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 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 ADENSAM, E. G. BWR Project Directorate 3

SUBJECT: Forwards supplemental info to 851101 submittal of DCRDR
 summary rept identifying human factors & emergency procedure
 task analysis deficiencies. Info provides findings that could
 not be completed by first refueling outage.

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 TITLE: OR/Licensing Submittal: Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737(Generic Ltr 82-33)

NOTES:

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	RGN5	1 1		
EXTERNAL:	24X	1 1	LPDR	1 1
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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

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June 3, 1986
G02-86-517

Docket No. 50-397

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attn: E. G. Adensam, Project Director
BWR Project Directorate No. 3
Division of BWR Licensing
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Ms. Adensam:


Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2
DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW (DCRDR)
SUMMARY REPORT, SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Reference: Letter, G02-85-758, G. C. Sorensen (SS) to W. R. Butler
(NRC), "Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR)
Summary Report, Submittal Of", dated November 1, 1985

The reference letter submitted the WNP-2 Detailed Control Room Design Review Summary Report identifying human factors and emergency procedures task analysis deficiencies relative to WNP-2. The submittal also provided recommendations for their resolution and implementation schedules. Of those deficiencies identified in the submittal to be completed by or during the first refueling outage, several findings could not be accomplished primarily due to engineering manpower constraints, material availability and the timeliness of NSSS vendor and BWR Owners' Group information. The attached provides these findings listed by their identification number as noted in the referenced submittal, and provides revised schedules for completion.

Should you have any questions, please contact Mr. P. L. Powell, Manager, WNP-2 Licensing.

Very truly yours,


G. C. Sorensen, Manager
Regulatory Programs

RGD/bk

cc: JO Bradfute - NRC
JB Martin - NRC RV
E Revel - BPA
NS Reynolds - BLCP&R
NRC Site Inspector

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ATTACHMENT

E3.70 This finding provided recommendations for changes to the Control Room annunciator control system. Recommendation two identified the need to provide automatic silencing capability for the control room rear annunciator panels during plant transients to reduce control room noise and to prevent operator distractions from the main control room panels. During installation, it was discovered that an incorrect relay had been specified and procured. No available relay of the correct design was located on site. Procurement action has been initiated and the modification is scheduled to be completed in July, 1986.

Recommendation three identified a need to upgrade the directional alarm panel on panel P851 and to reduce the number of operator interactions with rear control room panels. When the summary report was issued in December, 1985, preliminary engineering evaluations were used to provide a probable schedule. Detailed evaluations have since identified the implementation as more complex than the existing schedule allowed for and may not be possible to achieve. Recommendation three could not be implemented during the first refueling outage, but a detailed evaluation will be completed and, if possible, implemented prior to or during the second refueling outage.

F3.76 This finding identified the need to upgrade the engraved descriptions on the control room fire annunciator alarm panels. The design change package was issued early in January, 1986. However, procurement of the new engraved lenses did not occur due to improper identification of the procurement actions as not being identified for the first refueling outage. Procurement is presently being initiated and the new lenses will be installed upon arrival, but no later than the second refueling outage.

The concern relative to the engraved descriptions has been minimized by the recent preparation of individual fire alarm annunciator procedures. These procedures are located in the control room and provide sufficient direction and information to the operator for proper alarm response. With the new procedures, the human factors concern has been reduced such that the delay in upgrading the engraved descriptions is acceptable.

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F5.73

This finding noted several vendor supplied modular panel inserts that contained indicating lamps whose colored lenses did not conform to the WNP-2 control room indicating lamp color standard. Since the summary submittal, engineering has initiated a design change to totally replace one of the referenced panel inserts, the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM). This upgraded panel will eliminate the indicating lamp color deviation. Wiring for the new panel insert has been initiated during the first refueling outage, but final installation and removal of the existing panel insert is not scheduled until August, 1986, or the second refueling outage at the latest, depending on plant status.

This particular color deviation is considered a minor human Engineering concern in that the panel is not used during operation but at startup, operators have had specific training on the panel, and no operational problems have been identified to date with this specific color deviation. Thus, deferral of the correction until the new panel insert is installed is appropriate to conserve engineering resources and procurement expenditures.

