

# CATEGORY 10

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 FACIL: 50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit. 1, Rochester G      05000244  
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 MECREDY, R.C.      Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.  
 RECIP. NAME      RECIPIENT AFFILIATION  
 VISSING, G.S.

SUBJECT: Special rept: on 990309, halon systems were removed from svc & fire door F502 was blocked open. Caused by mods being made to CR emergency air treatment sys. Continuous fire watch was established with backup fire suppression equipment.

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ROBERT C. WECREDY  
Vice President  
Nuclear Operations

April 15, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Attn: Guy S. Vissing  
Project Directorate I-1  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Thirty (30) Day Special Report  
Halon Systems Inoperable for More Than 14 Days  
Fire Barrier Penetration Seal (Fire Door) Inoperable  
for More Than 7 Days  
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant  
Docket No. 50-244

Dear Mr. Vissing:

In accordance with the Ginna Station Technical Requirements Manual (TRM), Required Actions TR 3.7.3.B.1 and TR 3.7.5.B.1, this thirty (30) day special report is being submitted, outlining the cause of halon system inoperability and fire barrier penetration seal (fire door) inoperability and plans for restoration to operable status.

On March 9, 1999, activities affecting fire system components were performed to support the first phase of modifications to the Control Room Emergency Air Treatment System (CREATS). Based on the scope of the modification, it was anticipated during installation planning that the fire system components would be inoperable longer than specified in the TRM. The halon systems listed in TRM Table TR 3.7.3-1 were removed from service. These systems would discharge into the Computer Room and Relay Room in the event of a detected fire. Detection and electric solenoid valve release features were disconnected for these halon systems to eliminate the potential for false suppression system initiation during the modifications to the CREATS. Fire Door F502, between the Relay Room and the Back Stairwell (to the Control Room), was blocked open at this time, making this fire barrier component inoperable. These system impairments were required to establish temporary cooling capability for the Control Room while modifications were performed to the existing CREATS after all fuel was removed from the reactor.

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The halon systems and fire door were declared inoperable at approximately 0922 EST on March 9, 1999. Compensatory actions were immediately taken as per TRM Required Action TR 3.7.3.A.1 for the inoperable halon systems. A continuous fire watch was established with backup fire suppression equipment (additional fire extinguishers) at 0922 EST on March 9, 1999. These actions also ensured compliance with TRM Required Action 3.7.5.A.1.1 for the blocked open fire door.

Per TRM Required Action 3.7.5.A.2, Fire Door F502 is to be restored to operable status within 7 days. This Required Action and associated Completion Time was not met, as anticipated before the start of the work on March 9, 1999, requiring entry into TRM Required Action 3.7.5.B.1 on March 16, 1999. Fire Door F502 was restored to operable status on April 2, 1999, when this phase of modifications to the CREATS was completed and the temporary cooling features were no longer required.

Per TRM Required Action 3.7.3.A.2, the halon systems are to be restored to operable status within 14 days. This Required Action and associated Completion Time was not met, as anticipated before the start of the work on March 9, 1999, requiring entry into TRM Required Action 3.7.3.B.1 on March 23, 1999. The halon systems were restored to operable status on April 5, 1999, when the next phase of modifications to the CREATS was completed. The halon systems now operate upon detection of fire conditions in either the Computer Room or Relay Room.

All required compensatory actions remained in effect until these fire system components were restored to operable status.

Very truly yours,

  
Robert C. Mecredy

xc: Mr. Guy S. Vissing (Mail Stop 8C2)  
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