

CATEGORY 1

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

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 RECIP. NAME: SCARANO, R. RECIPIENT AFFILIATION: NRC - No Detailed Affiliation Given

SUBJECT: Provides update on 971029 telcon received from Siemens Power Corp (SPC) re biennial exercise of HazMat drill scenario.
 Copy of SPC ltr & draft rept of response to 980415 fire at SPC in Richland, WA, encl.

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STATE OF WASHINGTON
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
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50-397

June 2, 1998

TO: Ross Scarano
Nuclear Regulatory Commission

FROM: Richard Cowley *Richard Cowley*
Nuclear Engineer
Nuclear Safety Section

SUBJECT: Siemens' EP Program

To bring you up to date, on October 29, 1997, we got a (206)-NUCLEAR call from Siemens (SPC) because of their biennial exercise. The drill scenario was a HazMat event. I had never been called for one of their exercises before so I decided to look in their procedures for what they are supposed to do. When they called back to terminate the drill, I talked to the controller about the form and a few other things. This investigation prompted several questions. These questions were e-mailed to the Radiation Materials Section, who licenses certain aspects of Siemens Power Corporation's operation, and were then forwarded to Siemens.

I have included a copy of the letter from Siemens Power Corporation so you can see the questions and their responses. I will try to elaborate a bit on each of these so you may have a better understanding of the situation.

Problem #1 (these would not have been called "problems" if I had been sending them to SPC myself but more likely "questions" or "concerns") - When I looked at the procedures, I saw that SPC was to call Washington Emergency Management Division (EMD) for all emergencies, radiological or HazMat. They were only to call Radiation Protection for radiological emergencies. Since this was a HazMat scenario, I wondered why they had called us and if they had called EMD, so I called the EMD duty officer to see if they had been called. At that time, EMD could not verify that they had received a call from SPC on that day.

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The comment in the SPC letter regarding EMD not being able to find the correct form could well be an indicator that all agencies need to be more proactive in training and coordinating. Neither we nor EMD could find their form without help. (This was evident again in the April 15th fire notification which EMD had to take on a WNP-2 notification form.)

Problem #2 - This was a comment regarding SPC not strictly following its procedures evidenced by its notifying Radiation Protection for a HazMat event (Radiation Protection is only supposed to be notified for radiological events) - I don't have a problem with this response, it is better to notify everybody than to accidentally forget to call someone who was supposed to be notified.

Problem #3 - This regards the two different callout lists in the procedures. SPC's procedures and their response indicate that they consider immediate notification to be <1 hour. RegGuide-3.67 wording considers prompt notification as "*normally within 15 minutes of declaring an alert (or site area emergency)*". This should probably be cleared up. We presently hold Allied Technical Group (ATG), another of our licensees who falls under RegGuide-3.67 to the 15 minute time limit. While the NRC has approved Siemens' plan with the 1 hour requirement, we would like to discuss that time limit criteria basis.

Problem #4 - This item commented on the fact that Radiation Protection received redundant emergency notifications, one from EMD and another from SPC. There is nothing that we can do about this. If it means that we will get notification from EMD and from SPC, so be it. EMD does have a protocol for notifying the appropriate State agencies for response to classified radiological emergencies, such as Unusual Events, Alerts, Site Area Emergencies, and General Emergencies. This does not include notification for "regulatory" purposes, only for response to emergencies. We in Radiation Protection do not know how EMD handles hazardous material emergencies that are not classified in the above manner.

Problem #5 - This issue deals with coordinating exercises with the State and local agencies. Siemens has in the past invited us to their annually required EP presentation, however, this was the first time Radiation Protection had even been notified of an exercise, much less involved in the planning or invited to participate. We have a problem with SPC's interpretation of RegGuide 3.67 in this area. We feel that the State must be considered as one of the offsite assistance organizations, whether for radiological or Hazardous Materials incidents. A letter from Washington Governor John Spellman, dated August 28, 1983, identifies DOH as the lead response agency to radiological accidents and directs DOH to "*maintain a capability to assess any radiological hazards resulting from a Fixed Nuclear Facility emergency affecting the state of Washington.*" Siemens' statement that they are not notifying the State "*because of their (the State's) inability to respond in time to our plant site before the incident would typically be resolved*" does not reflect DOH's current capabilities. Regardless of the time it takes us to respond, we have the legal responsibility to protect public health and we certainly cannot do that

very well if they don't let us know as quickly as possible. Now that we have several Radiation Health Physicists as First Responders and field team members in the tri-cities area, we should have no more of a problem finding someone to respond to Siemens than we do to DOE-RL or WPPSS. Our responders do not need to respond to the SPC facility directly but more likely to the field to monitor any offsite releases and then communicate their findings back to SPC and the State and county EOCs.

Washington Emergency Management Division, as the lead State planning agency, is the appropriate agency for coordinating participation in SPC emergency drills and exercises. However, EMD is not the only agency that needs to be involved in this planning. As the State's lead response agency for radiological emergencies, the Department of Health must also be involved in any planning for response to radiological emergency drills and exercises.

