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50-305 Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant, Wisconsin Public Servic

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BERLINGER, C.

Generic Communications Branch

SUBJECT: Part 21 rept re potential util failure to comply w/component
containment isolation licensing commitment if proposed mods
to component cooling water sys instituted. Initially reported
on 840713. Util notified.

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Westinghouse
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Power Systems

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June 18, 1987

NS-NRC-87-3236

Mr. Carl Berlinger, Chief
Generic Communications Branch
Division of Operational Events Assessment
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Berlinger:

This is to confirm the telephone conversation on June 18 between Messrs. Johnson and McIntyre of Westinghouse and Mr. Carl Berlinger of the NRC. In that conversation, Westinghouse notified the NRC of a reportable item per 10CFR21 associated with a previously recommended modification to the component cooling water system of two operating plants: Point Beach 1 and 2. Had these recommended modifications been implemented by the utility, the above plants would have failed to comply with the containment isolation licensing commitment. This item may also affect five other plants: Turkey Point 3 and 4, H. B. Robinson, Ginna and Kewaunee. However, we lack sufficient information to complete an evaluation. Westinghouse has advised the owners of these plants of this issue.

The issue relates to an item that Westinghouse reported earlier concerning a potential overpressure condition in the component cooling water systems designed by Westinghouse. This earlier issue was reported under 10CFR21 as a Substantial Safety Hazard for 11 operating plants and 7 plants under construction in a July 13, 1984 letter to Mr. R. C. DeYoung, Division of Inspection and Enforcement, from Mr. E. P. Rahe, Jr., Westinghouse (NS-EPR-2938). Specifically, the overpressure condition could result from closure of the surge tank vent valve on a high radiation signal from the radiation detectors within the component cooling water system. This pressure increase (above the normal atmospheric pressure) in the surge tank results from a system inleakage and increases in system heat load. The pressure in the surge tank could increase to the set pressure of the surge tank relief valve. System overpressurization of up to 170% of the design pressure may occur downstream of the CCW pumps as a result of the pump developed head.

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Mr. Carl Berlinger

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June 18, 1987
NS-NRC-87-3236

Based on a generic review of typical plant designs, Westinghouse determined that the potential for overpressurization could be reduced or eliminated by minor modifications to the component cooling water system. Each Utility was notified by letter of the potential overpressure condition and recommendations were made for plant modifications. Specifically, it was recommended that:


1. The circuitry which automatically closes the CCWS surge tank vent valve on a high radiation or surge tank level signal be disabled and, in the long term, the air operated, fail closed vent valve be converted to a normally open, locked open, local valve; and
2. The surge tank relief valve be removed or the internals of the relief valve be removed.

These measures effectively achieve a low pressure drop overflow path from the surge tank which would be sufficient to ensure that the maximum pressure in the CCWS would not exceed 110 percent of the design pressure in the event of operation with a water solid surge tank coincident with the maximum anticipated inleakage through a ruptured tube in one of the system heat exchangers. Additional review of these recommended changes indicates that implementation could have lead to a violation of containment isolation requirements for Point Beach Units 1 and 2. The design for these units depends on the CCWS outside of containment being a closed system which serves as an extension of the containment boundary. The above changes, if implemented, would make the CCWS outside of containment an open system.

The individual utilities mentioned in this letter have been advised to evaluate their respective containment isolation systems with regard to this potential item.

If you have any questions, please contact myself (412-374-4868) or Mike Shannon (412-374-5590) of my staff.

Very truly yours,
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION


W. J. Johnson, Manager
Nuclear Safety Department

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