

ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9003140391 DOC.DATE: 90/03/02 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397
 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 FIES,C.L. Washington Public Power Supply System
 POWERS,C.M. Washington Public Power Supply System
 RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 89-038-01:on 890913,inadequate primary containment integrity verification.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR W/8 ltr. ENCL SIZE: 5
 TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

	RECIPIENT		COPIES			RECIPIENT		COPIES	
	ID CODE/NAME		LTR	ENCL		ID CODE/NAME		LTR	ENCL
	PD5 LA		1	1		PD5 PD		1	1
	SAMWORTH, R		1	1					
INTERNAL:	ACNW		2	2		ACRS		2	2
	AEOD/DOA		1	1		AEOD/DSP/TPAB		1	1
	AEOD/ROAB/DSP		2	2		DEDRO		1	1
	NRR/DET/ECMB 9H		1	1		NRR/DET/EMEB9H3		1	1
	NRR/DET/ESGB 8D		1	1		NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11		1	1
	NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10		1	1		NRR/DOEA/OEAB11		1	1
	NRR/DREP/PRPB11		2	2		NRR/DST/SELB 8D		1	1
	NRR/DST/SICB 7E		1	1		NRR/DST/SPLB8D1		1	1
	NRR/DST/SRXB 8E		1	1		REG FILE 02		1	1
	RES/DSIR/EIB		1	1		RGN5 FILE 01		1	1
EXTERNAL:	EG&G WILLIAMS, S		4	4		L ST LOBBY WARD		1	1
	LPDR		1	1		NRC PDR		1	1
	NSIC MAYS, G		1	1		NSIC MURPHY, G.A		1	1
	NUDOCS FULL TXT		1	1					

NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM P1-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED
 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTR 37 ENCL 37

A0-4
 MB

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

P.O. Box 968 • 3000 George Washington Way • Richland, Washington 99352

Docket No. 50-397

March 2, 1990

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 89-038-01

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 89-038-01 for the WNP-2 Plant. This revised report is submitted to correct some minor errors present in the original report.

Very truly yours,

CMPowers

C. M. Powers (M/D 927M)
WNP-2 Plant Manager

CMP:lr

Enclosure:
Licensee Event Report No. 89-038-01

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V
Mr. C. J. Bosted, NRC Site (M/D 901A)
INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA
Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI
Mr. D. L. Williams, BPA (M/D 399)

Ent No 8055600104
JE22
11

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2

DOCKET NUMBER (2)
0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 1

PAGE (3)
1 OF 0 4

TITLE (4)
Inadequate Primary Containment Integrity Verification

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)	
0	9	13	8	9	038	0	3	02		0 5 0 0 0	
0	9	13	8	9	038	0	3	02		0 5 0 0 0	
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
1		20.402(b)			20.405(c)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(c)
1 0 0		20.405(a)(1)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)			OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
20.405(a)(1)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)					
20.405(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(ix)					

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME
C. L. Fies, Compliance Engineer

TELEPHONE NUMBER
5 0 9 3 7 7 - 2 5 0 1

AREA CODE
E X I 2 0 3 9

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) ☒ NO ☐

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On September 13, 1989, a reportability evaluation was approved by the Plant Technical Manager which directed that an event which began on January 21, 1989, be reported per 10CFR50.73. On the later date, plant equipment operators discovered two small 3/8 inch valves which should have been included on the primary containment integrity verification surveillance. The immediate corrective action placed these valves on the surveillance to allow verification of their closed condition to occur on a monthly frequency. The Plant Manager also directed that the containment integrity procedure be compared with the local leak rate testing procedure to identify any other missing valves. Four additional 1/2 inch valves were discovered during that review.

The root cause of this event was less than adequate procedures that did not identify all the containment items that require verification.

Further corrective action will include a physical walk-down of all containment penetrations to provide assurance that all items are now contained on the checklist.

This event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the public or plant personnel.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7	8 9	- 0 3 8	- 0 1	0 2	OF 0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

Plant Conditions

Power Level - 100%

Plant Mode - 1 (Power Operation)

Event Description

On September 13, 1989, a reportability evaluation was approved by the Plant Technical Manager which directed that an event which began on January 21, 1989, be reported per 10CFR50.73.