Problem #6 - This issue addressed the topic of "communication checks". Radiation Protection was used to these being more like those conducted by WNP-2 where a phantom scenario is communicated to the State and locals, not only to test the physical communication system but to also ensure that the parties receiving the information understood it and were able to respond properly. Radiation Protection now understands that the communication "checks" required in RegGuide-3.67 are not the same as the communication "drills" required in NUREG-0654. There still may be a problem although, in the fact that Radiation Protection cannot recall or verify any previous quarterly communication checks from SPC over the 206-NUCLEAR line in the past few years. Radiation Protection has a policy to log every call received on the emergency line, even wrong numbers.

I think that with improved coordination and interaction between Siemens and Nuclear Safety we can easily resolve all of these remaining concerns.

Attachment

cc: Charles Hackney



STATE OF WASHINGTON
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
7171 Cleanwater Lane, Bldg. 5 • P.O. Box 47827 • Olympia, Washington 98504-7827
TDD Relay 1-800-833-6388

June 2, 1998

TO: See Distribution Below

FROM: Susan May *Susan May*
Department of Health

SUBJECT: Siemens Power Corporation
Report on the Response to the Fire on April 15, 1998

Attached is Draft #1 for the Report on the Response to the Fire and ALERT Classification on April 15, 1998 at the Siemens Power Corporation.

We would like you to review the draft concerning the events of the fire and ALERT classification. It is important to us that all information in this document is represented accurately. Please submit any comments to my attention by June 12, 1998.

Your time and support in reviewing this document is appreciated. If you have any questions, please call me at (360) 236-3271

cc: Tom Probasco, Siemens

✓ Charles Hackney, NRC

Terry Hobbs, BCEM

Linda Burton-Ramsey, EMD

Mailian Uphaus, EMD

Glen Woodbury, EMD

John Erickson, DOH

Al Conklin, DOH

Terry Frazee, DOH

Debra McBaugh, DOH

Dick Cowley, DOH

Al Danielson, DOH

Annie Grumbles, DOH

John Martell, DOH

John Schmidt, DOH

SIEMENS

November 21, 1997
LB/TCP:160:97

RECEIVED
NOV 24 1997
D.O.H. NUCLEAR SAFETY

Mr. Richard Cowley
Washington State Department of Health
Division of Radiation Protection
Airdustrial Park, Building 5, MS 7827
P. O. Box 47827
Olympia, WA 98504-7827

Dear Mr. Cowley:

Subject: Response to Field Exercise Concerns

Siemens Power Corporation (SPC) was notified by Mr. Leo Wainhouse that you had some concerns with regard to our last field exercise held on October 29, 1997. I am the Emergency Preparedness Coordinator for SPC and I would like to address your concerns so that there is no misunderstanding about our emergency program.

Problem #1:

You "could get no verification from the Emergency Management Division (EMD) that they were notified by Siemens as it appears they should have been, by procedure."

Answer:

According to the notes taken by our SPC phone notification monitors at the time of the exercise, we called the Emergency Management Division two times. At 1435 hrs. Mary Heilman (SPC) called EMD and talked to David Irwin. She indicated in her notes that he had difficulty in finding the correct forms on which to take down the information. When the exercise terminated, Mary Heilman again called David Erwin at 1451 hrs. informing him the exercise was over.

Problem #2:

"When we were notified of the drill on October 31 (sic), it was a HazMat scenario, therefore, according to this table, the Division of Radiation Protection (DRP) should not have been notified."

Siemens Power Corporation

Nuclear Division
Engineering & Manufacturing

2101 Horn Rapids Road
P.O. Box 130
Richland, WA 99352-0130

Tel: (509) 375-8100
Fax: (509) 375-8402

Answer:

You are correct; the SPC notification monitors inadvertently called all the agencies on the list and did not note the distinction that DRP should only be called during radiological events.

Problem #3:

"The table in EMF-32, Part II gives a different priority for notification than does Procedure 3.0 in EMF-32, Part I. The table also does not provide any indication of the required timeframe for notifying the various agencies."

Answer:

There was never any intent to list the agencies in EMF-32 Part I, Chapter 3 and EMF-32 Part II in any specific order or priority. We have multiple people calling the different agencies at the same time and we felt listing the agencies in the same order or in a special priority was not necessary. However, during the next Emergency Plan update this can be done. As for the required timeframe for notifying the various agencies, this table you refer to (EMF-32, Part II, Section 1.3.5) notes that these "notifications are to be immediate (<1 hour)."

Problem #4:

"Notifying DRP via 206-NUCLEAR is redundant notification if WAEMD is notified as required by procedures. EMD should notify DRP if they are notified of a rad event at Siemens".

