

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
07/26/90	RECEIVED 1,920,000 PAR VALUE OF U S TREASURY NOTE 7.625% 12/31/91 TRANS FROM A/C 748-993102		1,920,000.00
07/26/90	RECEIVED 2,000,000 PAR VALUE OF U S TREASURY NOTE 8.000% 8/15/99 TRANS FROM A/C 748-993102		2,000,000.00
08/03/90	DISTRIBUTED 220,000 PAR VALUE OF FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 8/03/90 VALUED AT \$219,931.80 ORIGINAL BUY WAS INCORRECT S/B FMDN		220,000.00-
08/03/90	RECEIVED 220,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 8/03/90 TO CORRECT ORIGINAL BUY		220,000.00
12/19/90	RECEIVED 225,000 PAR VALUE OF FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 2/28/91 FROM 748-993102		221,694.75
05/17/91	RECEIVED 225,000 PAR VALUE OF FED HOME LN MTG CORP DISC N 6/27/91		225,000.00



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 15

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
	TOTAL		8,876,694.75
	TRANSFER OF FUNDS -----		
07/26/90	CASH RECEIPT DEPOSIT DDA#1474-600	11,508.04	
08/24/90	CASH RECEIPT DEPOSIT DDA #1474-600	224,000.00	
09/21/90	CASH RECEIPT DEPOSIT DDA#1474-600	224,000.00	
10/26/90	CASH RECEIPT DEPOSIT DDA #1474-600	224,000.00	
11/14/90	CASH RECEIPT TRANSFER FROM OTHER TRUST	207,240.91	
11/16/90	CASH RECEIPT DEPOSIT FUNDS TRANSFERRED FROM # 2 REV	224,000.00	



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 16

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
12/19/90	CASH RECEIPT DEPOSIT FROM 1474-600	2,239.37	
01/22/91	CASH RECEIPT DEPOSIT DDA #1474-600	225,000.00	
02/08/91	CASH RECEIPT DEPOSIT PRO RATED FEE TO 11/30/90	4,042.00	
02/11/91	CASH RECEIPT DEPOSIT DDA #1474-600	225,000.00	
03/25/91	CASH RECEIPT DEPOSIT DDA 1474-600 #2 REV	225,000.00	
04/18/91	CASH RECEIPT DEPOSIT DDA # 1474-600	225,000.00	
05/14/91	CASH RECEIPT DEPOSIT QUARTERLY FEE TO 2/28/91	208.50	



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 17

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
05/17/91	CASH RECEIPT DEPOSIT #DDA1474-600	1,529.81	
06/06/91	CASH RECEIPT DEPOSIT DDA#1474-600	225,000.00	
	TOTAL	2,247,768.63	
	COST OF ASSETS PURCHASED -----		
08/03/90	PURCHASED 460,000 PAR VALUE OF FED NATL MTG ASSN DISC NT 9/20/90 TRADE DATE 8/ 3/90 S/D 8/3/90 SHEARSON/FED	455,338.67-	455,338.67
08/15/90	PURCHASED 2,230,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 11/05/90 TRADE DATE 8/15/90 PUR FR MERRILL W/H FED	2,191,802.58-	2,191,802.58



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 18

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
08/22/90	PURCHASED 435,000 PAR VALUE OF FED HOME LN BK DISC NT 11/14/90 TRADE DATE 8/22/90 S/D 8-22-90 CARROLL MCENTEE/FED	427,204.80-	427,204.80
08/24/90	PURCHASED 225,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 10/17/90 TRADE DATE 8/24/90 S/D 8/24/90 MERRILL/FED	222,384.38-	222,384.38
09/20/90	PURCHASED 695,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 11/08/90 TRADE DATE 9/20/90 S/D 9/20/90 MERRILL/FED	687,763.31-	687,763.31
09/21/90	PURCHASED 225,000 PAR VALUE OF FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 11/01/90 TRADE DATE 9/21/90 S/D 9-21-90 MORGAN/FED	223,052.50-	223,052.50



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 19

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
09/25/90	PURCHASED 1,055,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 12/05/90 TRADE DATE 9/25/90 S/D 9/25/90 @ FED	1,039,082.69-	1,039,082.69
09/26/90	PURCHASED 1,920,000 PAR VALUE OF U S TREASURY NOTE 8.500% 2/29/92 TRADE DATE 9/26/90 S/D 9-26-90 SHEARSON/FED	1,928,100.00-	1,928,100.00
09/26/90	PAID ACCRUED INTEREST ON PURCHASE OF U S TREASURY NOTE 8.500% 2/29/92	11,721.55-	
10/15/90	PURCHASED 85,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 11/30/90 TRADE DATE 10/15/90 S/D 10/15/90 SHEARSON/FED	84,169.13-	84,169.13



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 20

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
10/17/90	PURCHASED 230,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 1/02/91 TRADE DATE 10/17/90 S/D 10/17/90 CARROLL/MCENTEE	226,280.90-	226,280.90
10/25/90	PURCHASED 230,000 PAR VALUE OF FED NATL MTG ASSN DISC NT 2/26/91 TRADE DATE 10/25/90 S/D 10-25-90 SHEARSON/FED	224,097.94-	224,097.94
10/29/90	PURCHASED 220,000 PAR VALUE OF FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 12/05/90 TRADE DATE 10/29/90 SD 10/29/90 SHEARSON/FED	218,299.64-	218,299.64
11/02/90	PURCHASED 230,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 11/30/90 TRADE DATE 11/ 1/90	228,625.24-	228,625.24



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 21

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
11/05/90	PURCHASED 2,300,000 PAR VALUE OF FED NATL MTG ASSN DISC NT 4/08/91 TRADE DATE 11/ 5/90 SD 11/5/90 SHEARSON/FED	2,228,668.06-	2,228,668.06
11/08/90	PURCHASED 705,000 PAR VALUE OF FED NATL MTG ASSN DISC NT 2/04/91 TRADE DATE 11/ 8/90 S/D 11-8-90 CARROLL MCENTEE	692,419.67-	692,419.67
11/14/90	PURCHASED 440,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 12/31/90 TRADE DATE 11/14/90 11/14 S/D THRU MERRILL	435,806.56-	435,806.56
11/16/90	PURCHASED 4,000,000 PAR VALUE OF U S TREAS INT STRIPS 0% 2/15/06 TRADE DATE 11/16/90 S/D 11-16-90 SNW/FED	1,074,400.00-	1,074,400.00



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 22

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
11/16/90	PURCHASED 4,190,000 PAR VALUE OF U S TREASURY NOTE 8.875% 11/15/97 TRADE DATE 11/16/90 S/D 11-16-90 FIRST BOSTON/FED	4,328,511.62-	4,328,511.62
11/16/90	PURCHASED 225,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 1/14/91 TRADE DATE 11/16/90 S/D 11-16-90 MERRILL/FED	222,300.75-	222,300.75
01/14/91	PURCHASED 230,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DN 4/04/91 TRADE DATE 1/14/91 S/D 1-14-91 MORGAN/FED	226,754.44-	226,754.44
01/22/91	PURCHASED 235,000 PAR VALUE OF FNMA DISC NTS 7/10/91 TRADE DATE 1/22/91 SD 1/22/91 PAINE WEBBER/FED	227,994.72-	227,994.72



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 23

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
02/11/91	PURCHASED 230,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NOTE 7/05/91 TRADE DATE 2/11/91 S/D 2-11-91 MORGAN/FED	224,503.00-	224,503.00
02/14/91	PURCHASED 1,990,000 PAR VALUE OF U S TREASURY NOTE 8.000% 7/31/92 TRADE DATE 2/14/91 S/D 2/14/91 SEATTLE NE/FED	2,028,245.31-	2,028,245.31
02/14/91	PAID ACCRUED INTEREST ON PURCHASE OF U S TREASURY NOTE 8.000% 7/31/92	6,156.91-	
02/15/91	PURCHASED 80,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DN 4/04/91 TRADE DATE 2/15/91 S/D 2-14-91 MERRILL/FED	79,354.67-	79,354.67



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 24

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
02/28/91	PURCHASED 225,000 PAR VALUE OF FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 4/05/91 TRADE DATE 2/28/91 S/D 2/28/91 MERRILL/FED	223,605.00-	223,605.00
03/21/91	PURCHASED 1,960,000 PAR VALUE OF U S TREASURY NOTE 7.750% 10/31/92 TRADE DATE 3/21/91 S/D 3/21/91 SNW/FED	1,978,221.88-	1,978,221.88
03/21/91	PAID ACCRUED INTEREST ON PURCHASE OF U S TREASURY NOTE 7.750% 10/31/92 S/D 3/21/91	59,165.47-	
03/25/91	PURCHASED 225,000 PAR VALUE OF FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 4/05/91 TRADE DATE 3/25/91 S/D 3/25/91 CARROLL MCENTEE/FED	224,584.06-	224,584.06



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 25

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
04/04/91	PURCHASED 310,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 4/05/91 TRADE DATE 4/ 4/91 S/D 4/4/91 MERRILL/FED	309,947.90-	309,947.90
04/05/91	PURCHASED 770,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 6/06/91 TRADE DATE 4/ 5/91 S/D 4/5/91 MERRILL/FED	762,308.56-	762,308.56
04/18/91	PURCHASED 225,000 PAR VALUE OF FED FARM CR BK DISC 5/14/91 TRADE DATE 4/18/91 S/D 4/18/91 MERRILL/FED	224,065.62-	224,065.62
04/30/91	PURCHASED 75,000 PAR VALUE OF FFCB DISC NT 6/27/91 TRADE DATE 4/30/91 S/D 4/30/91 MERRILL/FED FUNDS	74,314.27-	74,314.27



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 26

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
05/14/91	PURCHASED 230,000 PAR VALUE OF FNMA DISC NT 7/12/91 TRADE DATE 5/14/91 S/D 5/14/91 MERRILL/FED	227,877.80-	227,877.80
05/15/91	PURCHASED 185,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 6/06/91 TRADE DATE 5/15/91 S/D 5/15/91 MERRILL/FED	184,361.24-	184,361.24
05/24/91	PURCHASED 1,965,000 PAR VALUE OF US TREASURY NOTES 6.750% 2/28/93 TRADE DATE 5/24/91 S/D 5/24/91 DEAN WITTER/FED	1,965,000.00-	1,965,000.00
05/24/91	PAID ACCRUED INTEREST ON PURCHASE OF US TREASURY NOTES 6.750% 2/28/93 S/D 5/24/91 DEAN WITTER/FED	30,636.38-	



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 27

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
06/06/91	PURCHASED 1,190,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 7/08/91 TRADE DATE 6/ 6/91 S/D 6/6/91 CARROLL MCENTEE/FED	1,183,917.78-	1,183,917.78
06/27/91	PURCHASED 300,000 PAR VALUE OF FHLMC DISC NT 7/08/91 TRADE DATE 6/27/91 S/D 6/27/91 MORGAN STANLEY/FED	299,470.63-	299,470.63
	SUBTOTAL FOR ACCRUED INT. ON BONDS PURCHASED	107,680.31-	
	SUBTOTAL FOR COST OF ASSETS PURCHASED	27,582,835.32-	27,582,835.32
	TOTAL	27,690,515.63-	27,582,835.32
	ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES -----		
02/08/91	SAFEKEEPING FEE COLLECTED PRO RATED FEE TO 11/30/90	4,042.00-	
05/14/91	SAFEKEEPING FEE COLLECTED QUARTERLY FEE TO 2-28-91	208.50-	
	TOTAL	4,250.50-	



WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

ACCOUNT NO.
709-956495

STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 28

DATE	ACTIVITY	CASH	INVESTMENT COST
	TRANSFER OF FUNDS -----		
11/14/90	CASH DISBURSEMENT	207,240.91-	
	TRANSFER TO OTHER TRUST		
	TOTAL	207,240.91-	
	CURRENT BALANCE	4,924.45	11,531,675.55



ASSETS ACQUIRED

956495

WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 29

SETTLEMENT DATE	FACE VALUE OR NO. OF SHARES	*-----D E S C R I P T I O N-----*	TOTAL COST
08/03/90	460,000	FED NATL MTG ASSN DISC NT 9/20/90	455,338.67
08/15/90	2,230,000	FHLMC DISC NT 11/05/90	2,191,802.58
08/22/90	435,000	FED HOME LN BK DISC NT 11/14/90	427,204.80
08/24/90	225,000	FHLMC DISC NT 10/17/90	222,384.38
09/20/90	695,000	FHLMC DISC NT 11/08/90	687,763.31
09/21/90	225,000	FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 11/01/90	223,052.50
09/25/90	1,055,000	FHLMC DISC NT 12/05/90	1,039,082.69
09/26/90	1,920,000	U S TREASURY NOTE 8.500% 2/29/92	1,928,100.00
10/15/90	85,000	FHLMC DISC NT 11/30/90	84,169.13
10/17/90	230,000	FHLMC DISC NT 1/02/91	226,280.90
10/25/90	230,000	FED NATL MTG ASSN DISC NT 2/26/91	224,097.94
10/29/90	220,000	FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 12/05/90	218,299.64
11/02/90	230,000	FHLMC DISC NT 11/30/90	228,625.24
11/05/90	2,300,000	FED NATL MTG ASSN DISC NT 4/08/91	2,228,668.06
11/08/90	705,000	FED NATL MTG ASSN DISC NT 2/04/91	692,419.67
11/14/90	440,000	FHLMC DISC NT 12/31/90	435,806.56
11/16/90	4,000,000	U S TREAS INT STRIPS 0% 2/15/06	1,074,400.00



ASSETS ACQUIRED

956495

WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 30

SETTLEMENT DATE	FACE VALUE OR NO. OF SHARES	*-----D E S C R I P T I O N-----*	TOTAL COST
11/16/90	4,190,000	U S TREASURY NOTE 8.875% 11/15/97	4,328,511.62
11/16/90	225,000	FHLMC DISC NT 1/14/91	222,300.75
01/14/91	230,000	FHLMC DN 4/04/91	226,754.44
01/22/91	235,000	FNMA DISC NTS 7/10/91	227,994.72
02/11/91	230,000	FHLMC DISC NOTE 7/05/91	224,503.00
02/14/91	1,990,000	U S TREASURY NOTE 8.000% 7/31/92	2,028,245.31
02/15/91	80,000	FHLMC DN 4/04/91	79,354.67
02/28/91	225,000	FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 4/05/91	223,605.00
03/21/91	1,960,000	U S TREASURY NOTE 7.750% 10/31/92	1,978,221.88
03/25/91	225,000	FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 4/05/91	224,584.06
04/04/91	310,000	FHLMC DISC NT 4/05/91	309,947.90
04/05/91	770,000	FHLMC DISC NT 6/06/91	762,308.56
04/18/91	225,000	FED FARM CR BK DISC 5/14/91	224,065.62
04/30/91	75,000	FFCB DISC NT 6/27/91	74,314.27
05/14/91	230,000	FNMA DISC NT 7/12/91	227,877.80
05/15/91	185,000	FHLMC DISC NT 6/06/91	184,361.24
05/24/91	1,965,000	US TREASURY NOTES 6.750% 2/28/93	1,965,000.00



ASSETS ACQUIRED

956495

WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 31

SETTLEMENT DATE	FACE VALUE OR NO. OF SHARES	*-----D E S C R I P T I O N-----*	TOTAL COST
06/06/91	1,190,000	FHLMC DISC NT 7/08/91	1,183,917.78
06/27/91	300,000	FHLMC DISC NT 7/08/91	299,470.63
			27,582,835.32



ASSETS DISPOSED OF
956495
WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 32

SETTLEMENT DATE	FACE VALUE OR NO. OF SHARES	*-----D E S C R I P T I O N-----*	PROCEEDS	ADJUSTED COST	REALIZED GAIN/LOSS
PROCEEDS FROM SALES/MATURITIES -----					
08/03/90	225,000	FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 8/03/90	225000.00	-225000.00	0.00
08/03/90	220,000	FHLMC DISC NT 8/03/90	220000.00	-220000.00	0.00
08/15/90	2,115,000	FHLMC DISC NT 8/15/90	2115000.00	-2115000.00	0.00
08/22/90	425,000	FHLMC DISC NT 8/22/90	425000.00	-425000.00	0.00
09/20/90	225,000	FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 9/20/90	225000.00	-225000.00	0.00
09/20/90	460,000	FED NATL MTG ASSN DISC NT 9/20/90	455338.67	-455338.67	0.00
09/25/90	1,000,000	FED HOME LN BK 8.300% 9/25/90	1000000.00	-1000000.00	0.00
09/26/90	1,920,000	U S TREASURY NOTE 7.625% 12/31/91	1908000.00	-1920000.00	-12000.00
10/15/90	80,000	FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 10/15/90	80000.00	-80000.00	0.00
10/17/90	225,000	FHLMC DISC NT 10/17/90	222384.38	-222384.38	0.00
10/29/90	220,000	FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 10/29/90	220000.00	-220000.00	0.00
11/01/90	225,000	FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 11/01/90	223052.50	-223052.50	0.00
11/05/90	2,230,000	FHLMC DISC NT 11/05/90	2191802.58	-2191802.58	0.00
11/08/90	695,000	FHLMC DISC NT 11/08/90	687763.31	-687763.31	0.00
11/14/90	435,000	FED HOME LN BK DISC NT 11/14/90	427204.80	-427204.80	0.00
11/16/90	2,300,000	FED NATL MTG ASSN DISC NT 4/08/91	2228668.06	-2228668.06	0.00



ASSETS DISPOSED OF

956495

WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 33

SETTLEMENT DATE	FACE VALUE OR NO. OF SHARES	*-----D E S C R I P T I O N-----*		PROCEEDS	ADJUSTED COST	REALIZED GAIN/LOSS
11/16/90	220,000	FED FARM CR BK DISC NT	12/05/90	218299.64	-218299.64	0.00
11/16/90	1,055,000	FHLMC DISC NT	12/05/90	1039082.69	-1039082.69	0.00
11/16/90	230,000	FHLMC DISC NT	11/30/90	228302.43	-228302.43	0.00
11/16/90	85,000	FHLMC DISC NT	11/30/90	84491.94	-84491.94	0.00
11/16/90	440,000	FHLMC DISC NT	12/31/90	435806.56	-435806.56	0.00
11/16/90	705,000	FED NATL MTG ASSN DISC NT	2/04/91	692419.67	-692419.67	0.00
11/16/90	230,000	FHLMC DISC NT	1/02/91	226280.90	-226280.90	0.00
11/16/90	230,000	FED NATL MTG ASSN DISC NT	2/26/91	224097.94	-224097.94	0.00
01/14/91	225,000	FHLMC DISC NT	1/14/91	222300.75	-222300.75	0.00
02/14/91	1,920,000	U S TREASURY NOTE 8.500%	2/29/92	1959450.00	-1928100.00	31350.00
02/28/91	225,000	FED FARM CR BK DISC NT	2/28/91	221694.75	-221694.75	0.00
03/21/91	1,990,000	U S TREASURY NOTE 8.000%	7/31/92	2016274.22	-2028245.31	-11971.09
04/04/91	310,000	FHLMC DN	4/04/91	306109.11	-306109.11	0.00
04/05/91	450,000	FED FARM CR BK DISC NT	4/05/91	448189.06	-448189.06	0.00
04/05/91	310,000	FHLMC DISC NT	4/05/91	309947.90	-309947.90	0.00
05/14/91	225,000	FED FARM CR BK DISC	5/14/91	224065.62	-224065.62	0.00
05/24/91	1,960,000	U S TREASURY NOTE 7.750%	10/31/92	1989400.00	-1978221.88	11178.12



ASSETS DISPOSED OF

956495

WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 34

SETTLEMENT DATE	FACE VALUE OR NO. OF SHARES	*-----D E S C R I P T I O N-----*	PROCEEDS	ADJUSTED COST	REALIZED GAIN/LOSS
06/06/91	955,000	FHLMC DISC NT. 6/06/91	946669.80	-946669.80	0.00
06/27/91	225,000	FED HOME LN MTG CORP DISC N 6/27/91	225000.00	-225000.00	0.00
06/27/91	75,000	FFCB DISC NT 6/27/91	74314.27	-74314.27	0.00
			24946411.55	-24927854.52	18557.03
				225,000.00	
		FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 10/15/90 =====			
				80,000.00	
		FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 10/29/90 =====			
				220,000.00	
		FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 9/20/90 =====			
				225,000.00	
		FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 11/01/90 =====			
				446,105.00	
		FED FARM CR BK DISC NT 12/05/90 =====			

436,599.28

FED FARM CR BK DISC NT

4/05/91



FED FARM CR BK DISC NT

2/28/91

896,378.12

221,694.75

FED FARM CR BK DISC

5/14/91

448,131.24

FED HOME LN BK

8.300% 9/25/90

1,000,000.00

FED HOME LN BK DISC NT

11/14/90

854,409.60

FED HOME LN MTG CORP DISC N

6/27/91

225,000.00

FED NATL MTG ASSN DISC NT

9/20/90

910,677.34

FED NATL MTG ASSN DISC NT

4/08/91

4,457,336.12

FED NATL MTG ASSN DISC NT

2/26/91

448,195.88

FED NATL MTG ASSN DISC NT

2/04/91



FFCB DISC NT

6/27/91

148,628.54

FHLMC DISC NOTE

7/05/91

224,503.00

FHLMC DISC NT

11/08/90

1,375,526.62

FHLMC DISC NT

8/15/90

2,115,000.00

FHLMC DISC NT

1/02/91

452,561.80

FHLMC DISC NT

8/03/90

220,000.00

FHLMC DISC NT

8/22/90

425,000.00

FHLMC DISC NT

11/05/90

4,383,605.16

FHLMC DISC NT

10/17/90

444,768.76

FHLMC DISC NT

12/05/90



FHLMC DISC NT

4/05/91

2,078,165.38

619,895.80

~~FHLMC DISC NT~~

~~11/30/90~~

625,588.74

FHLMC DISC NT

12/31/90

871,613.12

FHLMC DISC NT

1/14/91

444,601.50

FHLMC DISC NT

6/06/91

1,893,339.60

FHLMC DISC NT

7/08/91

1,483,388.41

FHLMC DN

4/04/91

612,218.22

FNMA DISC NT

7/12/91

227,877.80

FNMA DISC NTS

7/10/91

227,994.72

~~U-S TREAS INT STRIPS 01~~

~~2/15/06~~



SEAFIRST BANK

U S TREASURY NOTE 8.875% 11/15/97
=====

1,074,400.00

4,328,511.62

U S TREASURY NOTE 7.625% 12/31/91
=====

1,908,000.00

U S TREASURY NOTE 8.500% 2/29/92
=====

3,887,550.00

U S TREASURY NOTE 8.000% 7/31/92
=====

4,044,519.53

U S TREASURY NOTE 7.750% 10/31/92
=====

3,967,621.88

US TREASURY NOTES 6.750% 2/28/93
=====

1,965,000.00



BROKERAGE SUMMARY

956495

WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST
JUNE 30, 1990 TO JUNE 30, 1991

PAGE NO. 35

BROKER	COMMISSION	%	TOTAL TRANSACTION VALUE	% COST OF TRANS.	COMMISSION TRADES ----- EQUITIES	FIXED
=====	=====	==	=====	=====	=====	=====

NO BROKER COMMISSIONS PAID THIS PERIOD



REVALUED GAIN/LOSS INFORMATION
FROM 06/30/90 TO 06/30/91

WPPSS - WNP #2 DE COM TRUST

956495

REALIZED GAIN/LOSS BASED ON REVALUED COST

18,557.03

UNREALIZED GAIN/LOSS BASED ON REVALUED COST

54,868.28

100



100



9107010052

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Washington, D.C. 20472

MAR 18 1991

1991 APR 23 AM 10:00

RECEIVED
HRC
REGION V

Mr. Frank J. Congel
Director
Division of Radiation Protection
and Emergency Preparedness
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Congel:

Enclosed is a copy of the final exercise report for the September 11, 1990, full-participation exercise of the offsite radiological emergency response plans site-specific to the WNP-2 Nuclear Power Plant. The State of Washington and Benton and Franklin Counties, Washington, participated in the exercise. The exercise report was prepared in December 1990 by the Region X staff of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). A copy of this final exercise report will be provided to the State of Washington by the FEMA Region X staff.


