

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8708190262 DOC. DATE: 87/08/13 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #  
 FACIL: 50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397  
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION  
 ARBUCKLE, J. D. Washington Public Power Supply System  
 POWERS, C. M. Washington Public Power Supply System  
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 87-023-00: on 870714, surveillance procedures associated w/electrical protection assemblies not in compliance w/Tech Specs requirements. Caused by personnel error. Rev of test surveillance procedures. W/870813 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 4  
 TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL
	PD5 LA	1 1	PD5 PD	1 1
	SAMWORTH, R	1 1		
INTERNAL:	ACRS MICHELSON	1 1	ACRS MOELLER	2 2
	AEOD/DOA	1 1	AEOD/DSP/NAS	1 1
	AEOD/DSP/ROAB	2 2	AEOD/DSP/TPAB	1 1
	DEDRO	1 1	NRR/DEST/ADS	1 0
	NRR/DEST/CEB	1 1	NRR/DEST/ELB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/ICSB	1 1	NRR/DEST/MEB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/MTB	1 1	NRR/DEST/PSB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/RSB	1 1	NRR/DEST/SGB	1 1
	NRR/DLPQ/HFB	1 1	NRR/DLPQ/QAB	1 1
	NRR/DOEA/EAB	1 1	NRR/DREP/RAB	1 1
	NRR/DREP/RPB	2 2	NRR/PMAS/ILRB	1 1
	REG FILE 02	1 1	RES DEPY GI	1 1
	RES TELFORD, J	1 1	RES/DE/EIB	1 1
	RGN5 FILE 01	1 1		
EXTERNAL:	EG&G GROH, M	5 5	H ST LOBBY WARD	1 1
	LPDR	1 1	NRC PDR	1 1
	NSIC HARRIS, J	1 1	NSIC MAYS, G	1 1



## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 1										PAGE (3) 1 OF 3				
TITLE (4) Reactor Protection System Component Surveillance Procedures Not In Complete Compliance With Plant Technical Specifications Due to Personnel Error																								
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)					REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)													
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES						DOCKET NUMBER(S)									
0	7	1	4	8	7	8	7	0	2	3	0	0	0	8	1	3	8	7	0 5 0 0 0					
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																						
4		20.402(b)					20.405(c)					50.73(a)(2)(iv)					73.71(b)							
POWER LEVEL (10)		0 0 0					20.405(a)(1)(i)					50.73(a)(2)(v)					73.71(c)							
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)					50.73(a)(2)(vi)					50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)					OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)							
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)					50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					50.73(a)(2)(ix)												
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)					50.73(a)(2)(x)																	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)																						
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																								
NAME										TELEPHONE NUMBER														
J.D. Arbuckle, Compliance Engineer										5 0 9 3 7 7 - 2 1 1 5														
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																								
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs														
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)					MONTH		DAY		YEAR					
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO														

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On July 14, 1987, during a review of the test history of Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA) breakers, it was determined that surveillance procedures associated with these breakers did not meet the channel functional testing requirements of WNP-2 Plant Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.4.4.2. The review, which was initiated as a result of a previous event (LER 87-019), concluded that the channel functional test procedures did not fully test the circuit trip functions.

The EPA breaker channel functional test surveillance procedures were revised to meet all testing requirements.

The cause of this event is personnel error due to an oversight by Plant personnel in writing, reviewing and approving a procedure which did not fully meet the channel functional testing requirements.

There is no safety significance associated with this event in that these circuit breakers have functioned as designed during actual operational events.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (4)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	0500039787	87	023	00	2	OF	03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Plant Conditions

- a) Power Level - 0%
- b) Plant Mode - 4 (Cold Shutdown)

Event Description

On July 14, 1987, during a review of the test history of Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA) breakers, it was determined that Plant Surveillance Procedures (PPM 7.4.8.4.4.1, 2, and 3 "Electrical Protection Assemblies Channel Functional Test and Channel Calibration") associated with the breakers did not fully meet the channel functional testing requirements of WNP-2 Plant Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.4.4.2.

The review was initiated as a result of a previous event (LER 87-019 - Reactor Scram due to a full RPS trip caused by component failures), where part of the cause was the loss of RPS, Channel A, due to the tripping of an EPA breaker. These breakers (RPS-EPA-3A, B, C, D, E, and F) are located between the RPS motor-generator sets (A&B) and alternate power supply and the RPS Power Buses A and B. The intent of the review was to evaluate the effectiveness of surveillance testing associated with these breakers. At the completion of the review it was determined that the channel functional test portion of the procedures for the EPA breakers did not actually trip the breakers. As described in the WNP-2 Plant Technical Specification definition of a channel functional test, the test must include the injection of simulated signals to verify operability of the channel, including trip functions and must include all components which comprise the channel.

The channel functional test was performed by injecting a test signal at the electronics input and by using an oscilloscope at an intermediate point to monitor the channel logic state as an indication of breaker trip. The test signal should have been allowed to propagate through the rest of the channel and actually trip the breaker being tested.

The cause of this event is personnel error due to an oversight by Plant personnel who authored, reviewed, and approved these procedures. The author of these procedures relied on a vendor supplied procedure as a guide for writing these procedures, and the procedure as written does appear to perform a channel functional test. Test signals are injected into the trip circuit and a trip signal verified. The procedures author and the reviewers failed to recognize that the trip functions were not actually fully tested. Plant procedures were not the cause of this problem.

Immediate Corrective Action

The channel functional test surveillance procedures for the EPA breakers were revised to include a verification of the trip of the circuit breaker. The revised procedures were performed successfully on July 18, 1987.

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)  Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 8 7	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		0	2	3	0	0	3 OF 0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Further Corrective Action

None

Safety Significance

There is no safety significance associated with this event in that these circuit breakers have functioned as designed during actual operational events. Some examples of recent actuations from real trip signals have been reported in LERs 87-010 and 87-014. This event posed no threat to the health and safety of the Public or Plant personnel.

Similar Events

None

EIIS InformationText ReferenceEIIS Reference

Reactor Protection System (RPS)  
RPS-EPA-3A, B, C, D, E, and F

System

JC  
JC

Component

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BKR



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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

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P.O. Box 968 • 3000 George Washington Way • Richland, Washington 99352

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Docket No. 50-397

August 13, 1987


Document Control Desk  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 87-023

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 87-023 for the WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

Very truly yours,



C.M. Powers (M/D 927M)  
WNP-2 Plant Manager

CMP:ac

Enclosure:  
Licensee Event Report No. 87-023

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V  
Mr. R. T. Dodds, NRC Site (M/D 901A)  
INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA  
Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI  
Mr. D. L. Williams, BPA (M/D 399)

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