Answer:

Our last contact with the State on requirements for notifying the various State agencies as required in our Emergency Plan was about two years ago. At that time we were told to individually notify all agencies because the State did not have an internal call down system to notify all the State agencies from one central number. Also we are still required to follow State Regulation WAC 246-221-250, which requires that "notwithstanding other requirements for notification, each licensee and/or registrant shall immediately (as soon as possible, but no later than four hours after discovery of an incident) notify the State Department of Health, Division of Radiation Protection by telephone (206/682-5327)" of specific radiological incidences as noted in the regulations. That phone number is the 206-NUCLEAR emergency number.

Problem #5:

"Reg. Guide 3.67 requires the facility to invite participation by State and local agencies in the biennial exercises. To the best of my recollection, this is the first time that we have been notified of a drill by Siemens."

Answer:

Reg. Guide 3.67 requires in Section 7.3.1, Biennial Exercise, that we "ensure that an exercise will be held biennially and that offsite response organizations will be invited to participate in the biennial exercise in order to exercise coordination with offsite assistance organizations, including testing procedures and equipment for notifying and communicating with local and State agencies." We have interpreted this section to mean that the Richland Fire Department and the Benton County Emergency Management are our offsite response organizations who are invited to participate in the site exercise, while the State agencies (because of their inability to respond in time to our plant site before an incident would typically be resolved) are among their agencies we would be practicing the notification procedures with. However, since we send the USNRC a copy of the scenario 60 days before the exercise with an invitation to participate, we would also be happy to do the same with the WAEMD, if that is the correct lead agency to invite.

Problem #6:

"Reg. Guide 3.67 also requires the facility to perform quarterly communications drills. Again, I cannot recall any communications drills with us from Siemens. There may have been some instances where they have verified the 206-NUCLEAR number as being still correct, but no communications drills like the ones we hold WNP-2 to, where the State and locals are contacted and the information on a CNF is transmitted to the recipient to "verify understanding" as required in NUREG-0654."

Answer:

NUREG-0654 stipulates the criteria used for the preparation and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans and preparedness in support of nuclear power plants. SPC is not a nuclear power plant and the criteria that the State holds WNP-2 to are not appropriate for us. Reg. Guide 3.67 requires in Section 7.3.2, Quarterly Communication Checks, that we "ensure that checks are conducted with offsite response organizations each quarter to verify and update all necessary telephone numbers." This quarterly communication check is performed by our Security personnel. They call other nearby facilities (EMF-32, Part II, Section 1.3.2), offsite assistance (Section 1.3.4) and other contacts (Section 1.3.5). We are not required by Reg. Guide 3.67 to conduct quarterly communication drills; currently we conduct our communication drills as part of the biennial exercise.

Even though we have written our Emergency Plan to comply with the majority of Reg. Guide 3.67, we have deviated in some minor aspects because of site-specific requirements. Regulatory guides are just that, guides and not regulations. The NRC has reviewed SPC's Emergency Plan extensively over the last several years and has found no deficiencies with our written program.

Mr. Richard Cowley
November 21, 1997

LB/TCP:160:97
Page 4

I hope I have addressed your concerns about our emergency preparedness capabilities. If you have any additional comments, please contact me directly at (509) 375-8193.

Very truly yours,



T. C. Probasco, Manager
Safety

/mah

cc: Mr. Leo Wainhouse
Washington State Department of Health
Division of Radiation Protection
Airdustrial Park, Building 5, MS 7827
P. O. Box 47827
Olympia, WA 98504-7827

**Report on the
Response to the Fire
on April 15, 1998
at the Siemens Power Corporation
Richland, Washington**

Prepared By

**Washington Department of Health
Division of Radiation Protection**

DRAFT #1

May 29, 1998

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SIEMENS POWER CORPORATION

Fire and ALERT Declaration

April 15, 1998

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Siemens Power Corporation – Nuclear Division Engineering and Manufacturing Facility- is a nuclear fuel fabrication facility located on Horns Rapid Road in Richland, Washington. During testing of the fire alarm system on April 15, 1998 a Fire Protection Engineer noticed an alarm from the UO₂ Facility. Upon investigation, at approximately 0806 it was verified that a fire had broken out in a 4-ft x 4-ft waste sorting basket filled with vinyl gloves and paper in the hot radioactive maintenance shop of the UO₂ Facility. Richland Fire Department (RFD) was notified and responded in 11 minutes. The fire was extinguished.

The UO₂ Building houses the majority of the fuel fabrication activities. Enriched uranium is stored in a specially controlled area prior to being made into fuel pellets. If a moderator such as water surrounds the uranium, the quantity of thermal (slow) neutrons may increase, in turn, increasing the possibility of a criticality accident. To prevent this potential hazard, water was applied sparingly to the waste sorting basket before it was removed from the building. The low-level waste began to smolder and flare again. A tarp was put on the ground and the basket placed on top of it. RFD applied water, soaking the contents of the waste-sorting basket.

The event was classified as an ALERT at 0818. The Fire was extinguished by 0823 and the event was declassified at 0833. The ALERT classification and declassification notification were verbally given to Benton County at 0850. The Washington State Emergency Management Division (EMD) Duty Officer received notification from Siemens at 0859.