Three Deficiencies, all for the State of Washington, were identified during the exercise. All three related to dose assessment and were for (1) inadequate information flow from the Emergency Operations Facility to the State Emergency Operations Center; (2) inadequate capabilities and expertise of the staff responsible for dose projections; and (3) inadequate dose projection systems. Eighteen Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) were also identified during this exercise. FEMA Region X has discussed all exercise Deficiencies and ARCAs with Washington State and the report reflects commitments, action plans, and milestone dates to address these issues, including a remedial drill tentatively scheduled for May 7, 1991.

Pending the outcome of the scheduled remedial drill and other pending remedial actions, FEMA is unable to find that the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the WNP-2 Nuclear Power Plant are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the public's health and safety in the event of a radiological emergency at the site. Once FEMA has received the results of the remedial drill and other remedial actions, it will notify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of its findings.

4-66-00-95

If you should have any questions, please contact Mr. Craig S. Wingo, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-3026.

Sincerely,



Dennis H. Kwiatkowski
Assistant Associate Director
Office of Technological Hazards

Enclosure

CONTENTS

List of Acronyms	iii
Summary	v
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Exercise Background	1
1.2 FEMA Evaluators	3
1.3 Exercise Objectives	3
1.4 Summary of Exercise Scenario	9
1.5 Guide to Tables Used in This Report	10
2. EXERCISE EVALUATION	46
2.1 State of Washington	46
2.2 Benton and Franklin Counties	80
3. SUMMARY LISTING of EXERCISE INADEQUACIES	103
3.1 State of Washington	103
3.2 Benton and Franklin Counties	109
APPENDIX A: Verification of Corrective Actions	113

TABLES

1. Evaluator Assignment List	5
2. Objective/Location Matrix (Washington State)	6
3. Objective/Location Matrix (B/F Counties)	7
4. Significant Event Log - WNP-2 Exercise	11
5a. Protective Action Recommendations	31
5b. Protective Action Implementation	31
6. Text of EBS Messages	32
7a. Summary of Press Conferences - JIC	34
7b. Summary of Press Conferences - WEIC	39
8. Summary of Press Releases	42
9. Washington State Protective Action Guide	66

FIGURES

1. WNP-2 Plume EPZ Map	8
2. First Plume Projection Map Received at WA EOC	61
3. First Plume Location Map Received at WA EOC	62

~~4. First Plume Projection Map Received at WA EOC~~

List of Acronyms

ACP	. . access control point
ARCA	. . area requiring corrective action
ARFI	. . area recommended for improvement
DEF	. . deficiency
DOE	. . U. S. Department of Energy
DOH	. . Washington State Department of Health
EBS	. . Emergency Broadcast System
ECL	. . emergency classification level
EDPS	. . electronic dose projection system
EEM	. . exercise evaluation methodology
EOC	. . emergency operations center
EOF	. . emergency operations facility
EPZ	. . emergency planning zone
EW	. . emergency worker
EWAC	. . emergency worker/assistance center
FEMA	. . Federal Emergency Management Agency
FNF	. . fixed nuclear facility
FSO	. . Franklin County Sheriff's Office
FT	. . field team
GE	. . general emergency
IPZ	. . ingestion planning zone
JIC	. . joint information center
KI	. . potassium iodide
mr/hr	. . millirems per hour
MI	. . mobility impaired
MUDAC	. . meteorological and unified dose assessment center
NAWAS	. . National Warning System
NOUE	. . notice of unusual event
NRC	. . U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NWS	. . National Weather Service
ORP	. . Office of Radiation Protection
ORV	. . off road vehicle
PAD	. . protective action decision
PAG	. . protective action guide
PAR	. . protective action recommendation
PC	. . press conference
PR	. . press release
RAC	. . Regional Assistance Committee
RAG	. . radiological assessment group

List of Acronyms (continued)

RM . . recovery manager
SAE . . site area emergency
SS . . Washington Public Power Supply System
SSDC . . Supply System Decision Center
REM . . Radiological Emergency Manager
TH . . thyroid
TLD . . thermoluminescent dosimeter
TSC . . Technical Support Center
VCA . . verification of corrective action
WA . . Washington State
WB . . whole body
WEIC . . Washington Emergency Information Center
WNG . . Washington National Guard
WNP-2 . . Nuclear Plant #2
WSP . . Washington State Patrol

SUMMARY

On September 11, 1990, FEMA Region X evaluated an exercise of offsite plans and preparedness for the State of Washington, and the Counties of Benton and Franklin Counties, Washington for the WNP-2 Nuclear Plant. WNP-2 is located on the Hanford Reservation in Benton County, Washington. This was the first exercise in the second six year cycle. Previous exercises were conducted on March 1, 1989, September 13, 1988, September 18, 1986, May 16, 1984 and June 1, 1983.

This exercise was conducted in accordance with FEMA's regulations concerning the exercise of state and local radiological emergency plans and preparedness contained in 44 CFR 350.9(a).

FEMA evaluated the following operations:

State of Washington:	Accident Assessment/EOF; State EOC; field monitoring teams.
----------------------	---

Benton and Franklin Counties:	EOC; JIC; Columbia River route alerting; school and mobility impaired evacuation; access control points.
-------------------------------	--

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

FEMA Region X recommends the following corrective actions. Exercise participants have initiated remedial actions for those items identified as Deficiencies. Following the completion of remedial actions, a remedial drill will be conducted. See Sections 2 and 3 for further discussion of these issues.

STATE OF WASHINGTON

Deficiencies:

- * Dose Assessment - Improve information flow from the EOF to the state EOC. Demonstrate capabilities in a remedial drill.
- * Dose Assessment - Improve capabilities and expertise of staff responsible for dose projections. Demonstrate capabilities in a remedial drill.
- * Dose Assessment - Improve dose projection system. Demonstrate capabilities in a remedial drill.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action:

- * Control - Train DOH staff on the appropriate point of contact at the EOF.
- * Communication - Acquire and install equipment to provide additional fax capabilities.
- * Field Monitoring - Revise procedures and train staff on data collection and reporting processes.
- * Media Briefing - Improve capabilities for briefing the media in an accurate and timely manner at the State EOC.
- * Federal Assistance - Revise procedures to recognize the limitation of federal technical (radiological monitoring) assistance.

BENTON/FRANKLIN COUNTIES

Deficiencies: None

Areas Requiring Corrective Action:

- * Control - Improve capabilities for two-way briefings at the Bi-county EOC.

- * Emergency Worker Instructions - Revise instructions to eliminate inconsistency.
- * Alert & Notification - Revise procedures to ensure simultaneous activation of sirens and EBS system, if required.
- * EBS Messages - Revise text regarding shelter instructions. Prerecord messages to eliminate preparation and reading errors.
- * Emergency Workers & KI - Revise procedures to ensure that all emergency workers receive KI instructions.
- * Special Needs Data Base - Review, update, and maintain special needs data base.
- * Evacuation Verification - Develop procedures and resource needs. Revise plan. Train staff.
- * Press Releases - PIO log at the JIC should list the times that press releases were issued.

VERIFICATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

In addition to the preestablished exercise objectives, FEMA evaluated the implementation of the corrective actions identified in previous exercises. Benton and Franklin Counties demonstrated that seven of the eight verification of corrective actions (VCA) were corrected. Washington State demonstrated that only 7 of the 22 VCAs were corrected. See Appendix A for the report and status of corrective actions. Corrections not successfully implemented during this exercise will be the object of review in future exercises.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND

On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response.

FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

1. Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans developed by state and local governments;
2. Determining whether such plans can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans developed by state and local governments;
3. Responding to requests by the NRC pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between NRC and FEMA relating to Radiological Emergency Planning and Preparedness, 50 Federal Register 15485 (April 18, 1985);
4. Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:
 - U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC)
 - U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
 - U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
 - U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
 - U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
 - U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
 - U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
 - U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI)

Representatives of these agencies serve on the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.

The exercise participants employed their plans of record. The following plans and procedures were used by FEMA in evaluating the performance of the participants:

1. The State of Washington Emergency Response Plan dated June 30, 1990.
2. The State of Washington Fixed Nuclear Facility (FNF) Emergency Response Procedures, dated January 18, 1990.
3. The State of Washington DOH/ORP Response Procedures For Radiation Emergencies dated July 1990 and various Supply System joint procedures.

4. The Benton/Franklin County FNF Emergency Response Plan and Procedures dated June 1989.

This exercise was conducted in accordance with the exercise scenario and agreements on extent of play. The scenario presented a hypothetical accident at WNP-2 that was to trigger offsite response activities as well as various offsite conditions and contingencies. The extent of play agreements between FEMA and the emergency response organizations define the manner in which a particular response function will be demonstrated by the players. The agreements were designed to test the ability of the plans and procedures to be implemented under simulated emergency conditions. Where no extent of play agreement existed, FEMA evaluated the observed activities as if the plans and procedures were to be followed in their entirety.

The criteria used in the evaluation are contained in NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1, FEMA's Exercise Evaluation Methodology (EEM), and the actions called for in the participants' plans and procedures.

A Control Cell was used in this exercise. The Control Cell placed and received phone calls to the Joint Information Center and the state and county EOC's. The Control Cell was used to represent the media, concerned public and other response organizations. The response by participants to the Control Cell calls gave one basis for FEMA's evaluation of the adequacy of offsite preparedness.

Section 2 of this report contains the exercise evaluation. Each objective contains a statement of the objective, the outcome of the evaluation (met/not met) and a narrative summary of our observations which served as a basis for our evaluation. Where applicable, the narrative is followed by one or more exercise issues which fall into the following categories:

Deficiencies (DEF): demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would cause a finding that offsite preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant in the event of a radiological emergency. This inadequacy could be an exercise related issue regarding inadequate plans and procedures or the ability to implement plans. Because of the potential impact of deficiencies on emergency preparedness, they are required to be promptly corrected through appropriate remedial

actions.

Areas Requiring Corrective Actions (ARCA): demonstrated and observed inadequacies of performance. Although correction is required, they are not considered in and of themselves to adversely impact public health and safety.

Areas Recommended for Improvement (ARFI): issues observed that are not considered to adversely impact public health and safety. While not required, improvements in these areas would enhance an organization's level of emergency preparedness.

Plan Issues: An issue, identified as part of an exercise or drill, that deals with an area of planning that was not included in the scope of the exercise objectives and extent of play agreements. Corrective actions are required. Plan issues will be rated "inadequate" and will be identified by appropriate criterion in NUREG-0654.

When exercise issues or plan issues are identified in this report, they are listed with a brief statement of the issue, a reference to the applicable NUREG-0654 element, the level of the issue (DEF, ARCA, Plan, or ARFI) and, if the issue is DEF, ARCA, or Plan level, a tracking number used to identify the issue. Section 3 of the report is a summary listing of all DEF, ARCA or Plan issues identified during the exercise.

1.2 FEMA EVALUATORS

The 1990 WNP-2 exercise was evaluated by 32 evaluators drawn from FEMA, other Federal, State, local and contractor organizations. Table 1 lists these evaluators, their organizational affiliation and their assigned locations during the evaluation.

1.3 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES

The goal of this exercise was to demonstrate by actual performance a number of primary emergency preparedness functions. At no time was the exercise to interfere with the safe operation of the WNP-2 plant, or with State or local government activities. Tables 2 and 3 show the locations where each objective demonstrated

during the exercise was evaluated.

TABLE 1: Evaluator Assignment List - WNP-2 Exercise, September 11, 1990

Richard W. Donovan RAC Chairman

<u>EXERCISE LOCATION</u>	<u>EVALUATOR/AFFILIATION</u>
o WA State EOC	Richard Converse (ANL) Team Leader Jerry Leitch (EPA) Irv Silver (FEMA) Bill Van Pelt (FDA) Bennie Walthall (DOT)
o WA Accident Assessment & Coordination at the EOF	Joe Keller (WINCO) Dep. Team Leader Frank Bold (ANL) Bill Brown (FEMA) Dave Duncan (ANL) Gail Good (NRC) Brad Salmonson (WINCO)
o WA Rad Monitoring	Dale Denham (DOE-RL) Carl Hunkler (ANL)
o Joint Information Center	Ed Ronne (ANL) Dep. Team Leader Eleanor Castle (FEMA) Linda Lewis (ANL) Anita Nordstrom (FEMA) Elizabeth Post (USDA) Judy Tokarz (DOE-RL)
o B/F EOC	Arvind Teotia (ANL) Team Leader Colleen King (Observer) Bruce Knipe (FEMA) Mike Post (FEMA) George Turner (FEMA) Mary Beth Vasco (FEMA)
o B/F Field Operations	
- ACPs/TCPs - Franklin County	Sam Miller (FEMA) (Group Leader)
- Franklin County	Eva Neterowicz (FEMA)
- Richland	Bill Brown (FEMA)
- School Evacuation	Bill Knoerzer (ANL)
- Mobility Impaired Evacuation	Carolyn Williams (IND)
- Route Alerting	
- DOE	Jim Price (DOE-RL)
- Washington Fish & Game	Bill Gadberry (FEMA)

TABLE 2: Objectives Evaluated at each Washington State Location
WNP-2 Exercise September 11, 1990

Objective Description	OBJ NUM	EOC	EOF	JIC	FIELD RAD MONITOR
ECL	1	X	X	X	X
Alert, mobilize, activate	2	X	X	X	X
Direct, coordinate, control	3	X	X		
Communications	4	X	X	X	X
Facilities and displays	5	X	X	X	
Emergency worker dose control	6	X			X
Equipment and procedures radiation monitoring	7				X
Equipment and procedures airborne monitoring	8				X
Samples-particulate activity	9				X*
Dose projection	10	X	X		
Protective Action decisions	11	X			
Coordinate information and instructions	13	X		X	
Brief media	14	X**		X**	
Rumor control	15	X**		X**	
Emergency Workers - KI	16	X	X		X
Federal Assistance	26	X			

* Demonstrate collection of air sample and transfer to WSP.

** Phone calls from and to Media/Public Control Cell @ 5 calls/hour (minimum) per staff position at the Joint Information Center and at the State EOC.

TABLE 3: Objectives Evaluated at each B/F County Location
WNP-2 Exercise September 11, 1990

Objective Description	OBJ NUM	EOC	FIELD	JIC
ECL	1	X		X
Alert, mobilize, activate	2	X	X	X
Direct, coordinate, control	3	X		
Communications	4	X	X	X
Facilities and displays	5	X		X
Emergency worker dose control	6	X	X	
Protective Actions (PAs)	11	X		
Alert and Notification	12	X	X	
Coordinate information and instructions	13	X		X
Brief media	14			X*
Rumor control	15			X*
Emergency Workers - KI	16	X	X	
Implement PAs for Special populations	18	X	X	
Implement PAs for School population	19	X	X	
ACP and TCP establishment and maintenance	20	X	X	

* Phone calls from and to Media/Public Control Cell @ 5 calls/hr. (minimum)
per staff position at S/L EOC's.




Figure 1: WNP-2 Plume EPZ Map.

1.4 EXERCISE SCENARIO

The scenario was designed to test the objectives listed in Tables 2 and 3.

The scenario started with WNP-2 in the process of power ascension. It was at 10% power. At 0800, a protest group began a demonstration outside the WNP-2 fence. At approximately 0830, a separate group of demonstrators drove a truck up to the fence and placed a ladder against the fence. One member climbed the ladder and entered WNP-2 property. WNP-2 security detained the person and the control room shift manager declared an Alert per procedures.

At approximately 0910, a fire in the Technical Support Center started. The fire was quickly extinguished but it made the occupation of this work area impossible.

At 0955, the plant was continuing power ascension when a control rod accident occurred: a high worth control rod was inserted into the core out of sequence into the core. The resulting removal of negative reactivity caused a power excursion which caused a reactor scram. Plant parameters indicated fuel failure (clad damage of 1.8%).

As part of the scram process, two main steam isolation valves failed to operate. At 1010, the A Main Steam Line ruptured, allowing reactor steam to vent into the Turbine Bldg. This was the condition that triggered the emergency action level for the emergency classification level of General Emergency.

The release began with the 1010 event and continued until about 1400. During this timeframe the wind was blowing from the northwest at 300 degrees. The stability class was "E". The rate of release dropped significantly at about 1200 and remained constant until 1400.

1.5 GUIDE TO KEY TABLES USED IN THIS REPORT

1.5.1 Significant Event Log

Table 4 presents the Significant Event Log from the WNP-2 exercise. Evaluators at the exercise were instructed to record the times and substance of significant exercise events. Table 4 was constructed from their individual logs. It includes the time when the event took place, a short description of the event and any applicable comments. The times given for press releases are the times the releases were available to the media.

1.5.2 Protective Actions

Protective actions (PAs) are actions prescribed by public officials to minimize or prevent dose commitment. Examples of PAs include sheltering, evacuation and diversion of milk into cheese, dried or frozen products. These actions are based on protective action recommendations (PARs) from the utility or the state which in turn are based on protective action guides (PAGs). A PAG is a projected absorbed radiation dose level to the general population which warrants protective action to avoid this dose.

This process of recommending and deciding on protective actions, followed by appropriate public instructions is a key element of FEMA's exercise evaluation. Table 5a presents a summary of the PARs issued during the exercise and the time each was issued by the EOF. Once a PAR is agreed upon (becomes a PA), it is implemented by the responding organizations. Table 5b shows the time the PA was agreed to, what PAs were implemented by each organization, and other relevant comments.

Table 6 summarizes the implementation of these protective actions. Implementation is via the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS).

1.5.3 Information Provided to the Media

Information was provided to the media via news conferences and press releases. Tables 7a and 7b summarize the contents of the news conferences held by the Joint Information Center (JIC) in Richland, and the Washington Emergency Information Center (WEIC) in Olympia, respectively. Table 8 is a list of the press releases issued by the response organizations.

Table 4: Significant Events Log - WNP-2 Exercise September 11, 1990

SCENARIO TIME	LOCATION	EVENT
0823	EOF	NOUE Notification: at 816, Civil Disturbance.
0828	EOF to Offsite agencies.	NOUE fanout completed.
0830	B/F EOC	NOUE Notification.
0839	EOF	Alert Notification: at 836.
0840	JIC, WA EOC	Alert Notification.
0840	B/F EOC	NOUE Fanout Complete.
0846	EOF	Alert fanout complete.
0849	B/F EOC	Alert Notification.
0849	WA EOC	Declared functional.
0850	EOF to EOCs, etc.	Update Alert: Intruder location.
0852	DOE COC	Request Helicopter to perform surveillance.
0855	Franklin County Sheriff (FSO) to EOC.	Notified of ALERT; Officer dispatched to EOC.
0855	JIC	Team Discussion: regarding apprehension of intruder
0900	JIC	Begin calls to Media.
0903	EOF/MUDAC	MUDAC declared functional.
0905	B/F EOC	Alert Fanout begins.
0905	FSO	Begin EW Kit checkouts.
0911	WA EOC	WA PR#1 approved.
0913	B/F EOC	Alert fanout complete.

Table 4: Significant Events Log WNP-2 Exercise, September 11, 1990
(Cont.)

SCENARIO TIME	LOCATION	EVENT
0915-17	EOF to EOCs/JIC	EOF is declared Activated, RM in charge.
0915	EOF/MUDAC	Inquiry to Yakima NWS.
0919	B/F EOC	Declared Activated.
0920	WA EOC	PR WA#1 released
0927	B/F EOC	First Briefing.
0930	EOF to WA EOC	Faxed Alert Notification Form.
0930	JIC	Activate Public Inquiry Phone Team.
0932	EOF/MUDAC	DOE Rep arrives.
0936	EOF/MUDAC	3 Field Teams/Standby ready to go.
0936	EOF/SSDC	First RM Briefing.
0940	WA EOC	Declared Activated.
0941	EOF/MUDAC	REM Briefing.
0941	DOE-COC	Increased site security level.
0942	EOF/SSDC	Received NOUE & Alert Notification Forms.
0942	JIC	Declared Activated.
0944	EOF to B/F EOC	Discussed Status.
0945	WA EOC	Briefing.
0949	EOF	TSC Reactivated in Control Room.

Table 4: Significant Events Log WNP-2 Exercise, September 11, 1990
(Cont.)

SCENARIO TIME	LOCATION	EVENT
0951	B/F EOC	First SS Rep briefing.
0954	WA EOC	Begin callouts to Media.
0955	JIC	County Commissioner (Spokesperson) arrives.
0956	Plant	Scrammed.
0956	WA EOC	Briefing.
0957	JIC	PR SS #1 Released.
0957-1005	TSC to EOF	Discussed upgrade to SAE.
1003	B/F EOC	Reactor has scrambled.
1005	JIC	Security arrived.
1005	WA EOC	Discussion: potential release.
1006	EOF	Received signed notification form for SAE at 1001.
1007	SSDC to B/F/EOC	Request Columbia River Evacuation
1007	DOE @ EOF to DOE POC	Initiate Columbia River Evacuation; also assist in moving protestors.
1008	EOF to EOCs	SAE, PAR #1: Evacuate Columbia River, evacuate exclusionary zone.
1010	DOE POC	Send bus to WNP-2.
1010	WA EOC	Completed Press Release #1.

Table 4: Significant Events Log WNP-2 Exercise, September 11, 1990
(Cont.)

SCENARIO TIME	LOCATION	EVENT
1010	EOF/MUDAC	Dispatch field team to Leslie Groves Park to meet Sheriff boat.
1011	B/F EOC	WSP log entry: request Fish & Game to evacuate Wahluke hunting area.
1012	EOF/MUDAC	Dispatch 2 field teams (East/West side of Columbia River)
1012	FSO	Notification of SAE, effect River Closure (ACPs F15 & F16).
1012	DOE POC to Flight Operation	Effect Columbia River Evacuation for WNP-2.
1012	B/F EOC	Posted on status board: projected dose of 5 Rem at Site Boundary.
1014	B/F EOC	PAD #1: Evacuate Columbia River, Sound Sirens, Activate EBS.
1014	DOE POC	Dispatch Boat to White Bluffs.
1015	DOE-Helicopter	Airborne.
1015	B/F EOC	Richland Police - Evacuate Horn Rapids ORV Park; dispatch deputy to Leslie Grove Park.
1015	WA EOC	Briefing.
1017	B/F EOC	Siren Activation #1.

Table 4: Significant Events Log WNP-2 Exercise, September 11, 1990
(Cont.)

