

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**

FACILITY NAME (1) Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 1 OF 0 3										PAGE (3) 1								
TITLE (4) Inadvertent Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System Isolation (Group 1) During Performance of Surveillance Procedure-Personnel Error																												
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)					REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES							DOCKET NUMBER (9)												
0	7	03	8	7	0	2	1	0	0	8	0	3	8	7								0	5	0	0	0		
OPERATING MODE (9)			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 8: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																									
4			20.402(b)					20.408(e)					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(iv)					72.71(b)										
POWER LEVEL (10)			20.408(a)(1)(i)					80.39(a)(1)					80.73(a)(2)(iv)					72.71(e)										
0, 0, 0			20.408(a)(1)(ii)					80.39(a)(2)					80.73(a)(2)(vi)					OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 306A)										
			20.408(a)(1)(iii)					80.73(a)(2)(i)					80.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)															
			20.408(a)(1)(iv)					80.73(a)(2)(ii)					80.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)															
			20.408(a)(1)(v)					80.73(a)(2)(iii)					80.73(a)(2)(ix)															
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																												
NAME												TELEPHONE NUMBER																
J.D. Arbuckle, Compliance Engineer												AREA CODE		5 0 9 3 7 7 - 2 1 1 5														
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																												
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC						
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH		DAY		YEAR										
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO																

**ABSTRACT** (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lined (16)

On July 3, 1987 at 2207 hours, an inadvertent isolation of the Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System (NSSSS - Group 1) occurred during the performance of a Main Steam Line (MSL) low pressure surveillance procedure. The isolation was the result of the failure of Plant Instrument and Control (I&C) Technicians to have Plant Operators reset the half-trip logic prior to continuing with the procedure. With a half-trip condition in existence, the procedure was continued and another half-trip signal occurred which completed the NSSSS, Group 1, full-trip logic. The result was the automatic closure of Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) and Main Steam Line (MSL) drain valves.

The isolation logic was reset, the system returned to normal lineup and the procedure successfully completed.

The cause of this event has been determined to be personnel error in that the I&C Technicians failed to have Operations reset the half-trip logic as required by the procedure.

There is no safety significance associated with this event in that there was no actual initiating condition and all equipment operated correctly to place the Primary Containment (NSSS - Group 1) in an isolation condition. This event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the Public or Plant personnel.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
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Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 8 7	— 0	2 1	— 0 0	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

Plant Conditions

- a) Power Level - 0%
- b) Plant Mode - 4 (Cold Shutdown)

Event Description

On July 3, 1987 at 2207 hours, an inadvertent isolation of the Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System (NSSSS - Group 1) occurred during the performance of Plant Procedure 7.4.3.2.1.17, "Isolation - Main Steam Line Pressure Low - CFT." The procedure provides instructions for performing Divisions 1 and 2 Channel Functional Tests (CFT) of Main Steam Pressure Switches 15A, 15B, 15C and 15D.

The isolation was the result of the failure of Plant Instrument and Control (I&C) Technicians to have Plant Operators reset the half-trip logic prior to continuing with the procedure. During the first part of the procedure, the test for MS-PS-15A (Division 1), the Technicians failed to have Operations reset the half-trip logic, and verify that the associated annunciators were not in an alarm state as required by the procedure. With a Division 1 half-trip condition in existence, the technicians continued with the procedure by performing the test on MS-PS-15B (Division 2). As a result, when the bypass was removed for MS-PS-15B, another half-trip signal occurred which completed the NSSSS, Group 1, full-trip logic. The result was the automatic closure of MS-V-22A-D (MSL Isolation Inboard), MS-V-16 (MSL Drain Inboard), MS-V-19 (MSL Drain Outboard) and MS-V-67A-D (MSL Drain Outboard). The Main Steam Outboard Isolation Valves (MS-V-28A-D) were already closed due to Plant Conditions.

The cause of this event has been determined to be personnel error in that the I&C Technicians failed to have Operations reset the half-trip logic as required by the procedure. The technicians also apparently failed to confirm logic reset status by not verifying that the associated annunciators were not in an alarm state as required by the procedure.

Immediate Corrective Action

The isolation logic was reset, the system returned to normal lineup and the procedure successfully completed.

Further Corrective Action

1. The personnel involved in this event have been counseled regarding proper communications with Operations and the required verification of actions during the performance of surveillance procedures.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

2. While not a factor in this event, the Channel Functional Test procedure for these pressure switches will be divided into two procedures, one for Division 1 and one for Division 2.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

There is no safety significance associated with this event in that there was no actual initiating condition and all equipment operated correctly to place the Primary Containment (NSSSS - Group 1) in an isolation condition. This event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the Public or Plant Personnel.

Similar Events

None

EIIS InformationText ReferenceEIIS Reference

Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System  
MS-PS-15A-D  
MS-V-22A-D (Inboard Isolation)  
MS-V-16 (Inboard Drain)  
MS-V-19 (Outboard Drain)  
MS-V-67A-D (Outboard Drain)

System	Component
BD	----
SB	PS
SB	ISV
SB	V
SB	V
SB	V