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 SORESENSEN, G.C. Washington Public Power Supply System
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SUBJECT: Responds to IE Bulletin 88-005, Suppl 1, re nonconforming
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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

P.O. Box 968 • 3000 George Washington Way • Richland, Washington 99352

G02-88-194
September 9, 1988

Docket No. 50-397

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Mail Station P1-137
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Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2
RESPONSE TO IE BULLETIN 88-05, NONCONFORMING MATERIALS

Reference: IEB 88-05 Supplement 2, Dated August 3, 1988

In response to the subject IEB, the Supply System initiated an intensive program of records review, testing and analysis. The reference supplement allowed cessation of that effort effective August 3, 1988 and requested that the 120 day reporting requirements of the original bulletin be completed. Accordingly the attached report provides this information.

Very truly yours,


G. C. Sorensen, Manager
Regulatory Programs

PLP:lw

Attachment

cc: JB Martin - NRC RV
RB Samworth - NRC
DL Williams - BPA/399
NRC Site Inspector - 901A
NS Reynolds - BCP&R

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STATE OF WASHINGTON)
)
COUNTY OF BENTON)

Subject: IEB Response 88-05

I, G. C. Sorensen, being duly sworn, subscribe to and say that I am the Manager, Regulatory Programs for the WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM, the applicant herein; that I have full authority to execute this oath; that I have reviewed the foregoing; and that to the best of my knowledge, information and belief the statements made in it are true.


DATE 9 SEPT, 1988



G. C. Sorensen, Manager
Regulatory Programs

On this day personally appeared before me G. C. Sorensen to me known to be the individual who executed the foregoing instrument and acknowledged that he signed the same as his free act and deed for the uses and purposes herein mentioned.

GIVEN under my hand and seal this 9th day of September 1988.



Notary Public in and for the STATE
OF WASHINGTON

Residing at Richland, WA.
Dec 89.

ATTACHMENT

1. IEB 88-05: "Provide a list of the WJM- and PSI-supplied materials that are found not to be in conformance with the applicable code requirements or procurement specifications and identify the applications in which the materials are used. Include the material specification, the nature of the component (e.g., pipe flange), size, and pressure rating; also indicate the chain of purchase."

Response: As of August 3, 1988 one fitting in the plant was found to be nonconforming: A 10 inch blind flange, 300 lb, material type SA 105, heat number 473U, ASME Code Class 2, manufactured by WJM, purchased for use by the WNP-2 major mechanical contractor WBG from supplier, Gulfalloy Inc., (MTR date, June 19, 1981) and final field inspected December 13, 1982.

This flange provides a leak tight boundary when the Fuel Pool Cooling/Residual Heat Removal cross tie spool piece is removed. The flange is isolated from containment by two isolation valves. The line the flange connects to is used only when the reactor is shutdown. The flange has no specific safety function. A justification for continued operation has been completed for the flange verifying acceptability for interim operation. The replacement is scheduled for no later than the next refueling outage, spring, 1989.

The following table identifies additional material from the WNP-2 warehouse found to be nonconforming as of August 3, 1988 using the methodology and acceptance criteria described below in response to item 2. This material has been removed from stock and is in a "quality hold" status awaiting disposition, and as such is not available for use. The material, all SA 105, was initially purchased for use by the WNP-2 major mechanical contractor WBG, passed on by Bechtel (WNP-2 Construction Manager) to the Supply System upon construction completion.

<u>Quality</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Heat Number</u>	<u>CMTR Date</u>	<u>Supplier</u>
3	10", 300 lb, RF, Blind Flange	473U	6/19/81	Liberty
19	1", Sch 80, 300 lb, RF, Weld Neck	32D	11/2/81	Liberty
1	6", 900 lb, RF Blind Flange	473U	9/24/81	Liberty
3	1½", Sch 80, 300 lb, RF, Weld Neck	M1624	11/2/81	Liberty
1	4", Sch 80, 150 lb, RF, Weld Neck	GDCH	3/5/82	Guyon
3	½", 150 lb, RF, Blind Flange	J82D	7/7/80	Liberty
3	3/4", Sch 80, 150 lb, RF Socket Weld	64C	11/2/81	Liberty



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2. IEB 88-05: "Take actions that provide assurance that all received materials comply with ASME Code Section III, ASTM, and applicable procurement specification requirements, or that demonstrate that such materials are suitable for the intended service. For example, this program should include specific verification that austenitic stainless steels have been received in a non-sensitized condition."

Response: In accordance with the agreement established between NUMARC and the NRC staff, WNP-2 has utilized the Equotip hardness tester for Brinell conversion to demonstrate the suitability of materials purchased from WJM and PSI for their intended purpose. By this agreement, confirmation of complete compliance to ASME and ASTM codes was not necessary. A Brinell hardness of 137 minimum per NUMARC recommendation was used for the acceptance criterion. However, for warehouse tested flanges the Supply System used a conservative minimum Brinell value of 141.

Accordingly, as of August 3, 1988 approximately 7000 purchase orders for safety and non-safety related material and all ASME and ANSI B31.1 safety related work packages had been reviewed for WJM and PSI materials. From that effort, no PSI flanges were found and 1225 WJM SA105 flanges were identified by purchase orders. Safety related WJM flanges installed in the plant accounted for 144 flanges with 121 hardness tested in the plant with one having an unacceptable low hardness and 23 determined inaccessible and another 25 left to field verify accessibility or manufacturer source prior to testing. An additional two flanges on a quality class II system found during plant hardness testing were also tested. Hardness testing and some chemical and physical properties verification tests were completed on 304 WJM SA105 flanges in the warehouse with 33 considered failing due to hardness or verification tests of which three would be acceptable based on 137 Brinell hardness and one by tension test. Approximately 139 additional flanges in the warehouse on excess hold were not hardness tested. With only one plant installed safety related flange identified as nonconforming and the NUMARC Generic Analysis conclusion that the WJM flanges do not present a near-term safety concern, reasonable assurance has been provided that the materials installed are suitable for their intended function.

3. IEB 88-05: "Replace all questionable fittings and flanges with materials that have been manufactured in full compliance with ASME Code Section III, ASTM, and the applicable procurement specification requirements."

Response: As stated in the response to 1 above, the one nonconforming safety related flange will be replaced no later than the next refueling outage scheduled for spring 1989.

4. IEB 88-05: "For any PSI- or WJM-supplied materials having suspect CMTRs and used in systems that are not safety-related, take actions commensurate with the function to be performed."

Response: As of August 3, 1988 no suspect CMTRs were specifically identified for PSI- and WJM-supplied materials utilized in non safety-related systems, however two acceptable WJM flanges were hardness tested during plant testing as described in Item 2.

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