On January 21, 1989, while doing the primary containment integrity verification surveillance procedure (7.4.6.1.1), plant equipment operators discovered two 3/8 inch drain line valves (SLC-V-52 and SLC-V-53) associated with a standby liquid control flow transmitter (SLC-FT-1) which were not labeled and not contained on the primary containment integrity valve checklist (see Sketch 1). These valves are used to drain the instrument lines when calibrating SLC-FT-1 which is required on a yearly surveillance. These valves are located inside the outboard isolation valves (SLC-V-4A and SLC-V-4B) and therefore require closed verification on a monthly frequency per Technical Specification surveillance 4.6.1.1.b.

During the review of the problem evaluation request, the Plant Manager directed that the containment integrity verification procedure, PPM 7.4.6.1.1, be compared with the Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) procedure to check for additional missing valves. This review identified four Containment Monitoring System (CMS) valves which should have been on the primary containment integrity verification surveillance (PI-V-X29b1, PI-V-29f1, PI-V-X30a1, PI-V-X30f1). The purpose of these 1/2 inch valves is to allow operability tests to be performed on the associated excess flow check valves (PI-EFC-X29b, PI-EFC-X29f, PI-EFC-X30a, and PI-EFC-X30f) located directly downstream from the containment (see Sketch 2). These four valves were added to the plant during the refueling outage in May 1986.

Immediate Corrective Action

The primary containment integrity verification procedure was updated to show the additional valves.

Further Evaluation and Corrective ActionA. Further Evaluation

1. This event is being reported as a "...deviation from the plant's Technical Specifications...." per the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
2. There were no structures, components or systems that were inoperable prior to the start of this event which contributed to the event.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 9	0 3 8	0 1	0 3	OF	0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

3. The root cause of this event was less than adequate procedures that did not identify all the containment items that require verification. A contributing cause was inadequate review of procedures impacted by the plant modification which installed the four excess flow check valve test connections and valves.
4. The Plant modification process has been improved to provide a more complete review of impacted plant procedures.

B. Further Corrective Action

A physical walkdown will be performed of all containment penetrations to provide assurance that all items are now contained on the checklist. This walkdown will also identify the items that may have been added by plant modification.

Safety Significance

The establishment of primary containment integrity ensures that the release of radioactive material from the containment will be restricted to those leakage paths and rates assumed in the FSAR. This restriction is relied upon to limit the control room and site boundary radiation doses to within the limits established by General Design Criterion 19 and 10CFR100 during accident conditions.

The two valves associated with SLC-FT-1 (SLC-V-52 and SLC-V-53) are located outside containment and outboard of SLC-V-6, a check valve in the SLC injection line. The inboard containment isolation valve (SLC-V-7) is the inboard isolation valve located inside primary containment. Thus, there are two check valves in a series between the two drain valves and the primary containment. The second check valve (SLC-V-6) is not considered a containment isolation valve, but for purposes of this analysis, it does exist upstream of the valves in question and provides assurance of containment integrity. During plant operations, the lines leading to SLC-V-52 and SLC-V-53 are continually filled with water. Thus, any leaks in these valves would be apparent as they are in a very accessible area of the reactor building. These valves are only used during the 18 month surveillance which is performed during the annual refueling outage. In addition, the lines are capped downstream of the valves.

The four test connections for the excess flow check valves were added by a plant modification in May 1986. These test connections are used to test the excess flow check valve operation on the one inch lines which penetrate primary containment to monitor process conditions inside containment. These taps are used for an 18 month surveillance which is performed during the annual refueling outage. Specific steps in the procedure, Surveillance Testing of Containment Atmosphere and Suppression Pool Level Excess Flow Check Valves (7.4.6.3.4.2), call for the test connection valve to be closed after the test and the cap to be replaced on the line. In addition, the four test connections were identified in the Integrated Leak Rate Test (PPM) 7.4.6.1.2.1) which was performed at the end of the 1987 outage.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE (3)

Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2

0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7

YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER
89	038	01

0 4 OF 0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

In conclusion, there is a very low probability of these valves adversely affecting containment integrity even though they were not on the checklist.

Similar Events

LER 84-130 was written when 25 valves were found not listed on the primary containment integrity verification surveillance.

EIIS InformationText ReferenceEIIS Reference

	<u>System</u>	<u>Component</u>
Primary Containment	NH	--
SLC-V-52	BR	V
SLC-V-53	BR	V
SLC-FT-1	BR	FT
Containment Monitoring System (CMS)	IK	--