ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9006200446 DOC.DATE: 90/06/13 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397
AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
FIES,C.L. Washington Public Power Supply System
POWERS,C.M. Washington Public Power Supply System
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 90-010-00:on 900517,secondary containment ESF actuation caused by inadequate work control.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 1 ENCL 1 W/9 ltr. SIZE: 4
TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

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	PD5 LA	1	1	PD5 PD	1	1
	SAMWORTH,R	1	1			
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	AEOD/DOA	1	1	AEOD/DSP/TPAB	1	1
	AEOD/ROAB/DSP	2	2	DEDRO	1	1
	NRR/DET/ECMB 9H	1	1	NRR/DET/EMEB9H3	1	1
	NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11	1	1	NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10	1	1
	NRR/DOEA/OEAB11	1	1	NRR/DREP/PRPB11	2	2
	NRR/DST/SELB 8D	1	1	NRR/DST/SICB 7E	1	1
	NRR/DST/SPLB8D1	1	1	NRR/DST/SRXB 8E	1	1
	REG FILE 02	1	1	RES/DSIR/EIB	1	1
	RGN5 FILE 01	1	1			
EXTERNAL:	EG&G STUART,V.A	4	4	L ST LOBBY WARD	1	1
	LPDR	1	1	NRC PDR	1	1
	NSIC MAYS,G	1	1	NSIC MURPHY,G.A	1	1
	NUDOCS FULL TXT	1	1			

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THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN SCANNED

NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

P.O. Box 968 • 3000 George Washington Way • Richland, Washington 99352

Docket No. 50-397

June 13, 1990

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 90-010

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 90-010 for the WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

Very truly yours,

C M Powers

C. M. Powers (M/D 927M)
WNP-2 Plant Manager

CMP:lr

Enclosure:
Licensee Event Report No. 90-010

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V
Mr. C. J. Bosted, NRC Site (M/D 901A)
INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA
Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI
Mr. D. L. Williams, BPA (M/D 399)

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'11

NRC FORM 366 (6-89)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 4/30/92

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4) Secondary Containment Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Actuation Caused by Inadequate Work Control

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 5	1 7	9 0	9 0	— 0 1 0	— 0 0	0 6	1 3	9 0		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9): 5

POWER LEVEL (10): 0 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: *(Check one or more of the following)* (11)

	20.402(b)		20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)
	20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER *(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)*
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
	20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (AREA CODE)
C. L. Fies, Compliance Engineer	5 0 9 3 7 7 - 2 0 3 9

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES *(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)*	X NO				

ABSTRACT *(Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines)* (16)

During the reactor refueling outage on May 17, 1990, at 1438 hours a Secondary Containment isolation occurred. This Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation resulted in the shutdown of non-safety related HVAC equipment, the actuation of containment isolation valves, and the startup of various safety related systems such as Standby Gas Treatment. Plant maintenance workers were replacing auxiliary relays as part of the normal preventative maintenance program when they inadvertently placed two channels in the tripped condition which initiated the ESF actuation.

The root cause for this event was inadequate work control which allowed work to proceed simultaneously on two safety-related divisions when no provisions had been made for such an activity.

Immediate corrective action was taken to place the Secondary Containment systems in their normal configuration.

There is no safety significance associated with this event. ESF isolations and actuations occurred as designed for the plant configuration at the time of the event. Accordingly, this event posed no threat to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

Plant Conditions

Power Level - 0%
Plant Mode - 5

Event Description

During the reactor refueling outage on May 17, 1990, at 1438 hours a Secondary Containment Isolation Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Actuation occurred. At the time of the actuation maintenance work was being performed by Plant Maintenance workers on General Electric Model HFA auxiliary relays. This ESF Actuation initiated a Balance of Plant (BOP) isolation involving Group 3 (Primary and Secondary Containment Ventilation and Purge Systems) and part of Group 4 (Miscellaneous Balance of Plant Systems). These two Groups are part of the Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System (NSSSS) that provides overall isolation of plant systems in response to various process parameters. During refueling (Mode 5) the Primary Containment can be open to the Secondary Containment and this isolation function is limited to Secondary Containment although Primary Containment isolations will occur if components have not been deactivated. In addition to the isolations, the Secondary Containment ESF actuation causes the normal Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) heating and ventilating supply and exhaust fans to stop and Reactor Building pressure control is transferred to the safety-related Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) system which was initiated by this event.

Immediate Corrective Action

Plant operators took immediate corrective action to place the systems back in their normal configuration. The restoration of systems, including the shutdown of SGT, was completed at 1520 hours.

Further Evaluation and Corrective Action

A. Further Evaluation

1. This event is being reported per the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an "..... event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF).....".

2. Further evaluation showed work was in progress on the Division I manual actuation relay (MS-RLY-K35A) which put the "A" channel in the tripped condition. When work started on the "B" channel relay (MS-RLY-81B) this caused a full trip on the outboard relay cabinet (RC-1) which resulted in the Secondary Containment Isolation.

3. The root cause was inadequate work control which allowed work to proceed simultaneously on two safety related divisions when no provisions had been made for such an activity.

4. There were no structures, components or systems that were inoperable prior to the start of this event which contributed to the event.

B. Further Corrective Action

1. Work control procedures will be reviewed to determine if additional steps need to be added to control Division related work.

2. The current work control administrative process will be reviewed with Plant Maintenance Department Supervisor and Engineering personnel.

Safety Significance

There is no safety significance associated with this event. ESF isolations and actuations occurred as designed for the plant configuration at the time of the event. Accordingly, this event posed no threat to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

Similar Events

None

EIIS Information

Text Reference	EIIS Reference System	EIIS Reference Component
Secondary Containment	C	--
Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System	--	--
Primary Containment	C	--
Standby Gas Treatment	BH	--
Main Steam Relay K35A (MS-RLY-K35A)	SB	RLY
Main Steam Relay K81B (MS-RLY-K81B)	SB	RLY

ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

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FIES,C.L. Washington Public Power Supply System
POWERS,C.M. Washington Public Power Supply System
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 90-010-00:on 900517,secondary containment ESF actuation caused by inadequate work control.

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	NUDOCS FULL TXT	1	1			

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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

P.O. Box 968 • 3000 George Washington Way • Richland, Washington 99352

Docket No. 50-397

June 13, 1990

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 90-010

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C. M. Powers (M/D 927M)
WNP-2 Plant Manager

CMP:lr

Enclosure:
Licensee Event Report No. 90-010

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V
Mr. C. J. Bosted, NRC Site (M/D 901A)
INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA
Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI
Mr. D. L. Williams, BPA (M/D 399)

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11

NRC FORM 366 (6-89)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4) Secondary Containment Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Actuation Caused by Inadequate Work Control

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 5	1 7	9 0	9 0	— 0 1 0 —	0 0	0 6	1 3	9 0		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9): 5

POWER LEVEL (10): 0 0 0

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Plant Mode - 5

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Main Steam Relay K81B (MS-RLY-K81B)	SB	RLY