SCENARIO TIME	LOCATION	EVENT
1018	FSO	Dispatch FSO # 1 & 2 to Selph/Ringold (F15 & F16).
1018	B/F EOC to SS	Request confirmation of siren activation (per procedures) - SS cannot confirm siren activation.
1018	WA JIC Team	Airport closed due to fog - cannot get to Richland.
1018	EOF	KI decision for SS, confirm release has started.
1019	EOF/MUDAC	First dose projection (using BEDPS), 25.7 Rem TH at 1.2 miles.
1019	B/F EOC	Posted on status board, Fish & Game enroute to perform route alerting & evacuation verification.
1022	EOF to EOCs	GE, PAR #2: Shelter Sector 2 to 5 miles, KI for SS, KI PAR for S/L EWs. Note, form said "no release", but the RM explained on the crash call that the release had just started.
1023	B/F EOC	Find out if sirens have activated.
1023	EOF to SS #1-3	Take KI.
1024	B/F EOC	Siren Activation #2.
1024	EOF to JIC	GE notification.
1025	EOF to SS #1	Use respirators.

Table 4: Significant Events Log WNP-2 Exercise, September 11, 1990
(Cont.)

SCENARIO TIME	LOCATION	EVENT
1024-36	WA EOC	Discussion on EW KI PAR.
1025	EOF	Announced DOE Helicopter Airborne as of 1015.
1025	JIC	OR PR #1 & WA PR #1 are released.
1028	B/F EOC	Begin callouts to field re: siren activation.
1028	EOF/MUDAC	SS to DOE #1, re: monitoring assignment.
1028	DOE POC	Hanford boat enroute.
1029	B/F EOC & KONA	Broadcast (simulated) EBS #1 for PAD #1.
1030	B/F EOC & KONA	Broadcast (simulated) EBS #1 in Spanish.
1031	JIC	SS PR #2 & B/F PR #1.
1032	DOE to Field	Establish Decontamination station at White Bluffs.
1032	JIC	SS PR #3 and #4.
1032	B/F EOC	WSP noted on their log that Fish & Game had completed the evacuation of Wahluke hunting area.
1033	EOF/MUDAC	Field team reports first Contact & measurement with release.
1035	FSO # 1	Arrive at Selph Landing.
1035	WA EOC	Decision to administer KI to S/L EWs.

Table 4: Significant Events Log WNP-2 Exercise, September 11, 1990
(Cont.)

SCENARIO TIME	LOCATION	EVENT
1037	WA EOC to EOF & B/F EOC	Administer KI to S/L EWS.
1038	EOF/MUDAC to SSDC	First Plume Projection (data point report - location of plume).
1038	EOF/MUDAC	First EDPS dose projection.
1039	DOE Helicopter	Completes River EPZ Sweep (contacted 4 boats per extent of play agreement). Actual count is 22 persons on shore and 20 boats.
1040	FSO#2	Arrive at Ringold; acted as base station for Fish & Game.
1040	WA EOC	WA PR#2 - State of Emergency.
1040	Fish & Game	At Ringold - monitor radio traffic.
1041	WSP to WA EOC	Field personnel have taken KI.
1042	SS # 1	Take first air sample.
1042	JIC	PC #1.
1042	WA EOC	Briefing.
1043	DOE/EOF to DOE/POC	Release will not reach river for 22 minutes, perform another run up river.
1043	FSO#1	Observed DOE Helicopter.

Table 4: Significant Events Log WNP-2 Exercise, September 11, 1990
(Cont.)

SCENARIO TIME	LOCATION	EVENT
1044	B/F EOC	PAD#2: Shelter livestock to 5 miles; Shelter Section 2 from 0 to 5 miles. Emergency Workers take KI.
1045	Radio Station KONA	Broadcast EBS test message in English.
1045	EOF/SSDC	RM decision, transmit first plume forecast (data point report) to S/L.
1045	EOF/MUDAC	First dose projection using ambient (field) radiation measurements, projected dose TH 26 REM at 1/2 mile.
1047	Radio Station KONA	Broadcast EBS test message in Spanish.
1047	B/F EOC	Receive confirmation of siren activation.
1047	FSO#2	Inform FSO that road blocks in place on river.
1048	Fish & Game to FSO	Decision to proceed with Hunting Area Closure (Note, Fish & Game had not received notification & instructions from WSP).
1048-57	EOF/SSDC	Briefing on status of PARS & PADs.
1049	WA EOC	Question, have we received the text of any EBS messages? (AD-DEM asks staff person).
1049	FSO#2	Observed DOE helicopter (Sweep #2).

Table 4: Significant Events Log WNP-2 Exercise, September 11, 1990
(Cont.)

SCENARIO TIME	LOCATION	EVENT
1049	B/F EOC to PASCO SCHOOL/TRANS.	Dispatch buses to schools.
1049	B/F EOC & KONA	Broadcast (simulated) EBS #2: Shelter Section 2 from 0 to .5 miles; place livestock in shelter and on stored feed. Note, no mention of ORV Park closure.
1049	DOE patrol boat	Arrives at White Bluff.
1051	Fish & Game to FSO#2	Commencing evacuation verification & route alerting of Hunting Area.
1052	FSO to FSO # 1 & 2	Verification of road block.
1053	FSO #1 & 2 to FSO	Verified positions at F15 & F16.
1057	B/F EOC	SS Briefing: release has started, wind is at 3 mph, measured dose rate of 173 mr/hr.
1059	EOF to B/F EOC	Briefing: Offsite dose rates are increasing.
1100	EOF/MUDAC	First MUDAC PAR with EDPS Dose Projection (TH dose 14,492 mr/hr. at 10 miles, evacuate Section 2, 0-10 miles, no KI PAR.
1100	EOF/SSDC	Discussion: 5% Clad failure, what is the cause?
1100	DOE field team	Begin Setup of Decontamination at White Bluffs station

Table 4: Significant Events Log WNP-2 Exercise, September 11, 1990
(Cont.)

SCENARIO TIME	LOCATION	EVENT
1101	PASCO TRANS./ SCHOOL	Bus departs to Markham School with radio check.
1101	Fish & Game	Enroute to Wahluke slope.
1102	B/F EOC	Receiving many phone calls r e s t a t u s o f schoolchildren.
1102	B/F EOC	Signed Proclamation of Emergency.
1102-1106	B/F EOC	Decision to evacuate schools.
1105	WA EOC	State JIC arrives back.
1103	DOE Helicopter	Completes upriver sweep.
1105	EOF/SSDC	Briefing: 4 Boats are out of zone (Columbia River-plume EPZ).
1106	SS#1	Count on cartridge, 308 mr/hr.
1106	JIC	SS PR #4.
1107	FSO#1	Observed Benton County Sheriff's boat patrolling down river.
1107	EOF/REM to MUDAC	Sent back MUDAC PAR (1100) with request to confirm MUDAC dose projection.
1109	Fish & Game	Secured north end of Hunting Area.

Table 4: Significant Events Log WNP-2 Exercise, September 11, 1990
(Cont.)

SCENARIO TIME	LOCATION	EVENT
1109	MUDAC to REM,	Confirm dose projection and MUDAC REM to MUDAC, PAR #1; REM changes MUDAC PAR #1 REM to RM to include evacuation of Sections 1, 3 & 4 from 0 to 5 miles.
1110	EOF/MUDAC	Second EDPS Dose Projection - 10 mr/hr (WB) at 10 miles.
1113	DOE to field teams	Terminate DOE portion of River route alerting, access control & decontamination station.
1113	B/F EOC	Decision to evacuate special populations in Section 2 from 0 to 10 miles.
1114-1121	EOF to EOCs	PAR #3: Sections 1, 3, 4 Evacuate to 5 miles. Section 2 evacuate to 10 miles, KI for EWs, Evacuate Columbia River.
1116	EOF/REM to WA EOC	Discussion on PAR #3.
1118	PASCO/TRANS SCHOOL	Bus dispatched for Mobility Impaired pickup.
1120	EOF to WA #2	Dispatched to east side of river.
1122	B/F EOC	Status board posted, evacuation bus arrives at Edward Markham School.

Table 4: Significant Events Log WNP-2 Exercise, September 11, 1990
(Cont.)

SCENARIO TIME	LOCATION	EVENT
1124	B/F EOC	PAD #3; evacuate Section 1 to 5 miles; Evacuate Section 2 to 10 miles.
1124	WA EOC to EOF	Discussion: is PAR # 3 both the MUDAC PAR & the RM's PAR? Answer: Yes.
1125	WA EOC	Last Media callout completed.
1125	WA #1	Radio Check.
1127	Edwin Markham School	Bus departs for Isaac Stevens EWAC
1128	FSO #1 & 2	Dispatch to F#5 & F#6, take KI.
1130	JIC	WA DOH Technical Advisors arrived.
1131	EOF to WA #1	Dispatched to N. Taylor Flats.
1131	B/F EOC	Status board posted: Columbia River evacuation is complete.
1131	Fish & Game	Completed Wahluke route alert/verification, return to Ringold.
1132	WA EOC to B/F EOC	WA concurs with PAR # 3 from SS. State also concurs with PAR # 3.
1133	Fish & Game	Complete route alerting, access controls in effect.

Table 4: Significant Events Log WNP-2 Exercise, September 11, 1990
(Cont.)

SCENARIO TIME	LOCATION	EVENT
1134	B/F EOC & KONA	Broadcast (simulated) EBS #3 - Evacuate Section 1, to 5 miles; evacuate Section 2, to 10 miles. Schools being evacuated, two assistance centers have been opened.
1135	FSO to FSO 1 & 2	Informed them that 2 assistance centers open.
1135	Fish & Game to FSO	Completed Evacuation and Access control; awaiting further instructions.
1137	MUDAC	WA DOH arrives.
1140	Fish & Game to FSO	Any instructions?
1140	JIC	Receive B/F PR #3 & SS PR #5.
1141	FSO#2	Arrives at ACP #F5.
1141	JIC	Received B/F PR #2.
1142	WA EOC	Briefing.
1143	EOF to WA #1	Briefing on plant status, (Not told to take KI).
1144	WA EOC	Receive B/F PR #3.
1145	Fish & Game	Depart to EWAC at Connell.

Table 4: Significant Events Log WNP-2 Exercise, September 11, 1990
(Cont.)

SCENARIO TIME	LOCATION	EVENT
1145	EOF/SSDC	Briefing: School evacuation completed; evacuation of ORV park in progress; Columbia River evacuation is completed. Dose Projection 2.9 TH at 10 miles, B/F recommended shelter of animals in Section 2, 0 to 10 miles. MUDAC is considering PARS beyond 10 miles.
1148	WA EOC to FEMA	Request Federal assistance - 5 field teams and mobile lab.
1148	JIC	Receive WA PR#2.
1150	FSO#1	Arrive at ACP #F6.
1151	EOF to WA#1	Take KI.
1151	WA EOC	Received B/F EBS #1 & #2 texts.
1152	MUDAC	Receive first lab analysis. (from SS air sample taken at 1042, 0.5 mile from plant).
1153	School bus	Arrived at Host School (EWAC).
1154	MI bus	Arrived at residence.
1155	WA EOC	Phone team tells public that evacuation is being considered (when its actually taking place).

Table 4: Significant Events Log WNP-2 Exercise, September 11, 1990
(Cont.)

SCENARIO TIME	LOCATION	EVENT
1158	EOF/MUDAC	First dose projection based on Iodine measurement, TH 6.29 rem/hr at 1.2 miles; TH 1.09 rem/hr at 5 miles, TH 481 mr/hr at 10 miles.
1204	WA EOC	Media section received text of B/F EBS 1 & 2.
1204	JIC	PC #2.
1205	B/F EOC	Discussion: OK to remove loaded/harvested produce/go back in to evacuated area. No actions are taken to implement this issue.
1206	B/F EOC	SS Briefing: 1 mr/hr at leading edge of plume.
1210	EOF/MUDAC	MUDAC PAR # 2: IPZ advisory for Sections 1, 2, and 3, from 10 to 50 miles.
1210	B/F EOC	First Staff Briefing (Note, no mention by Richland Police of ORV Park closure & no mention by WSP of Fish & Game actions).
1218	SS at B/F EOC to EOF	Discussion: County's concerns on sending people in to get food.
1218	WA EOC/WEIC	Received SS PR #5.
1219	REM to RM/EOF	New dose projection: no need to go beyond 10 miles re PARS.
1225	B/F EOC	Report: Section 1 and 2 - evacuation is completed.

Table 4: Significant Events Log WNP-2 Exercise, September 11, 1990.
(Cont.)

SCENARIO TIME	LOCATION	EVENT
1225	RM to WA EOC	Notification/discussion of IPZ advisory (MUDAC PAR # 2).
1226	WA EOC	Received information that core had not been at 100% power.
1228	JIC	OR PR #2 and B/F PR #4.
1230	EOF to WA #2	Take KI.
1230	B/F EOC	Controller insert to FSO: perform evacuation verification of Section 2: FSO is unable to comply (no procedures).
1231	EWAC	MI Bus #1 arrives.
1233	EOF to B/F EOC	Discuss differences in dose projections
1235-37	WA #1	Made first plume pass/measurements: 6 mr/hr at center line.
1235	WA #2	Made plume edge measurement (at FIR street) 0.6 mr/hr.
1235	PASCO/TRANS	Dispatch Mobility impaired bus to School second residence.
1240	WA 1 to EOF	Report measurements.
1242	EOF to WA #1	Take air sample.
1245	WA EOC to B/F EOC	IPZ Advisory: Sections 1, 2, and 3, from 10 to 50 miles.

Table 4: Significant Events Log WNP-2 Exercise, September 11, 1990
(Cont.)

SCENARIO TIME	LOCATION	EVENT
1245	WA #1	Take Air Sample #1, Taylor Flat Road.
1247	WA #2	Takes KI
1250	FSO # 1 & # 2	Depart sites to EWAC.
1251	WA #2	Take 2nd set of measurements through plume: 3.1 mr/hr (edge) and 4.6 mr/h (center) @ 19K46
1254	B/F EOC to EOF	Discussion and question the rationale for the IPZ Advisory for Section s 1 & 3.
1255	WA #2 to EOF	Field Analysis reported 2.99×10^{-4} u/ci/cc; 3.33×10^{-7} particulate.
1259	B/F EOC	Briefing: WA Field Team reports plume edge (northern side) is at North Elm & Dogwood.
1301	WA#2	Makes measurements at 19K2B, 822 uR/hr.
1301	REM/RM	Discuss IPZ Advisory.
1302	B/F EOC to WA EOC	Do not agree with IPZ Advisory.
1305	EOF to B/F EOC	Stand by IPZ Advisory (MUDAC PAR # 2).
1309	WA EOC	Received WA PR #3.

Table 4: Significant Events Log WNP-2 Exercise, September 11, 1990
(Cont.)

SCENARIO TIME	LOCATION	EVENT
1310	WA #1 to MUDAC	Reports results of sample taken at 1245 from 27D9G (6.5 miles): iodine 2.93×10^{-4} .
1310	WA EOC	Decides on IPZ Advisory.
1310	WA #2	Take air sample @ 19K46.
1320	EOF	Received first indication that majority of release was over - 1.4 hr/duration.
1320	WA EOC & KONA	Broadcast (simulated) EBS #1: IPZ Advisory.
1321-30	WA#1 to WSP	Attempted to contact re: sample transfer, finally established contact.
1322	EOF	WA had made decision on IPZ Advisory as submitted.
1325	EOF/MUDAC	Field Data (received at 1255) gets to Dose Assessment Group.
1326	EOF/SSDC	Discussion re: multiple dose projections received from MUDAC.
1330	EOF/MUDAC	Dose Projection based on field data: 27.6 Rem at 6.5 mile.
1333	JIC	B/F PR #4.
1334	WA EOC	WA PR#4.
1335	EOF/MUDAC	State Liaison confirms that WA EWS took KI about 2 hours ago.

Table 4: Significant Events Log WNP-2 Exercise, September 11, 1990
(Cont.)

SCENARIO TIME	LOCATION	EVENT
1335-40	JIC	PC#3.
1337	WA EOC	PC#1.
1340	EOF to WA #1 & #2	Release had been stopped.
1342	Mob. Imp. Bus	Arrive at EWAC.
1342	JIC	WA PR #3.
1345	EOF/MUDAC to REM	Revised Dose Projection based upon 1.4 hour release duration: 8.07 (TH) Rem at 10 mile.
1347	EOF	Briefing - release stopped.
1349	WA EOC	Amends IPZ Advisory - Section 1, add 5 to 10 miles.
1351	Control Room to MUDAC	Request TH dose projection at 1.2 mile.
1355	WA #1 & 2 to WSP	Transfer samples for delivery to State DOH Lab.
1358	PASCO TRANS School	School District terminates exercise play.
1400	FSO # 1 & # 2	Terminates exercise play.
1400	B/F EOC	Checked Rumor Control at JIC.
1402	EOF	REM to RM, we may have issued a non conservative PAR.
1402	WA EOC	PC #1 concludes.
1413	WA EOC	WA PR #5.

Table 4: Significant Events Log WNP-2 Exercise, September 11, 1990
(Cont.)

SCENARIO TIME	LOCATION	EVENT
1414	B/F EOC	Briefing: Price Anderson Insurance representatives will set up tomorrow at Richland airport.
1417	WA#2 to MUDAC	Sample from 19K4C (taken at 1320): 2.0×10^{-5} .
1420	JIC	Received WA PR #4.
1425	JIC	Received WA PR #5.
1428	WA EOC	Received OR PR #2.
1430	B/F EOC	Notified that JIC PC at 1330 had an error.
1434	EOF/MUDAC	Completed dose projection with different set of field data, 0.37 REM (TH) at 10 miles.
1437	B/F EOC	Terminates Exercise Play.
1442	JIC	B/F PR #6 and SS PR #6.
1441	EOF & JIC	Terminates Exercise play.
1445	WA EOC	Terminates Exercise play.
1448	MUDAC to FIELD	Terminates Exercise play.

TABLE 5a Protective Action Recommendations - WNP-2 Exercise
September 11, 1990

PAR #	Protective Action Recommendation	Time Issued at EOF
1	SAE; Evacuate Columbia River; and exclusion zone at WNP-2.	1008
2	GE; Shelter Section 2, 0 to 5 miles; KI for EWS.	1022
3	Evacuate to 5 miles in Sections 1, 3, & 4, and to 10 miles in Section 2.	1114

TABLE 5b Protective Action Implementation - WNP-2 Exercise
September 11, 1990

PA # Time	Protective Action Decision	Comments
1 1014	Adopt PAR #1	Sound Sirens; Broadcast EBS #1 at 1029 (Sirens sounded at 1017, again at 1024).
2 1044	Adopt PAR #2; Place livestock on stored feed; shelter in Section 2 to 5 miles.	EBS #2 broadcast at 1049.
3 1124	Evacuate to 5 miles in Section 1, and to 10 miles in Section 2.	EBS #3 broadcast at 1134.

OTHER PAs (NOT PART OF THE PAR/PAD PROCESS)

1015	RPD begins evacuation of ORV Park.
1106	B/F EOC decides to evacuate 3 schools.
1113	B/F EOC decides to evacuate special populations in Section 2, 5 to 10 miles

TABLE 6 Emergency Broadcast System Messages Issued by B/F EOC
WNP-2 Exercise September 11, 1990

EBS # / Time Broadcast

EBS Message Text

#1 / 1029

This is B/F County PIO at the County EOC. There has been an accident at the Hanford Reservation at the WNP-2 plant. It has been classified as a Site Area Emergency. No protective measures are advised at this time. Keep your radio tuned to the EBS station KONA for further instructions. Further information will be provided as it becomes available.

The Columbia River is being closed from Leslie Groves Park to the White Bluffs Ferry Landing. The Wahluke Slope is being evacuated. Selph Landing and Ringold boat launches are closed.

#2 / 1049

This is the B/F County PIO at the County EOC. There has been an accident at the Hanford Reservation at the WNP-2 plant. It has been classified as a General Emergency. The Columbia River is being closed from Leslie Groves Park to the White Bluffs Ferry Landing.

Sheltering is necessary in Section 2 from 0 to 5 miles. (Gives geographic description of Section 2). (Reads section 7 of EBS form dealing with how to shelter - reads as printed). Sheltering of livestock is directed. Put them on stored feed. We will continue to keep you informed.

#3 / 1134

This is the B/F County PIO at the County EOC. There has been an accident at the Hanford Reservation at the WNP-2 plant. It has been classified as a General Emergency. The Columbia River is being closed from Leslie Groves Park to the White Bluffs Ferry Landing.

TABLE 6 Emergency Broadcast System Messages Issued by B/F EOC
WNP-2 Exercise September 11, 1990 (Cont.)

EBS # / Time Broadcast

EBS Message Text

#3/1134 (Cont.)

The following schools are taking actions to protect their children: Edwin Markham, Country Haven Academy and Country Christian School are being evacuated. Parents are advised that they can pick up their children at the Isaac Stevens Jr. High School.

Evacuation is necessary in Section 1 from 0 to 5 miles; and in Section 2 from 0 to 10 miles

(Gives geographic description of the sections).

Should take the following items with you... (Reads section 10 of the EBS form as it is written).

Assistance Centers have been established (Connell, Stevens and Kiona-Benton). Keep your radio tuned to KONA.

TABLE 7a: Summary of Press Conferences - Joint Information Center,
Richland

ECL	Press Conference Number	Time	Speaker	Synopsis
GE	1	1042	B/F Rep	EOC Emergency Chairman has requested that the Columbia River be evacuated. Suspect in the plant entry has been arrested. Sirens alerting people to evacuate the River have been activated.
			DOE Rep	DOE sees none of its facilities impacted at this time. Hanford Patrol boat is assisting in the River evacuation.
			SS Rep	At approximately 0815, the plant was returning to full power after being down to repair some equipment. There was a plant demonstration taking place. An individual put a ladder against the fence which caused the plant to go to ALERT. Person has been apprehended. During this period there was an equipment malfunction in the steam isolation valves. (Tries to use a projector to demonstrate a point, but it would not work). As a result of the failure of those valves to close, there is an escape path for radiation from the plant to turbine which is not a part of the plant containment. We have some indication that there has been radiation detected outside the plant. There may have been fuel failure which is contributing to radiation readings being picked up.

TABLE 7a: Summary of Press Conferences - Joint Information Center, Richland, WNP-2 Exercise September 11, 1990 (Cont.)

ECL	Press Conference Number	Time	Speaker	Synopsis
GE (Cont.)	1	1042		As a result of these incidents, the SS declared a GE at 1012 this morning. SS is evacuating non-essential personnel.
			B/F Rep	Points out areas affected by PAs on display map.
GE	2	1204	B/F Rep	Additional PAs: B/F has recommended evacuation of Columbia River and Section 1 from 0 to 5 miles; Section 2 from 0 to 10 miles and Sections 3 and 4 0 to 5 miles; Sections 3 and 4 are entirely under the direction of DOE; Busses have been dispatched to evacuate Edwin Markham School, Country Christian school and Country Haven School. These schools are all in Franklin County. All students are being moved to Isaac Stevens school where they may be picked up by parents. EBS is going out over KONA. Assistance centers have been established at Connell High School, Isaac Stevens Jr High School and at Kiona Benton Middle School. (Reads items to be taken when evacuating).
GE	#2	1204	DOE Rep	Non-essential personnel evacuated from FFTF. DOE

TABLE 7a: Summary of Press Conferences - Joint Information Center, Richland, WNP-2 Exercise September 11, 1990 (Cont.)

