

# ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM

## REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8910030560 DOC. DATE: 89/09/28 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #  
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 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 89-037-00: on 890830, RHR sys differential pressure  
 indicating switch discovered to be isolated & equalized.  
 W/8 ltr.

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 TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

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	NRR/DEST/ESB 8D	1 1	NRR/DEST/ICSB 7	1 1
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	NRR/DEST/SGB 8D	1 1	NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10	1 1
	NRR/DLPQ/PEB 10	1 1	NRR/DOEA/EAB 11	1 1
	NRR/DREP/RPB 10	2 2	NUDOCS-ABSTRACT	1 1
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EXTERNAL:	EG&G WILLIAMS, S	4 4	L ST LOBBY WARD	1 1
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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

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Docket No. 50-397

September 28, 1989

Document Control Desk  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 89-037

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 89-037 for the WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

Very truly yours,

C. M. Powers (M/D 927M)  
WNP-2 Plant Manager

CMP:lr

Enclosure:  
Licensee Event Report No. 89-037

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V  
Mr. C. J. Bosted, NRC Site (M/D 901A)  
INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA  
Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI  
Mr. D. L. Williams, BPA (M/D 399)

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7	8 9	— 0 3 7	— 0 0 0	0 2	OF	0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Plant Conditions

- a) Power Level - 70%
- b) Plant Mode - 1 (Power Operation)

Event Description

On August 30, 1989, at 0214 hours, Differential Pressure Indicating Switch RHR-DPIS-12B was found to be isolated and equalized. This condition was discovered by Plant Instrument and Control (I&C) Technicians during the performance of Plant Procedure (PPM) 7.4.3.2.1.63, "Residual Heat Removal Shutdown Cooling Mode High Flow Isolation - CFT/CC." The function of RHR-DPIS-12B is to provide an auto-close signal to RHR-V-9 (Residual Heat Removal System Shutdown Cooling inboard isolation valve) upon receipt of a high flow (differential pressure) indication in the shutdown cooling line.

On August 29, 1989 at 2324 hours, the shift manager had authorized performance of the procedure and Plant I&C Technicians proceeded to the appropriate instrument rack and successfully completed the required surveillance on RHR-DPIS-12A. Upon initiation of Section "B" (RHR-DPIS-12B) of the procedure, the technicians discovered both the high and low pressure isolation valves closed, and the equalizing valve open. This configuration rendered RHR-DPIS-12B inoperable and; therefore, incapable of providing an RHR inboard isolation signal on shutdown cooling line excess flow.

Following discovery, the problem was brought to the attention of the shift manager and the decision was made to complete the procedure.

Immediate Corrective Action

Plant I&C Technicians successfully completed the surveillance and returned RHR-DPIS-12B to service.

Further Evaluation and Corrective ActionA. Further Evaluation

1. This event is reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), "Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications."
2. The root cause of this event is indeterminate. An analysis of the event was performed and it was determined that the procedure (which is performed monthly) was last performed on July 31, 1989. At that time, the applicable procedural step was signed off as complete. The procedural step also requires that "a second I&C Technician verify that RHR-DPIS-12B is properly valved back into service."

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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A review of Maintenance Work Requests, Clearance Orders, Radiation Work Permits and Control Room Logs was also performed and concluded that no identified maintenance activity had occurred between July 31, 1989 and August 30, 1989 which would have required RHR-DPIS-12B to be valved out of service.

Although the root cause of this event is indeterminate, a contributing factor could be work practices less than adequate in that 1) requirements for application of the independent verification process are inconsistent, and 2) the independent verification process is not fully understood by personnel performing tasks where independent verification is implied.

**B. Further Corrective Action**

1. An I&C Work Practices Manual will be developed which specifically describes the independent verification process.
2. Training on the independent verification process will be provided to all Plant I&C Technicians.

**Safety Significance**

There is no safety significance associated with this event. The other channel (outboard RHR-DPIS-12A) was available to provide an auto-close signal to RHR Shut-down Cooling (SDC) Outboard Isolation Valve RHR-V-8. In addition, had an SDC line break occurred, the Reactor Pressure Vessel Low Level (Level 3) isolation signal was operable during the event period and serves as a backup to the high flow (RHR-DPIS-12A/12B) isolation signal.

Furthermore, an RHR System isolation would also occur from a Leak Detection System initiated RHR Area High Temperature signal.

Accordingly, this event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the public or Plant personnel.

**Similar Events**

LER 89-020

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

EIIS InformationText ReferenceEIIS Reference

	System	Component
RHR-DPIS-12B	BO	PDIS
RHR-V-9	BO	ISV
Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System	BO	---
RHR-DPIS-12A	BO	PDIS
RHR-V-8	BO	ISV
Reactor Pressure Vessel	NH	RPV
Leak Detection System	IJ	---