

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)
SRM Channel A Inoperable during Core Alterations caused by Personnel Error

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)												
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)										
0	4	2	7	8	7	0	0	7	0	1	0	5	2	9	8	7	0	5	0	0	0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)											
OPERATING MODE (9)		5		20.402(b)		20.406(e)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)	
POWER LEVEL (10)		0 0 0		20.406(a)(1)(i)		50.36(a)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(e)	
				20.406(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(d)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vi)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 306AJ)	
				20.406(a)(1)(iii)		X 50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)			
				20.406(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)			
				20.406(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)											
NAME								TELEPHONE NUMBER			
Steven L. Washington, Compliance Engineer								5 0 9 3 7 7 - 2 0 8 0			

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)								EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)								X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On April 27, 1987 at approximately 0345 hours Washington Nuclear Plant Unit-2 (WNP-2) was in Operational Condition 5, Refueling, and core alterations (fuel shuffle) were in progress. The Plant Shift Manager reviewed and approved performance of the weekly Source Range Monitoring System (SRM) Channel Functional Surveillance during the time periods when core alterations were not being performed. Plant Operators and Plant Instrument and Control (I&C) Technicians were coordinating core alterations (fuel shuffle) and performance of the SRM Channel A Functional Surveillance. Due to an error in the coordination of the two activities, SRM Channel A was inoperable while a fuel bundle was being loaded into the reactor core quadrant monitored by that Channel. When Plant Operators recognized SRM Channel A was inoperable, core alterations were suspended. All three remaining SRM channels were operable during the event.

The cause of the event was personnel error during the coordination of SRM testing and core alterations.

There is no safety significance associated with this event because during core refueling operations the SRM System is only for indication while, Reactor protection is provided by the Intermediate Range Monitoring (IRM) and the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Systems.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Plant Conditions

- a) Power Level - 0%
- b) Plant Mode - 5 (Refueling)

Event

On April 27, 1987 at approximately 0345 hours the plant was in Operational Condition 5 (Refueling), and Plant Operators were coordinating two activities; Core Alterations (fuel shuffle) and the weekly Source Range Monitor Channel Functional Surveillance. For a short period of time during this process, Source Range Monitor "A" was inoperable while a fuel bundle was being loaded in the reactor core quadrant monitored by SRM "A". However, neither SRM "B" or "D", which monitor the adjacent quadrants, showed any increase in core reactivity.

WNP-2 Plant Technical Specification 3/4.9.2 requires at least two SRM channels to be operable and located in the quadrant the core alteration is being made and in an adjacent quadrant. This ensures that any changes in core reactivity are readily detected. Prior to the event it was determined and approved by the Plant Shift Manager that the SRM Channel Functional Surveillance could be performed between core alterations with proper communications between the Plant Operator and the Plant I&C Technicians performing the surveillance.

The root cause of this event is insufficient coordination of the SRM testing and core alterations. Plant procedures were not the cause of this event.

Immediate Corrective Action

Core alterations were immediately stopped. The four SRM Channel Functional Surveillances were completed later that day while core alterations were stopped.

Further Corrective Action

Each SRM Channel Functional Surveillance Procedure was deviated (revised) to require the Shift Manager to delay core alterations until the SRM Channel Functional Surveillances are completed.

An Operations Night Order describes the procedure deviation of the SRM Channel Functional Surveillances which prohibits these surveillances from being done between core alteration steps.

Written feedback was provided to all licensed reactor operators describing the procedure deviations.

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		87	007	01	03	OF	03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

Safety Significance

There is no safety significance associated with this event. During core alterations the Source Range Monitoring System provides the operator indication of reactivity changes only and is not required to provide a protective RPS function. The IRM and APRM Systems which were operable at the time of the event provide reactor protection trip functions. In addition the two SRM channels in adjacent quadrants were also operable during the event. This event results in consequences no different than if an SRM channel were to fail during core alterations. All required Technical Specification actions were successfully completed once it was recognized that the SRM was inoperable. This event caused no threat to the safety of the public or plant personnel.

Similar Events

None

EIIS Information

Text Reference

EIIS	Reference
System	Component

Source Range Monitoring System (SRM)

IG ---

Intermediate Range Monitoring System (IRM)

IG ---

Average Power Range Monitor (APRM)

IG ---

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

P.O. Box 968 • 3000 George Washington Way • Richland, Washington 99352

Docket No. 50-397

May 29, 1987

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555


Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 87-007-01

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Supplemental Licensee Event Report No. 87-007-01 for WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the item of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

This Supplemental Licensee Event Report includes similar events and EIIS information sections which were inadvertently omitted from the original report.

Very truly yours,


C.M. Powers (M/D 927M)
WNP-2 Plant Manager

CMP:db

Enclosure:
Licensee Event Report No. 87-007-01

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V
Mr. R. T. Dodds, NRC - Site (M/D 901A)
Mr. W. E. Milbrot, BPA (M/D 399)
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