

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

P.O. Box 968 • 3000 George Washington Way • Richland, Washington 99352

May 27, 1987  
G02-87-179

Docket No. 50-397

Mr. J. B. Martin  
Regional Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region V  
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210  
Walnut Creek, California 94596

Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2  
LICENSE NO. NPF-21  
NRC INSPECTION REPORT 87-02

Dear Mr. Martin:

The Plant Staff has reviewed the above subject inspection report. Although no response was necessary, I feel their comments provide a timely update on this issue. Many of the items are ready for your review and closure.

Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Very truly yours,

  
G. C. Sorensen  
Regulatory Programs Manager

GCS:lp  
Attachment

cc: R. T. Dodds (NRC) - 901A

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## NRC INSPECTION REPORT 87-02

### 2.B Unresolved Item (50-397/86-25-03) - Allegation File RV-86-A-027-04

The Supply System did not commit to any modification prior to startup from our current refueling outage. The Supply System intends to add one (1) isolation valve during the current outage, since it is inaccessible during operation. The remaining four (4) isolation valves and the proposed sleeving of the buried pipe will start after July 1, 1987. The analysis of the effects of a line break under the Diesel Generator Building has demonstrated no safety significance. It is our intent to complete this work by October 1987, if the work can be executed as our design change currently specifies.

### 2.C Unresolved Item (50-397/86-25-04) - Design Change Packages Appear to Have Required Protection of Additional Safe Shutdown Circuits That Were Not Reported in LER No. 84-031

There have been approximately fifteen (15) Design Change Packages (DCPs) to implement this work (not the 100 reported). We are prepared to demonstrate the correlation between LER concern/fire area/design change package.

### 2.D Unresolved Item (50-397/86-25-05) - Analysis of Safe Shutdown Methodology

- (1) We believe the protection of Division I ADS valves to be adequate for a Control Room fire. Should this reference the Division II ADS valves (as described in Section 3)?
- (2) The Supply System maintains that the closure of the MSIVs from the Control Room is the single most important action to be performed given a fire requiring Control Room evacuation. This action, which takes only seconds, can be performed at a single Control Room location. This action conserves coolant inventory and provides additional operator response time for most transients. We will continue our dialogue with NRR on this topic.
- (3) This design change is in progress and is expected to complete during this refueling outage.

### 2.E Unresolved Item (50-397/86-25-06) - Safe Shutdown Procedures

It is the Supply System's position that the difference in time to close the MSIVs versus a singular action to initiate a reactor scram will not jeopardize compliance with the ten (10) minute criteria. The revision to PPM 4.12.1.1, Control Room Evacuation, has been made and is available for your review. The design change to replace the shorting screws with transfer switches is in progress and is expected to complete during this refueling outage.



2.G Unresolved Item (50-397/86-25-08) - Associated Circuits Hi-Low Pressure Interface Analysis

The Supply System is currently in discussion with NRR regarding this issue. (Reference: Letter, Knighton (NRC) to Sorensen (SS), TAC No. 63528, Dated May 13, 1987)

2.J Unresolved Item (50-397/86-25-11) - Cable Spreading Room Design

- (1) A technical basis has been provided and is available for review. (Reference: TSI-RFC-017)
- (2) The fire protection in the Cable Spread Room is designed in accordance with NRC requirements, i.e., detection, automatic suppression, and 20 foot noncombustible area. Within the 20 foot separation area, there are several dedicated Division II cables, which were provided with an one (1) hour barrier. This one (1) hour barrier was recently tested and proved to be adequate. The only outstanding issue in the area is the protection of some "heat flow path" steel, which is in progress. In the interim, appropriate Technical Specification requirements have been implemented.

2.L Unresolved Item (50-397/86-25-13) - Inadequate Fire Detection System

An independent inspection by an outside consultant has confirmed that our detection system meets requirements for safety-related areas. A copy of our consultant's report has been provided to you.

2.M Unresolved Item (50-397/86-25-14) - Inadequate Emergency Lighting

Design changes are being implemented during our current refueling outage. Interim corrective actions were previously taken.

3. Potential Failure to Adequately Protect Alternative Control Room Division II ADS and RPV Level and Pressure Indication Circuits from Fire Damage

Design changes to protect the Division II ADS cable in the Control Room are in process. We expect to complete this modification during our current outage.

