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ACCESSION NBR: 8312190155 DOC. DATE: 83/12/12 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: 50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Power 05000397
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 RECIP. NAME: SCHWENCER, A. RECIPIENT AFFILIATION: Licensing Branch 2

SUBJECT: Forwards supplemental information re equipment justification Number:
 1. Equipment qualified for LOCA conditions & can be expected
 to perform safety function if needed to mitigate accident
 condition.

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Washington Public Power Supply System

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Docket No. 50-397

December 12, 1983
G02-83-1139

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attention: Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 2
Division of Licensing
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

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PDR ADOCK 05000397
A PDR

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

Subject: NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2
JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION #1
CIA PROGRAMMER

References: a) G02-83-1089, G. C. Sorensen to A. Schwencer, "Valve Nitrogen Supply," dated November 23, 1983.
b) G02-83-842, G. C. Sorensen to A. Schwencer, "Environmental Qualification Report for safety Related Equipment, September 1983," dated September 16, 1983.

In response to your staff's request for additional information and conclusions regarding the subject equipment, please find attached a discussion of equipment features and our conclusions regarding equipment qualification.

The equipment is qualified for LOCA accident conditions. We confidently conclude that the equipment can be expected to perform its safety function if it is needed to mitigate an accident condition. We hope this supplemental discussion will assist you in reaching the same conclusion.


Very truly yours,

Alan Hasler for

G. C. Sorensen, Manager
Regulatory Programs

GCS:KRW:st
Attachment

cc: R. Auluck, NRC
W. S. Chin, BPA
A. Toth, NRC Site



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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION ON EQUIPMENT JUSTIFICATION #1

EPN: CIA-PROG-1A

Additional information has been obtained to qualify and further justify the programmer. This data is summarized below:

LOCA - During the LOCA, the programmer is exposed to a maximum of $T = 128^{\circ} \text{F}$, $R. H. = 65\%$ and the six-month integrated dose is 1.2×10^4 rad. Review of the materials of construction show that the programmer is not susceptible to these conditions. It should be noted that the programmer does not contain any integrated circuits.

The programmer is qualified for the LOCA conditions.

HELB - The worst case HELB conditions include a maximum $T = 180^{\circ} \text{F}$ and $R. H. = 100\%$. While steam test results are not currently available, the following data strongly indicates that the programmer will perform its required function:

- 1) The programmer is hermetically sealed.
- 2) The long-term humidity of Profile 21X is not a steam condition, but is due to hot water on the reactor building floor. $R. H. = 100\%$ is a conservative representation of this condition.
- 3) The equipment would be accessible soon after a HELB for maintenance.
- 4) In any one HELB accident, one of the programmers would not be exposed to temperatures in excess of 128°F .

It is concluded that the programmer will perform its safety function for at least 24 hours, and access for maintenance can then be accomplished.

Additional information has also been obtained on operation of the ADS system. The charged accumulator tanks on the safety-relief valves are sized to operate each valve five times, instead of once as previously stated. This number of operations should be sufficient to depressurize the reactor without use of the CIA system for additional valve cycling.