The Washington Department of Health's (DOH) Emergency Response Duty Officer (ERDO) received notification of the event from the EMD Duty Officer at approximately 0920. Information given to DOH indicated the event was "an Emergency ALERT DOE - RL in the UO₂ Building."

DOH also received notification from the 206-NUCLEAR line via the answering service at the same time. Information from the answering service identified the location as the UO₂ Building. There was no facility (i.e. Siemens Power Corporation or US Department of Energy -RL) identified, only an address. Susan May, Nuclear Safety Section Supervisor (NSS), Mike Robertson (NSS DOE Program Manager), John Erickson (Radiation Protection Division Director), and Al Conklin (Air Emissions Section Supervisor) were notified of "an Emergency ALERT at DOE-RL in the UO₂ Building."

There was some additional confusion about both notifications when a copy of the notification form was received by fax. The EMD Duty Officer who took the notification from Siemens used a Supply System Classification Notification Form (CNF) because no Siemens Incident Notification Form was available. He crossed out Supply System's name and wrote "Siemens" in red ink at the top of the page. It should be noted that the red ink was not picked up by the fax.

As the ERDO was informing John Erickson of the situation, Al Conklin came over with information that he had just received a call from the NRC Region IV office. The fire was at Siemens, not the Supply System or DOE. Conklin had the details and updated Erickson and the ERDO.

Terry Frazee (Radioactive Materials Section Supervisor) was briefed of the incident, as Siemens is a Radioactive Materials licensee.

Three DOH Radiation Health Physicists stationed in Richland (Al Danielson, John Schmidt, and John Martell) were dispatched to Siemens to follow up on the event.

Siemens reported to DOH that no offsite release was believed to have occurred. Dan Noss of Siemens reported that they had monitoring teams taking samples, including air samples. The survey of Richland Fire Department personnel found one boot with 400 dpm alpha. No other contamination above background was found. A survey of the controlled area indicated one spot, 1200 dpm/100 cm². This area was decontaminated and the controlled area released. The area above the door and the roof were surveyed and were found less than 200 dpm/100 cm². Analysis of Siemens' sample results confirms no significant releases of radioactive contaminants. (Report not yet available).

II. DESCRIPTION OF RESPONSE ACTIVITIES TO SIEMENS ALERT ON APRIL 15, 1998

Time	Event
0806	Fire Alarm sounds in UO ₂ Building at Siemens Power Corp. (Siemens) while fire alarms are being tested.
0806	Siemens calls Benton County 911 to request fire assistance
0818	Fire classified in accordance with Siemens procedures as ALERT
0823	Fire Out
~0830	Richland Fire Chief calls Terry Hobbs, Benton County Emergency Management to inform her of a small fire at Siemens, in UO ₂ Building

- 0833 ALERT is reclassified as "ALERT Over" on same INF as the ALERT notification.
- 0850 Siemens verbally notifies Benton County Emergency Management of the ALERT.
- ~0850 Siemens gives verbal notification to Allied Technical Group, Department of Energy's Occurrence Notification Center, and Czebotar Farms
- 0859 EMD Duty Officer receives verbal notification of ALERT from Siemens. No INF was sent or faxed.
- 0900 Siemens sends a fax of their INF to Benton County
- 0917 DOH ERDO paged by answering service
- 0920 206-NUCLEAR line rings while dialing answering service; EMD duty officer notifies Department of Health ERDO of "an Emergency ALERT at DOE-RL in the UO₂ Building." The point of contact at Siemens was Christine Kragcik.
- 0924 ERDO called answering service – received similar notification – but the answering service did not identify the initiator of the ALERT.
- 0926 ERDO notifies Health Staff in accordance with *Department of Health Response Procedures for Radiation Emergencies* procedures: Susan May, Mike Robertson, John Erickson. Al Conklin
- 0926 Faxed Notification Form of ALERT (stamped 0826), received by DOH on Supply System Incident Notification Form.
- 0951 Benton County receives fax of the notification from EMD on Supply System Incident Notification Form.
- ~1000 Al Conklin receives notification from Linda McClean of the NRC Region IV office concerning the Siemens ALERT.
- 1004 Southeast Communications Center (Benton County Dispatch) receives fax from Siemens.
- 1010 Al Conklin advises John Erickson and Anine Grumbles that, according to the NRC, the ALERT is at Siemens, not at Supply System or DOE-RL.
- ~1020 Anine Grumbles (ERDO) briefs Terry Frazee of sequence of events.
- 1030 Al Conklin assigns Richland staff to investigate the incident on scene.

- 1030 The ERDO calls the EMD Duty Officer to advise them of the information received from the NRC.
- ~1100 Debra McBaugh (Environmental Section Supervisor) calls Al Danielson to join John Schmidt and John Martell to represent the environmental section on the incident follow-up at Siemens.
- 1215 DOH receives a copy of Siemens Incident Notification Form with the ALERT as well as a blank form.
- ~1300 The DOH Health Physicists from the Richland Office arrive at Siemens to follow-up on the incident.