ECL	Press Conference Number	Time	Speaker	Synopsis
-----	-------------------------------	------	---------	----------

(Cont.)

				monitoring teams have not detected any radiation.
			WA DOH Rep	Just arrived from west side about 5 minutes ago. Do not have much information to give. Field teams are in the area making measurements.
			SS Rep	Plant technical status update. Vessel pressure reduced. Decreasing trends in radiation levels in reactor and turbine buildings. Based on releases from turbine building that we have been able to measure, estimated doses at the 10 mile boundary are approx. 2 mr/hr to the whole body and 6 mr/hr to the thyroid. These are very low levels of radiation. These are not measured values, but projections only.
			WA DOH Rep	Explains what the reported radiation readings mean, and relates them to natural background radiation.
			All Staff	Q & A session.

TABLE 7a: Summary of Press Conferences - Joint Information Center, Richland, WNP-2 Exercise September 11, 1990 (Cont.)

ECL	Press Conference Number	Time	Speaker	Synopsis
GE	3	1335	B/F Rep	Summarizes status of PAs to date: School evacuation completed at 1152; Total of 379 students; Richland ORV Park was closed at 1106; Columbia River was closed from Leslie Groves Park to White Bluff Ferry Landing and evacuation was complete at 1131; EBS broadcasts have gone out on KONA and being updated periodically; Gives public concern phone number.
			DOE Rep	FFTF evacuation completed at 1240.
			WA DOH Rep	WA field teams are in the field and we are just starting to get data into the EOF; There is a measurable plume east of the Columbia River but we are unsure of exact location as yet; We will share information with the public when available.
			SS Rep	Little new information on the plant available; Performing shut down cooling; Closure of the steam tube isolation valve not obtained yet.
			All staff	Q & A session.

TABLE 7a: Summary of Press Conferences - Joint Information Center,
Richland, WNP-2 Exercise September 11, 1990 (Cont.)

ECL	Press Conference Number	Time	Speaker	Synopsis
GE (Cont.)	3	1335	B/F Rep	945 people were evacuated from Section 2; Section 1 evacuated 45 people. Sections 3 and 4 are under DOE responsibility. Office for insurance claims will be opened in the area.

TABLE 7b: Summary of Press Conference - WEIC Olympia, WA
WNP-2 Exercise September 11, 1990

ECL	Press Conference Number	Time	Speaker	Synopsis
GE	1	1337	WEIC PIO	<p>Accident update: NOUE declared at 0816 due to civil disturbance. Problem with a steam isolation unit led to declaration of SAE shortly after 1000. GE was declared at 1012. Release of radioactivity shortly thereafter.</p> <p>Current PAs: B/F has decided to evacuate Section 1 to 5 miles; Section 2 "to the grey and the clear area here(points to map); and three schools totaling about 400 kids also moved. Sheltering recommended in Sections 3 and 4 out to 5 miles, these are DOE and SS facilities. FC is handling the evacuation of people in Sections 1 and 2; Latest word from County is that those evacuations are still underway; Involves 2700 residents that reside in this whole area but I don't have specific details on Section 2; I refer you to Franklin County for further details. School children were bussed to Kiona Benton middle school in Benton City, Isaac Stevens Jr High in</p>

TABLE 7b: Summary of Press Conference - WEIC Olympia, WA
WNP-2 Exercise September 11, 1990 (Cont.)

ECL	Press Conference Number.	Time	Speaker	Synopsis
GE (Cont.)	1	1337		Pasco and Connell High School in Connell.
			WA DOA	State has issued agricultural advisories in conjunction with DOH and DCD in cooperation with the counties. These are precautionary advisories in case of radiation movement in these areas (points out affected areas on ingestion map). Milk producing animals and livestock on stored feed and covered water; All harvested crops covered or stored; Milk producers should pick up milk currently in tanks; Close water cisterns. DOA has contacted individually all dairy farms in Sections 1,2 and 3. Also contacted all milk processors and haulers in these sections to make sure they are aware of this advisory. State of OR has issued a similar advisory. All counties are in agreement with this advisory.
			WEIC PIO	Agricultural advisory has a couple of oversights that I want to fill you in on. One is that the advisory deals with

TABLE 7b: Summary of Press Conference - WEIC Olympia, WA
WNP-2 Exercise September 11, 1990 (Cont.)

ECL	Press Conference Number	Time	Speaker	Synopsis
GE (Cont.)	1	1337		Section 1,2, and 3 from 10 to 50 miles. However, Sections 1 and 3 have only been evacuated out to 5 miles, so there is a 5 mile gap there. We are modifying the advisory to include this 5 to 10 mile gap. We will get this information out to the public.
			SS Tech. Rep.	Gives summary of technical aspects of accident and on site response.
			WA DOA	Collects PR #4 and says that replacement PR #5 will be given to media when available.

TABLE 8: Summary of Press Releases in Chronological Order
WNP-2 Exercise September 11, 1990

Chronological PR # (Organization)	Time of Release *	Summary/Main Points
1 (SS)	0853	Alert declared at WNP-2 at 0836.
2 (BF)	0919	Counties EOC activated.
3 (WA)	0920	State EOC being activated (Gives media phone number which will be activated as of 0945).
4 (SS)	0945	JIC activated (Gives media and public concern phone numbers).
5 (OR)	0952	Oregon monitors WNP-2 emergency.
6 (SS)	0955	Fire extinguished at Plant 2.
7 (BF)	1030	Protective measures recommended. People advised to leave Columbia River from Leslie Groves Park to White Bluffs Ferry Landing.
8 (SS)	1035	General Emergency declared at Plant 2 at 1012.
9 (BF)	1050	Protective measures recommended. (Repeats Columbia River closure). Shelter in Section 2 from 0 to 5 miles.
10 (WA)	1100	Governor declares State of Emergency in 8 WA Counties.

* Time of release is taken from that listed on the organization's press release and may not correspond to the time the media actually received the information.

TABLE 8: Summary of Press Releases in Chronological Order
WNP-2 Exercise September 11, 1990 (Cont.)

Chronological PR # (Organization)	Time of Release	Summary/Main Points
11 (SS)	1120	Radioactivity released from Plant 2.
12 (BF)	1132	Protective measures recommended. Students at 3 schools are being evacuated to Isaac Stevens Jr. High. Evacuation of the public in Section 1, 0 to 5 miles and Section 2, 0 to 10 miles.
13 (OR)	1200	Evacuation not necessary in Oregon.
14 (B/F)	1225	Evacuations of public in Section 1, 0 to 5 miles has been completed as of 1225; Columbia River evacuation from Leslie Groves Park to White Bluffs Ferry Landing completed as of 1131; Richland ORV Park evacuated at 1106; Markham Elementary, Country Haven Academy and Country Christian Center students and staff evacuated at 1105. 379 students reported to Isaac Stevens Elementary at 1152. Law enforcement officials in the above areas are continuing to restrict access to these areas. People who need to return briefly must check with assistance center workers to make proper arrangements.
15 (WA)	1251	Washington State has sent two radiological teams to WNP-2's EOF in Richland. Persons within 50 miles of

* Time of release is taken from that listed on the organization's press release and may not correspond to the time the media actually received the information.

TABLE 8: Summary of Press Releases in Chronological Order
WNP-2 Exercise September 11, 1990 (Cont.)

Chronological PR # (Organization)	Time of Release *	Summary/Main Points
		WNP-2 should stay tuned to the EBS station serving their community (lists stations):
16 (WA)	1300	Washington State officials recommend protective actions due to radiation release at WNP-2. Individuals in areas 10 to 50 miles south or east of the plant should: place milk animals & livestock on stored feed and covered water; Cover or store all harvested crops; Pick up all milk currently in tanks, if feasible; Close water cisterns and cover surface waters if possible. These are precautionary actions in anticipation of possible movement of radiation releases beyond the current 10 mile evacuation zone. Advisory is for Sections 1, 2, 3 in Washington State. No advisory for Section 4.
17 (BF)	1404	Money to compensate those affected by WNP-2 emergency is available through Price-Anderson Act.
18 (SS)	1415	Plant 2 containment isolated.
19 (WA)	1420	Washington State officials recommend protective actions due to radiation release at WNP-2. Individuals in areas 10 to 50 miles south or east of the plant should (lists same PAs as in

* Time of release is taken from that listed on the organization's press release and may not correspond to the time the media actually received the information.

TABLE 8: Summary of Press Releases in Chronological Order
WNP-2 Exercise September 11, 1990 (Cont.)

Chronological PR # (Organization)	Time of Release *	Summary/Main Points
---	----------------------	---------------------

1300 release). The PAs listed in News Release #4 affect the area within 5 to 50 miles of WNP-2, in Sections 1 and 3. This advisory is for individuals within 10 to 50 miles of WNP-2 in Section 2. These are precautionary actions in anticipation of possible movement of radiation beyond the current evacuation zone. Evacuation zones are: in Section 2, out to 10 miles; in Sections 1, 3, and 4, out to 5 miles. This agricultural advisory is for the areas beyond these evacuated areas defined as Sections 1, 2, and 3 out to 50 miles. (Describes areas in terms of geographic landmarks).

* Time of release is taken from that listed on the organization's press release and may not correspond to the time the media actually received the information.

2.0 EXERCISE EVALUATION

2.1 WASHINGTON STATE

Objective #1: Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand and use emergency classification levels (ECL) through the appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs as required by the scenario. The four ECLs are: Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency (SAE) and General Emergency (GE).

Evaluation: Met.

Narrative Summary:

The State of Washington demonstrated the ability to monitor, understand and use ECLs at the EOC, the EOF, and in the field.

At the EOC

The ECL levels in effect were quickly posted and prominently displayed in the EOC. The lighted ECL status board is a very effective means of displaying ECL levels. ECL levels were mentioned during EOC briefings and all staff appeared to be aware of the ECL level in effect at any given time.

At the EOF

The EOF was notified of ECLs by the Supply System (SS) on-site organization. The NOUE and the ALERT were declared by the SS control room and the SAE and GE by the SS Plant Emergency Director (PED). After the EOF was activated, the SS Recovery Manager (RM) held briefings to update staff for the reasons for the ECL change. Offsite actions which were based on preplanned actions depending on ECL declaration were all recommended by the SS Recovery Manager (RM).

FIELD MONITORING TEAMS

Field Team #1 and #2 demonstrated the ability to monitor, understand and use ECLs. Notifications were given to the teams by the Meteorological Unified Dose Assessment Center (MUDAC).

Past Issues Examined:

There were no past issues for this objective.

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

Current Exercise Issues:

None.

Objective #2: Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for both facility and field-based emergency functions.

Evaluation: Met.

Narrative Summary:

The State of Washington demonstrated the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate emergency personnel at the EOC, EOF, and in the field.

Activation and mobilization was in accordance with the extent of play agreement. The agreement specified that the State EOC would be set up prior to the exercise, and that State representatives to the B/F EOC, JIC, EOF and field teams were not to appear at their assigned locations until 2 hours and 20 minutes after receiving the ALERT at the WA EOC. Staffing of most facilities begins in earnest at the ALERT ECL. The ALERT was declared by the PED at 0836.

At the EOC

The ALERT was received in the dispatch area of the WA EOC at 0840. Notification fanout began immediately after this and the EOC was declared functional at 0849. The facility was fully activated at 0940 after all agency representatives had arrived.

In the Field

The WA EOC sends representatives to the B/F EOC, the EOF, and the JIC. Most of these representatives were prepositioned in the Tri-Cities and reported to their duty locations 2 hours and 20 minutes (to simulate travel time from western Washington) after the ALERT was received at the WA EOC (0840). The EOF and B/F representatives arrived at their locations after the appropriate

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

delay. The majority of the State JIC team decided not to predeploy. Adverse weather at the Seattle airport on the morning of the exercise prevented the JIC players from traveling to Richland to participate in the exercise.

We note that the WA Fish and Game agents were to have been notified by Washington State Patrol's (WSP) Office in Yakima to begin route alerting in the Wahluke wildlife area. In a past exercise, WSP had not demonstrated prompt alerting (exercise issue S88-2). The Fish and Game agents did not receive notification from the WSP in Yakima, who were merely simulating all notifications and response functions. Instead the agents established contact with the Franklin County (FC) Sheriff's dispatch for instructions to begin route alerting of the Wahluke wildlife area.

Past Issues Examined:

Resolved: None; Unresolved: S88-2; (see Appendix A for details).

Current Exercise Issues:

None.

Objective #3: Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities.

Evaluation: Met.

Narrative Summary:

Washington State demonstrated the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities at the three sites evaluated during the exercise.

At the WA EOC

The Assistant Director, Division of Emergency Management (AD-DEM), was in charge of the emergency response for the State. Protective Action (PA) decisions were discussed among the members of the executive group and all members actively participated. Periodic briefings were held and all groups were given the opportunity to participate.

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

The status of the alert and notification by the Counties was not adequately reported in the EOC. Procedure 10.18 gives WSP the responsibility to monitor the County EBS broadcasts. The procedure checklist for the State B/F representative gives a very detailed procedure on the way that this person should monitor EBS broadcasts. This includes the instruction to immediately call the WA EOC after monitoring the broadcast and brief the EOC on accuracy. This person is also supposed to send a fax copy of the EBS text to the WA EOC. We find no record that the State representative reported on EBS activity to the EOC. We note that the executive table requested the EOC manager to find out the status of EBS broadcasts at 1049, and the operations staffs logs indicate that they placed calls to B/F EOC but the results of this request were not made available. However, we did find that copies of the EBS messages were received and available at the State EOC.

We note that frequent and generally informative staff briefings were held. These briefings did report on what the counties were doing to implement PAs, but the status of EBS messages and siren sounding was not reported. This is essentially the same issue covered by SO-89-1, an inadequacy from a previous exercise (See Appendix A).

At the EOF

The Supply System's emergency response organization demonstrated the ability to interface with the offsite agencies. Periodic briefings were held to inform the EOF personnel of changing conditions. FEMA notes that a public address announcement was not made after the GE was declared and a briefing did not occur until 38 minutes after the GE was declared. The GE notifications were made to the offsite authorities at 1022, 10 minutes after the ECL declaration. Procedures were available and used by the Supply System EOF emergency response organization.

Logs were kept to document incoming and outgoing messages. The Supply System has an informal internal message handling system. The Technical Data Center appeared to be the only center that

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

utilized a pre-printed form to send messages to the Supply System Decision center (SSDC). There was a delay in getting the NOUE and ALERT Fixed Nuclear Facility (FNF) forms to the SSDC. They were not distributed until 0942, 27 minutes after the EOF was activated. In general, the Supply Systems's activities were conducted in accordance with the applicable Emergency Procedures-Implementing Procedures (EPIPs). The only exception noted involved the Radiological Emergency Manager (REM) and RM's change to the MUDAC Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) discussed on the 1114 CRASH call. MUDAC recommended evacuation to 10 miles in Sector 2. The REM & RM added evacuations to 5 miles in Sectors 1, 3, and 4 to the MUDAC recommendation. The RM did not mention the change or explain the basis for the change to the offsite response organizations in the CRASH call at 1114. This is essentially the same issue covered by S87-1, an inadequacy from a previous exercise (See Appendix A).

In MUDAC, direction and control was initially demonstrated in a very effective manner. The MUDAC coordinator (MC) provided a briefing to his staff at 0910 and informed the REM that the MUDAC was functional. A public address announcement at 0918 indicated that the RM had accepted the overall direction and control responsibility from the onsite SS staff. Prior to the arrival of the State personnel in MUDAC, the WA EOC Radiological Assessment Group (RAG) staff requested, on several occasions, clarifications from the MC. Upon the arrival of the USDOE and State representatives, the MC immediately provided briefings to these representatives. Periodic briefings after this point were not conducted in MUDAC.

The Field Team Coordinator (FTC) did a very good job of directing the Supply System field teams and the WA State field teams when they arrived. A DOE field team was present in the field at about 1028, but procedures used by DOE field teams do not permit them to enter the plume and as a result the team could not be effectively used to make plume measurements.

The State decided to order KI for emergency workers at 1035 (during the State field teams transit from

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

their normal duty stations). This decision was not provided to the State field team #1 until 1151. Field team #2 was not instructed to take KI until 1230. This could have been the result of inadequate briefings of the MUDAC staff.

Past Issues

Examined:

Resolved: None; Unresolved: S87-1 and SO89-1 (see Appendix A for details).

Current Exercise Issues:

Issue #1: (S90-1)

Coordination of accident assessment activities (PARs) between WA EOC and EOF. ARCA (A.2.a).

Evaluation:

WA EOC was addressing requests for dose data to the MUDAC Coordinator. DOH procedures specify that communication with the EOF should be through the REM or RM (see figure 4-2, WA DOH procedures).

Recommendation: Review and revise procedures, if appropriate. Train staff.

Objective #4: Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

Evaluation: Met.

Narrative

Summary:

The State of Washington demonstrated the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.

At the WA EOC

The EOC staff used commercial telephones (about 25 lines), a dedicated phone system, fax, NAWAS and other radio systems to communicate with offsite agencies. The EOC staff was able to communicate with the EOF, JIC, B/F EOC, the ingestion counties and various state agencies. All communications systems demonstrated worked well.

At the EOF

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

The EOF staff demonstrated the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations.

The EOF Communication Center (EOFCC) had trouble faxing the FNF forms to the State. The problem was initially thought to be a problem with the auto/manual switch on the State's machine. Further investigation revealed that this was not the case, since the State received faxes from other locations during this time frame. It appears that there was no malfunction of equipment. FEMA's conclusion is that there is insufficient fax capability from the EOF to offsite organizations. There is only one dedicated fax circuit from the EOF to other onsite locations and offsite locations. There is no ability to "fax to all stations" or to determine whether one of the many parties on this "party fax line" is faxing information.

A short delay occurred with verbal notifications of the ALERT over the CRASH phone. The County dropped off the line before a formal role call was taken. The EOFCC duty officer called the B/F EOC to ensure that this notification had been received.

The MUDAC staff demonstrated the ability to communicate via commercial telephones, FM radio, and computer links (used to obtain plant parameter data) with no apparent problems.

In the Field

Both Washington State field teams (WA#1 and WA#2) successfully demonstrated the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations using portable radios and commercial telephones. Some slight delays in communications occurred for WA #2 because of: 1) Line-of-site problems with radios in valleys east of the plant; 2) Other radio traffic obscuring transmissions; 3) Wrong telephone number in the emergency kit for B/F EOC while attempting to contact WSP. The team was able to work around these difficulties and none of them represented a serious impairment to their performance.

Past Issues
Examined:

There were no past issues for this objective

Current

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

Exercise Issues:

Issue #2: Insufficient fax capability from EOF to offsite
(S90-2) organizations. ARCA (F).

Evaluation: For a period of time, hard copy data transfer was
 not accomplished from the EOF to the offsite State
 EOC. The current fax capability is limited to one
 party line linking the EOF to many locations. The
 onsite and offsite organizations should have a
 dedicated system [EOF to the two offsite EOCs only]
 that allows for the timely transfer of data.

Recommendation: Acquire equipment and data lines. Revise
 procedures. Train staff.

Objective #5: Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment,
 displays and other materials to support emergency
 operations.

Evaluation: Met.

Narrative Summary:

The State of Washington demonstrated that adequate facilities, equipment and displays were available to support emergency operations.

At the WA EOC

The WA EOC complex consists of four rooms; the main room (where most staff are located), the communications area, the WEIC dissemination area which contains the phone teams, and a room which was used for the press conference. The EOC was is considered to be undersized for the number of people it contains. This was especially evident in the main room and in the press briefing area. Adequate status boards were in place and ventilation and lighting were adequate. Production of news releases was enhanced by the availability of several computers and skilled operators. Status boards in use included a lighted ECL board, plant status, weather, status of PAs and requests for assistance. Maps of both the plume and ingestion planning zones were available. A wireless microphone was used to conduct EOC briefings. This made it easy for all staff to hear what was being

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

said during the briefings. We noted good access control at the EOC entry, and only authorized persons were permitted into the EOC.

At the EOF

The SS provides space and facilities in their EOF for representatives from WA State and B/F Counties. The facilities provide adequate space, furnishings and amenities for the offsite representatives. These personnel have a dedicated room (the OACC) for their use and have space available in the SSDC for conferences and briefings held by the SS RM. Access to the EOF was restricted to authorized personnel. Standard office equipment was available. The SS had access to maintenance workers for repairs to equipment which failed to operate properly. The various operational rooms had status boards displaying ECLs, plume and ingestion EPZ, evacuation routes and assistance center locations. Status board posting was done by the Information Coordinators from information received over a conferencing net. These boards, particularly in MUDAC were not always updated in a timely fashion (within about 20 minutes). Also, the Information coordinator in the MUDAC did not change the posting time for events between 0922 and 1210 (e.g., events were current, but the times of the events were not).

At the JIC

At the JIC, press conferences were held in an auditorium which is more than adequate. The use of a boom mike to allow everyone to hear questions from the audience during the second news conference was beneficial.

Past Issues

Examined:

There were no past issues for this objective.

Current Exercise Issues:

None.

Objective #6: Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control Emergency Worker exposure.

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

Evaluation: Met.

Narrative
Summary:

The State of Washington successfully demonstrated the ability to continuously monitor and control EW exposure.

Each EW was issued the required dosimetry package consisting of two self reading dosimeters (0-200 mR and 0-20 R) and a permanent record TLD badge. The readings were recorded at 30 minute intervals and reported to MUDAC by radio. On the basis of interviews we determined that EWs were familiar with the authorized exposure levels and knew what action to take if these levels were exceeded.

The Field Team Coordinator did an excellent job of directing the field teams in order to minimize their exposure. The teams were directed to report dosimeter readings throughout the exercise.

Past Issues
Examined:

Resolved: S86-8; S86-10; S88-3; Unresolved: None.
(see Appendix A for details).

Current
Exercise
Issues:

None.

Objective #7: Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for determining field radiation measurements.

Evaluation: Met.

Narrative
Summary:

The State of Washington demonstrated the appropriate equipment and procedures for determining field radiation measurements.

The Field Teams (FTs) demonstrated the ability to properly complete operational and source checks of all radiation monitoring equipment specified in the plan. The teams were instructed to define the plume in Franklin County. The FTs interpreted the radiation readings accurately and promptly transmitted the results to the MUDAC. The proper

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

dosimetry was issued (0-200 mR and 0-20 R dosimeters and a permanent record TLD badge). All team members had been fitted for and received certification in the use of respirators.

The Washington FT #1 (WA #1) was not requested to obtain ground deposition measurements, but during an interview the team captain described how the measurements would be taken at ground level and waist level had they been requested.

During the exercise the FTs were reporting closed window readings only. The FTC had to request them to report the window open readings. If the team had completed the Field Measurement Worksheet in their procedures, they would have performed this step correctly. This procedure is mentioned on page 7-1 of DSHS (DOH)/ORP procedures dated September 1986.

Past Issues Examined:

Resolved: S86-7; Unresolved: None. (see Appendix A for details).

Current Exercise Issues:

Issue #3: Incomplete FT readings. ARCA (I.8).
(S90-3)

Evaluation: The FTs did not report window open readings along with window closed readings while determining the parameters of the plume until the FTC requested them to do so.

