

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 NYREG1 200-000000-000 341111 45  
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T  
01 REPORT SOURCE L 605000244 7032779 8071079 9  
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

## EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 During inservice inspection of piping supports for safety equipment a number of anchor  
03 bolts were identified as not being in accordance with drawings. (T.S. 6.9.2.a(9))  
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05  
06  
07  
08

09 SYSTEM CODE SF 11 CAUSE CODE B 12 CAUSE SUBCODE C 13 COMPONENT CODE SUPPORT 14 COMP. SUBCODE B 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20  
17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 79 21 22 012 24 26 01 28 29 X 30 31 1 32  
ACTION TAKEN B 18 X 19 FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21 HOURS 000 22 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23 NRPD-4 FORM SUB. N 24 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A 25 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER B 1 3 0 26  
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

## CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 Inadequate control of construction installation. The anchor bolts were corrected.  
11 Additional supports were examined and found to be able to perform intended function.  
12 Non-conformances and the evaluations for acceptability were documented for supports  
13 involved. Further corrective action will be controlled by response to IE Bulletin  
14 79-02.

15 FACILITY STATUS H 28 % POWER 000 29 OTHER STATUS NA 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY B 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Inservice inspection 32  
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80  
16 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE Z 33 Z 34 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE NA 36  
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80  
17 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 000 37 TYPE Z 38 DESCRIPTION NA 39  
7 8 9 11 12 13 44 45 80  
18 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 000 40 DESCRIPTION NA 41  
7 8 9 11 12 44 45 80  
19 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42 DESCRIPTION NA 43  
7 8 9 10 44 45 80  
20 PUBLICITY ISSUED N 44 DESCRIPTION NA 45  
7 8 9 10 44 45 80

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7907160404



Attachment to LER 79-012/01X-1  
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation  
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1  
Docket No. 50-244

During the annual refueling maintenance shutdown, inservice inspection was conducted on pipe supports. The anchor bolts for six pipe supports inside containment were observed not to be in accordance with drawings. Data on these supports was reported to the Engineering Department on March 26, 1979. The evaluation of the data on four of the supports (RH-21, RH-22, RH-32, RH-33) resulted in the conclusion that they required correction to assure the capability to perform their intended function. The evaluation of the other two supports (CH-9 and CH-10) showed that the existing installations are adequate to assure performance of their intended functions.

On March 27 the Engineering Department was requested to determine additional supports for inspection to assure that the discrepancies found on RH-21, 22, 32 and 33 were limited to them. Over 500 pipe support drawings were then reviewed. The results of this review showed that there were no other Seismic Category I supports of similar design. Consequently, six additional supports outside containment of various designs containing anchor bolts were selected at random for inspection. These supports were located on several safety related systems in various locations throughout the plant. The evaluation of the inspection results (NCR's G-79-38 through G-79-43) for these supports shows that all the existing installations are adequate to assure performance of their intended functions.

It was concluded that the anchor bolt discrepancies found on RH-21, 22, 32 and 33 were unique to those supports. It is believed that they were caused by the field conditions relative to the specific location of these supports. Correction of these supports was judged to be the most prudent and conservative approach based on the nature of the discrepancies and the intended function of the supports. The drawing discrepancies found on the remaining supports, both inside and outside containment, were judged to be of minimal consequence, and in all cases it was determined that the supports met their intended design function.

Further action in this area is planned in response to IE Bulletin 79-02, Pipe Support Base Plate Designs using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts.

