

ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8807010046 DOC.DATE: 88/06/21 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397
 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 DAVISON,W.S. Washington Public Power Supply System
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 RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 88-018-00:on 880522,diesel generator inoperable due to
 control power transfer switch in mid-position. W/8 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE:4
 TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL
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INTERNAL:	ACRS MICHELSON	1 1	ACRS MOELLER	2 2
	AEOD/DOA	1 1	AEOD/DSP/NAS	1 1
	AEOD/DSP/ROAB	2 2	AEOD/DSP/TPAB	1 1
	ARM/DCTS/DAB	1 1	DEDRO	1 1
	NRR/DEST/ADS 7E	1 0	NRR/DEST/CEB 8H	1 1
	NRR/DEST/ESB 8D	1 1	NRR/DEST/ICSB 7	1 1
	NRR/DEST/MEB 9H	1 1	NRR/DEST/MTB 9H	1 1
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	NRR/DEST/SGB 8D	1 1	NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10	1 1
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	NRR/DREP/RAB 10	1 1	NRR/DREP/RPB 10	2 2
	NRR/DRIS/SIB 9A	1 1	NUDOCS-ABSTRACT	1 1
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	RGN5 FILE 01	1 1		
EXTERNAL:	EG&G WILLIAMS,S.	4 4	FORD BLDG HOY,A	1 1
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2DOCKET NUMBER (2)
0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 1 OF 0 3TITLE (4)
Emergency Diesel Generator Number Two Inoperable Due to Control Power Transfer Switch
in Mid-Position - Cause Unknown

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)								
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)							
0	5	2	2	8	8	8	8	0	1	8	0	5	0	0	0		
0	5	2	2	8	8	8	8	0	1	8	0	5	0	0	0		

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)															
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0	5	20.402(b)				20.405(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)			
		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)			
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vi)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)			
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)							
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)							

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12):
NAME
W.S. Davison, Compliance EngineerTELEPHONE NUMBER
AREA CODE
5 0 9 3 7 7 1 - 2 5 0 1COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
Ext. 2726

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) ☐ NO ☒
EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)
MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 1012 hours on May 22, 1988, during a panel walkdown, the Control Room Operator (CRO) noted that the green status indicating light for the Division Two Emergency Diesel Generator (DG2) start circuit was not energized. Investigation revealed that the Diesel Generator Control Power Transfer Switch (FRTS-7) located in the Remote Shutdown Room was not in its required position. The switch, a two position GE SB-1 transfer switch, was found in a mid-position between the two active positions "Normal" and "Emergency". Evaluation of the switch design revealed that with the switch in the mid-position, it is highly probable that DG2 would not have responded to a start signal and was inoperable. At this time the Division One Emergency Diesel Generator (DG1) was out of service for modification and Core Alterations were in progress. With both Division One and Division Two Diesel Generators inoperable, the requirements specified in the WNP-2 Technical Specification 3.8.1.2 (Electric Power Systems A.C. Sources - Shutdown) were not complied with. This resulted in the Plant being in a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications. (i.e., less than the minimum required A.C. power sources while shutdown) Diesel Generator Control Power Transfer Switch FRTS-7 was immediately placed in the "Normal" position restoring the green status light indication and DG-2 operability. No definite cause has been established for this event. This LER will be required reading for all licensed operators and all equipment operators at WNP-2. A technical evaluation will be completed to determine if protective barriers should be installed to prevent inadvertent contact with switch FRTS-7. A technical evaluation will be completed to determine if protective barriers should be installed on the Alternate Remote Shutdown Panel. During the shutdown conditions which existed at the time of the event, the primary safety concern was maintenance of water level above the fuel. At no time during this event was there any significant increase in the potential for uncovering the fuel. Therefore this event posed no threat to the safety of Plant personnel or the public.

