

# CATEGORY 1

## REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 9706110112      DOC. DATE: 97/06/03      NOTARIZED: NO      DOCKET #:  
 FACIL: 50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G      05000244  
 AUTH. NAME      AUTHOR AFFILIATION  
 MECREDY, R.C.      Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.  
 RECIP. NAME      RECIPIENT AFFILIATION  
 VISSING, G.S.

SUBJECT: Special rept: on 970503, declared fire barrier component (fire door) inoperable. Caused by maint activities that inintentionally blocked open Fire Door F-30. Stopped activities hr later & closed Fire Door F-30.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D      COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 0 SIZE: 2  
 TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES: License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).      05000244

RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL
PD1-1 PD	1	VISSING, G.	1
INTERNAL: <del>AEOD/SPD/RAB</del>	2	AEOD/SPD/RRAB	1
<del>FILE CENTER</del>	1	NRR/DE/ECGB	1
NRR/DE/EELB	1	NRR/DE/EMEB	1
NRR/DRCH/HHFB	1	NRR/DRCH/HICB	1
NRR/DRCH/HOLB	1	NRR/DRCH/HQMB	1
NRR/DRPM/PECB	1	NRR/DSSA/SPLB	1
NRR/DSSA/SRXB	1	RES/DET/EIB	1
RGN1 FILE 01	1		
EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD	1	LITCO BRYCE, J H	1
NOAC POORE, W.	1	NOAC QUEENER, DS	1
NRC PDR	1	NUDOCS FULL TXT	1

**NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:**

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR      24      ENCL 2

C  
A  
T  
E  
G  
O  
R  
Y  
  
1  
  
D  
O  
C  
U  
M  
E  
N  
T



ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION • 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649-0001



AREA CODE 716 546-2700

ROBERT C. MECREDY  
Vice President  
Nuclear Operations

June 3, 1997

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Attn: Guy S. Vissing  
Project Directorate I-1  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Thirty (30) Day Special Report  
Inoperable Fire Barrier Component, Due to Fire Door Blocked Open  
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant  
Docket No. 50-244

Dear Mr. Vissing:

Fire Door F-30, which provides part of the overall fire barrier for Diesel Generator (DG) Room A, was blocked open without an assigned fire watch. This resulted in the fire barrier component (fire door) being considered inoperable. The Ginna Station Technical Requirements Manual (TRM), Section TR 3.7.5, Required Action B.1, requires a Special Report outlining the cause of fire barrier penetration seal inoperability and plans for restoring to operable status. This thirty (30) day Special Report is being submitted to satisfy that requirement.

Maintenance activities involving painting of the floor in DG Room A were started at approximately 0700 EDST on May 3, 1997. This activity included intentionally blocking open Fire Door F-30. Blocking open the fire door resulted in that portion of the overall fire barrier being considered inoperable, and a designated worker in the area acted as the fire watch. Work activities were stopped about an hour later, and Fire Door F-30 was closed.

Some time later, an individual noted the drying paint in DG Room A, and blocked open Fire Door F-30, presumably to assist the drying process. With the fire door blocked open, those opening the security door to enter DG Room A would be aware of the drying paint. (The security door is approximately one foot ahead of door F-30.) The fire door was blocked open without ensuring that an hourly fire watch inspection would be performed, which is contrary to the requirements of TRM Section 3.7.5. Subsequent inspections of DG Room A were performed by Security and Operations personnel. Those personnel were unaware that no hourly fire watch inspection was being performed, and took no action to correct the situation.

9706110112 970603  
PDR ADDCK 05000244  
S PDR

110065




10  
DEV

At approximately 2000 EDST on May 4, 1997, the Operations Shift Supervisor, performing a plant tour, identified that having Fire Door F-30 blocked open required compensatory actions to comply with TRM Section 3.7.5, Required Action A.1. He confirmed that no hourly fire watch inspection was being intentionally performed. The fire door was immediately unblocked and closed, restoring the overall fire barrier to operable status. ACTION Report 97-0674 was initiated to identify the condition to management and to initiate measures to prevent recurrence.

During this period, DG Room A was never completely vulnerable to the effects of a fire. While the fire door was blocked open, the fire detection and suppression system for DG Room A was operable, as were those for the adjoining areas: DG Room B and Turbine Building Basement. Hourly fire watch inspection of the affected fire zone would have satisfied TRM Required Action A.1. Although no hourly fire watch inspection was intentionally being performed, Operations and Security personnel (who are trained as fire watches) made numerous entries into DG Room A during the period the door was blocked open. Additionally, the overall fire barrier is protected by a high energy line break (HELB) "superwall" (which is located approximately a foot away from the fire barrier wall and contains the security door). This "superwall" remained operable during the period that Fire Door F-30 was blocked open.

Very truly yours,



Robert C. Mecredy

xc: Mr. Guy S. Vissing (Mail Stop 14B2)  
PWR Project Directorate I-1  
Washington, D.C. 20555

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region I  
475 Allendale Road  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Ginna Senior Resident Inspector

