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ACCESSION NBR: 9509070205 DOC. DATE: 95/09/01 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
FACIL: 50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 P
AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
ST MARTIN, J.T. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.
MECREDY, R.C. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.
RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

JOHNSON, A.R.

SUBJECT: LER 95-007-00: on 950803, lost power from 34.5 kV offsite power circuit 751 due to offsite electrical storm, resulting in automatic start of EDG B. Offsite power restored, EDG B stopped & realigned & circuit 751 cleared. W/950901 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 11
TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES: License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2, 2.109(9/19/72). 05000244 T

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ROBERT C. MECREDY
Vice President
Nuclear Operations

September 1, 1995

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Attn: Allen R. Johnson
PWR Project Directorate I-1
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: LER 95-007, Loss of 34.5 KV Offsite Power Circuit 751, Due to Offsite
Electrical Storm, Results in Automatic Start of "B" Emergency Diesel Generator
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
Docket No. 50-244

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a) (2) (iv), which requires a report of, "Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)", the attached Licensee Event Report LER 95-007 is hereby submitted.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Very truly yours,


Robert C. Mecredy

xc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mr. Allen R. Johnson (Mail Stop 14B2)
PWR Project Directorate I-1
Washington, D.C. 20555

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406

U.S. NRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant

DOCKET NUMBER (2)
05000244PAGE (3)
1 OF 10

TITLE (4) Loss of 34.5 KV Offsite Power Circuit 751, Due to Offsite Electrical Storm, Results in Automatic Start of "B" Emergency Diesel Generator

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
08	03	95	95	--007--	00	09	01	95	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
OPERATING MODE (9)		N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)							
POWER LEVEL (10)		097	20.402(b)		20.405(c)		X		50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
			20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
			20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME John T. St. Martin - Technical Assistant

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
(716) 771-3641

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
C	EA	CBL5	X000	N						

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On August 3, 1995, at approximately 1526 EDST, with the reactor at approximately 97% steady state power, power from Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source) was lost. This resulted in deenergization of 4160 Volt bus 12B and "B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17. The "B" Emergency Diesel Generator (D/G) automatically started and reenergized buses 16 and 17 as per design. There was no change in reactor power or turbine load.

Immediate corrective action was to perform the appropriate actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1 (Loss of 12A And/Or 12B Busses) to stabilize the plant and to verify that the "B" Emergency D/G had started and reenergized buses 16 and 17.

The cause of the loss of power from Circuit 751 was determined to be electrical storm activity that affected circuits at offsite Station 204 and tripped the "C" phase instantaneous overcurrent protective relay for Circuit 751 (at Station 204), deenergizing the circuit.

This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code (C).

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

I. PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS

The plant was at approximately 97% steady state reactor power. The "B" Emergency Diesel Generator (D/G) had been removed from service earlier on August 3 to perform planned maintenance (and had been declared inoperable at 0422 EDST to perform this maintenance). By mid-afternoon on August 3, the maintenance had been completed, but the "B" Emergency D/G was still considered inoperable, pending completion of post-maintenance testing. Due to weather conditions (a thunderstorm was in progress in the vicinity of the plant), testing was being deferred until the thunderstorm passed. The Plant Manager recommended that the "B" Emergency D/G be aligned for auto standby (although still inoperable from an administrative viewpoint) to be an available source of power in the event of a loss of offsite power during the thunderstorm. Therefore, the "B" Emergency D/G was aligned for auto standby.

The offsite power configuration to the plant was in the alternate "50% / 50%" offsite power lineup. This configuration uses Circuit 767 (instead of Circuit 751) to supply power to the "A" train of safeguards equipment:

- o Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source) was supplying power to the "B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17 through 34.5 KV to 4160 Volt transformer 12A (12A transformer), via Circuit Breaker 52/12AX, to 4160 Volt bus 12B, and through the safeguards bus 4160 Volt to 480 Volt transformers.
- o Circuit 767 (34.5 KV offsite power source) was supplying power to the "A" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 14 and 18 through 34.5 KV to 4160 Volt transformer 12B (12B transformer), via Circuit Breaker 52/12BY, to 4160 Volt bus 12A, and through the safeguards bus 4160 Volt to 480 Volt transformers.

See the attached sketch of the offsite power distribution system.

II. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

A. DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES:

- o August 3, 1995, 1526 EDST: Event date and time.
- o August 3, 1995, 1526 EDST: Discovery date and time.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

- o August 3, 1995, 1526 EDST: Control Room operators verify the "B" Emergency Diesel Generator (D/G) operation and that safeguards buses 16 and 17 are energized.
- o August 3, 1995, 1628 EDST: Safeguards buses 16 and 17 were transferred to Circuit 767 from the "B" Emergency D/G.
- o August 3, 1995, 1635 EDST: The "B" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby.
- o August 3, 1995, 1644 EDST: Circuit 751 was declared operable.
- o August 7, 1995, 1228 EDST: Offsite power configuration was restored to the alternate "50% / 50%" lineup.

B. EVENT:

On August 3, 1995, at approximately 1526 EDST, with the reactor at approximately 97% steady state full power, the Control Room received numerous Main Control Board annunciator alarms. Among these alarms were L-20 (12A XFMR OR 12A BUS TROUBLE), J-5 (#11 OR #12 TRANSFORMER OUT OF SYNCH), J-7 (480V MAIN OR TIE BREAKER TRIP), J-9 (SAFEGUARD BREAKER TRIP), and J-32 (EMERGENCY DIESEL GEN 1B PANEL). The Control Room operators determined that the following events had occurred:

- o Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source) was deenergized
- o "B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17 had lost their power supply from 4160 Volt bus 12B (buses 16 and 17 had been momentarily deenergized)
- o The "B" Emergency D/G had automatically started and was tied to safeguards buses 16 and 17

The Control Room operators verified that reactor coolant system temperature and pressure were stable, and that there was no change in reactor power or turbine load. They performed the appropriate actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1 (Loss of 12A And/Or 12B Busses) to stabilize the plant. They verified that the "B" Emergency D/G was operating and that safeguards buses 16 and 17 were energized. The Control Room operators observed that Circuit 751 and bus 12B displayed zero (0) voltage.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

The loss of power from Circuit 751 resulted in undervoltage on safeguards buses 16 and 17, and the "B" Emergency D/G automatically started within ten (10) seconds as per design and reenergized these buses.

Energy Operations personnel also identified the loss of power from Circuit 751, and promptly notified Ginna Control Room operators of the loss of power from Circuit 751, which appeared to be caused by an offsite lightning strike that affected Circuit 751.

The Control Room operators referred to Equipment Restoration procedure ER-ELEC.1 (Restoration of Offsite Power) to restore offsite power to 4160 Volt bus 12B and 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17. The Control Room operators closed 4160 Volt circuit breaker 52/12BX to energize bus 12B from Circuit 767, via the 12B transformer, at approximately 1602 EDST. At approximately 1628 EDST, safeguards buses 16 and 17 were transferred to Circuit 767 from the "B" Emergency D/G. (Circuit 767 had remained in operation, supplying "A" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 14 and 18, throughout the event.)

At approximately 1635 EDST, August 3, 1995, the "B" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby, pending performance of the post-maintenance testing.

Energy Operations subsequently contacted the Control Room operators and confirmed that the loss of power from Circuit 751 was caused by electrical storm activity that affected circuits at offsite Station 204 and tripped the "C" phase instantaneous overcurrent protective relay for Circuit 751 (at Station 204), deenergizing the circuit. Relays had been reset at Station 204, and Circuit 751 was reenergized and declared operable at approximately 1644 EDST.

Circuit 751 was not immediately lined up to supply plant loads, but was maintained as the plant's backup supply of offsite power rather than realigning the electrical system during the thunderstorm conditions.

C. INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT:

None

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

D. OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:

The thunderstorm conditions also affected some telephone service. At approximately 1539 EDST, the Emergency Notification System (ENS) line for Ginna Station became inoperable. The Shift Technical Advisor notified the NRC Operations Center and the USNRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector of the loss of the ENS at approximately 1544 EDST. (The ENS was subsequently restored to operable status at approximately 1401 EDST on August 4.)

E. METHOD OF DISCOVERY:

This event was immediately apparent due to numerous Main Control Board alarms and other indications in the Control Room when power from Circuit 751 was lost.

F. OPERATOR ACTION:

Following the undervoltage condition on buses 16 and 17, the "B" Emergency D/G automatically started and reenergized these buses. The Control Room operators performed the appropriate actions to verify that the "B" Emergency D/G was operating and safeguards buses 16 and 17 were energized.

The Control Room operators manually restarted the "B" and "C" containment recirculation fans, which had tripped due to the loss of bus 16.