III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Issue #1: Improper Notification Form sent to Department of Health and Benton County

EMD Duty Officer used a Supply System CNF (Classification Notification Form) to notify DOH and Benton County. To indicate that it was not actually a Supply System event, Supply System was crossed out and Siemens written in red ink at the top of the page. The red ink was not picked up by the fax machine. Neither the EMD Duty Officer nor Benton County Dispatch was aware of a specific notification form for Siemens. Blank copies were not available for recording notification information.

Recommendation: There is no formal protocol in place between Siemens and Emergency Management or the Department of Health for receiving classified emergency notifications. The State and Benton County should work with Siemens to develop/improve procedures for notification of events at Siemens. Duty Officers should be trained concerning Siemens classifications and their Notification Forms.

Copies of blank Incident Notification Forms should be readily available to State duty officers and county staff by Siemens

Issue #2: Department of Health received inconsistent information during the verbal emergency notification.

There were two EMD Duty Officers at the time of the incident. The duty officer who initially notified the ERDO via phone announced that there was "an Emergency ALERT at DOE-RL in the UO₂ Building." This information was apparently inconsistent with the information written down by the second duty officer who noted that this was a Siemens event. The supervisor of the EMD duty officers was also told it was a DOE event.

Recommendation:

Emergency Management should take actions to prevent future occurrences. EMD Duty Officers should receive training on the Siemens notification form, as well as for handling notification for classified emergencies from any other facilities within the State of Washington with a potential for reporting a radiological incident.

Issue #3: Timeliness and Sequence of Notification

Benton County received verbal notification from Siemens 32 minutes after the classification of the ALERT. Siemens Power Corporation faxes notification form to Benton County 42 minutes after classification. (The Duty Officer did not request a hard copy of the INF).

Washington Emergency Management (EMD) received verbal notification from Siemens 41 minutes after the classification of ALERT. The Duty Officer did not request a hard copy of the Incident Notification Form.

EMD verbally notifies the Department of Health 66 minutes after the classification of the ALERT (21 minutes after they received notification). EMD faxes notification form to DOH (on WNP-2 form) 73 minutes after the ALERT classification (32 minutes after EMD is notified).

Discussion:

Siemens Power Corporation Emergency Plan, Part I, Section 3.0, *Classification and Notification of Accidents* provides no guidance as to time requirements for notifying offsite agencies. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) 1.1, *Classifying an Emergency* and 4.2, *Incident Notification Worksheet - Offsite Agencies* also do not indicate any time requirements. The only location where time requirements for notification can be found is in Part II, *Quick Reference Guide*. Section 1.3.5 of this guide indicates that Seimen Power Corporation's interpretation of "immediate notifications" is less than 1 hour.

US NRC Regulatory Guide (RegGuide) 3.67, *Standard Format and Content for Emergency Plans for Fuel Cycle and Materials Facilities*, Section C, items 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 recommend that notifications be made "normally within 15 minutes of declaring an Alert/Site Area Emergency". The NRC has approved Siemens' plan and procedures with the 1 hour time requirement.

The county is responsible for the timely protection of residents and must therefore receive notification of any emergency in a timely manner so that appropriate protective measures may be evaluated and implemented. One concern is a daycare facility located approximately 1.25 miles from Siemens, who may not have the capability to evacuate.

The State of Washington's Department of Health, Division of Radiation Protection (DRP), the State's lead response agency for radiological emergencies, feels that the 1 hour allowance for notification needs review because it may not provide adequate notification to permit necessary offsite protective actions to be implemented, especially in the event of a release of hazardous materials.

Recommendation: Siemens Power Corporation should meet with Benton County and State representatives to discuss notification time requirements and prioritize notifications. DOH will work with Siemens and the NRC to see if the time requirement for notification of offsites to that indicated in RegGuide 3.67 is adequate and if greater emphasis on notifying Benton County and Siemens site neighbors within that 15 minute time frame is necessary. The State and the NRC can be notified after the county and the site neighbors.

Issue #4: The answering service for Nuclear Safety did not obtain clear information.

The answering service for Nuclear Safety (*The Call Center*) did not obtain the name of the facility and Siemens Power Corporation did not clearly identify themselves to *The Call Center* operator. Siemens Security staff may have assumed that they were talking to a Department of Health employee when delivering the information to the answering service. *The Call Center* also did not fax information regarding the call the following day, as requested.

(Note: the point of contact listed by the answering service, Peggy Green, is a different person than the point of contact listed on the CNF sent by Emergency Management.)

Recommendation: Nuclear Safety should revise the answering service procedures to clarify the instructions and include all requests in writing. The section should further train the *Call Center* staff on the procedures and on obtaining essential information.

Issue #5: Siemens Power Corporation did not clearly identify itself to DOH

Siemens did not clearly identify themselves as Siemens Power Corporation when the ERDO called to verify information concerning the ALERT. "Security" was their only acknowledgment, upon answering the phone. This added to the mix-up about the location of the fire. The ERDO had to request the identity of the facility responding as "Security."

