

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8707240154 DOC. DATE: 87/07/20 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: 50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397
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 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 87-015-00: on 870620, Div 2 drywell pressure monitoring instrumentation found not tracking Div 1 since instrument rack isolation valves closed. Caused by inadequate valve labeling. Valves opened & instruments operable. W/870720 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 4
 TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL		RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL
	PD5 LA	1 1		PD5 PD	1 1
	SAMWORTH, R	1 1			
INTERNAL:	ACRS MICHELSON	1 1		ACRS MOELLER	2 2
	AEOD/DOA	1 1		AEOD/DSP/NAS	1 1
	AEOD/DSP/ROAB	2 2		AEOD/DSP/TPAB	1 1
	DEDRO	1 1		NRR/DEST/ADE	1 0
	NRR/DEST/ADS	1 0		NRR/DEST/CEB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/ELB	1 1		NRR/DEST/ICSB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/MEB	1 1		NRR/DEST/MTB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/PSB	1 1		NRR/DEST/RSB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/SGB	1 1		NRR/DLPQ/HFB	1 1
	NRR/DLPQ/QAB	1 1		NRR/DOEA/EAB	1 1
	NRR/DREP/RAB	1 1		NRR/DREP/RPB	2 2
	NRR/PMAS/ILRB	1 1		NRR/PMAS/PTSB	1 1
	REG FILE 02	1 1		RES DEPY GI	1 1
	RES TELFORD, J	1 1		RES/DE/EIB	1 1
	RGN5 FILE 01	1 1			
EXTERNAL:	EG&G GROH, M	5 5		H ST LOBBY WARD	1 1
	LPDR	1 1		NRC PDR	1 1
	NSIC HARRIS, J	1 1		NSIC MAYS, G	1 1

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 0 7 1 0 8 3										PAGE (3) 1 of 3				
TITLE (4) Plant Operating Mode Changed While Division 2 Drywell Pressure Monitoring Instrumentation was Inoperable Due to Inadequate Valve Tagging																								
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)					REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)													
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME					DOCKET NUMBER (9)										
0	6	2	0	8	7	8	7	0	7	1	5	0	0	0	7	2	0	8	7	0 5 0				
OPERATING MODE (10)		2		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 18 CFR 3: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																				
POWER LEVEL (10)		0 0 2		28.482(b)					28.486(a)					88.736(a)(2)(iv)					73.716(a)					
				28.486(a)(1)(i)					88.38(a)(1)					88.736(a)(2)(iv)					73.716(a)					
				28.486(a)(1)(ii)					88.38(a)(2)					88.736(a)(2)(vii)					OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 308A)					
				28.486(a)(1)(iii)					88.736(a)(2)(i)					88.736(a)(2)(viii)(A)										
				28.486(a)(1)(iv)					88.736(a)(2)(ii)					88.736(a)(2)(viii)(B)										
				28.486(a)(1)(v)					88.736(a)(2)(iii)					88.736(a)(2)(ix)										
				28.486(a)(1)(vi)					88.736(a)(2)(iv)					88.736(a)(2)(x)										
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																								
NAME Steven L. Washington, Compliance Engineer										TELEPHONE NUMBER 5 0 9 3 7 7 - 2 0 8 0														
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																								
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC														
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR								
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO												

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On June 20, 1987 during the initial WNP-2 Plant Startup after Refueling Outage Number 2 (R2), at 0130 hours, Plant Operators noted that Division 2 Drywell Pressure Monitoring Instrumentation was not responding to plant conditions. Plant operators discovered the instrument rack isolation valves were closed. The Plant Shift Support Supervisor initiated a Nonconformance Report but failed to have Plant Instrument and Control Technicians open the valves. Plant operators began to periodically vent the Drywell and they maintained Drywell Pressure near zero psig which masked the continued inoperability of the Division 2 instruments. At 0555 hours on June 21, 1987 Plant operators manually scrambled the Plant. This was a planned scram for control rod scram timing. At approximately 0700 on June 22, 1987 the Plant I&C Supervisor while investigating the event opened the isolation valves and restored these instruments to operational status.

The root cause of the event was inadequate plant labeling of instrumentation valves which met plant procedures did not specifically identify the isolation valves by a tag number. An instrument valve tagging program was begun in the fall of 1986 and is now complete. Plant procedures are being revised to include specific valve tag numbers. There is no safety significance associated with this event because Division 1 Drywell Pressure Monitoring Instrumentation was operational and the Reactor Protection System and Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System Drywell Pressure instrumentation were not affected. The Reactor Recirculation System Loop B Pump Discharge Valve and Flow Control Valve high drywell pressure lockup feature was made inoperable by this event.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7	8 7	0 1 5	0 0 0	2	OF 0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Plant Conditions

- a) Power Level - 2%
- b) Plant Mode - 2 (Startup)

Event Description

On June 20, 1987, during the initial WNP-2 Plant Startup after Refueling Outage Number two (R2), at 0130 hours, Plant Operators noted that the Division 2 Drywell Pressure Monitoring Instrumentation was not tracking the Division 1 Drywell Pressure Monitoring Instrumentation. At the time of the discovery Reactor Power was approximately 2%, Reactor pressure 150 psig, and Reactor temperature 350 °F.