Recommendation: Train staff to follow DOH procedures which instructs FTs to obtain window open and window closed measurements.

Issue #4: Incomplete FT procedures. PLAN ISSUE
(S90-4) (I.8)

Evaluation: There is no procedure requiring the FT to obtain ground level and waist level measurements (both open and closed window) for ground deposition measurements.

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

Recommendation: Revise procedures. Train staff.

Objective #8: Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for the measurement of airborne radioiodine concentrations as low as 10^{-7} microcuries per cc in the presence of noble gases.

Evaluation: Met.

Narrative Summary:

The State of Washington successfully demonstrated the proper operation of equipment and procedures to sample and measure airborne iodine.

The WA FTs demonstrated the assembly and disassembly of sampling train, choosing areas free of obstructions (but within observed centerline of the plume) for sample collection, relocating promptly to a low background area for field analysis and purging. Proper field analysis methods and delivery of the sample to a WSP trooper for delivery to the state analytical lab was also demonstrated. Charcoal filters were used to simulate silver zeolite. The silver zeolite cartridges were available in the FT kits. The WA #1 team placed the sampling head inlet facing opposite the anticipated direction of the plume. The flow meter used was in calibration.

Past Issues Examined:

There were no past issues for this objective.

Current Exercise Issues:

Issue #5: Improper placement of sampling head. ARFI (I.9).

Evaluation: The sampling head inlet was placed facing the opposite the anticipated direction of the plume.

Recommendation: Train staff.

Objective #9: Demonstrate the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity in the airborne plume and promptly perform laboratory analyses.

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

Evaluation: Met.

Narrative
Summary:

The State of Washington demonstrated the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity.

The WA state field teams successfully demonstrated the ability to obtain samples of airborne particulate activity, remove promptly to a low background area for field analysis of samples and deliver the appropriately labeled, bagged and contaminated survey samples to a WSP trooper for simulated delivery to the state analytical lab. An appropriate sampling location free of obstructions was chosen by each team member. See Objective #8, Issue #5 (page 57), which also applies to this objective.

Past Issues
Examined:

There were no past issues for this objective.

Current
Exercise
Issues:

None.

Objective #10: Demonstrate the ability, within the plume exposure pathway, to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data.

Evaluation: Not Met.

Narrative
Summary:

The State of Washington did not demonstrate the ability to accurately project dose to the public.

The Radiological Assessment Group (RAG) at the WA EOC did not understand the parameters utilized for the basis of the dose projections made by the primary dose assessment system (EDPS) or the backup dose assessment system (BEDPS). The State's representatives at the EOF (MUDAC representative and Administrative Liaison) failed to ensure that data flow was occurring in an accurate and timely manner between the EOF and the State EOC. The MUDAC representative failed to demonstrate the ability to recognize the significance of reported field data and oversee the selection of field data

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

for utilization in dose projections. The RAG and EOF representatives failed to demonstrate the development of appropriate dose projections.

INFORMATION TRANSFER FROM MUDAC TO WA EOC

Washington's FNF plan assigns the RAG the responsibility to assess the adequacy, timeliness and effectiveness of all PARs generated by the EOF. The State has responsibility to issue PARs to the County, by either passing along the utility PAR or initiating their own when appropriate. An MOU between the SS and the State included in the plan says that the SS is responsible for providing information on the incident (follow up messages as defined by NUREG 0654/FEMA REP-1) to the State in the event of an emergency at WNP-2. The State's plan assumes that the EOF will ensure that this information flow is established and maintained by the EOF staff until State representatives to the EOF arrive and are able to assume this role.

FEMA's review of the players' logs indicate that almost all important information acquired by the RAG at the WA EOC was obtained by inquiries generated by the RAG staff through phone calls to MUDAC. In almost no instances, according to player logs, did the licensee's staff initiate contact with the WA EOC to inform them of critical plant or dose projection information. Once the State's people arrived at the EOF, they were given an initial briefing and never briefed again during the exercise. The RAG had to continue to call the State's representatives at the MUDAC in order to get information.

Information regarding the assessment of the incident was not completely shared with the RAG at the WA EOC. For example, the WA EOC received hard copy of one EDPS dose projection and one hard copy and three verbal dose projections from the BEDPS (the EOF prepared seventeen separate dose projections). Although the MUDAC staff prepared 10 plume location maps, only two hard copy and six verbal data point reports were transmitted to the State EOC dose assessment staff. By 1300, MUDAC had prepared seven plume maps. The two hard copy plume location maps were received by the State EOC at 1337 and 1339. These maps were prepared at 1245

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

(Figure 2, page 61) and 1249 (Figure 3, page 62).

FEMA notes that the SS notification forms do not contain an area for dose rate and dose projection information as specified by criterion E.4 of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1. Unless the State receives a separate fax for the dose projection, they do not have any material that supports PARs based upon dose.

Washington State was not given the detailed flow of information needed to develop and issue PARs to the Counties. The RAG staff spent much of their time trying to get information from the EOF, rather than performing analysis of the information, which is their primary function.

DOSE ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES

During this exercise, both the primary and back up dose projection systems were demonstrated for dose projection. Three dose projections were made with the EDPS and 14 projections were made using the BEDPS.

The EDPS produces real time dose projections. In other words, EDPS dose projections represent the projected dose for just the time period beginning with the initiation of the release and to the point in time that the dose projection was made. Alternatively, the BEDPS can produce a dose projection based on a default value for an estimated time of release duration. The SS procedures do not call for the use of a standard set of release duration defaults. Most BEDPS dose projections were based upon real time release durations. The State's procedures call for the use of a three hour release default time unless a better estimate is available.

CONTROLLED COPY

Projections Based on Field Measurement
10 MILE EPZ - THYROID INTEGRATED DOSE MAP





Figure 2: First plume projection received at WA EOC.



10 MILE EPZ FIELD TEAM SUMMARY MAP

DATE: 9/11/90 TIME: 12:49
 MAJOR DOSE RATE: 60 mr/hr DISTANCE: ~6 miles
 COMMENTS: reading in Franklin Co. just begun to
appear. - air sample being taken at
center location; front edge being redefined
 PREPARED BY: C. Card Ch. Able

Figure 3: First plume location received at WA EOC: Shows whole body dose rate of 0.6 mr/hr trailing edge & 60 mr/hr leading edge. The 0.6 mr/hr datapoint was used by MUDAC for the dose projection made at 1434.

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

In the various briefings at the State EOC and at the EOF, comparisons of dose projections were made. These comparisons were not qualified by the statement that these dose projections were based upon actual release durations: e.g., the input parameters were different. Washington State's PAR process calls for the comparison of dose projections based upon total release duration, not just to the point in time when a particular dose projection is made.

The EDPS and BEDPS dose assessment system allows the tracking of 15 plant parameters to provide a time history of these parameters. New dose projections based on field measurements were not rigorously analyzed and no one on the dose assessment staff performed a comprehensive review of the field data and laboratory data to validate the dose projections. This led to incorrect dose assessment conclusions which were used to support PAR #3 developed by the REM.

Most of the 14 BEDPS dose projections were made based on real elapsed time (time from start of release to time of calculation). These dose projections were not transmitted in chronological order to the SSDC and this led to some confusion as the REM attempted to interpret the data.

As stated above, only two hard copy dose projections were faxed to the WA EOC. The EDPS dose projection was made at 1044, which represented a 44 minute release. This EDPS dose projection was received by the State EOC at 1127 (note that PA #3 was made at about 1114). The RAG at the WA EOC did not appear to understand the source term supporting the EDPS dose projection. This resulted in long telephone discussions between the MUDAC Coordinator and the WA EOC, and the REM and the WA EOC. FEMA notes that during this consultation process, the SS Liaison to the State EOC called the EOF and was advised that WNP-2 had only been operating for a day at 15% power. The RAG briefed the State decision makers on this dose projection and characterized it as a "what if" dose projection instead of a real time dose projection based upon measured plant parameter data. The BEDPS dose projection was made at 1200 and represented a 55.2

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

minute release. The BEDPS dose projection was attached to the ingestion advisory and was received by the State EOC at 1254. The PAR for this advisory was made at 1225.

The MUDAC Coordinator and the REM did not act on a well developed dose projection developed by the systems analyst and the meteorologist and forwarded to the REM at 1345. This dose projection involved the total integrated release and release time based on the BEDPS system monitor history. This dose projection projected a dose of 8.07 REM to the Thyroid at 10 miles for a 1.4 hour release duration and would have supported the need for PAs beyond 10 miles based on the PAR decision logic (State and SS procedure 13.14.1 & 2).

Two sets of plume measurements were made at approximately 1245 by the WA FTs #1 and #2. The ambient gamma readings were reflected in the data report produced at 1249 (see Figure 3). Air sample analysis was available at the 0.6 mr/hr and the 60 mr/hr locations shown in Figure 3. The MUDAC Coordinator and the State MUDAC Representative were aware of both sets of data. The MUDAC Coordinator selected an air sample data point from the trailing edge of the plume (0.6 mr/hr location shown in Figure 3). The dose projection based on this data point indicated low thyroid dose (39 mrem) at 10 miles. This dose projection (completed at 1434) was used to support the existing PAs even though it did not reflect the correct total integrated dose at 10 miles. This dose projection was reviewed by the State dose assessor in the MUDAC. The State dose assessor agreed to the dose projection without understanding where and when the air sample was collected. This would have indicated that the chosen sample point should not have been used to generate the total integrated dose.

Washington State's Protective Action Guides have been incorporated into the EOF/MUDAC procedures (See Table 9 on page 66). FEMA notes that the PAG values of < 1 REM WB and < 5 REM Thyroid are not part of the State's PAGs. Table 9 shows that if the projected dose for an individual for the entire release is > 125 mrem and < 1 rem Whole Body or > 625 mrem and < 5 rem Thyroid, then adults should be told to seek shelter and evacuation should be

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

considered for pregnant women and children. The EDPS dose projection received at the State EOC at 1127 projected a dose rate of 14,492 mrem/hr to the thyroid at 10 miles. If the staff assigned to accident assessment at the EOF and WA EOC had correctly assessed the EDPS dose projection or correctly selected field data points and release durations as input parameters to the BEDPS, they would have noted that the projected dose rate and dose (EDPS - 14,492 mrem/hr to the Thyroid, and the BEDPS - 8.07 rem to the Thyroid) would have exceeded this conservative PAG of 625 mrem to the Thyroid at 10 miles, thus requiring protective actions beyond 10 miles.

State staff at the State EOC and at the EOF did not demonstrate that they fully understood the basis for the dose projections, or the actual projections, which were used to confirm that the PAs were adequate.

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

Projected Dose To An Individual For The Entire Release	Recommended Actions	Comments
Whole Body \leq 125 mrem	o No protective action required based on projected dose.	Protective Action Recommendations may be required by the classification. See Attachment A.
Thyroid \leq 625 mrem		
Whole Body $>$ 125 mrem to $<$ 1 rem Thyroid $>$ 625 mrem to $<$ 5 rem	o Seek shelter ⁺ and wait further instructions. o Consider evacuation, particularly for children and pregnant women. o Monitor environmental radiation levels. o Control access.	Previously recommended protective actions may be reconsidered or terminated.
Whole Body \geq 1 rem to $<$ 5 rem Thyroid \geq 5 rem to $<$ 25 rem	o Conduct evacuation of populations in the predetermined area. o Monitor environmental radiation levels and adjust area for evacuation based on these levels. o Control access.	Seeking shelter would be an alternate if evacuation were not immediately possible.
Whole Body Dose \geq 5 rem Thyroid \geq 25 rem	o Conduct Evacuation o Control Access	Seeking shelter would be an alternative if evacuation were not immediately possible.

⁺ Sheltering is to be with ventilation control. Ventilation control means turning off air conditioners or fans and closing doors and windows, thus limiting access of outside air.

Attachment C

PROCEDURE NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	PAGE NUMBER
13.14.2	12	13.14.2-15 of 20

WPP-123 A1 (7-43)

Table 9: PAR Decision Logic as contained in EOF/MUDAC procedures.

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

MANAGEMENT OF FIELD TEAMS

The FTs were properly directed to define the plume. Field monitoring data were plotted and dose projections plotted and displayed in the MUDAC. Field monitoring data including gamma, gamma plus beta, and air sample measurements, were recorded and posted on a variety of status boards and data point reports. Six air samples were collected during the exercise play, three by the SS field teams and three by the WA State field teams. The three air samples collected by the SS were brought to the EOF for counting and the three air samples collected by the WA field teams were counted in the field and then given to WSP for transport to the State laboratory for further analysis.

FEMA notes that the MUDAC had collected positive and negative verifications of plume measurements: e.g., they knew where the plume was, where it had been based on ground deposition, and where it was going. The above referenced data point reports showing plume locations were available to the staff that prepared the ingestion advisory. Field teams were available to continue to track the plume. The near-term weather forecast did not call for any changes in existing conditions. In other words, the MUDAC had access to adequate information (in the field and from weather forecasts) to predict that the plume was going to continue to travel in a south easterly direction (section II on the plume EPZ map). Yet, the ingestion advisory was for an area out to 50 miles in an arc of 270 degrees. There was no basis for the scope of this advisory. In fact the evidence was that the plume would probably not leave the southeastern quadrant.

Past Issues Examined:

Resolved: S88-6; Unresolved: S84-1; S86-9; S88-4; S88-5. (see Appendix A for details).

Current Exercise Issues:

Issue #6:
(S90-5)

Inadequate Information Transfer. Deficiency
(I.10).

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

Evaluation:

EOF staff and State Representatives did not establish an accurate and timely flow of information with the WA EOC regarding accident assessment. The RAG staff devoted a large amount of time to information collection instead of data analysis. Dose projections and data reports were not sent to the WA EOC in a timely manner. Only two of 17 dose projections were faxed to the WA EOC. A dose projection which was not sent to the WA EOC would have provided the information that would have justified taking protective actions beyond 10 miles. Only two of 10 plume location maps were faxed to the WA EOC. Also see open issue S88-4 in Appendix A.

Recommendation: Assign an EOF staff member the task of providing information to the WA EOC until the State Administrative Liaison arrives at the EOF. Train the Administrative Liaison to continue this information transfer after arrival at the EOF. Review and revise, if appropriate, SS notification form to provide integrated dose projections for 5 & 10 miles (whole body & thyroid) for all release default durations. Demonstrate capabilities in a remedial drill.

Issue #7: (S90-6)

Inadequate capability and expertise to make dose projections. Deficiency (I.8).

Evaluation:

1. The WA EOC RAG did not demonstrate an understanding of the dose projections. The RAG did not explain to the State decision makers that the various dose projections were based upon measured parameters (either plant status or field data) and that the dose projections were calculated for the "actual elapsed release time" versus a projected total release time as specified by the state's PAGs and procedures.

2. The Washington State staff at the EOF did not understand the basis for the dose assessment that they agreed to. The MUDAC Coordinator selected an air sample data point from the trailing edge of the plume. The dose projection based on this data point indicated low thyroid dose (39 mrem) at 10 miles. This dose projection (made at 1434) was used to support the existing PAs even though it did not reflect the correct total integrated dose at 10

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

miles. This dose projection was reviewed by the State dose assessor in the MUDAC. The State dose assessor agreed to the dose projection without understanding the basis for the dose projection, i.e. where and when the air sample was collected. An analysis of the available data would have indicated that this sample should not have been used to generate the total integrated dose. The State dose assessor at MUDAC was aware of the previous dose assessment (made at 1345) that projected 8.07 Rem to the Thyroid at 10 miles. FEMA notes that no one in MUDAC provided an overall correlation and validation of dose projections with the field data.

3. Also see open issues S86-9 and S88-5 in Appendix A.

Recommendation: Review staffing assignments the RAG and EOF. Develop a system for certifying that these individuals understand the parameters, methodologies, strengths, weakness, etc. of the two dose projection systems. Provide training on the use of these dose projection systems and the use of field data to staff assigned to accident assessment functions at the WA EOC and the EOF. Demonstrate capabilities in a remedial drill.

Issue #8: Inadequate dose projection systems. Deficiency
(S90-7) (I.10).

Evaluation: Federal guidance (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Section I, Part D) states that offsite organizations should plan for a spectrum of accidents, including a spectrum of release characteristics and durations). NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 (E.4.i) also states that the dose projection system should produce dose rates and integrated doses for 2, 5, and 10 miles. Washington State's accident assessment methodology requires the development of integrated dose projections using a three hour release default when no better estimate of release time is available and the comparison of these dose projections to the State's PAGs (which represent a projected dose for the whole release). Most of the 14 BEDPS projections were based on real elapsed time (time of release to time of calculation). Integrated

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

dose from these projections was interpreted as the total dose for the release. Also see Objective 16, issue S90-11 (page 67), and open issue S84-1 in appendix A.

Recommendation: Establish appropriate release default time durations. Revise procedures to include these defaults and to require the operator to produce dose projections consistent with the chosen release defaults. Train staff with accident assessment and PAR responsibilities to ensure that the dose projections are presented in the context of the release default and that comparisons between dose projections are made on a consistent basis. Demonstrate capabilities in a remedial drill.

Objective #11: Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate Protective Action Decisions, based on projected or actual dosage, EPA PAG's, availability of adequate shelter, evacuation time estimates and other relevant factors.

Evaluation: Met.

**Narrative
Summary:**

The State of Washington demonstrated the ability to make appropriate Protective Action Decisions based upon the information available to them.

The State of Washington analyzes protective actions taken by the counties. The State provides concurrence or non-concurrence to the counties. In the case of non-concurrence, the State will make a state protective action recommendation. The State will make decisions regarding protective actions to be implemented within the ingestion exposure EPZ.

As documented in FEMA's evaluation of objective 10, the state decision makers (executive group) received inadequate analysis and briefings from the state staff assigned to accident assessment functions. The decisions that the State made in concurring with the PAs for the plume exposure EPZ and the decision for the ingestion exposure advisory might have been different if the accident assessment staff had properly analyzed the data and properly displayed and briefed the decision makers on the location, extent of coverage, and direction

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

of travel of the plume.

The decision makers in the EOC exhibited a good, consensus oriented decision making process. All appropriate agency representatives were present and, because of the infrared CRASH phone monitoring system, all were able to hear what PARs were made and the rationale for each. All were given the opportunity to ask questions and voice their opinion on the EOF PARs.

There was detailed discussion by the decision makers, especially on the KI PAR and agricultural advisory. They had been told by the RAG and facility representatives that iodine was not a problem in the release, and were understandably puzzled by the facility's decision to issue KI to its EWs and the recommendation that offsite EWs also take the drug. The executive table finally agreed with the facility KI PAR in order to avoid alarming offsite EWs who would know that KI had been ordered for the SS EWs. During the 1252 EOC briefing, the facility representative corrected the earlier statement to say that the plant had been at 15% power coming out of an outage, but it had only been a one day outage. The plant had been at 100% power for about a month prior to this. Later in the exercise, considerable discussion preceded the State's advisory on agricultural products, again with input from Agriculture, Health and B/F Counties as to costs, effectiveness and areas to which the advisory should apply.

An agricultural advisory was issued by the State issued in Press Release (PR) #4 and PR #5 (also WA EBS #1 and WA EBS #2). This advisory recommended that farmers cover and store all harvested crops. FEMA notes that perishable crops could have been adversely impacted by the delay in marketing. The advisory was not in accord with Federal guidance which states that precautionary actions (advisories) such as the placement of milk animals on stored feed & covered water is appropriate in those situations when "only dose projections" are available. Rather, "recommended actions that include the restrictions on movements of crops to market" should only be based upon laboratory data that confirms the presence of radiation.

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

In spite of the lengthy discussion, the advisory in its final form was poorly worded and confusing. See our evaluation of Objectives 13 and 14 below.

The executive group questioned a proposed B/F County decision to let farmers back in to retrieve crops and gave cogent reasons to oppose the decision. The Counties decided not to proceed with this decision and this was noted in the WA EOC during the 1252 briefing.

In general, the decision makers knew their authority and considered relevant information. As stated above, FEMA's concern is with the inadequate analysis and briefings made by the State staff assigned to accident assessment functions.

Past Issues

Examined: Resolved: S87-2; Unresolved: S87-3. (see Appendix A for details).

Current Exercise Issues:

None.

Objective #13: Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion after the initial alert and notification has occurred.

Evaluation: Not Met.

Narrative
Summary: See Objective #14 below.

Objective #14: Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in an accurate, coordinated and timely manner.

Evaluation: Not Met.

Narrative
Summary: The State of Washington did demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of emergency information and emergency instructions. The State did not always provide the emergency information in a timely manner. The State did not brief the media in an accurate and timely manner.

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

The State of Washington issued five press releases, two EBS messages and conducted one news conference during the exercise. All activity occurred at the WA EOC because, due to airport closure, the State's JIC team was unable to fly to Richland to participate at the JIC. One DOH representative did appear at the JIC news conferences #2 and #3, but added little substantive information (see Table 7a).

Press release (PR) #1 announced that the WA EOC was being activated. This PR was issued at 0920 and was well coordinated with other agencies. PR #2 reported on the Governor's declaration of emergency and was released at 1040. PR #3 took an extremely long time to be issued as it kept being revised as the situation changed. It was finally available at about 1251, and informed the public that Washington field teams had been dispatched to the WNP-2 site. PA #4, issued at 1300, covered the agricultural advisories. PR #5 was a reworked version of PR #4 containing the correct information on the State's agricultural advisory. PRs #4 and #5 spoke of releases from the plant and actions to take. Later in the text is the comment that those actions were in anticipation of possible movement of the release beyond the current evacuation zone. This should perhaps be presented earlier in the text as well, in order to prevent misunderstandings by the public from a partially heard or read text.

The press briefing was originally scheduled for 1200, but kept being postponed until it finally began at 1337. The press briefing covered the extent of emergency response activities and covered the State's agriculture advisory. PR # 4 was distributed to the media at the press briefing. PR # 4 was recalled during the press briefing (at about 1400) with an explanation that it contained an error and would be reissued to the press in correct form. FEMA notes that the briefing contained some incorrect information, such as when it was announced that school children were being evacuated to all three assistance centers that had been established. In reality, school children were moved only to Isaac Stevens. It was also announced that evacuation was still in progress when it had been completed over an hour before the briefing began.

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

The two EBS messages covered the agricultural advisory issued by the state and were essentially the texts of PR #4 and PR #5 modified for broadcast. The procedure for airing the broadcast was explained in detail and the message was actually read, but not transmitted over the air. Although the text was somewhat confusing, the operation seemed well executed.

We noted that there was a person assigned to update the status board in the WEIC dissemination room and this was done very well. However, it appears that there is still a problem with getting information to the dissemination area in a timely fashion. Although PA #3, which included evacuation, had been agreed to at 1124, the dissemination group was still being briefed by their chief at 1157 that evacuation was under consideration.

Past Issues Examined:

Resolved: None Unresolved: S86-4; S86-6; S87-10; S089-1. (see Appendix A for details).

Current Exercise Issues:

Issue #9: Inadequate briefing of the media. ARCA (G.3.a; G.4.b). (S90-8)

Evaluation: Only one press briefing was held by the State. The manner in which PR # 4 was discussed and recalled could have confused the media. Inaccurate information was also provided to the media during the briefing.