Recommendation: Siemens staff performing notifications or taking incoming calls should clearly identify themselves. Siemens and Department of Health should work together to coordinate our notification methods so that the communication process works efficiently and effectively. Participation in communication drills and other drills and exercises would improve effectiveness.

Conclusion:

On April 20, 1998, at 13:51 Jack Horner of the Walnut Creek office of the NRC faxed a photo of the damaged exit sign to Department of Health staff in the Richland Office.

On April 22, 1998, at approximately 10:00 am, Rich Berklund (SPC) advised DOH that a tritium exit sign had melted during the fire. It was determined from procurement records that the sign was 15 years old and should have had a current activity of ~5.16 Ci. The room volume was calculated to be 10,080 Cu.Ft. The concentration of the room was calculated to be 1.8 E-2 uCi/ml . Using a dilution factor from P-Screen of 1862 and assuming that it was all released at one time, the concentration at the fence was calculated to have been ~1 E-5 uCi/ml.

Many of the issues arising from the April 15 ALERT occurred due to a lack of understanding of each other's emergency response protocols and responsibilities.

In order to ensure adequate protection of the health and safety of the public, Washington Emergency Management, the State's lead planning agency for emergency preparedness, should coordinate a planning meeting with all affected agencies to gain a better understanding of each other's capabilities, responsibilities, and needs. The session should also identify areas where specific plans and procedures should be revised so that they can be integrated with each other.

Building trust will help all of us to better handle future emergencies. Smoothing out the communication and notification processes should be the first step.

29 '98 8:38

1234 THE CALL CENTER

P. 1

THE CALL CENTER
MESSAGE RETRIEVAL 7059AMTELCO PC-MX
Wed 29-Apr-98 08:18a

509 375 8171

NAME.....: PEGGY GREEN
PHONE W/AREA CODE...: 502*076*8171
LOCATION/ADDRESS OF CALLER:
2101 HORN RAPIDS RD IN RICHLAND 99352
TYPE OF EMERGENCY: 4/15 @ 0132
4/15 @ 0833 ALERT OVER ER ALERT
CLASSIFICATION-FIRE EXPLOSION-SMOKE
DETECTED UO2 BLDG HOT RADIOACTIVE MAIN
SHOP REPORTEDLY INVOLVED RADIOACTIVE
FLAMES OUT AT 0823. RELEASE IS NOT
EXPECTED. FIRE DEPT REQUESTED. STABLE
PAR FOR OFFSIGHT N/A BASIS IS PLANT

Wed 15-Apr-98 09:04a LMP TAKEN
Wed 15-Apr-98 09:07a LMP PAGED
SERVICE 1
TOTAL CALLOUTS: 1
Wed 15-Apr-98 09:14a LMP DELIVERED

NAME.....: CONDITIONS PA IN EFFECTIVE
PHONE W/AREA CODE...: BLDG EVACUATIONS
LOCATION/ADDRESS OF CALLER:
UO2 AND DRY CONVERSION FACILITIES.
TYPE OF EMERGENCY:

Wed 15-Apr-98 09:05a LMP TAKEN
Wed 15-Apr-98 09:14a LMP DELIVERED


**WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER
SUPPLY SYSTEM**
CLASSIFICATION NOTIFICATION FORM (CNF) No.
1 NOTIFICATION PROVIDED BY: Name Christine Kragcik Phone No. 509 375-8350
2 FACILITY: WNP-2 **3** TYPE OF EVENT a. ☒ Emergency b. ☐ Exercise/Drill

4 CLASSIFICATION/STATUS

- a.
- ☒
-
- b.
- ☐
-
- c.
- ☐
-
- d.
- ☐
-
- e.
- ☐

Classification/Status	Date	Time
Initial Classification	4-15-98	0818
Reclassification	4-15-98	0833
Termination		
PAR Changes/Additions		
Information		

5 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL AND RECOMMENDED PROTECTIVE ACTIONS:

a. <input type="checkbox"/> UNUSUAL EVENT No offsite protective actions recommended c. <input type="checkbox"/> SITE AREA EMERGENCY Automatic Protective Action Recommendations EVACUATE: • Columbia River • Horn Rapids Recreation Area/ORV Park • Ringold Fishing Area • Wahluke Hunting Area • Schools in EPZ	b. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ALERT No offsite protective actions recommended d. <input type="checkbox"/> GENERAL EMERGENCY Automatic Protective Action Recommendations EVACUATE: • Columbia River • Horn Rapids Recreation Area/ORV Park • Ringold Fishing Area • Wahluke Hunting Area • Schools in EPZ Select the following additional PARs: Note: The minimum PAR is Shelter All Sections 0-2 Miles and 10 Miles Downwind.
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
1. All Sections (0-2 Miles)
☐ Shelter
☐ Evacuate