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PDR ADOCK 05000397

IEDP

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/88

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7	8 8	0 1 8	0 0	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Plant Conditions

- a) Power Level - 0%
- b) Plant Mode - 5 (Refueling)

Event Description

At 1012 hours on May 22, 1988, during a panel walkdown, the Control Room Operator (CRO) noted that the green status indicating light for the Division Two Emergency Diesel Generator (DG2) start circuit was not energized. Investigation revealed that the Diesel Generator Control Power Transfer Switch (FRTS-7) located in the Remote Shutdown Room was not in its required position. The switch, a two position GE SB-1 transfer switch, was found in a mid-position between the two active positions "Normal" and "Emergency". Evaluation of the switch design performed several weeks afterward, revealed that with the switch in the mid-position, it is highly probable that DG2 would not have responded to a start signal and was inoperable. At the time of this event the Division One Emergency Diesel Generator (DG1) was out of service for modification and Core Alterations were in progress. With both Division One and Division Two Diesel Generators inoperable, the requirements specified in the WNP-2 Technical Specification 3.8.1.2 (Electric Power Systems A.C. Sources - Shutdown) were not complied with. This resulted in the Plant being in a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications (i.e., less than the minimum required A.C. power sources while shutdown, during core alterations).

Immediate Corrective Action

Diesel Generator Control Power Transfer Switch FRTS-7 was immediately placed in the "Normal" position restoring the green status light indication and DG-2 operability.

Further Evaluation

1. This event is being reported under the provisions of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a "condition prohibited by the Plant's Technical Specifications".
2. The Division Two Diesel Generator was potentially inoperable for a maximum period of approximately ten hours. This time frame is based upon discussions with the operating crew on shift prior to the point of discovery that claimed Diesel Generator Two to be operable on their shift.
3. No definite cause has been established for this event. A probable cause of switch FRTS-7 being out of position was that it was inadvertently bumped by an Equipment Operator while making his inspection tour of the Remote Shutdown room. The switch is located approximately six inches from the edge of a control panel at waist height. An individual wearing a portable radio in a hip holster can come into contact with the switch when rounding the edge of the panel.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/88

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	0500039788	88	018	00	03	OF	03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

4. The FRTS-7 switch position is annunciated in the Control Room to inform the Operators when the switch is in the "Emergency" position. The mid-position interrupts the circuit for the diesel generator start circuit status and other functions but does not complete the circuit for the annunciator until the switch is positioned completely to "Emergency".

Futher Corrective Action

1. This LER will be required reading for all licensed operators and all equipment operators at WNP-2.
2. A technical evaluation will be completed to determine if protective barriers should be installed to prevent inadvertent contact with switch FRTS-7.
3. A technical evaluation will be completed to determine if protective barriers should be installed on the Alternate Remote Shutdown Panel. This panel is in the same walk path on the operator tour.

Safety Significance

At the time of this event, the Plant was shutdown for refueling with core alterations in progress (Control Rod Drive removal and replacement only). The only action required by Plant Technical Specifications during this instance of inoperability of both Diesel Generators is to suspend core alterations. In the absence of fuel movement, the primary safety concern during shutdown conditions is maintenance of water level above the fuel. This event did not affect core water level. At no time during this event was there any significant increase in the potential for uncovering the fuel. This event posed no threat to the safety of Plant personnel or the public.

Similar Events

None

EIIS InformationText ReferenceEIIS Reference

	System	Component
Diesel Generator One	EB	DG
Diesel Generator Two	EB	DG
Switch FRTS-7	EB	HS
Alternate Remote Shutdown Panel	EB	PL
Control Rod Drive	AA	75

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

P.O. Box 968 • 3000 George Washington Way • Richland, Washington 99352

Docket No. 50-397

June 21, 1988

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 88-018

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 88-018 for the WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

Very truly yours,



C.M. Powers (M/D 927M)
WNP-2 Plant Manager

CMP:lg

Enclosure:
Licensee Event Report No. 88-018

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V
Mr. C.J. Bosted, NRC Site (M/D 901A)
INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA
Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI
Mr. D.L. Williams, BPA (M/D 399)

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