Recommendation: Hold press briefings early and often. Train staff.

Issue #10: Inadequate information and instructions. ARCA (S90-9) (E.7 & G.4.a).

Evaluation: PR #4 was partially recalled. PR #5 was issued in its place, but it was confusing and also PR #4 was necessary to fully understand PR #5. The state's EBS messages could have been misconstrued as to

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

whether it was an advisory or a recommendation.

Recommendation: Review and revise, if appropriate, boilerplate releases and EBS message texts. Train staff on their use.

Issue #11: Information to Dissemination Group was not
(S90-10) always current. ARCA (G.4.b).

Evaluation: Although PA #3, which included evacuation, had been agreed to at 1124, the dissemination group was still being briefed by their chief at 1157 that evacuation was under consideration.

Recommendation: Train staff to update dissemination group as soon as possible after a new PA or other relevant information is available.

Objective #15: Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion.

Evaluation: Met. . .

Narrative Summary:

The State of Washington demonstrated the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely manner.

The WEIC and Rumor Control section were activated at 0845. The WEIC dissemination room had four telephone operators, a unit supervisor, a technical representative and a status board maintenance person. Periodic briefings were given to dissemination staff by the Unit Supervisor, WEIC Manager and Assistant Manager.

The Rumor Control staff secured information on current events by observing the status board and receiving copies of news releases, and by monitoring a closed circuit television located in the dissemination room.

The Rumor Control staff did provide best available information to callers in a prompt manner. When staff received calls of a technical nature, or on areas on which they had no information, they sought the unit supervisor. See S90-10 (page 74)

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

regarding timeliness of information provided to Rumor Control. Of the 30 calls received during the exercise, 28 were answered correctly.

Message logs were kept of all inquiries both from the media and the public.

Past Issues Examined:

Resolved: S89-5; Unresolved: None. (see Appendix A for details).

Current Exercise Issues:

None.

Objective #16: Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of KI to Emergency Workers and institutionalized persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radioiodine releases.

Evaluation: Met.

Narrative Summary:

The State of Washington demonstrated the ability to make the decision to recommend KI to EWS.

At the plant, initial readings in containment and on the turbine deck and a release of radioactive material at 1010 prompted the SS RM to recommend that KI be taken by the SS EWS. The decision was made at 1018. The three SS teams were instructed to take KI at 1023 and all three teams confirmed the simulated ingestion of KI. At 1057, the DOE offsite Technical Director instructed the DOE team to take KI.

The decision to recommend KI for state and county EWS rests with the State Health Officer. The Executive Group at the WA EOC heard the SS recommendation to take KI at 1018. They were confused by this recommendation because the plume information they had received indicated that little or no iodine was present at that time. At 1035, the decision was made to recommend KI for state and county workers for "psychological reasons" and for the sake of consistency of PAs. We note that the

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

instruction to take KI was not received by the WA field teams until much later (see discussion on page 50-51). No discussion of institutional use of KI was noted.

WA FT #1 simulated the administration of KI to each of the 3 members within one minute of the time the request to take KI was received at 1151. The team noted the time and used the standard form in their kits to record the necessary information. The team's kits were examined and found to contain an adequate supply of KI with an expiration date of October 1990. About 20 minutes prior to the instruction to take KI, the team had discussed whether or not KI should be taken. However they concluded that they had no basis for this given that they had not found any detectable radiation levels nor confirmation that the reported release contained any radioiodine.

WA FT #2 was directed to take KI at 1230. At this time the team had not encountered the plume and they delayed taking KI until they first encountered the plume at about 1235. The time and dose were recorded on the proper form.

The MUDAC received data that indicated that iodine was present in the release. Dose projections were made and verbally passed on to the State EOC. An initial calculation indicated about 5 rem to the thyroid at the site boundary. Another calculation indicated 25 rem. The State's Protective Action Guide for administering KI is expressed as a radioiodine air concentration (1.4×10^{-7} uCi/cc). The federal PAG is 25 rem to the thyroid (adult). The dose projection systems produces projected child thyroid doses, not calculated adult thyroid exposures.

Past Issues Examined:

There were no past issues for this objective.

Current Exercise Issues:

Issue #12 (S90-11)

KI decision process. ARCA (J.10.f).

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

Evaluation The State's KI decision process was not followed. The State's PAG for KI is not expressed as a projected dose to the thyroid. The State's dose projection system does not produce projected doses for adult thyroid exposure.

Recommendation: Revise State PAG (Table 2, Appendix A, DOH procedures) for KI exposure to include a projected dose figure for thyroid (expressed as an adult exposure). Develop a process for converting current child thyroid dose projections into adult dose projections. Revise KI decision process. Revise plans. Train staff.

Objective #26: Demonstrate the ability to identify the need and call upon Federal and other outside support agencies assistance.

Evaluation: Met.

Narrative

Summary: The State of Washington demonstrated the ability to identify the need for and call upon federal and other outside agencies support.

At the WA EOC, the executive group recognized the need for federal assistance at about 1135. The Assistant Director of WA DEM called FEMA Region X (represented by the control cell) at 1148 and requested five monitoring teams, three mobile laboratories and three aerial monitoring planes. A message back to the WA EOC indicated that these resources would be available to the state by 1200 the following day.

We note that the WA EOC also requested aircraft support from WSP and the Washington National Guard (WNG). The WSP plane was used to take key people to Richland, and the WNG planes remained on standby at Olympia airport.

Washington DOH needs to recognize that DOE field teams will not enter the plume. This may impact how WA field teams are deployed (e.g. use DOE FTs for confirming absence of radiation in areas of non-deposition).

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR WASHINGTON STATE

Past Issues
Examined:

There were no past issues for this objective.

Current
Exercise
Issues:

Issue #13:
(S90-12)

Use of Federal technical assistance. ARCA
(C.1.a).

Evaluation:

DOE-RL field team procedures prohibit FT members from entering the plume. This may impact how WA field teams are deployed (e.g. use DOE FTs for confirming absence of radiation in areas of non-deposition).

Recommendation: Review and revise procedures to indicate that technical federal assistance (radiological monitoring teams) has restrictions [for plume monitoring] on the mission that they will accept. Train staff.

2.2 EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR BENTON/FRANKLIN COUNTIES

Objective #1: Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand and use emergency classification levels (ECL) through the appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs as required by the scenario. The four ECLs are: Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency (SAE) and General Emergency (GE).

Evaluation: Met.

Narrative Summary:

Benton and Franklin Counties demonstrated the ability to monitor, understand and use emergency classification levels (ECL) through the appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs as required by the scenario.

The EOC was notified by the Supply System (SS) of the ECLs as follows:

NOUE	0830
ALERT	0849
SAE	1008
GE	1022

ECLs were announced in the EOC and also displayed on the status boards so that all staff were aware of the current ECL. The ECL functions and activities were implemented in a manner consistent with their plan.

Past Issues

Examined: There were no past issues for this objective.

Current Exercise Issues:

None.

Objective #2: Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for both facility and field-based emergency functions.

Evaluation: Met.

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR B/F COUNTIES

Narrative Summary:

Benton and Franklin Counties demonstrated the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both facility and field-based emergency functions.

At the B/F EOC

Calls to notify offsite response organizations were completed by the 911 dispatch center using the written call list specified in the County procedures. The staff was alerted in a timely manner; calls were completed in 10 minutes for initial notification (NOUE) and eight minutes for activation call out (Alert).

As specified in the County procedures, three Commissioners were automatically dispatched to other locations. One Commissioner and support staff were sent to the JIC and two were sent to the EOF.

In the Field

Emergency field personnel consisted of the FC Sheriff's department, school evacuation units, mobility impaired evacuation units, Columbia River route alerting units, and WA Department of Wildlife route alerting units.

Calls to notify offsite organizations were completed by the 911 dispatcher in the B/F EOC using the written call list as specified in the B/F procedures (IP-1). The WA Department of Wildlife agents did not receive notification from the WSP in Yakima, who were merely simulating all notifications and response functions. Instead the agents established contact with the FC Sheriff's dispatch for instructions to begin route alerting of the Wahluke wildlife area. All other field staff were alerted in a timely manner and mobilized promptly.

All relevant functions and activities were implemented in a manner that was consistent with the organization's emergency plan and procedures.

Past Issues Examined:

There were no past issues for this objective.

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR B/F COUNTIES

Current Exercise Issues:

None.

Objective #3: Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities.

Evaluation: Met.

Narrative Summary:

Benton and Franklin Counties demonstrated the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities.

The Emergency Chairman in the B/F EOC was effectively in charge of emergency response. The Decision Group was fully involved in the decision making process. This group consisted of the Emergency Chairman, one County Commissioner and the Emergency Management Directors of Benton and Franklin Counties. Periodic briefings were held by the Chairman to update staff on the status of the emergency. The Emergency Chairman effectively coordinated all PA decisions as well as the implementation of the decisions with the EOF, WA EOC, and JIC. During the during the EOC briefings, the Chairman failed to emphasize that the PAs were County decisions and not the utility recommendations. There was only one EOC staff briefing (at 1210) in which a representative of each agency updated the other EOC staff on their agency's emergency response activities.

Separate message logs were kept for all incoming and outgoing messages and transmissions. Copies of the plan and procedures were available to and used by the EOC staff.

Past Issues Examined:

There were no past issues for this objective.

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR B/F COUNTIES

Current Exercise Issues:

Issue #1: Inadequate briefings. ARCA (A.2.a).
(C90-12)

Evaluation: The Emergency Chairman did not emphasize that actions discussed during his briefings were the Counties' PAs, not the utility's recommendations. With one exception, the Chairman did not provide for two way briefings in which agency staff could report on the responses of their agencies.

Recommendation: Two way briefings should be provided on a regular basis. Review and revise procedures, if appropriate. Train staff.

Objective #4: Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.

Evaluation: Met.

Narrative Summary:

Benton and Franklin Counties demonstrated the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.

At the B/F EOC

The EOC had the following communications equipment: five telephone lines and a facsimile machine. In the Communications Center adjacent to the EOC there were VHF/UHF public service radios, ham radio, HF, VHF, and UHF digital teletype machine, an EBS radio and a CHEM net radio. This equipment was available to communicate with the EOF, WA EOC, County public safety organizations, WSP, ham radio net, state CHEMNET, DOE and various support agencies.

The primary communications systems were able to handle traffic without delay. Backup radio systems were not used during the exercise but were tested and all worked in a satisfactory manner.

We note that the CB radio mentioned in the County

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR B/F COUNTIES

plan was not available at the EOC.

In the Field

Field radio communications were by two way radio on the FC Sheriff Department net and School District #1 transportation net. Telephone communication between the EOC and the field dispatch centers was available and used.

Past Issues

Examined: Resolved: C88-2; Unresolved: None. (see Appendix A for details).

Current Exercise Issues:

Issue #2: No CB radio in the B/F EOC. ARFI (F).

Evaluation: The Plan specifies a CB radio in the EOC. The CB radio is missing.

Recommendation: Add CB radio to the EOC communications equipment or delete plan reference.

Objective #5: Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays and other materials to support emergency operations.

Evaluation: Met.

Narrative Summary:

Benton and Franklin Counties demonstrated the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays and other materials to support emergency operations.

The physical facility and components at the EOC are sufficient to support emergency operations. Adequate office equipment and administrative supplies were available. Sleeping and complete kitchen facilities were not available and deemed not necessary since the EOC is outside the 10 mile EPZ. Off duty staff can leave the facility and food can be sent out for.

Adequate maps were available. The following maps, status boards and displays were used during the

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR B/F COUNTIES

exercise: plume EPZ, evacuation routes, ingestion EPZ, ECL status, PA decisions, incident status log and wind speed and direction. The data/dose projection chart was not used during the exercise but was demonstrated during the participants meeting on 9/13/90. All displays were updated in a timely manner. The relevant functions and activities were conducted in accordance with the plan.

Past Issues

Examined: Resolved: C88-3; Unresolved: None. (see Appendix A for details).

Current Exercise Issues:

None.

Objective #6: Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control Emergency Worker exposure.

Evaluation: Met.

Narrative Summary:

Benton and Franklin Counties demonstrated the ability to continuously monitor and control Emergency Worker exposure at all observed field locations.

EWs are responsible for self monitoring. All EWs reviewed appropriate procedures and carried the correct dosimetry.

The EW kits which contained the dosimetry were well thought out and conveniently put together. The kit was contained in a 5" x 8" 3-ring binder. It had tabs for instructions, maps, record keeping card and a plastic envelope containing one 0-20 R dosimeter, one TLD, one bottle of KI tablets and a reference sheet on KI.

The Wildlife Agents procedures (IP-14) are inconsistent in terms of what to do when 5 r dose is reached. Pg 4, item 11 of IP-14 tells the agent to report to an EW Center if a 5 r dose is reached. Pg 5 item 4 tells the agent to pick up a EW kit and follow procedure IP-19. IP-19 tells EWs to call the EOC for further instructions if a 5 r dose is

2



EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR B/F COUNTIES

reached. IP-14 should not tell EWS to abandon their post until they have received authorization from the EOC.

Past Issues Examined:

Resolved: C88-4; Unresolved: None. (see Appendix A for Details).

Current Exercise Issues:

Issue #3: Inconsistent EW procedures. ARCA (K.3.a).
(C90-13)

Evaluation: The Wildlife Agents procedures (IP-14) are inconsistent in terms of what to do when 5 r dose is reached. Pg 4, item 11 of IP-14 tells agent to report to a EW Center if a 5 r dose is reached. Pg 5 item 4 tells the agent to pick up a EW kit and follow procedure IP-19. IP-19 tells EWS to call the EOC for further instructions if a 5 r dose is reached. This is the correct instruction.

Recommendation: Revise IP-14 to make it consistent with IP-19.

Objective #11: Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate Protective Action Decisions, based on projected or actual dosage, EPA PAG's, availability of adequate shelter, evacuation time estimates and other relevant factors.

Evaluation: Met.

Narrative Summary:

Benton and Franklin Counties demonstrated the ability to make appropriate Protective Action Decisions.

The Decision Group consisted of the Emergency Chairman, County Commissioners and the Emergency Management Directors of Benton and Franklin Counties. This group made three PA decisions. Based on the first PAR from the EOF at 1008, the decision for evacuation of the Columbia River (PAD

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR B/F COUNTIES

#1) was made at 1014. When the ECL status changed from Site Area Emergency to General Emergency, PAD #2 was adopted. This involved, in addition to continuation of PAD #1, the sheltering in Section 2 from 0 to 5 miles and use of KI by EWs. Finally, PAD #3 was issued which involved evacuation of Section 1, 0 to 5 miles, Section 2, 0 to 10 miles, and the evacuation of the three schools within the EPZ.

Preplanned PAs concerning institutionalized, transit dependent and handicapped persons were implemented as per procedures. The Decision Group also considered such relevant factors as economic effects of PAs in its decision making process. Price Anderson Act information was given to EOC staff for their use.

We note that the Decision Group did not have representatives from the FC Sheriff or BC Sheriff's offices or from the Health Department as indicated in IP-2, Attachment B of the B/F procedures.

Past Issues
Examined:

There were no past issues for this objective.

Current
Exercise
Issues:

None.

Objective #12: Demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision by appropriate state and/or officials.

Evaluation: Met.

EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT: Benton & Franklin Counties will demonstrate route alerting along the Columbia River (at least four boats will be targets for alerting); Benton & Franklin Counties will activate the four sirens (to be in sequence and within 15 minutes from receipt of with SAE) and broadcast the exercise EBS message; radio station KONA will broadcast its normal test EBS message upon request of the B/F EOC; the Department of Wildlife will demonstrate alerting (as described in IP-14) and City of Richland will not be expected to perform route alerting of the Horn

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR B/F COUNTIES

Rapids areas.

Narrative Summary:

Benton and Franklin Counties demonstrated the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision by appropriate officials. Benton and Franklin Counties demonstrated the ability to perform route alerting along the Columbia River within 45 minutes.

At the B/F EOC

The County's procedures require them to broadcast an instructional message to the public within 15 minutes of making a protective action decision. PAD #1 (See Table 5 for the content of the three PADs issued during the exercise) was made at 1014 at the B/F EOC. The sirens were activated at 1017. At 1029 EBS #1 was issued.

PAD #2 was made at 1044. EBS #2 was broadcast by KONA at 1049. No mention of the ORV Park closure was included in this message.

PAD #3 was made at 1124 in the B/F EOC. EBS #3 was broadcast at 1134.

The County met the 15 minute criterion (time from decision to EBS broadcast) for all three PAs.

FEMA noted some discussion and confusion between the Communications Center, the PIO, and the Emergency Chairman over siren activation confirmation. There was some discussion and confusion on whether the EBS broadcast should be postponed until siren activation confirmation was received. The County dispatch procedures contain a step that calls for confirmation that the sirens have sounded. There is no mention of this requirement in the County PIO procedures. The County PIO has the responsibility for effecting the EBS broadcast. The four sirens are designed to alert the transients on the Columbia River within five miles of the WNP-2 facility.

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR B/F COUNTIES

In the Field

The Hanford Patrol flight crew was notified to perform route alerting along the Columbia River at 1012. Using the DOE helicopter, route alerting along the River was demonstrated by contacting four boats identified as exercise participants and informing these individuals that due to the accident at WNP-2 they should return to their launch point and tune to 610 AM for EBS instructions. Columbia River route alerting was completed at 1039, well within the 45 minute time frame allowed for notification in low population areas.

The Hanford Patrol and the Benton County Sheriff's Office mobilized and deployed boats as part of the Columbia River route alerting process. The purpose of the boats is to establish access control on the river at the 10 mile points on the north and south side of the plume EPZ.

Past Issues Examined:

There were no past issues for this objective.

Current Exercise Issues:

Issue #4: (C90-14)

Siren and EBS activation - Procedural inadequacies.. ARCA (E.6).

Evaluation:

There are inconsistencies between the dispatch procedures (IP-1) and the PIO procedures (IP-8). The Emergency Chairman's procedures (IP-4) are not specific regarding siren activation and EBS broadcasts. FEMA notes that the siren activation is only for the Columbia River alerting. All appropriate procedures should be revised to indicate that a time will be specified for the activation of the sirens and EBS broadcast and that the responsible parties will ensure that both the siren activation and the broadcast of the EBS message are in effect at the specified time.

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR B/F COUNTIES

Recommendation: Revise procedures to ensure consistency regarding EBS implementation. Train staff.

Objective #13: Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion after the initial alert and notification has occurred.

Evaluation: Met.

EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT: Benton and Franklin Counties will broadcast appropriate EBS messages in both English and Spanish.

Narrative

Summary: Benton and Franklin Counties demonstrated the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion after the initial alert and notification had occurred.

B/F EOC is the location where public instructions are formulated and disseminated. EBS messages were produced in both English and Spanish after PADs were announced by the Emergency Chairman.

The text of EBS #2 required employers (mostly farmers) to shelter employees indoors. The capability to effect shelter of the employees may not exist during the harvest season. Evacuation may be a more appropriate instruction since sufficient inside space may be lacking in many farm areas.

The English language EBS texts were complete and consistent with the PADs. However, EBS #3 in Spanish was not consistent with PADs identified in the English version of PAD #3. The Spanish version omitted the following information: Items to take with you when evacuating; warn others who may not have heard the instructions of the need to evacuate; secure homes and businesses; what actions to take if you need transportation assistance; Actions to take while evacuating; Services provided at Red Cross Shelters.

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR B/F COUNTIES

Past Issues

Examined: Resolved: C88-5; C88-7; Unresolved: C89-1; (see Appendix A for details).

Current
Exercise
Issues:

Issue #5: Inappropriate EBS Instructions. ARCA (E.7).
(C90-15)

Evaluation: PAD #2 required residents to shelter themselves and their employees, if appropriate. The prescribed shelter text of the EBS message advises persons, who have family or employees outdoors, to direct those persons to come indoors. Evacuation may be a more appropriate instruction since sufficient inside space may be lacking in many areas.

Recommendation: Revise EBS message text regarding sheltering (part 7). FEMA recommends that the following sentence be substituted for the current second sentence in part 7: "If you have family or employees who are out-of-doors and who do not have immediate access to shelter, direct them to evacuate the area". In other words, the text should advise persons to evacuate [for a shelter PA] if immediate access to shelter is not available.

Issue #6: Incomplete Spanish EBS message. ARCA (E.5).
(C90-16)

Evaluation: The Spanish version of EBS #3 omitted the following information: Items to take with you when evacuating; warn others who may not have heard the instructions of the need to evacuate; secure homes and businesses; what actions to take if you need transportation assistance; Actions to take while evacuating; Services provided at Red Cross Shelters. It is not clear to FEMA whether the blocks on the message form were not checked or whether the spokesperson misread the text.

Recommendation: Prerecording EBS messages (in order to eliminate possible reading or preparation errors). Revise plan and procedures. Train staff.

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR B/F COUNTIES

Objective #14: Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in an accurate, coordinated, and timely manner.

Evaluation: Met.

Narrative Summary:

Benton and Franklin Counties demonstrated the ability to brief the media in an accurate, coordinated, and timely manner.

Press releases from the SS and the State were received and available in the EOC. The press releases received (faxed copies) from the JIC were sometimes incomplete and garbled and were not consistently available for others to view in the EOC.

Benton and Franklin Counties participated in the three press briefings which were held at the SS JIC. The County Commissioner, who was the spokesperson for the counties, did an excellent job of summarizing the Counties responses to the emergency. He was able to provide details on what actions had been taken, and the times that these actions began or had been completed. See Table 7a for a synopsis of the three JIC press briefings.

The JIC served as a central point where information from various sources was coordinated, and where designated spokesperson briefed the media. The JIC is the location where the Benton and Franklin Counties press releases are prepared and disseminated. The JIC is also a location where telephone teams answer questions from the media and the public.

Benton and Franklin County PIOs stationed at the JIC effectively coordinated the formulation and dissemination of public information. The JIC staff had access to current and accurate information and produced six press releases during the exercise.

The staff at the JIC obtained information from the PIO at the County EOC. Prescribed information releases were utilized to formulate the news releases. Protective actions were appropriately supported by specific instructions and related information. Before issuing news releases, the

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR B/F COUNTIES

PIOs received authorization to release the information from the Emergency Chairman and the PIO at the B/F EOC.

A log was maintained by the PIOs at the JIC, but this log did not reflect all of the times at which news releases were issued.

The answers provided in response to the calls placed to the JIC media team were for the most part accurate. The responses appeared to be reasonable and would not have caused additional uncertainty on the part of the media callers.

Past Issues

Examined:

Resolved: C89-2; Unresolved: None. (see Appendix A for details).

Current Exercise Issues:

Issue #7: Incomplete PIO log at the JIC. ARCA (G.3.a).
(C90-17)

Evaluation: A log was maintained by the PIOs at the JIC, but this log did not reflect all of the times at which news releases were issued.

Recommendation: Train staff.

Objective #15: Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion.

Evaluation: Met.

Narrative

Summary:

Benton and Franklin Counties demonstrated the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion.

The JIC had two phone numbers dedicated to the Rumor Control function. These numbers were publicized during news conferences and in press releases. Ten or more phone lines were available for rumor control use, but only four were used for the exercise.