4. State criteria met for administering KI
☐

2. Shelter (2-10 Miles)
☐ Section 1
☐ Section 2
☐ Section 3
☐ FTF
☐ Section 4

3. Evacuate (2-10 Miles)
☐ Section 1
☐ Section 2
☐ Section 3
☐ FTF
☐ Section 4

5. Basis for PARs
☐ Radiological ☐ Plant ☐ Security


6 TYPE(S) OF INCIDENT a. ☒ Fire/Explosion c. ☐ Radiological e. ☐ Electrical g. ☐ Other
 EAL # _____ b. ☐ Reactor System Problem d. ☐ Security f. ☐ Hazardous Materials

DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT: (Please provide enough detail for understanding)

Smoke detected in UO2 Building Hot Radioactive Maintenance
Shed reportedly involved. Wire baskets of low level radioactive waste
Flames reportedly out @ 0823 AM.
7 Offsite Release Information:

- a.
- ☒
- No Release Estimated start time of release _____
-
- b.
- ☐
- Release
-
- ☐
- Airborne Assumed duration of release _____
-
- ☐
- Waterborne
-
- c.
- ☐
- Release Terminated

8 Meteorological Data:

Wind Speed _____ mph

Wind Direction: from _____

 Precipitation: ☐ Yes ☐ No

Stability Classification:

☐ A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ G

9 Offsite Assistance Responding: (to site)

- a.
- ☐
- None d.
- ☐
- Law Enforcement
-
- b.
- ☐
- Ambulance e.
- ☐
- Other _____
-
- c.
- ☒
- Fire

10 Prognosis of Situation:

- a.
- ☐
- Unknown c.
- ☐
- Escalating
-
- b.
- ☒
- Stable d.
- ☐
- Improving

EMERGENCY DIRECTOR Approval Signature for release of this CNF:

Print Name

Signature

SIEMENS**Siemens Power Corporation****Fax****To** Anina Grumbles**Date** 04/15/98**Time in** 11:41 AM**Pages to follow** 4**Company** WDOH**From** D.L. Noss**Dept. or Radiation Protection****Telephone** 509-375-8380 **MB**☐ **Original to be mailed** ☒ **Via fax only****Receiving fax** 360-236-2255**Sending fax** 509-375-8345**Telephone** 360-236-3273**Fax verification****Extra distribution to****Message****Ms. Grumbles,**

As you requested, here is a copy of SPC's notification form for today's incident. Also included is a blank copy of the form.

Should you have any questions, please feel free to give me a call.

This facsimile transmission is intended only for the individual(s) named above. It may contain information which is legally privileged, confidential, or otherwise protected from disclosure by law. Any use of this transmission by individuals other than those named above is strictly prohibited. If you receive this transmission in error, please call the fax verification number above immediately, and mail the original transmission to us at the address set forth below. Thank you.

Siemens Power Corporation
Nuclear Division Headquarters
Engineering & Manufacturing
PO Box 130, 2101 Horn Rapids Road
Richland, WA 99352-0130
Tel: (509) 375-8100

Operator _____
Log No _____ **Time Sent** _____

EMF-32, Part III
Revision 2

SIEMENS POWER CORPORATION, NUCLEAR DIVISION, EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES
 NUMBER: 4.1 REV: 1
 SECTION: NOTIFICATION
 TITLE: INCIDENT NOTIFICATION FORM

DATE: July 85

SIEMENS POWER CORPORATION INCIDENT NOTIFICATION FORM, Number: 11. This is (name) Richard J. [unclear], at phone _____

2. Of the Siemens Power Corp. facility in Richland.

3. We have an event that is an: a. ☒ Actual emergency, b. ☐ Exercise.

4. The date and time of this classification status is:

Classification Status

- a. ☒ Initial classification
 b. ☒ Reclassification
 c. ☐ Termination
 d. ☐ PAR change only

Date4/8Time(24 hr)08180833 [unclear] over

5. The emergency classification is:

a. ☒ (Unusual Event - not used)b. ☒ Alertc. ☐ Site Area Emergency [PAR required]d. ☐ (General Emergency - not used)e. ☐ Nonef. ☐ Not yet classifiedg. ☐ HazMat Level 2 [PAR required]h. ☐ HazMat Level 3 [PAR required]

6. The type of incident is:

a. ☒ Fire/explosionb. ☐ Radiological release/exposurec. ☐ Criticality (potential/actual)d. ☐ Hazardous materials release/exposuree. ☐ System problemsf. ☐ Electricalg. ☐ Securityh. ☐ Other

Description of Incident: [Include, as applicable, information on chemicals/
 radionuclide(s) involved, physical form of released material(s), quantity/rate of release,
 Emergency Action Levels (EALs) pertinent to event classification.]

Smoke detected in UO₂ Bldg Unit (radioactive) maintenance
Shop - reportedly involved wire basket of low level
radioactive waste - flames reportedly out at 8²³ a.m.