The momentary loss of power to buses 16 and 17 caused the trip of the common sample pump for monitoring of the containment (CNMT) atmosphere by channels R-10A (iodine), R-11 (particulate) and R-12 (noble gas). The Control Room operator manually restarted the common sample pump at approximately 1535 EDST.

The Control Room operators restored offsite power (from Circuit 767) to buses 16 and 17, stopped the "B" Emergency D/G, and realigned it for auto standby, prior to starting post-maintenance testing of the D/G.

Subsequently, the Shift Supervisor notified the NRC at approximately 1748 EDST per 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (2) (ii), non-emergency four hour notification.

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G. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:

All safeguards equipment functioned properly. The "B" Emergency D/G automatically started due to the undervoltage condition on buses 16 and 17, displayed proper voltage and frequency, and reenergized safeguards buses 16 and 17 to supply emergency power.

Running containment recirculation fans on bus 16 tripped as designed and were manually restarted as needed to restore normal cooling to the Containment. The running service water pump on bus 17 tripped as designed and the pump selected for autostart started when power was restored to bus 17.

III. CAUSE OF EVENT

A. IMMEDIATE CAUSE:

The automatic actuation of the "B" Emergency D/G was due to undervoltage on safeguards buses 16 and 17.

B. INTERMEDIATE CAUSE:

The undervoltage on safeguards buses 16 and 17 was due to the loss of power from Circuit 751.

C. ROOT CAUSE:

The underlying cause of the loss of power from Circuit 751 was electrical storm activity that affected circuits at offsite Station 204 and tripped the "C" phase instantaneous overcurrent protective relay for Circuit 751 (at Station 204), deenergizing Circuit 751.

This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code (C), "External Cause". This loss of power and subsequent start of an Emergency D/G does not meet the NUMARC 93-01, "Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants", definition of a "Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure".

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

IV. ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a) (2) (iv), which requires a report of, "Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)", in that the starting of the "B" Emergency D/G was an automatic actuation of an ESF system.

An assessment was performed considering both the safety consequences and implications of this event with the following results and conclusions:

There were no operational or safety consequences or implications attributed to the loss of Circuit 751 and start of the Emergency D/G because:

- o All reactor control and protection systems performed as designed.
- o Although the maintenance work for the "B" Emergency D/G had been completed, the "B" Emergency D/G remained administratively inoperable. It was available for operation and subsequently functioned as designed to reenergize "B" train safeguards buses 16 and 17.
- o While in this condition, the plant electrical power system (offsite power sources and the Emergency D/Gs) remained within the requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) of Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.2.2.b.1, which requires that the "A" Emergency D/G be demonstrated operable within one hour of the "B" Emergency D/G being inoperable and at least once per 24 hours thereafter. The "A" Emergency D/G had been demonstrated operable within one hour of 0422 EDST on August 3, so no further actions were required by TS for the short time that Circuit 751 was also inoperable on August 3.
- o Circuit 767 remained in operation supplying power to the "A" train safeguards buses; subsequently, Circuit 767 was lined up to supply power to the "B" train safeguards buses also, as permitted by TS.

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- Radiation monitor channels R-10A, R-11, and R-12 were temporarily lost. The common sample pump was manually restarted within a few minutes, which is within the required action time of TS 3.1.5.1.2 to obtain a grab sample at least once every 24 hours.

Based on the above, it can be concluded that the public's health and safety was assured at all times.

V. CORRECTIVE ACTION

A. ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS:

- Offsite power was restored to safeguards buses 16 and 17 from Circuit 767, and the "B" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby, prior to the start of post-maintenance testing of the "B" Emergency D/G.
- Circuit 751 was cleared for use by Energy Operations, protective relays for Circuit 751 (at Station 204) were reset by Energy Operations, and Circuit 751 was reenergized and restored to operable status.

B. ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

As stated in LER 95-006, options for offsite power configuration to the plant will be reevaluated to optimize reliability during adverse weather conditions. (Refer to LER 95-006, Revision 0, Docket No. 50-244.) The primary option currently being evaluated would use a "100% / 0%" offsite power configuration as the preferred configuration, with Circuit 767 normally supplying power to both the "A" and "B" train safeguards buses.

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VI. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

A. FAILED COMPONENTS:

None

B. PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS:

A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: LERs 91-002, 92-007, 94-012, and 95-006 were similar events with similar root causes (start of an Emergency D/G due to loss of offsite power from external causes).

C. SPECIAL COMMENTS:

None