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR B/F COUNTIES

The JIC/Rumor Control staff secured information on current events by observing press conferences on closed circuit TV, reading press releases issued by the various organizations involved in the emergency response, listening to briefings by the Information Manager, and reading the status board posting. The Rumor Control staff at the JIC did provide available and responsive information to callers in a prompt manner. Most of the calls were answered correctly. Calls asking for transportation assistance were referred to the B/F EOC. The largest source of error among the responses to the calls was the failure of the Rumor Control staff to adequately dispel the rumor that the protestors were terrorists who were responsible for the escalation of the emergency beyond the ALERT level. FEMA notes that this rumor was the onsite response organization's responsibility.

Past Issues

Examined: There were no past issues for this objective.

Current Exercise Issues:

None.

Objective #16: Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of KI to Emergency Workers and institutionalized persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radioiodine releases.

Evaluation: Met.

Narrative Summary:

Benton and Franklin Counties demonstrated the capabilities to distribute and administer KI. Some of the EWs did not receive the recommendation to administer KI. FEMA notes that the State of Washington has the responsibility for decision making regarding KI.

Franklin County Sheriff's deputies received the instruction to take KI at about 1128. Proper procedures were demonstrated by both mobile units.

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR B/F COUNTIES

Other EWS (with the exception of WA field teams, which are discussed in the state section of this report), did not take KI. The Columbia River route alerting team completed their required actions prior to the KI decision. The remaining EWS (Washington State Department of Wildlife, Benton and Franklin County school and mobility impaired bus drivers) never received the KI notification. This was the result of the failure of the transportation coordinator, and in the case of the Wildlife Agents, the WSP, to notify these people to take KI. Interviews with these EWS revealed that they were familiar with KI procedures, including recommended dosage and potential side effects.

Past Issues Examined:

There were no past issues for this objective.

Current Exercise Issues:

Issue #8: (C90-18)

Some EWS did not receive KI instructions. ARCA (J.10.e).

Evaluation:

Benton and Franklin Counties school and mobility impaired bus drivers never received the KI notification. The Transportation Coordinator's procedure (IP-5) states that the Transportation Coordinator is the main point of contact with the school districts, including the transportation supervisors of the school districts. Attachment B of IP-5 does contain a note that requests the Transportation Coordinator to confirm that bus drivers have taken their KI. This attachment does not contain a specific step requiring the Transportation Coordinator to advise the bus drivers through the school districts that they should take KI. An overall interpretation of IP-5 is that it is implied that the Transportation Coordinator should do so.

Recommendation: Review & revise procedures to include a specific step requiring the Transportation coordinator to advise the school districts' bus drivers to take KI when a KI decision is made. Train staff.

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR B/F COUNTIES

Objective #18: Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate Protective Actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ population (including transit-dependent persons, special needs populations, handicapped persons and institutionalized persons).

Evaluation: Met.

EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT: Scenario will call for two mobility impaired persons to request transportation assistance. B/F EOC will dispatch resources to the requested location and simulate the transport to EWAC (no persons will be moved, vehicle will run route to EWAC).

Narrative Summary:

Benton and Franklin Counties demonstrated the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate Protective Actions for the impacted permanent plume EPZ population. FEMA recommends that additional planning be conducted in order to be able to provide prompt evacuation of mobility impaired persons. FEMA also recommends that the data base of mobility impaired persons be updated.

At the B/F EOC

The Transportation Coordinator at the B/F EOC activated the system for assessing and providing transportation support to handicapped, transit-dependent, institutionalized, and special needs groups. In a real emergency, the Transportation Coordinator would use Attachment E of IP-5 to call and assess the needs of the known mobility impaired persons. For this exercise, calls were made to and from the control cell. Delays were encountered in calling the Control Cell because of the number of lines available. When a valid request came in, the Transportation Coordinator requested transportation assistance from the appropriate school district. FEMA notes that the requests for assistance (per the extent of play agreement) were to represent actual mobility impaired persons from the existing data base. Communications with emergency workers in the field was from the Transportation Coordinator through the Bus Transportation Supervisor by telephone, then from the Bus Supervisor to the drivers via two-way radio.

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR B/F COUNTIES

In the Field

At 1049 Pasco School District #1 Transportation Dispatch was notified by B/F EOC to be on alert for evacuation of special populations. Six wheelchair/lift buses were available and ready to be put into service. All district bus drivers are routinely cross-trained to operate these special buses. Office and vehicle maintenance personnel are also authorized drivers. At least six drivers were available onsite at the time of the call. This school district transports five wheelchair students on a daily basis. A current roster of all drivers and phone numbers was available.

The B/F EOC Transportation Coordinator requested a Mobility Impaired (MI) bus be dispatched at 1118 to pick up a MI resident. The resident to be transported needed a stretcher which made it an inappropriate referral because the buses are not designed to carry stretchers. The bus driver realized the problem and raised the question with the bus dispatcher. It was decided that the bus could be used to carry a stretcher. In the process of trying to locate the address, it was determined from the family that the resident had died one and a half years previously. In accordance with the extent of play agreement, it was assumed that the pickup was made and the bus transported the simulated evacuee to Stevens EWAC.

A second bus was dispatched to another MI location. The second address was not found, probably because of a control cell error. However, another individual on the Special Needs Population List, whose address was near that provided (as part of the exercise), was known to the bus driver to have moved out of the area about a year ago. Once again it was assumed that the pickup had been made, and the process of transporting this resident to Stevens EWAC was then simulated.

We noted that the Pasco School District bus dispatcher indicated that she doesn't remember ever seeing the B/F emergency plan and did not have a copy of the plan or checklist available (IP-18, Evacuation Transportation Function). She stated that she was not aware of PADs nor did she ask for situation updates. On the other hand, no



EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR B/F COUNTIES

information was offered by the B/F EOC Transportation Coordinator.

The Special Needs Population Data Base needs to be available to the bus dispatchers and drivers to insure verified special instructions are available to all concerned. Simple route maps or directions used in conjunction with the addresses would have prevented delays and confusion during this exercise. For example, the driver encountered one lane bridge with unknown weight capacity, and an area with no obvious house numbers on homes.

Past Issues Examined:

There were no past issues for this objective.

Current Exercise Issues:

Issue #9: (C90-19)

Incomplete plans for Mobility Impaired persons.
ARCA (J.10.d & g).

Evaluation:

Exercise play demonstrated that the Special Needs Database (IP-5 Attach. E) was inaccurate since it listed at least two people who no longer lived in the area. Exercise play demonstrated that the bus drivers had some difficulty finding addresses and that route instructions and maps would improve the ability of the school district to provide timely evacuation.

Recommendation: Review and update the Special Needs Population Data Base (FEMA notes that annual updates of the data base including verification are required). Develop maps and route instructions for the bus drivers to follow when locating and transporting mobility impaired persons. Revise procedures. Train Staff.

Issue #10:

No procedures for bus dispatcher. ARFI

Evaluation:

We noted that the Pasco School District bus dispatcher indicated that she doesn't remember ever seeing the B/F emergency plan and did not have a copy of the plan or checklist available (IP-18, Evacuation Transportation Function). She stated that she was not aware of PADs nor did she ask for

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR B/F COUNTIES

situation updates. On the other hand, no information was offered by the B/F EOC Transportation Coordinator.

Recommendation: Provide proper procedures.

Objective #19: Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate Protective Actions for school children within the plume EPZ.

Evaluation: Met.

EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT: B/F EOC will dispatch a bus to one school to demonstrate driver's knowledge of route, EWAC location, EW kit and communication procedure.

Narrative Summary:

Benton and Franklin Counties demonstrated the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate Protective Actions for school children within the plume EPZ.

At the B/F EOC

The B/F EOC Transportation Coordinator contacted the three schools in the plume EPZ and the School Bus Supervisor and placed them on alert at about 0850. It was determined that 380 students and staff needed to be moved from these schools if there was a PA. Resources available included 40 buses with capacity for 2,800 riders plus eight specially equipped buses. The Transportation Coordinator was instructed to notify the school of the order to evacuate at 1100. The Coordinator got through to Edwin Markham School at about 1104. The other two schools (Country Christian and Country Haven) could not be reached until 1126 because the control cell number used to simulate calls to these schools was busy until that time. Communication to the Bus Supervisor was not a problem, nor was communication from the Supervisor to the drivers.

In the Field

One bus was driven to Edwin Markham school and from there to Stevens EWAC, simulating the evacuation of students. At 1050 the Pasco School District #1

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR B/F COUNTIES

Bus Garage received a call from the B/F EOC asking for a bus to be sent to Edwin Markham School to standby for possible evacuation of students. At 1101, the bus driver made a radio check in his bus and then left for the school. The bus arrived at Edwin Markham at 1122, departed at 1127 and arrived at Isaac Stevens EWAC at 1153.

The Bus Dispatcher did not have access to a complete set of B/F County procedures and checklists. She was not aware of any plant conditions or PADs in effect (See Objective #18).

The attendance at the three schools in the EPZ is such that 12 buses can evacuate all students in one sweep. At least 40 buses were available on the day of the exercise.

Arrangements were made with FC Sheriff's Office (FCSO) to dispatch traffic control assistance to Edwin Markham School. Given the resources available to FCSO, and competing requirements for staff at ACPs, river closure points, evacuation verification routes as well as normal police activities, it is questionable whether or not there would be adequate staff to assist in traffic control at Edwin Markham School.

Past Issues Examined:

There were no past issues for this objective.

Current Exercise Issues:

None.

Objective #20: Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas.

Evaluation: Met.

EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT: City of Richland will deploy resources for closure of the Columbia River access; Franklin County will deploy resources for closure of the Columbia River at Ringold and Selph Landing; the two Franklin County vehicles will be redeployed to two access control points; and the two Franklin County vehicles will demonstrate evacuation verification patrol.

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR B/F COUNTIES

Narrative Summary:

Benton and Franklin Counties (Sheriff's Offices as well as the Richland Police and WSP) demonstrated the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas with some exceptions.

The extent of play called for two FCSO officers to close the Columbia River access at Ringold and Selph landing. The RPD was to close the landing at Leslie Grove Park. All other ACP responsibilities were to be simulated. These tasks were accomplished successfully. After performing the above tasks, the FCSO officers were successfully redeployed to ACP F5 and F6. This involved travel across the plume path. Officers reported dosimeter readings to the B/F EOC.

The B/F procedures (IP-6) do not detail routes or the resources required to perform evacuation verification. As a result, it would be necessary to take time away from operations duties (during an emergency) to plan routes, determine necessary resources, prepare instructions and assignments, etc. The task of determining evacuation verification routes could be accomplished more effectively by pre-incident planning. This planning should address assistance to special populations (schools), possible alerting of farm field workers, areas of traffic congestion as well as locating transit-dependent persons. FEMA notes that the agencies performing these activities do not necessarily have to be public safety agencies.

FEMA notes that the WA Department of Wildlife agents did accomplish their assigned responsibility to establish access control for the Wahluke wildlife area and that the Richland Police Department did promptly establish access control at the Leslie Grove Park (Columbia River closure). The Richland Police Department also dispatched (simulated) officers to evacuate the ORV park without benefit of a protective action decision or coordinated EBS broadcast.

Past Issues Examined:

Resolved: C88-9; Unresolved: None. (see Appendix

EXERCISE EVALUATION FOR B/F COUNTIES

A for details).

Current Exercise Issues:

Issue #11: Incomplete evacuation verification procedures.
(C90-20) ARCA (J.10.j).

Evaluation: Benton and Franklin Counties' procedures do not specify evacuation verification routes. As a result, it is necessary to take time away from operations duties and plan routes to provide observations on the status of the evacuation PAD. The task of determining evacuation routes could be accomplished more effectively by pre incident planning.

Recommendation: Develop procedures for evacuation verification process. Revise procedures. Train staff.

3.1 SUMMARY LISTING OF EXERCISE INADEQUACIES
WNP-2 EXERCISE -- WA STATE ISSUES
DATE OF EXERCISE: 09/11/90

TRAC #	OBJ#	LEVEL	INADEQUACY	FEMA RECOMMENDATION	COMMITMENT DATE FOR CORRECTION
S90-1	3	ARCA	WA EOC was addressing requests for dose data to the MUDAC Coordinator. DOH procedures specify that communication with the EOF should be through the REM or RM (see Fig. 4-2 of DOH procedures). A.2.a	Review and revise procedures, if appropriate. Train staff.	09/30 / 91
S90-2	4	ARCA	For a period of time, fax messages from the EOF were not being received by the WA EOC. The problem may have been due to the fact that the communications link consists of a single party line which links the EOF to many locations. There should be a dedicated system between the EOF and the state and local EOCs to allow for timely data transfer.	Purchase equipment and data lines. Revise procedures and train staff.	09/30 / 91
S90-3	7	ARCA	The field teams did not report window open readings along with window closed readings while determining the parameters of the plume until	Train staff to follow DOH procedures which instruct FTs to obtain open and closed window readings.	09/30 / 91

3.1 SUMMARY LISTING OF EXERCISE INADEQUACIES
WNP-2 EXERCISE -- WA STATE ISSUES
DATE OF EXERCISE: 09/11/90

TRAC #	OBJ#	LEVEL	INADEQUACY	FEMA RECOMMENDATION	COMMITMENT DATE FOR CORRECTION
			the FTC requested them to do so.		
S90-4	7	ARCA	There is no procedure instructing DOH field teams to obtain ground level and waist level measurements (open and closed window) for ground deposition. PLANNING ISSUE	Revise procedures and train staff.	09/30 / 91
S90-5	10.	DEF	Dose projections and field data collected were not sent to the WA EOC in an adequate and timely manner. Only 2 of 17 dose projections were faxed to the WA EOC. One of the dose projections which was not sent to the EOC would have provided information that would have justified taking PAs beyond 10 miles. Only 2 of 10 plume location maps were sent to the WA EOC. (I.10)	Assign an EOF staff member the task of providing hard copy data to the WA EOC until the WA Administrative Liaison arrives at the EOF. Train the Administrative Liaison to continue this flow of data to the EOC after arriving at the EOF. Revise SS notification form to provide integrated dose projections for 5 and 10 miles (whole body and thyroid) for all default release durations. Demonstrate capabilities in a remedial drill.	09/30 / 91

3.1 SUMMARY LISTING OF EXERCISE INADEQUACIES
WNP-2 EXERCISE -- WA STATE ISSUES
DATE OF EXERCISE: 09/11/90

TRAC #	OBJ#	LEVEL	INADEQUACY	FEMA RECOMMENDATION	COMMITMENT DATE FOR CORRECTION
S90-6	10	DEF	<p>The WA EOC Radiological Assessment Group did not demonstrate an understanding of the RAG dose projections sent by the EOF. State Decision Makers were not briefed on the basis of the dose projection or that the basis was different than that specified by State procedures.</p> <p>WA dose assessment staff at the EOF did not understand the basis for the final dose assessment based on field data. An air sample point from the trailing edge of the plume was used as the basis to support existing PAs. This projection did not reflect the correct integrated dose at 10 miles. (1.8)</p>	<p>Review assignments for staff assigned to the RAG and EOF. Develop a system for certifying that these people adequately understand the dose projection system in use.</p> <p>Demonstrate capabilities in a remedial drill.</p>	09/30/91
S90-7	10	DEF	Inadequate dose projection systems. The BEDPS projections were based on real elapsed time (time of release	Establish appropriate release default time durations. Revise procedures to include these defaults and to require the	09/30/91

3.1 SUMMARY LISTING OF EXERCISE INADEQUACIES
WNP-2 EXERCISE -- WA STATE ISSUES
DATE OF EXERCISE: 09/11/90

TRAC #	OBJ#	LEVEL	INADEQUACY	FEMA RECOMMENDATION	COMMITMENT DATE FOR CORRECTION
			to time of calculation). Integrated dose from these projections were interpreted as total dose of the release. (I.10)	operator to produce dose projections consistent with the chosen release defaults. Train staff with accident assessment and PAR duties to ensure that the dose projections are presented in the context of the release default and that comparisons between dose projections are made on a consistent basis. Demonstrate capabilities in a remedial drill.	
S90-8	14	ARCA	Inadequate media briefing. Only one press briefing was held by the state. The manner in which PR #4 was discussed and then recalled with no replacement provided could have confused the media. Inaccurate information was provided to the media during the briefing. (G.3.a)	Hold press briefings early and often. Train staff.	09/30/91
S90-9	14	ARCA	Inadequate information and	Review boilerplate releases and	09/30/91

3.1 SUMMARY LISTING OF EXERCISE INADEQUACIES
WNP-2 EXERCISE -- WA STATE ISSUES
DATE OF EXERCISE: 09/11/90

TRAC #	OBJ#	LEVEL	INADEQUACY	FEMA RECOMMENDATION	COMMITMENT DATE FOR CORRECTION
			instructions. PR #4 was recalled. PR #5 was issued in its place (but not actually given to the media). However it was confusing and PR #4 was necessary to fully understand PR #5. The EBS message by the state could have been taken for a recommendation when in fact it was an advisory. (E.7; G.4.a)	EBS message texts and revise if appropriate. Train staff.	
S90-10	14	ARCA	The dissemination group was still being told by their supervisor that evacuation was being considered when it had actually been include as part of PA #3 at 1124. (G.4.b)	Train staff to update dissemination group as soon as possible after a new PA or other relevant information is available.	09/30 /91
S90-11	16	ARCA	The State's PAG for KI is not expressed as a projected dose to the thyroid. The dose projection system used by the state does not produce projected doses for adult thyroid exposure. This should be the criteria on which KI decisions for (adult) EWs	Revise state PAG for KI exposure to include a projected dose for thyroid (expressed as an adult exposure). Develop a process for converting current child thyroid dose projections into adult dose projections. Revise KI decision process. Revise plans and train staff.	09/30 /91

3.1 SUMMARY LISTING OF EXERCISE INADEQUACIES
WNP-2 EXERCISE -- WA STATE ISSUES
DATE OF EXERCISE: 09/11/90

TRAC #	OBJ#	LEVEL	INADEQUACY	FEMA RECOMMENDATION	COMMITMENT DATE FOR CORRECTION
			should be based. (J10.e).		
S90-12	26	ARCA	Since DOE field teams will not enter the plume, this may impact how WA field teams are deployed. For example, DOE teams instead of WA teams could be used for confirming the absence of radiation in areas of non-deposition. (C.1.a)	Review and revise DOH procedures to indicate that federal rad monitoring teams have restrictions on the type of mission they can accept. Train staff.	09 / 30 / 91

3.2 SUMMARY LISTING OF EXERCISE INADEQUACIES
WNP-2 EXERCISE -- B/F COUNTY ISSUES
DATE OF EXERCISE: 09/11/90

TRAC #	OBJ#	LEVEL	INADEQUACY	FEMA RECOMMENDATION	COMMITMENT DATE FOR CORRECTION
C90-12	3	ARCA	<p>The Emergency Chairman at the B/F EOC did not emphasize that actions discussed during his briefings were County PAs, not utility recommendations. During only one briefing were agency staff asked to report on their agencies' response actions. (A.2.a)</p> <p>In a 11/9/90 letter, the Counties said that appropriate training would be conducted by 6/30/91.</p>	<p>Provide two-way briefings on a regular basis. Review and revise procedures, if appropriate.</p>	06/30/91
C90-13	6	ARCA	<p>The Wildlife Agent procedures (IP-14) are inconsistent in terms of what to do when 5 r dose is reached. Pg 4, item 11 tells the agent to report to an EW Center if a 5 r dose is reached. Pg 5 item 4 tells agent to pick up an EW kit and follow procedure IP-19. IP-19 tells EWs to call the EOC for further instructions if a 5 r dose is reached. This is the correct instruction. (K.3.a)</p>	<p>Revise IP-14 to make it consistent with IP-19.</p> <p>The Counties said that IP-14 will be revised by 12/31/90.</p>	12/31/90

3.2 SUMMARY LISTING OF EXERCISE INADEQUACIES
WNP-2 EXERCISE -- B/F COUNTY ISSUES
DATE OF EXERCISE: 09/11/90

TRAC #	OBJ#	LEVEL	INADEQUACY	FEMA RECOMMENDATION	COMMITMENT DATE FOR CORRECTION
C90-14	12	ARCA	The County dispatch procedures require confirmation that sirens have sounded. There is no mention of this requirement in the County PIO procedures. During the exercise, the dispatch office requested that EBS transmission be delayed until confirmation of siren sounding had been received. This caused confusion in the EOC since there was no mention of this requirement in the staff's procedures. (E.6)	Revise IP-4 and IP-8, as well as any other applicable procedures, to indicate that a time will be specified for siren activation and EBS broadcast and that the responsible parties will ensure that both the siren activation and EBS message are in effect at the specified times. The Counties said that IP-8 will be revised by 12/31/90.	12/31/90
C90-15	13	ARCA	The shelter text of the B/F EBS message advises persons who have families or employees outdoors to direct those people to come inside (to shelter). Evacuation may be a more appropriate instruction for these people in some cases since there may be insufficient indoor space convenient to these people. (E.7)	FEMA recommends that the following sentence be substituted for the current second sentence in part 7 of the EBS text: "IF YOU HAVE FAMILY OR EMPLOYEES WHO ARE OUT-OF-DOORS AND WHO DO NOT HAVE IMMEDIATE ACCESS TO SHELTER, DIRECT THEM TO EVACUATE THE AREA". The Counties said that the EBS	12/31/90

3.2 SUMMARY LISTING OF EXERCISE INADEQUACIES
WNP-2 EXERCISE -- B/F COUNTY ISSUES
DATE OF EXERCISE: 09/11/90

TRAC #	OBJ#	LEVEL	INADEQUACY	FEMA RECOMMENDATION	COMMITMENT DATE FOR CORRECTION
				form would be revised by 12/31/90.	
C90-16	13	ARCA	The Spanish version of the EBS #3 omitted several of the boilerplate instruction (what to take with you when evacuating...etc) that were included in the English version. It is not clear whether the blocks on the message form were not checked or whether the reader misread the text over the air. (E.7)	Prerecord EBS messages to eliminate preparation and reading errors. Revise procedures, train staff. The Counties said that they will conduct a feasibility study on the use of prerecorded EBS messages and make a decision by 6/30/91.	06/30/91
C90-17	13	ARCA	Although a log was maintained by the County PIOs at the JIC, it did not reflect all of the times at which news releases were issued. (G.3.a)	Train staff. The Counties said that appropriate training will be conducted by 6/30/91.	06/30/91
C90-18	16	ARCA	B/F school and mobility impaired bus drivers did not receive the KI notification given to other EWs. IP-5 for the Transportation Coordinator does not contain a specific	Revise procedure IP-5. The Counties said that IP-5 will be revised by 12/31/90.	12/31/90

3.2 SUMMARY LISTING OF EXERCISE INADEQUACIES
WNP-2 EXERCISE -- B/F COUNTY ISSUES
DATE OF EXERCISE: 09/11/90

TRAC #	OBJ#	LEVEL	INADEQUACY	FEMA RECOMMENDATION	COMMITMENT DATE FOR CORRECTION
			step requiring the Transportation Coordinator to advise the bus drivers (through the school districts) to take KI. An overall interpretation of IP-5 is that it is implied that this person should do so. (J.10.e)		
112 C90-19	18	ARCA	The Special Needs database (IP-5 Attachment E) used during the exercise was out of date and did not reflect the status of mobility impaired people in the area. (J.10.d & g)	Review and update the Special Needs Population database annually as required by FEMA guidance. The Counties said that the disabled person database would be updated by 6/30/91.	06/30/91
C90-20	20	ARCA	B/F procedures do not specify the routes to be used for evacuation verification. It is necessary to take time away from operations duties and plan routes to provide observations on the status of the evacuation PAD. (J.10.j)	Preplan evacuation verification routes. Revise procedures. Train staff. The Counties said that they would preplan evacuation verification routes by 6/30/91.	06/30/91

APPENDIX A: RESULTS OF ISSUES TESTED
DURING 9/11/90 WNP-2 EXERCISE
WA STATE ISSUES

TRAC #	LEVEL	DATE TESTED	INADEQUACY	EVALUATOR COMMENTS	ISSUE CLOSED (TRUE/FALSE)
S84-1	ARCA	09/11/90	No range of default values exists for use with the EDPS. (I.7; I.10)	<p>9/18/86 exercise comments: Procedure 13.8.1 does not appear to contain default values or specific references of where to locate default values. The H.P./Dose Projectionist said that the EDPS has a 2 hour default time for integrating the dose projection. However it is not clear if there were default, design basis release values for different accident scenarios upon which dose projections could be made.</p> <p>9/13/88 exercise comments: The methodology remains inflexible for modifying the source term for different accident scenarios. It allows two different nuclide mixes dependent on a filtered or non-filtered release which may not be representative of the actual source term.</p> <p>9/11/90 Evaluator comment: The above comments are still valid. The main EDPS has a</p>	.F.