EMF-32, Part III
Revision 2SIEMENS POWER CORPORATION, NUCLEAR DIVISION, EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES
NUMBER: 4.1 REV: 1
SECTION: NOTIFICATION
TITLE: INCIDENT NOTIFICATION FORM

DATE: July 95

7. A release:
a. ☒ Is not expected.
b. ☐ May start/started at (time) _____ and may last for _____ hours.
c. ☐ Has been terminated.
8. The weather:
Wind speed approximately _____ mph; direction from _____, to _____.
Precipitation: ☐ Yes, ☐ None.
9. Offsite assistance requested is:
a. ☐ None c. ☒ Fire e. ☐ Other: _____
b. ☐ Ambulance d. ☐ Law enforcement _____
10. The prognosis of the situation is:
a. ☐ Unknown b. ☒ Stable c. ☐ Escalating d. ☐ Improving
11. The Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) for offsite is:
a. ☐ Shelter in the 1 Mi Zone (and): _____
b. ☐ Evacuate the 1 Mi Zone (and): _____
c. ☒ Not applicable
12. The basis for this PAR is:
a. ☒ Plant conditions d. ☐ Other _____
b. ☐ Radiological conditions e. ☐ Not applicable
c. ☐ Hazardous chemicals
13. Protective Actions in effect onsite are:
a. ☐ Partial shelter, areas: _____
b. ☐ Site-wide shelter
c. ☒ Building evacuations, buildings: UO₂ and Dry Conversion Facility
d. ☐ Site-wide evacuation
e. ☐ None

Authorized By: B. J. Bentley

Plant Emergency Director

4/15/98

Date

0832

Time

DOH: John Schmidt & John Martell (Air Emissions) Allen Danielson (Environmental)

Contacts at Siemens: Lorin Maus Edward Foster 509-375-8389 (Gave us the information)

- Accident description

During the testing of fire alarm system, a Fire Protection Engineer noticed alarm from UO_2 . Sent someone to investigate (5 min.). They noticed fire coming from the UO_2 Facility. Richland Fire Department was notified (11-min. response time).

Cause of smoke was a burning 4-ft X 4 ft waste sorting basket filled with vinyl gloves and paper. RFD setup fan to blow fresh air into the room. Most of the air was exhausted out the stack. A small amount escaped through the open door. Two gooseneck samplers were setup and samples were collected. A control area was established.

Fire was extinguished and due to a moderator hazard near the room, the waste sorting basket was moved out of the building. At this point it was smoldering and began to flare. RFD applied water soaking the contents of the waste-sorting basket.

Survey of RFD found one boot with 400 dpm alpha. No other contamination above background was found.

Survey of the control area indicated one spot, 1200 dpm/100 cm^2 . This area was decontaminated and the control area released.

The area above the door and the roof were surveyed and were found less than 200 dpm/100 cm^2 .

- Preliminary Sample Data

Effluent Data K-37 Stack

1 min. count	(Stack concentration)	1.1 E-12 $\mu Ci/ml$
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Estimated fence line concentration		1.3 E-15 $\mu Ci/ml$
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Room air from fire

Counted twice, no change		1.7 E-11 $\mu Ci/ml$
--------------------------	--	----------------------

Two goose neck samples from outside room		7.1 E-12 $\mu Ci/ml$
--	--	----------------------

A conference call was held between NRC and Siemens at 1200.

Chuck Hooker and Debra Seymour of NRC were at Siemens at the time of the occurrence doing and inspection. Talked with Chuck Hooker and offered DOH services, if needed.

Siemens will provide DOH updated information/data within the next three days.

To: "McBaugh, Debra"
Cc: "Conklin, Al"
From: Danielson, Al
Subject: Siemens Fire
Date: 4/16/98 Time: 8:20AM

April 15th, 1998

Debra:

I accompanied Conklin's Richland staff to Siemens for a meeting with Jim Edgar, Loren Maas and Ed Foster concerning their recent fire.

It appears the facility damage is minimal and estimated release of radioactive material, based on routine and emergency air samples, is less than the DAC for Uranium. Initial Uranium air concentrations were all less than 2 E-11 uCi/ml and the fence line concentration is estimated to be 1E-15 uCi/ml. All air samples were counted for 1 minute and would most likely contain activity from Radon since they were not decayed.

Siemens staff indicate the Fire Department tried to use as little water as possible because of criticality concerns. They carried the smoldering debris from the building to the outside area where it was extinguished. There is a possibility some of the smoke contained Uranium particulate but any release would have been small. They were going to take smears of soot deposits inside the building to get an idea what may have been in the smoke.

Contamination levels were very low. One of the emergency workers boots had 400 dpm/100 cm² from carrying the smoldering debris outside and a spot approximately 1200 dpm/100cm² was found on the asphalt inside the emergency exclusion area. All other equipment and personnel were surveyed with no contamination detected.

Siemens staff indicate they are preparing an internal report which they will make available upon request. Conklin's staff has requested the air data and some of the radiological surveys.

At this point, I see no reason to initiate any special environmental followup. Any environmental surveys taken in this area would most likely indicate residual Uranium contamination from natural sources as well as past Siemens and Hanford practices.

Please call if you have any questions.

Thanks

Allan Danielson
Environmental Radiation Section
Richland (509) 377-3870

