

# CATEGORY 1

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ACCESSION NBR: 9612060128      DOC. DATE: 96/11/27      NOTARIZED: NO      DOCKET #  
 FACIL: 50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G      05000244  
 AUTH. NAME      AUTHOR AFFILIATION  
 MECREDY, R.C.      Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.  
 RECIP. NAME      RECIPIENT AFFILIATION  
 VISSING, G.S.

SUBJECT: Special rept: on 961015, identified problem w/automatic release actuation of sys deluge valve & sys declared inoperable. Compensatory actions will remain in effect until all four suppression sys restored to operable status.

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November 27, 1996

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Attn: Guy S. Vissing  
Project Directorate I-1  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Thirty (30) Day Special Report  
Inoperable Fire Suppression Systems in the Transformer Yard  
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant  
Docket No. 50-244

Dear Mr. Vissing:

In accordance with the Ginna Station Technical Requirements Manual (TRM), Required Action TR 3.7.2.C, which requires a special report outlining the cause of system inoperability and plans for restoring the system to operable status, this thirty (30) day special report is being submitted.


On October 15, 1996, the suppression system which protects the station #12B transformer (system S23) was tested in accordance with the requirements of Surveillance Test Procedure PT-13.4.10B. The results of the testing activities identified a problem with the automatic release actuation of the system deluge valve and the system was declared inoperable at approximately 1435 EDST on October 15, 1996. Compensatory actions were immediately taken as per TRM Required Actions TR 3.7.2.B.1 and 3.7.2.B.2. Hourly fire watch tours were initiated and backup fire suppression equipment (hose lines with a deck gun, connected to a yard hydrant) was placed in the area of the station #12B transformer. ACTION Report 96-0938 was initiated to address the inoperability of the system.

Work activities were initiated the next day (10/16/96) with a local fire protection factory-trained company to identify what repairs were required to restore system S23 to operation. Trouble shooting activities were scheduled to be initiated on 10/18/96. However, due to an unexpected increase in combustible gas levels in the main #1 transformer, all work in this area of the plant was deferred until the condition of the main transformer could be determined.

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On 10/23/96, Rochester Gas and Electric (RG&E) decided to replace the main transformer, since the cause of the combustible gas increase could not be identified. On 10/24/96, the main #1 transformer suppression system (system S20) was removed from service in order to minimize the potential for an inadvertent discharge of the system while working on the main transformer. Hourly fire watch tours were initiated and backup fire suppression equipment (existing hose lines with the deck gun) was available as the backup equipment. These compensatory actions will remain in effect until all four suppression systems (as discussed below) are restored to operable status.

In order to remove the main transformer equipment, four fire suppression systems were removed from service: for the main #1 transformer (system S20), for the auxiliary transformer #11 (system S21), for the auxiliary transformer #12A (system S22), and for the auxiliary transformer #12B (system S23).

Prior to removing system S21 and system S22 from service on 10/25/96, hourly fire watch tours were modified to include all four suppression systems in the transformer yard. Backup fire suppression equipment continued to be available via the utilization of hose lines with a deck gun which were connected to a yard hydrant.

The sprinkler piping systems have all been reinstalled for each of the affected systems (S20, S21, S22, and S23) with manual actuation capability. The installation of the detection portion of each system, which will provide full system operability, is under construction and scheduled for completion in December, 1996.

Very truly yours,



Robert C. Mecredy

xc: Mr. Guy S. Vissing (Mail Stop 14C7)  
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Washington, D.C. 20555

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Ginna Senior Resident Inspector