APPENDIX A: RESULTS OF ISSUES TESTED
DURING 9/11/90 WNP-2 EXERCISE
WA STATE ISSUES

TRAC #	LEVEL	DATE TESTED	INADEQUACY	EVALUATOR COMMENTS	ISSUE CLOSED (TRUE/FALSE)
S86-4	ARCA	09/11/90	The media was not briefed in a timely manner. Delays were attributed to lack of management supervision by the production manager. (G.3.a;G.4.a)	single 2 hour default value. The backup EDPS has the flexibility for entering release duration times, however no reference default values were used during the exercise. Instead, real time (from start of release to time of calculation) was used for most dose projections. During the Feb 28 - Mar 1, 1989 ingestion exercise, the WEIC never released control of the PI function to the JIC per procedures. Consequently, the JIC did not have the opportunity to issue any press releases. Although the press releases issued by the WEIC were timely, the press release function must be demonstrated at the JIC as well. In a 6/28/90 letter, the state indicated that additional training has been conducted on this issue. In the 9/11/90 exercise, FEMA will evaluate the capabilities of the WEIC and the JIC as a single unit acting for the state.	.F.

APPENDIX A: RESULTS OF ISSUES TESTED
DURING 9/11/90 WNP-2 EXERCISE
WA STATE ISSUES

TRAC #	LEVEL	DATE TESTED	INADEQUACY	EVALUATOR COMMENTS	ISSUE CLOSED (TRUE/FALSE)
				9/11/90 exercise comment: The State did not brief the media in a timely manner. Only one press conference was held.	
S86-6	ARCA	09/11/90	The State JIC team refused to take the State's PIO responsibilities until FEMA/NRC arrived at the JIC. The State JIC team acted in a coordination of emergency response role instead of reporting the State's response actions to the media. (A.3; G.3.a; G.4.a)	During the Feb 28 - March 1, 1989 ingestion exercise, FEMA observed that "the State JIC team either did not seek to assume the State's PIO responsibilities (per 10.2-13) or the WEIC failed to initiate this action." Therefore this remains an open item.	.F.
				9/11/90 exercise comment: The State JIC team did not participate in this exercise, therefore this issue was not evaluated.	
S86-7	ARCA	09/11/90	Field teams had incomplete kits, a radio that did not work and some members were not certified for respirator use. (I.8)	During the 9/88 plume exercise, the FEMA evaluator reported that the EW kits were complete, but that some team members were still not certified for respirator use. This item is therefore only	.T.

APPENDIX A: RESULTS OF ISSUES TESTED
DURING 9/11/90 WNP-2 EXERCISE
WA STATE ISSUES

TRAC #	DATE LEVEL TESTED	INADEQUACY	EVALUATOR COMMENTS	ISSUE CLOSED (TRUE/FALSE)
			partially complete.	
			In a 6/28/90 letter, the state said that respirator certification has been completed and is an ongoing operation. DOH/DRP will not send uncertified staff on the field teams.	
			9/11/90 exercise comment: The evaluator observed up-to-date list of rad team members certified to wear respiratory protection; one team member held a current HazMat card for SCBA.	
S86-8	ARCA 09/11/90	Current instructions for EWs do not facilitate efficient replacement of workers whose doses are approaching 5 rem. Instructions require the PSO to either abandon the post or receive authorization for higher dose. Current instruments provided	During the 9/88 plume exercise, FEMA found that the dosimetry available to EWs was still inadequate; it consisted of only a 0 - 100 R instrument. These instruments also seemed to drift significantly from a given reading. (See S88-3 for further discussion of	.T.

APPENDIX A: RESULTS OF ISSUES TESTED
DURING 9/11/90 WNP-2 EXERCISE
WA STATE ISSUES

TRAC #	LEVEL	DATE TESTED	INADEQUACY	EVALUATOR COMMENTS	ISSUE CLOSED (TRUE/FALSE)
			to WSP do not allow accurate detection of low doses. (K.3.a; K.3.b)	dosimetry). In a 6/28/90 letter, the state said that new dosimetry has been obtained. 9/11/90 exercise comment: All EWs had 0 to 20 R instruments.	
S86-9	ARCA	09/11/90	A single field measurement was used as the basis for a PAR even though there were five field teams available to take measurements. (I.10)	During the 9/88 exercise, FEMA .F. observed that "The PAR to shelter ... was based on a dose projection using counting results from one air sample. ... This sample was not representative of the true plume characteristics since the sample was taken very close to the plant." The MUDAC requested a dose rate projection at approximately the same time that another sample report was received from the other field team. This sample would have been more representative of iodine concentrations in populated areas since it was taken over	

APPENDIX A: RESULTS OF ISSUES TESTED
DURING 9/11/90 WNP-2 EXERCISE
WA STATE ISSUES

TRAC #	LEVEL	DATE TESTED	INADEQUACY	EVALUATOR COMMENTS	ISSUE CLOSED (TRUE/FALSE)
				5 miles from the plant.	
				A 6/28/90 letter from the state said that annual training stresses the importance of [more than one air sample].	
				9/11/90 exercise comment: The final MUDAC decisions were supported by the incorrect use of a single air sample. The total integrated dose based on this sample was incorrect.	
S86-10	ARCA	09/11/90	Because of the assumptions by MUDAC that the unmonitored release pathway and source term would continue to produce low radiation field measurements, the FTC did not request dosimeter readings. However, the FTC and MUDAC PADG did not express concern or interest in the exposure that EWs might receive while staffing ACPs over a 12 hour shift.	SS procedure 13.11.14 (Rev. 1) .T. does not address FEMAs recommendations.	
			Procedure 13.11.14 in place at	A 6/28/90 letter from the state indicated that SS EW dose is monitored by the workers themselves, and the Field Team Coordinator. SS procedure 13.11.14 reminds the FTC to check status of EW exposure. DOH/DRP coordinators have trained their field teams and county	

APPENDIX A: RESULTS OF ISSUES TESTED
DURING 9/11/90 WNP-2 EXERCISE
WA STATE ISSUES

TRAC #	LEVEL	DATE TESTED	INADEQUACY	EVALUATOR COMMENTS	ISSUE CLOSED (TRUE/FALSE)
			the time did not assign any group responsibility to track and estimate dose commitment for field personnel. (K.3.a; K.3.b)	EWs. The Dept. of Ecology has responsibility to train their staff. 9/11/90 exercise comment: Dose was effectively managed by WA-1 and WA-2 field teams. Team members estimated their dose after passing through the plume; dose was also requested from MUDAC. EOF provided plant status messages and recommended that FTs take KI.	
S87-1	ARCA	09/11/90	When the RM made PARs which extended the evacuation and sheltering areas, the County was not aware that these PARs were different from those developed by MUDAC. The County was not aware that this PAR was not the "unified PAR" anticipated per their plan. (I.10; J.7).	In a 6/28/90 letter, the state .F. said that the EFSEC procedure checklist (10.13.2.e) and the DEM Assistant Director EOC procedure checklist (10.3 B-1(c) 11/14/89) both address FEMA's recommendation that the RM should ensure that off-site representatives are aware of the issues supporting the RM's decision on the EOF PAR. 9/11/90 exercise comment: The first MUDAC PAR, prepared by the SS and DOE before the State arrived, was modified by the REM with the RM's support.	

APPENDIX A: RESULTS OF ISSUES TESTED
DURING 9/11/90 WNP-2 EXERCISE
WA STATE ISSUES

TRAC #	LEVEL	DATE TESTED	INADEQUACY	EVALUATOR COMMENTS	ISSUE CLOSED (TRUE/FALSE)
				In accordance with EPIP 13.11.7, the REM informed the MUDAC coordinator of the change in PAR. The RM did not inform offsite authorities during the CRASH call of the SS change in the MUDAC PAR as required by EPIP 13.14.2 .	
S87-2	ARCA	09/11/90	The PADG focused on the primary PAR areas and sometimes missed automatic PARs which should have been included, based on the decision for the primary PAR. (E.4)	In a 6/28/90 letter, the state .T. said that training on automatic PARs will be conducted and automatic PARs are included in the DEM Assistant Director EOC procedures. 9/11/90 Evaluator Comment: The MUDAC procedures now assign automatic PARs to the REM. These PARs were initiated by the REM.	
S87-3	ARCA	09/11/90	At one point during the PAR development process, the plume center line appeared to be near the boundary of Sections I & II. When PARs were	In a 6/28/90 letter, the state .P. said that all plume maps in use have been revised to change division lines to coincide with major roads or	

APPENDIX A: RESULTS OF ISSUES TESTED
DURING 9/11/90 WNP-2 EXERCISE
WA STATE ISSUES

TRAC #	LEVEL	DATE TESTED	INADEQUACY	EVALUATOR COMMENTS	ISSUE CLOSED (TRUE/FALSE)
			developed for distances beyond 10 miles, both sections were included, resulting in an affected area of about 180 degrees. In reality the affected area was much smaller. (I.10; J.9)	streets. Training will be conducted during July and August, 1990. 9/11/90 Evaluator comment: The new maps (dated July, 1990) were in place. However, the large map is still used to plot the field monitoring data. "Neon" type tape placed on the new sector boundaries might be useful.	
S87-10	ARCA	09/11/90	At least 5 examples of incomplete or incorrect information were noted in the WEIC press releases and the press conference.(G.3.a)	During the March, 1989 ingestion exercise, the number of press release issued by the WEIC was adequate. However the content of the releases was not adequate to justify the rationale for PAs and the associated health risks. The press release associated with PAD #7 did not address the instructions for return, although the PAD did. Other examples of incorrect information are described in the exercise report. In a 6/28/90 letter, the state	.F.

APPENDIX A: RESULTS OF ISSUES TESTED
DURING 9/11/90 WNP-2 EXERCISE
WA STATE ISSUES

TRAC #	LEVEL	DATE TESTED	INADEQUACY	EVALUATOR COMMENTS	ISSUE CLOSED (TRUE/FALSE)
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

said that PIO staff have received additional training regarding the use of timely and accurate information in news releases and press briefings. Boilerplate health related background information has been developed to avoid providing inaccurate or misleading health information to the public.

9/11/90 exercise comment:
Five news releases were prepared and issued by the WA WEIC. These contained accurate information as far as they went. PR #4 reflected an incomplete effective zone for the agricultural advisory and was supplanted by PR #5. At the only press briefing held, PR #4 was issued, then recalled with the comment that PR #5 would replace it. No other PRs were handed out to the press. As it turned out, not only did the press not get PR #4, PR #4 was necessary in order to understand PR #5 since this release made reference to

APPENDIX A: RESULTS OF ISSUES TESTED
DURING 9/11/90 WNP-2 EXERCISE
WA STATE ISSUES

TRAC #	LEVEL	DATE TESTED	INADEQUACY	EVALUATOR COMMENTS	ISSUE CLOSED (TRUE/FALSE)
--------	-------	-------------	------------	--------------------	---------------------------

PR #4.

Only 1 press briefing was held. It was originally scheduled for 1200, but it kept being postponed every 15 to 30 minutes until it was finally held at 1337. See discussion of the briefing under Objective 13/14 in the exercise report.

In a 6/28/90 letter, the state .F. said that they will do additional training to alert WSP of the need to quickly alert the Department of Fisheries and Wildlife of the need to perform route alerting and provide access control at Ringold fish hatchery.

9/11/90 exercise comment: F&G agent did not receive any message from WSP to proceed with evacuation. Agents proceeded with notification based on hearing the sirens. Apparently, WSP thought that

S88-2 ARCA 09/11/90 The WSP dispatch at Yakima waited 27 minutes to notify Fish and Game to begin route alerting. (E.6)

APPENDIX A: RESULTS OF ISSUES TESTED
DURING 9/11/90 WNP-2 EXERCISE
WA STATE ISSUES

TRAC #	LEVEL	DATE TESTED	INADEQUACY	EVALUATOR COMMENTS	ISSUE CLOSED (TRUE/FALSE)
				all calls were to be simulated and therefore did not actually place a call to the F&G agent.	
S88-3	ARCA	09/11/90	Fish and Game agents did not carry proper dosimetry. Agents carried one 0 to 100 R dosimeter. (K.3a).	9/11/90 exercise comment: All .T. WA EWs had proper dosimetry, with the exception of one Fish and Game agent whose 0-20 R unit was defective and had been returned to the State for repair.	
S88-4	ARCA	09/11/90	Dose projections which supported PARs were not sent to the B/F County EOC. (I.10).	In a 6/28/90 letter, the state .P. said that it is the normal procedure to send dose projection data to the state and county EOCs. 9/11/90 exercise comment: Only 2 of 10 data point reports and 2 of 17 dose projections were sent offsite.	
S88-5	ARCA	09/11/90	Dose and ground deposition projections were based on data from a single air sample even	9/11/90 exercise comment: The .P. field data collected was not properly evaluated in terms of	

APPENDIX A: RESULTS OF ISSUES TESTED
DURING 9/11/90 WNP-2 EXERCISE
WA STATE ISSUES

TRAC #	LEVEL	DATE TESTED	INADEQUACY	EVALUATOR COMMENTS	ISSUE CLOSED (TRUE/FALSE)
			though there were four samples available in the MUDAC. (I.10).	were it came from and the time of collection when the data were used to provide dose projections. In addition, the dose projections were not compared in order to understand the differences. The air sample obtained about 1340 which was used to calculate the dose at 10 miles was collected after the plume had passed. The iodine concentration would not have represented the release iodine concentration. Further discussion is contained under Objective #10 of the exercise report.	
S88-6	ARCA	09/11/90	The PAR for milk herds was inconsistent with the PAR for people. (I.10).	In a 6/28/90 letter, the state .T. said that annual training stresses the importance of consistency in PARs. 9/11/90 exercise comment: Care was taken at the WA EOC to ensure that PARs for people and livestock were consistent.	

APPENDIX A: RESULTS OF ISSUES TESTED
DURING 9/11/90 WNP-2 EXERCISE
WA STATE ISSUES

TRAC #	LEVEL	DATE TESTED	INADEQUACY	EVALUATOR COMMENTS	ISSUE CLOSED (TRUE/FALSE)
S88-7	ARCA	09/11/90	The hot line used at the Kiona Benton EWAC did not allow for contamination control. (J.12).	In a 6/28/90 letter, the state .F. said that new procedures are in development that will resolve this issue. Training will be given to K-B EWAC staff. Correction can be observed during the next K-B EWAC drill.	
S089-1	OTHR	09/11/90	Procedures for State EBS actions are not integrated. Individual procedures for monitoring EBS by DAG and WSP do not specify to whom the results of the monitoring should be reported. The procedure for the DCD/DEM Assistant Director does not direct that EBS message text be acquired from the EOC supervisor in a timely fashion. Procedures do not specify use of WEIC to prepare EBS messages. WEIC procedures do not call for EBS messages to be available to all WEIC dissemination points.	This other issue was generated .F. out of S84-1 and S86-5. These issues have been closed out and replaced by this issue which more accurately reflects the status of current WA procedures. In a 6/28/90 letter, the state said that this issue will be addressed in revisions to 10.18. Commitment date for correction is August 1990. 9/11/90 exercise comment: Procedures for State EBS actions are still not integrated. There was no way	

APPENDIX A: RESULTS OF ISSUES TESTED
DURING 9/11/90 WNP-2 EXERCISE
WA STATE ISSUES

TRAC #	DATE	LEVEL TESTED	INADEQUACY	EVALUATOR COMMENTS	ISSUE CLOSED (TRUE/FALSE)
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
				to monitor the B/F County EBS messages at the WA EOC. Although State procedures currently assign two people the responsibility to monitor EBS broadcasts (WSP and State rep. to B/F EOC), no report was available at the WA EOC.	
127 S89-2	ARCA	09/11/90	MUDAC had 4 different map displays of the EPZ. This makes data collection and reporting difficult. (H.3; H.4)	In a 6/28/90 letter, the state .F. said that the decision has been made to use the Washington State Search and Rescue Grid as the standard map display for the MUDAC. New aerial photos will be taken and staff will be trained. Target completion date is 1/91.	
S89-3	ARCA	09/11/90	1.a: WEIC manager did not release control of the public information function to the JIC after the JIC was operational. 1.b: Coordination of press releases was accomplished after they were distributed,	In a 6/28/90 letter, WA responded as follows: 1.a: see discussion under S86-4. 1.b: State PIOs have received additional training on this issue.	.F.

APPENDIX A: RESULTS OF ISSUES TESTED
DURING 9/11/90 WNP-2 EXERCISE
WA STATE ISSUES

TRAC #	LEVEL	DATE TESTED	INADEQUACY	EVALUATOR COMMENTS	ISSUE CLOSED (TRUE/FALSE)
			not before as specified in procedures. (G.4.b)	1.c: Training will be given to DOA staff describing educational materials used and how these are to be distributed.	
			1.c: Educational material was not distributed to farmers and processors in the IPZ. EBS messages are an inappropriate means to alert and inform commercial agricultural operations. (J.11)	FEMA notes that DOA procedure 10.6 has not been revised since 1986. This procedure requires DOA to issue embargo notices. Until this procedure and other procedures are revised to reflect the issues raised here and in S89-1 (see FEMA report for the 1989 ingestion pathway exercise, pg. 88) a table top drill should not be scheduled.	
			1.d: Press releases did not explain the basis for the IPZ PARs being recommended.	1.d: Additional boilerplate messages have been developed to deal with health effects, DOH, ingestion and re-entry issues. These will be included in a kit to be distributed during the fall exercise.	
S89-4	ARCA	09/11/90	Spokespersons at the JIC did not present information in an accurate manner. (G.4.a)	In a 6/28/90 letter, the state .F. said that state PIOs have received additional training	

APPENDIX A: RESULTS OF ISSUES TESTED
DURING 9/11/90 WNP-2 EXERCISE
WA STATE ISSUES

TRAC #	DATE LEVEL TESTED	INADEQUACY	EVALUATOR COMMENTS	ISSUE CLOSED (TRUE/FALSE)
			<p>on this issue. Boilerplate information has been developed and will be part of an information packet to be used during the 9/90 exercise.</p> <p>Displays recommended by FEMA for ingestion use remain under development. Expected commitment date is 6/91.</p> <p>9/11/90 exercise comment: No information packets were handed out to the media who came to the WEIC news conference. Information available at this conference was limited and not entirely accurate. (See discussion in the 9/11/90 exercise report).</p>	
S89-5	ARCA 09/11/90	Status boards in the WEIC were not properly maintained: they often contained out of date information. (G.4.c)	<p>The state indicated (6/28/90 letter) that the state PIO staff have received additional training on this issue.</p> <p>9/11/90 exercise comment: The WEIC demonstrated the ability to maintain status boards in</p>	.T.

APPENDIX A: RESULTS OF ISSUES TESTED
DURING 9/11/90 WNP-2 EXERCISE
WA STATE ISSUES

TRAC #	LEVEL	DATE TESTED	INADEQUACY	EVALUATOR COMMENTS	ISSUE CLOSED (TRUE/FALSE)
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

the Dissemination Section. A specific status board staff person was assigned to post all significant events and actions on the board for the use of the media/public concern phone teams. There was a problem in that the Rumor Control section did not always receive current information in a timely manner. See issue under objective 13/14 of the exercise report for discussion of this separate issue.

APPENDIX A: RESULTS OF ISSUES TESTED
DURING 9/11/90 WNP-2 EXERCISE
B/F COUNTY ISSUES

TRAC #	LEVEL	DATE TESTED	INADEQUACY	EVALUATOR COMMENTS	ISSUE CLOSED (TRUE/FALSE)
C88-2	ARCA	09/11/90	During school evacuation route driving, the bus driver did not turn on his radio. (F.1)	9/11/90 exercise comment: The school evacuation bus driver performed a radio check prior to departing the Pasco School Dist. #1 bus garage. The radio was functional and was monitored by the driver during the trip to Edwin Markham school.	.T.
C88-3	ARCA	09/11/90	The weather status board, specified in IP-2 of the B1-County procedures was not in use at the EOC. The Barricade and Evacuation route map does not show the three river launch areas that require closure during a river evacuation. (H.3)	9/11/90 exercise comment: The evacuation route maps used during the exercise did show the river ACPs. The weather status/dose projection chart (an overhead graphic) was demonstrated during the participants meeting on 9/13/90.	.T.
C88-4	ARCA	09/11/90	EWs were not carrying proper dosimetry. Each carried one unit with range of 0 to 100 R. This does not meet federal criteria outlined in REP-2, pp. 5-7.	9/11/90 exercise comment: All EWs, including Sheriff's Deputies, carried proper dosimetry.	.T.



APPENDIX A: RESULTS OF ISSUES TESTED
DURING 9/11/90 WNP-2 EXERCISE
B/F COUNTY ISSUES

TRAC #	LEVEL	DATE TESTED	INADEQUACY	EVALUATOR COMMENTS	ISSUE CLOSED (TRUE/FALSE)
C88-5	ARCA	09/11/90	AS broadcast, EBS meesage #4 and #5 contained incomplete sheltering and ad hoc respiratory protection information, although this information was correctly stated in the text from which the Commissioner was reading. (E.7)	9/11/90 exercise comment: The .T. B/F EOC PIOs effectively used prescribed boilerplate text to provide complete and consistent information on sheltering.	
C88-7	ARCA	09/11/90	The Bi-County procedures were not consistent with observed play during the exercise regarding the beginning of the 15 minute period for broadcast of the EBS message. (E.5)	9/11/90 exercise comment: The .T. County has revised their procedures to set the time criterion for broadcast of the EBS message at 15 minutes after the emergency chairperson makes the decision to implement the PAD.	
C88-9	ARCA	09/11/90	IP-6 does not list the Franklin County river access points. (J.10.g)	9/11/90 exercise comment: The .T. present B/F procedures (IP-6, & IP-13 and IP-6 Attch. H) list the Ringold and Selph landing closure points. Attachment M does not list the two river ACPs but a 7/9/90 letter from the Counties states that this will be	