Upon investigation by Plant Operators, it was discovered that the instrument rack isolation valves to the Division 2 Drywell Pressure Monitoring Instrumentation were closed. The Plant Shift Support Supervisor, initiated a Nonconformance Report, but failed to have Plant Instrument and Control Technicians (I&C) open the valves. At 0440 hours, on June 20, 1987 Plant Operators began the Drywell venting process and subsequent venting by Plant Operators maintained drywell pressure near 0 psig, thus masking the fact that the Division 2 Drywell Pressure Monitoring Instrumentation was still not operable. The Plant continued to run at approximately 2% reactor power with a gradual heatup to a reactor pressure of 950 psig and a reactor temperature of 540 °F until the plant was manually scrammed, for control rod drive scram timing, at 0555 hours on June 21, 1987. The instrument rack isolation valves were opened at approximately 0700 hours on June 22, 1987 by the Plant I&C Supervisor while investigating the Nonconformance Report.

The Division 2 Drywell Pressure Monitoring Instrumentation which was isolated during this event included Control Room Drywell Pressure Recorders for Range 1, .5 to + 3.0 psig (CMS-PR-8); Range 2, 0 to 25 psig (CMS-PR-2) and Range 3, 0 to 180 psig (CMS-PR-2). Remote Shutdown Panel Pressure Indicators for Drywell Low Range Pressure 0 to 2 psig (CMS-PI-2R) and Drywell High Range Pressure 0 to 100 psig (CMS-PI-6R) and, Reactor Recirculation pressure switch (RRC-PS-36) which provides a lockup signal on high drywell pressure to the Reactor Recirculation Loop B pump discharge valve (RRC-V-67B) and flow control valve (RRC-FCV-60B).

The instrument rack (IR-68) isolation valves were mispositioned by Plant I&C Technicians during performance of Plant Procedure PPM 3.1.6, "Startup Instrument Rack Valve Lineup" on June 17, 1987. Instrument Rack 68 is different from other plant instrument racks in that the isolation valves are located at the bottom of the rack instead of at the top of the rack.

At the time of the event the Plant was in the process of labeling all instrument valves in response to a recognized plant problem and an INPO commitment. Each instrument valve on an instrument rack will be numbered and tagged and a valve diagram posted at the rack. All valve tags are currently in place.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit. 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 8 7	— 0	1 5	— 0 0	0 13	OF	0 13

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

The root cause of this event was inadequate valve labeling. Without valve labeling the determination of the proper valves to position was dependent on the knowledge of the I&C technician performing the valve lineup. With all instrument rack valves labeled and referenced in Plant procedures there should be no confusion in identifying the proper valves to be checked on repositioned. This event is reported because plant modes were changed with these instruments inoperable.

Immediate Corrective Action

The isolation valves were opened and the instruments returned to service. The other instrument rack with isolation valves located at the bottom of the rack (IR-67) was checked and the valves were found to be correctly positioned.

The Plant Shift Support Supervisor was counseled regarding the importance of ensuring that corrective action is accomplished, and communicating such action to appropriate Plant personnel.

Further Corrective Action

Plant procedure PPM 3.16 "Startup Instrument Rack Valve Lineup" was revised to incorporate valve numbers for Instrument Racks 67 and 68.

All Plant instrument valves have been labeled, and another revision of PPM 3.1.6 is being prepared to include instrument valve numbers in all procedure steps.

Safety Significance

There is no safety significance associated with this event in that Drywell pressure was maintained at normal levels throughout the event and Division 1 Instrumentation was available. The Drywell Pressure inputs to the Reactor Protection System and Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System were not affected by this event. The Reactor Recirculation Pump Discharge Valve and Flow Control Valve lockup on high drywell pressure. This feature is provided only to ensure maximum blowdown rate in case of a LOCA. This event posed no threat to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

EIIS

Test Reference

EIIS Reference

Drywell Pressure Monitoring Instrumentation

System

Component

Reactor Recirculation System

IK

Reactor Protection System

AD

Reactor Protection System

JC

Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System

BD



WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

P.O. Box 968 • 3000 George Washington Way • Richland, Washington 99352

Docket No. 50-397

July 20, 1987

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 87-015

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 87-015 for WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the item of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

Very truly yours,



C.M. Powers (M/D 927M)
WNP-2 Plant Manager

CMP:bc

Enclosure:
Licensee Event Report No. 87-015

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V
Mr. R. T. Dodds, NRC, Site (901A)
INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA
Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI
Mr. D. L. Williams, BPA (M/D 399)

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