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GPO 917-926

Attachment to LER 80004/01T-0
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1
Docket No. 50-244

On May 6, 1980 during performance of post installation hydrostatic pressure testing of the reactor vessel remotely operated head vent system it was found that the DC switches which supply power to both trains of the low temperature overpressurization protection control of the pressurizer power operated relief valves were found in the OFF position, with no Reactor Coolant System vent open as required by Technical Specification 3.15 when the system temperature is less than 330°F. This was discovered when the Operations Supervisor, during a tour of containment, investigated the sound of venting from the nitrogen system for the power operated relief valves.

A review of previous activities showed that at 0115 hours that morning procedure S-29.2 "Charging the Reactor Vessel Overpressure Protection System Accumulators with N₂" was performed. The DC supply switches must be closed to allow the nitrogen to charge these accumulators. At 1115 hours a member of the Results and Test Group, in preparing for the hydrostatic pressure test of the newly installed head vent system, noted that these switches were open, but was not aware that the modification being tested had been added to the same source of power supplying the overpressure protection system. At 1400 hours a member of the Results and Test Group inserted fuses and closed the switches in order to perform the hydrostatic pressure test of the head vent system, and after completion reopened the switches and removed the fuses. This resulted in venting of two small nitrogen accumulators in the overpressure protection system, heard by the Operations Supervisor. After he notified the Control Room of the condition, the system was restored to operability, and at that time it became known that both the overpressure protection system and the head vent solenoid valves are powered by the same DC switches.

The low temperature overpressure protection system was provided to insure that temperature-pressure requirements in consideration of reactor vessel fracture toughness are not exceeded. In further recognition of these requirements the control switches for the safety injection pumps were in the PULL-STOP position and the reactor coolant-steam generator temperature differences were virtually zero so that potential causes of overpressure transients were minimized and no hazardous consequences resulted. The DC power switches would have been returned to the correct position upon completion of work on the head vent system.

The personnel on the night shift and day shift were questioned about who was given the key for the DC panel. The only persons who they remembered giving the key to were the two test individuals mentioned above. However, since the key is common to several electric panels, it is possible that other keys are available. The operators do not recall seeing other personnel in the DC panels.

The station hold records were checked. The switches were restored to service on May 2, 1980, with no other holds performed on this system since that date.

Procedure O-7 Alignment and Operation of the Reactor Vessel Over-pressure Protection System was modified to require verification that the DC power switches are closed prior to putting the system into service. The locks for the DC panels will be changed in order to limit the distribution of keys to prevent recurrence.

